Judge: Serena R. Murillo, Case: 22STCV33027, Date: 2023-03-21 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV33027    Hearing Date: March 21, 2023    Dept: 29

TENTATIVE

 

Defendant Pibe’s Auto LLC’s motion to strike punitive damages against it is GRANTED with 30 days leave to amend.

Legal Standard

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, section 436, “the court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.”  The grounds for a motion to strike must “appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.)   

 

Any party may move to strike the whole or any part of a pleading within the time allotted to respond to the pleading.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1).)  The allegations of a complaint “must be liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice between the parties.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 452.)  The court “read[s] allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume[s] their truth.”  (Clauson v. Sup. Ct. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255 (Clauson).) 

 

Discussion

 

Meet and Confer 

 

The motion to strike is accompanied by the declaration of Erika Sandler, which satisfies the meet and confer requirement. (Code Civ. Proc. § 435.5.)  

 

              Merits

 

Defendant moves to strike portions of Plaintiff’s Complaint praying for punitive damages, arguing that plaintiff has failed to plead allegations which give rise to punitive damages.

 

“To support punitive damages, the complaint ... must allege ultimate facts of the defendant's oppression, fraud, or malice.”  (Cyrus v. Haveson (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 306, 316-317 (Cyrus).) “Malice” is conduct intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1).) “‘Punitive damages are proper only when the tortious conduct rises to levels of extreme indifference to the plaintiff’s rights, a level which decent citizens should not have to tolerate.’ [Citation.]” (Lackner v. North (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1210.) “As amended to include [despicable], the [Civil Code section 3294] plainly indicates that absent an intent to injure the plaintiff, ‘malice’ requires more than a ‘willful and conscious’ disregard of the plaintiffs’ interests. The additional component of ‘despicable conduct’ must be found.” (College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725.) The statute’s reference to despicable conduct represents a “new substantive limitation on punitive damage awards.” (Id.) Despicable conduct is “conduct which is so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people. Such conduct has been described as ‘having the character of outrage frequently associated with crime.’” (Tomaselli v. Transamerica Ins. Co. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1287.) 

 

A “conclusory characterization of defendant’s conduct as intentional, willful and fraudulent is a patently insufficient statement of ‘oppression, fraud, or malice, express or implied,’ ” and inadequate to support punitive damages.  (Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 872 (Brousseau).)  

 

Further, “[t]here must be evidence that defendant acted with knowledge of the probable dangerous consequences to plaintiff’s interests and deliberately failed to avoid these consequences.” (Flyer’s Body Shop Profit Sharing Plan v. Ticor Title Ins. Co. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1149, 1155; see also Angie M. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1228 [“Conscious disregard for the safety of another may be sufficient where the defendant is aware of the probably dangerous consequences of his or her conduct and he or she willfully fails to avoid such consequences”].)  

 

An employer shall not be liable for punitive damages based on the acts of an employee, unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which damages are awarded, or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (b).)  

Here, the FAC alleges that the Honda Accord Decedent was a passenger in at the time of the collision was taken to Defendant Pibe’s Auto LLC for a wheel alignment and two new tires. It additionally alleges that the Honda left the travel lane of the 210 Freeway in part due to the faulty maintenance conducted on it. The FAC alleges that Defendant Pibe’s was negligent because it failed to properly conduct the work described herein on the Honda; failed to hire and retain a properly trained mechanic; failed to train its mechanics; failed to properly inspect its equipment; and failed to properly inspect its work.

Plaintiffs fail to allege facts evidencing malice, oppression, or fraud with the requisite specificity required to state a prima facie claim for punitive damages.  Plaintiff only alleges that Defendant failed to properly hire and train a mechanic, and properly inspect its equipment and work.  These are conclusory statements, and further, only form the basis of a negligence claim and do not evidence the conscious disregard or despicable conduct necessary to plead a cause of action for punitive damages.   

 

Conclusion 

 

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to strike punitive damages against it is GRANTED with 30 days leave to amend.
Moving party to give notice.