Judge: Serena R. Murillo, Case: 23STCV05995, Date: 2023-11-06 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV05995 Hearing Date: November 6, 2023 Dept: 31
Tentative Ruling
Judge Kerry Bensinger, Department 31
HEARING DATE: November
6, 2023 TRIAL
DATE: September 3, 2024
CASE: Charles Wilder v. General Motors, LLC
CASE NO.: 23STCV05995
DEMURRER
WITH MOTION TO STRIKE
MOVING PARTY: Defendant
General Motors, LLC
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Charles
Wilder
I. FACTUAL AND
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This is a Song-Beverly action relating to a 2019 Chevrolet
Silverado (the “Vehicle”). On March 17,
2023, Plaintiff, Charles Wilder, filed a Complaint against Defendant, General
Motors, LLC, after Defendant failed to repair the transmission of the Vehicle,
among other parts, pursuant to a Chevrolet Limited Warranty for the Vehicle. On April 24, 2023, Plaintiff filed the First
Amended Complaint (“FAC”). In the FAC, Plaintiff
asserts causes of action for (1) Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability
under The Song-Beverly Act, (2) Breach of Express Warranty under The
Song-Beverly Act, (3) Breach of Express Warranty under California Commercial
Code § 2-313, (4) Violation of The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, and (5)
Violation of Civil Code § 1750 et seq., The Consumers Legal Remedies Act
(“CLRA”). Plaintiff prays for punitive
damages.
Defendant
now demurs to the Fifth Cause of Action for Violation of the CLRA and seeks an
order striking punitive damages from the FAC.
Plaintiff
filed an Opposition to the Demurrer only.[1] The Motion to Strike is unopposed.
Defendant
filed a Reply.
II. LEGAL STANDARD FOR DEMURRER
A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the pleadings and
will be sustained only where the pleading is defective on its face. (City
of Atascadero v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (1998) 68
Cal.App.4th 445, 459.) “We treat the demurrer as admitting all material
facts properly pleaded but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact
or law. We accept the factual allegations of the complaint as true and also consider
matters which may be judicially noticed. [Citation.]” (Mitchell
v. California Department of Public Health (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1000, 1007; Del
E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 604
[“the facts alleged in the pleading are deemed to be true, however improbable
they may be”].) Allegations are to be liberally construed. (Code
Civ. Proc., § 452.) In construing the allegations, the court is to give
effect to specific factual allegations that may modify or limit inconsistent
general or conclusory allegations. (Financial Corporation of America
v. Wilburn (1987) 189 Cal.App.3rd 764, 769.)
A demurrer may be brought if insufficient facts are stated
to support the cause of action asserted. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10,
subd. (e).) “A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where
a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified
under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly’s of California,
Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)
Where the complaint contains substantial factual
allegations sufficiently apprising defendant of the issues it is being asked to
meet, a demurrer for uncertainty will be overruled or plaintiff will be given
leave to amend. (Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185
Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2.) Leave to amend must be allowed where there
is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v.
Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the complainant
to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Ibid.)
III. DISCUSSION
A. Meet and Confer
Defense counsel has complied with the meet and confer
requirement. (See Declaration of Cameron Major, ¶ 2.)
B. Demurrer
Defendant demurs to the Fifth Cause of Action for Violation
of the CLRA for two reasons: (1) Plaintiff did not provide proper notice as
required by Civil Code section 1782, and (2) the FAC did not set forth facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action for violation of the CLRA.[2]
1. The
FAC alleges proper notice under Civil Code section 1782.
Pursuant to section 1782, subdivision (a), of
the CLRA, at least 30 days prior to the commencement of an action for damages,
the consumer shall “(1) Notify the person alleged to have employed or committed
methods, acts, or practices declared unlawful by Section 1770 of the particular
alleged violations of Sections 1770” and “(2) Demand that the person correct,
repair, replace, or otherwise rectify the goods or services alleged to be in
violation of Section 1770.” (Civ. Code,
§ 1782, subd. (a)(1)-(2).)
Defendant argues the Fifth Cause of Action fails
because neither a letter nor notice was sent to Defendant prior to the filing
of Plaintiff’s initial Complaint. Nor
was the letter or notice attached to the Complaint. Defendant’s argument lacks merit. “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone ... and
will be sustained only where the pleading is defective on its face.” (City
of Atascadero, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 459.) Defendant improperly raises extrinsic matters
to challenge the legal sufficiency of the Fifth Cause of Action.
The FAC alleges that “Plaintiff provided the
proper statutory notice required by The CLRA. Despite the passage of this 30 day statutory
notice, Defendants have failed to provide an appropriate remedy.” (FAC, ¶ 64.)
The Fifth cause of Action is not subject to demurrer on these grounds.
2.
The FAC alleges facts sufficient to state a claim for a CLRA violation.
The CLRA is set forth in Civil Code section 1750
et seq. “The CLRA makes unlawful, ...
‘[27 distinct] unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices undertaken by any person in a transaction intended to result or which
results in the sale or lease of goods or services to any consumer.’ ” (Meyer v. Sprint Spectrum L.P. (2009)
45 Cal.4th 634, 639.) To establish a
claim for violation of the CLRA, a plaintiff must prove (1) that the plaintiff
acquired, or sought to acquire, by purchase or lease, the product or service
for personal, family, or household purposes; (2) that the defendant engaged in
a prohibited practice under section 1770; (3) that the plaintiff was harmed;
and (4) that the plaintiff’s harm resulted from defendant’s conduct. (CACI No. 4700.) The plaintiff’s harm resulted from
defendant’s conduct if the plaintiff relied on the defendant’s
representation. (CACI No. 4700; Nelson
v. Pearson Ford Co. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 983, 1022, disapproved of on
other grounds in Raceway Ford Cases (2016) 2 Cal.5th 161, 180.) To prove reliance, plaintiff need only prove
that the representation was a substantial factor in the plaintiff’s decision to
buy or lease the goods. If the
defendant’s representation of fact was material, reliance may be inferred. A fact is material if a reasonable consumer
would consider it important in deciding whether to buy or lease the goods or
services. (CACI No. 4700; (Collins v.
eMachines, Inc. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 249, 256.)
Defendant argues the Fifth Cause of Action is
premised on misrepresentations which require Plaintiff to plead with specificity
similar to that for a cause of action alleging fraud.[3] This argument fails. The Court of Appeal addressed this very issue
in Gutierrez v. Carmax Auto Superstores California (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th
1234. After reviewing the pertinent case
law, the court in Gutierrez concluded that “causes of action under the
CLRA ... must be stated with reasonable particularity, which is a more lenient
pleading standard than is applied to common law fraud claims.” (Gutierrez, 19 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1261.)
Here, the CLRA claim is stated with reasonable
particularity. The FAC alleges that Plaintiff
“purchased a 2019 Chevrolet Silverado ... for personal, family, and/or
household purposes” (FAC, ¶ 5); that “Defendant’s actions violated the CLRA by
mispresenting the subject vehicle as being free from defects” and “by
representing that any defect that did occur during the warranty would be
repaired” (FAC, ¶ 62); that Defendants “failed to conform the Vehicle to the
applicable warranties because said defects ... continue to exist even after a
reasonable number of attempts to repair was given” (FAC, ¶ 13); that Plaintiff
has been damaged in the form of general, special and actual damages in an
amount within the jurisdiction of this Court” (FAC, ¶ 52). The FAC also identifies three[4] of the twenty-seven unfair
methods. (See FAC, ¶ 61.) Each of the four elements of a CLRA claim are
pled. Further, two reasonable inferences
may be drawn from these allegations: (1) representing that the vehicle was free
from defects and that any defect occurring during the warranty period are
material to Plaintiff’s decision to purchase the vehicle, and (2) Plaintiff
relied on these representations. The FAC
is sufficiently pled.
C. Motion
to Strike
Plaintiff does not oppose the motion to strike. The motion is therefore Granted.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Demurrer is OVERRULED.
The Motion to Strike is GRANTED. Plaintiff is ordered to file within 10 days a
Second Amended Complaint striking reference to and the prayer for punitive damages.
Defendant General Motors, LLC is ordered to file and serve
its Answer within ten days of service to the Second Amended Complaint.
Moving party to give notice.
Dated: November 6,
2023 ___________________________________
Kerry
Bensinger
Judge
of the Superior Court
[1] In the Opposition, Plaintiff
requests, in the alternative, a stay of all proceedings, including the hearing
for this Demurrer, pending the California Supreme Court’s decision in Rodriguez
v. FCA US, LLC (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 209, review granted, 512 P.3d
654. However, Defendant demurs to the
Fifth Cause of Action for violation of the CLRA. Rodriguez does not concern CLRA
claims. As such, Rodriguez is
inapplicable to the disposition of the Demurrer. The request is DENIED.
[2] In the notice of motion, Defendant
states as a third basis for the Demurrer that the Fifth Cause of Action is
uncertain, ambiguous, and unintelligible.
However, Defendant does not provide argument or otherwise demonstrate how the Fifth Cause of Action
is subject to demurrer on these grounds.
As such, the Court does not address this argument further.
[3] In support of this argument,
Defendant cites cases that are inapposite.
(See Demurrer, p. 10:9-12.) None
of the cases concern or otherwise discuss a CLRA claim.
[4] (5) Representing the goods or
services have sponsorship, approval, characteristics, ingredients, uses,
benefits, or quantities that they do not have, or that a person has a
sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation, or connection that the person does
not have.
(7)
Representing that goods or services are of a particular standard, quality, or
grade, or that goods are of a particular style or model, if they are another.
(14)
Representing that a transaction confers or involves rights, remedies, or
obligations that it does not have or involve or that are prohibited by law. (Civ. Code, § 1770, subd. (a)(5), (7), and
(14).)