Judge: Serena R. Murillo, Case: 23STCV10178, Date: 2023-08-08 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV10178 Hearing Date: August 8, 2023 Dept: 31
TENTATIVE
Defendant’s motion is strike is GRANTED
with 20 days leave to amend.
Legal Standard
Any party, within the time allowed to
respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole
or any part thereof. (CCP § 435(b)(1).) (CRC 3.1322(b).) The court may, upon a
motion or at any time in its discretion and upon terms it deems proper: (1)
strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading;
or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in
conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court.
(CCP §436(a)-(b).) (See also Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767,
782 (“Matter in a pleading which is not essential to the claim is surplusage;
probative facts are surplusage and may be stricken out or disregarded.
[Citations]”).)
Meet and Confer
The demurrer is
not accompanied by the declaration of Noah
Green, which satisfies
the meet and confer requirements. (CCP section 435.5(a).)
Discussion
To state a claim for punitive damages under Civil
Code section 3294, a plaintiff must allege specific facts showing that the
defendant has been guilty of malice, oppression or fraud. (Smith v. Superior
Court (1992) 10 Cal. App. 4th 1033, 1042.) The basis for punitive damages
must be pled with specificity; conclusory allegations devoid of any factual
assertions are insufficient. (Id.) A motion to strike may lie where the facts
alleged, if proven, would not support a finding that the defendant acted with
malice, fraud or oppression. (Turman v. Turning Point of Central California
(2010) 191 Cal. App. 4th 53, 63.)
“Malice” is defined in section 3294(c)(1) as
“conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury” or “despicable
conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious
disregard of the rights or safety of others.” “Oppression” is defined in
section 3294(c)(2) as “despicable conduct subjecting a person to cruel and
unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” The term
“despicable” has been defined in the case law as actions that are “base,”
“vile,” or “contemptible.” (See, e.g., Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative
Products Sales & Marketing, Inc. (2000) 78 Cal. App. 4th 847,
891.) “In order to survive a motion to strike an
allegation of punitive damages, the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to
such relief must be pled by a plaintiff.” (Clauson v. Superior Court
(1998) 67 Cal. App. 4th 1253, 1255.) In passing on the correctness of a ruling
on a motion to strike, judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a
motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their
truth. [Citations.] In ruling on a motion to strike, courts do not read
allegations in isolation. [Citation.]” (Id.)
“[A] corporate defendant cannot be punished for harassment
merely because one of its employees has harassed another employee in the
workplace; rather, the focus of the punitive damages inquiry must be on the
corporation's institutional responsibility, if any, for that harassment.” (Roby
v. McKesson Corp. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 686, 714.) “An employer
shall not be liable for punitive damages based upon acts of an employee of the
employer, unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the
employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or
safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the
damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or
malice. With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and
conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud,
or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the
corporation.” (Civil Code § 3294(b).) The California Supreme Court interpreted the
“latter statement as requiring the officer, director, or managing agent to be
someone who ‘exercise[s] substantial discretionary authority over
decisions that ultimately determine corporate policy.’” (White v. Ultramar,
Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 563, 577.)
Punitive damages
are available in actions based on FEHA or violations of public policy. (Commodore
Home Systems v. Sup. Ct. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 211, 220; Cloud v. Casey¿(1999)
76 Cal.App.4th 895, 911-912.) California law long has recognized that
discharges in violation of public policy may be actionable torts for which punitive
damages can be recovered under Civil Code section 3294. (E.g., Tameny v.
Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal. 3d 167, 176-177 [discharge for
refusal to commit antitrust violation; availability of punitive damages no bar
to recognition of action]; see also Montalvo v. Zamora (1970) 7 Cal.
App. 3d 69, 77 [discharge for exercise of right to self-organization]; Kouff
v. Bethlehem-Alameda Shipyard (1949) 90 Cal. App. 2d 322, 325 [discharge
for acting as poll watcher; punitive damages available].)
However, wrongful termination, without more,
will not sustain a finding of malice or oppression. (Scott v. Phoenix
Schools, Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 702, 717.)
In Cloud v. Casey, supra,
76 Cal.App.4th 895, a female employee was passed over for promotion because of
her gender. The court held the employer was liable for punitive damages because
it denied the plaintiff a promotion based on gender, then attempted to hide the
illegal reason for denying the promotion with a false explanation, which
constituted despicable conduct. (Id. at p. 912, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 757.)
Here, Plaintiff
alleges she was discharged due to discrimination based on a disability, among
other things. Further, she alleges that Defendant engaged in one or more
investigations of Plaintiff’s. However, the investigations constituted a
purposeful avoidance of truth, inaction, and failure to investigate which was a
product of a deliberate decision not to acquire knowledge of facts that would
confirm Plaintiff’s allegations. (Complaint, ¶ 18.) As
alleged, this is despicable conduct which is
carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of
Plaintiff’s rights. As
such, the complaint sufficiently states a claim for punitive damages.
As to whether
punitive damages are properly pled as to Defendant, a corporation, the
complaint states insufficient facts to plead a claim for punitive damages. “[T]he imposition of punitive damages upon a corporation is
based upon its own fault. It is not imposed vicariously by virtue of the
fault of others.” (City Products Corp. v. Globe Indemnity Co.
(1979) 88 Cal. App. 3d 31, 36.) Although it appears the complaint
alleges Defendant was personally
guilty of malice, “[c]orporations are legal entities which do not have minds
capable of recklessness, wickedness, or intent to injure or deceive. An award
of punitive damages against a corporation therefore must rest on the malice of
the corporation’s employees. But the law does not impute every employee’s
malice to the corporation. Instead, the punitive damages statute requires proof
of malice among corporate leaders: the officers, directors, or managing
agents.” (Cruz v. Home Base (2000) 83 Cal. App. 4th 160, 167,
internal quotations and citation omitted.) There are no facts alleged as to any acts
of Defendant’s employees, only Defendant itself, which is a corporation, and does not have a mind capable of recklessness, wickedness,
or intent to injure or deceive. In addition, there are no facts pled to
show malice among corporate leaders: the officers,
directors, or managing agents. Lastly, while Plaintiff alleges Defendant
ratified the conduct, this allegation is not specific and merely conclusory.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing,
the motion is strike is GRANTED with 20 days leave to amend.
Moving party is
ordered to give notice.