Judge: Serena R. Murillo, Case: BC695262, Date: 2022-09-28 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: BC695262 Hearing Date: September 28, 2022 Dept: 29
Motion
for Summary Adjudication filed by Defendant Louis Stratis Skenderis
TENTATIVE
Defendant Louis Stratis Skenderis’
motion for summary adjudication is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The
motion is denied as to Plaintiff’s claim for non-economic damages but granted
as to Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages.
Legal Standard
CCP § 437c(f)(1)
states: “A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more
causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or
more claim for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if the party contends
that the cause of action has no merit, that there is no affirmative defense to
the cause of action, that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as
specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants
either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs. A
motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes
of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue
of duty.”
CCP § 437c(t) states: “Notwithstanding subdivision
(f), a party may move for summary adjudication of a legal issue or a claim for
damages other than punitive damages that does not completely dispose of a cause
of action, affirmative defense, or issue of duty pursuant to this subdivision.”
However, “before filing a motion pursuant to this subdivision, the parties
whose claims or defenses are put at issue by the motion shall submit to the
court both of the following:
(i) A
joint stipulation stating the issue or issues to be adjudicated.
(ii) A
declaration from each stipulating party that the motion will further the
interest of judicial economy by decreasing trial time or significantly
increasing the likelihood of settlement.”
(CCP § 437c(t)(1)(A)(i)(ii).)
The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to
allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary
support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal
without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25
Cal.4th 826, 843.) In analyzing motions for summary judgment, courts must apply
a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2)
determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent's claims; and (3)
determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable,
material factual issue.” (Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135
Cal.App.4th 289, 294.) Thus, summary judgment is granted when, after the
Court’s consideration of the evidence set forth in the papers and all
reasonable inferences accordingly, no triable issues of fact exist, and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (CCP § 437c(c); Villa
v. McFarren (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 733, 741.)
Discussion
A.
Civil
Code Section 3333.4
Defendant requests that the court enter summary adjudication
in his favor as to plaintiff’s claim for non-economic damages because plaintiff
cannot establish his financial responsibility as required by Civil Code § 3333.4.
Under Civil Code § 3333.4, “(a) in any action to recover
damages arising out of the operation or use of a motor vehicle, a person shall
not recover non-economic losses to compensate for pain, suffering,
inconvenience, physical impairment, disfigurement, and other nonpecuniary
damages if any of the following applies: . . . (3) The injured person was
the operator of a vehicle involved in the accident and the operator cannot
establish his or her financial responsibility as required by the financial
responsibility laws of this state.” (See also Yoshioka v. Superior
Court (1997) 58 Cal. App. 4th 972, 978.)
Defendant argues Plaintiff was driving
without valid automobile insurance at the time of the accident. Defendant
served discovery relating to Plaintiff’s claims. In response to form interrogatory
no. 4.1, which asks Plaintiff whether he was insured in any manner relating to
the accident, Plaintiff admitted “No.” (SS 4.) Further, in deposition, he also
confirmed he did not have auto insurance at the time of the accident. (SS 4.)
Finally, there is further confirmation in the form of a coverage denial from a
former insurance carrier confirming that his policy cancelled prior to the date
of the accident. (SS 4.)
However, the Court
cannot grant summary adjudication as to an item of compensatory
damages that does not completely dispose of a cause of action as Defendant
has not complied with CCP §437c(t)
to bring a motion for summary adjudication as to a claim for damages other than
punitive damages.
The motion for summary adjudication on this claim is therefore
DENIED.
B.
Punitive
Damages
Defendant
also moves for summary adjudication of the punitive damages claim, arguing it
has no merit because Plaintiff cannot meet his burden of
proof to
establish oppression,
fraud, or malice against
Defendant.
Civil Code § 3294 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(a)¿In an
action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is
proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression,
fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover
damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.
***
(c)¿As used in this section, the following definitions shall apply:
(1)¿“Malice”
means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the
plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a
willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.
(2)¿“Oppression”
means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in
conscious disregard of that person’s rights.
(3)¿“Fraud”
means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material
fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of
thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing
injury.
While “the ‘clear
and convincing’ evidentiary standard is a stringent one, it does not impose on
a plaintiff the obligation to ‘prove’ a case for punitive damages at summary
judgment.” (Spinks v. Equity Residential Briarwood Apartments (2009) 171
Cal.App.4th 1004, 1053.) However, where the plaintiff's ultimate burden of
proof will be by clear and convincing evidence, the higher standard of proof
must be taken into account in ruling on a motion for summary judgment or
summary adjudication, since if a plaintiff is to prevail on a claim for
punitive damages, it will be necessary that the evidence presented meet the
higher evidentiary standard. (Basich v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2001) 87
Cal.App.4th 1112, 1118–1120, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 153.) Further, summary
judgment “on the issue of punitive damages is proper” only “when no reasonable
jury could find the plaintiff’s evidence to be clear and convincing proof of malice,
fraud or oppression.” (Id.)
In Taylor v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1979) 24
Cal.3d 890, 892, the California Supreme Court considered whether “punitive
damages…are recoverable in a personal injury action brought against an
intoxicated driver.” The Court concluded that “the act of operating a motor
vehicle while intoxicated may constitute an act of ‘malice’ under [Civil Code]
section 3294 if performed under circumstances which disclose a conscious
disregard of the probable dangerous consequences.” (Id.) The Court held
that “one who voluntarily commences, and thereafter continues, to consume
alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication, knowing from the outset that
he must thereafter operate a motor vehicle demonstrates…‘such a conscious and
deliberate disregard of the interests of others that his conduct may be called
willful or wanton.’ [Citation]” (Id. at 899.)
In Dawes v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 82, 88, the
California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, recognized
that the term “malice” under Civil Code §3294 has, since 1974 at the latest,
“been interpreted as including a conscious disregard of the probability that
the actor’s conduct will result in injury to others. [Citations]” The Court of
Appeal determined Taylor did not change the law in this regard. (Id.)
The Court of Appeal stated “petitioners are correct that under the law as it
existed prior to the Taylor decision, the allegations set forth in the
fifth count of their first amended complaint relating to Mardian’s conduct were
sufficient to support an award of punitive damages.” (Id.) The Court of
Appeal stated:
Petitioners
alleged a good deal more than Mardian's decision to drive and his driving in an
intoxicated condition. They alleged that "with knowledge that probable
serious injury would result to persons in the area," Mardian ran a stop
sign, and was zigzagging in and out of traffic at a speed in excess of 65 miles
per hour in a 35-mile-per-hour zone at the entrance to a popular recreation
area on a Sunday afternoon when many pedestrians and bicyclists were in the
immediate vicinity. They also alleged that immediately after the accident
Mardian and his passenger falsely reported to the police that the passenger was
driving rather than Mardian. If these allegations were proved at trial, the
factfinder could reasonably find that Mardian acted with "malice" --
with a conscious disregard of safety and the probable injury of others as a
result of his conduct.
(Id. at 88-89.) The Court of Appeal concluded that, with
respect to Mardian, “the court could only exercise its discretion in one way in
ruling on the motion to strike – by denying the motion.” (Id. at
91.)
Defendant argues that with respect to punitive damages,
the Complaint only includes allegations that Defendant was driving under the
influence of alcohol at the time of the accident, and he is entitled to
punitive damages as a result. However, in response to form interrogatory no.
2.13, which asks whether anyone involved in the accident used any alcohol,
drugs, or medication within 24 hours of the accident, Plaintiff admitted “No.”
(SS 5.) Further, in deposition, Plaintiff admitted that he did not have any
reason to believe that anyone involved in the accident was under the influence
of alcohol or drugs at the time of the accident. (SS 5.) Finally, Defendant has
never been convicted of any alcohol-related offenses arising out of the
accident, nor are there any pending. (SS 6.)
The Court finds that Defendant has met his burden to
show that no triable issues of fact exist as to Plaintiff’s claim for punitive
damages as Plaintiff has admitted he has no evidence that Defendant was under
the influence at the time of the accident and no other allegations have been set
forth in the complaint to support the claim for punitive damages.
As Plaintiff has not filed an opposition, he has not
met his own burden to show triable issues of fact exist as to his claim for
punitive damages. As a result, the motion for summary adjudication is GRANTED
as to the claim for punitive damages.
Conclusion
Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication is
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The motion is denied as to Plaintiff’s
claim for non-economic damages, but granted as to Plaintiff’s claim for
punitive damages.