Judge: Serena R. Murillo, Case: BC717451, Date: 2022-11-01 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: BC717451    Hearing Date: November 1, 2022    Dept: 29

Ronald Russell v. The City of Los Angeles, et al.  

Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority

TENTATIVE

Defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

Legal Standard 

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) CCP Section 437c(c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)  “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.”  (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-382.)

As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (CCP § 437c(p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520. ) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.”  (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.  To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)

Evidentiary Objections

Plaintiff’s Objections to Defendant’s evidence:

·       The following objections are SUSTAINED: n/a

·       The following objections are OVERRULED: 1-8

Discussion

Defendant moves for summary judgment on the basis that Plaintiff signed an effective release and waiver of liability as to all claims and injuries, including the subject accident.

To state a negligence cause of action, a plaintiff must plead: (1) a legal duty owed to the plaintiff to use due care; (2) breach of duty; (3) causation; and (4) damage to the plaintiff. (County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 292, 318.) Generally, each person has a duty to use ordinary care and is liable for injuries caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care in the circumstances. (Romero v. Superior Court (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1080.) 

“A release may negate the duty element of a negligence action.” (Benedek v. PLC Santa Monica (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1356.) “To be effective, such a release ‘must be clear, unambiguous, and explicit in expressing the intent of the subscribing parties.’ [Citation.] The release need not achieve perfection.” (Ibid.) “In the absence of extrinsic evidence, the scope of a release is determined by the express language of the release.” (Id. at p. 1357.) “The express terms of the release must be applicable to the particular negligence of the defendant, but every possible specific act of negligence of the defendant need not be spelled out in the agreement.” (Ibid.)  “If a release of all liability is given, the release applies to any negligence of the defendant. . . . The issue is not whether the particular risk of injury is inherent in the recreational activity to which the release applies, but rather the scope of the release.” (Id.)  

For an express release of liability to be enforceable against a plaintiff (1) the release agreement “must be clear, unambiguous and explicit in expressing the intent of the parties (citation omitted);” (2) the injury-producing act “must be reasonably related to the object or purpose for which the release is given (citation omitted); and (3) the release cannot contravene public policy.”  (Sweat v. Big Time Auto Racing, Inc. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1304-5.)  Exculpatory agreements releasing a party from liability for a violation of a statute are void as against public policy.  (Capri v. L.A. Fitness International, LLC (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1078, 1085; Cal. Civ. Code § 1668.)  “A release of liability for future gross negligence . . . generally is unenforceable as a matter of public policy.”  (Grebing v. 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 631, 637, citation omitted.)

This action arises from a December 7, 2017 sideswipe collision between a Honda Civic driven by defendant Cham and a LACMTA Ford Econoline Van driven by defendant Rivera. (Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Fact (“UMF”) No 1.) The van was in use as part of LACMTA’s Community Service program, "Metro Clean." (UMF No. 3.) The Metro Clean program allows persons convicted of certain types of crime to complete community service including cleaning up LACMTA bus stops, in lieu of fines and or incarceration. (Adams Decl., ¶ 4.) Plaintiff was a participant in the Metro Clean program, one of eight passengers in the Van. (UMF 3, 14.) The accident occurred as the Metro Clean participants were being driven from one clean up location to the next clean up location. (UMF No. 8.)

Defendant presents evidence that as a condition of participation in the Metro Clean program, Plaintiff was required to sign a Release and Waiver of Liability/Indemnity Agreement. (UMF No. 4, 5; Adams Decl., Exh. G.) Plaintiff signed the Release and Waiver of Liability Indemnity Agreement on September 2, 2017. (Id.) A copy of Plaintiff’s California Driver License is copied to the Court Referral Program Time Sheet which has his signature matching the signature on the Indemnity Agreement. (Id., Exh. G.) Participants of Metro Clean are not allowed to participate and complete the program unless they sign the release and waiver agreement. As a requirement of participating in the program, the release is explained to the participant and the words of the release are read to the participant. (Adams Decl., ¶¶ 4, 8.)

The release of liability and waiver releases Defendant from liability for: "personal injury ... arising out of or in connection with my participation ... from whatever cause, including the active or passive negligence of the MTA…employees." (Adams Decl., Exh. G.)

The Court finds that Defendant has met its burden to show that there are no triable issues of fact as to whether the release Plaintiff signed, which was required as part of his participation in Metro Clean, bars Plaintiff’s claim. The term “in connection with” is broad enough to encompass the injury Plaintiff sustained when he was being driven to the cleaning site. Moreover, the Release is not limited to specific activities. (See e.g., Leon v. Family Fitness Center (No. 107), Inc. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1227, 1235 [release for injuries from “sport or physical exercise” does not waive liability when member sustained injuries when sauna bench he was reclining on collapsed because that injury was not related to sports or exercise].) Therefore, the Release governs Plaintiff’s cause of action against Defendant. 

To meet his burden on summary judgment, Plaintiff makes two arguments, both of which fail to meet Plaintiff’s burden to show there are triable issues of fact as to whether the release bars his claims.

First, Plaintiff argues that the language in the release does not encompass the kind of injury that occurred because he was being driven to the work site when the accident occurred and a car accident while being driven to a work site is not the type of event one would imagine they were releasing when signing a waiver to participate in a program to clean public transportation places. However, as explained above, this argument fails because the term “in connection with” Plaintiff’s participation in the program is broad enough to encompass the vehicle collision here. “The express terms of the release must be applicable to the particular negligence of the defendant, but every possible specific act of negligence of the defendant need not be spelled out in the agreement.” (Benedek, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at 1356.)  

Second, Plaintiff argues he is illiterate and could not read the release he signed, that no one read the contents of the waiver, and he was forced to sign the waiver in order to perform the work. (Russell Decl., ¶¶ 3, 4.) Plaintiff’s inability to read the agreement, even if assumed to be true, would not constitute grounds to disregard the agreement.  “It is well established, in the absence of fraud, overreaching or excusable neglect, that one who signs an instrument may not avoid the impact of its terms on the ground that he failed to read the instrument before signing it.”  (Randas v. YMC of Metro. Los Angeles (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 158, 163.)  Plaintiff then argues that there is a showing of misconduct on the part of Defendant because the program regularly requires participants who are illiterate to sign a series of documents in order to participate in the program. However, Plaintiff contends, there is no document or space on any of the documents to identify who, if anyone, in Defendant’s office actually read the document to Plaintiff. There is no declaration from any employee of defendant attesting that person read the document to Plaintiff. Plaintiff argues the declaration of John Adams (the supervisor of the Metro Clean program) made it clear that participants were made to sign documents to participate and there is a reasonable inference from his declaration that it was not uncommon to have illiterate persons participating in the program. However, Plaintiff argues, there is no showing of accommodations for illiterate people. The Court finds this argument unavailing as no inference can be drawn from Adams’ declaration that it was not uncommon to have illiterate persons participating in the program. In fact, the evidence provided clearly states the oppose: “As part of the intake and orientation process, I or another supervisor would have explained and read the []agreement to [Plaintiff].” (Adams Decl., ¶ 8.)

Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not met his burden of raising a triable issue of fact regarding whether he signed the release, whether his inability to read the release would constitute a ground to disregard the agreement, or whether Defendant overreached.  As such, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted.

The Cham Defendants argue in their opposition that in his verified responses to LACMTA’s requests for admission, set one, no. 1, Plaintiff denies that the release bears his signature. (DMF No. 16.) However, Plaintiff has admitted he signed the release. (Russell Decl., ¶¶ 3, 4.) Thus, this argument fails.

The Cham Defendants also argue that the release is unenforceable in cases of gross negligence. A waiver cannot release a defendant for actions that are grossly negligent.  (City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 747, 777.)  The court in Grebing v. 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 631, 638 acknowledged the emphasis placed by the City of Santa Barbara court on “the importance of maintaining a distinction between ordinary and gross negligence, and of granting summary judgment on the basis of that distinction in appropriate circumstances.”  (City of Santa Barbara, supra, at 767.)  Ordinary negligence is an unintentional tort that “consists of a failure to exercise the degree of care in a given situation that a reasonable person under similar circumstances would employ to protect others from harm.”  (City of Santa Barbara, supra, at 753-54.)  By contrast, gross negligence is defined as “want of even scant care” or “an extreme departure from the ordinary standard of conduct.”  (Id. at 754 (citation omitted).)  “Generally it is a triable issue of fact whether there has been such a lack of care as to constitute gross negligence [citation] but not always.”  (Chavez v. 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 632, 640.)  

The Cham Defendants present evidence that Plaintiff testified that the driver of the LACMTA van, Rivera was at-fault for the subject accident. (DMF No. 20.) According to the deposition testimony provided by Plaintiff, Rivera was driving the van to the next Metro Clean bus stop, which was past the freeway on ramp. Rivera had no intention of getting on the freeway, despite driving in a right turn lane designated for freeway entry. Plaintiff unequivocally states: “Our next stop before the accident was – that was where he was going. It was right after the freeway, there’s a bus stop right there. That’s the next stop we were going to...He knew where he was going...we take that route every day that I was working with him. He knew exactly what he was doing.” (Lawrence Decl., Exhibit A, pp. 23:10-24:5.) Plaintiff further states that Rivera continued straight while in the right turn lane, and as a result, collided with Defendants’ vehicle, which was lawfully turning from the adjacent right turn lane onto the freeway. “It’s two lanes, okay, to make a right on the freeway, he [Rivera] was on the front lane, and the lady [Cham] was on the outside lane. When it was time to turn to get on the freeway, he went straight, she turned like she was supposed to...All I know is he was in the lane to turn on the freeway and he didn’t turn. I can tell you that. We took that route many times. That’s the route we take early in the morning...He wasn’t changing lanes. He was talking to everybody to conversate. But he continued to go straight. He went straight. He was going straight.” (Lawrence Dec., Exhibit A, pp. 24:9-14; 25:1-4; 28:11-19.) The Court finds that fact that Rivera continued straight while in the right turn lane does not rise to the level of gross negligence as this conduct is not an extreme departure from the ordinary standard of conduct.

Lastly, the Cham Defendants argue that Defendant Rivera caused the collision. However, the issue of whether Rivera’s negligence was a proximate cause of injury is not a factual matter relevant to this motion for summary judgment relating to Plaintiff’s complaint due to the application of the release agreement.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

Moving party is ordered to give notice.