Judge: Shirley K. Watkins, Case: 20STCV15471, Date: 2023-02-22 Tentative Ruling
If ALL parties submit on the tentative, then no appearance is necessary unless some other matter (i.e., Case Management Conference) is on calendar. It is not necessary to call the court to request oral argument. Oral argument is permitted on all tentative rulings.
Case Number: 20STCV15471 Hearing Date: February 22, 2023 Dept: T
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FALISHA PORTER, Plaintiff, vs. PHARMAVITE, LLC, et al., Defendants. |
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[TENTATIVE]
ORDER DENYING MOTION
FOR NEW TRIAL OR ALTERNATIVE REQUEST PURSUANT TO CCP SECTION 662 Dept. T 8:30 a.m. February 22, 2023 |
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[TENTATIVE] ORDER: Plaintiff Falisha Porter’s Motion for New
Trial and the Alternative Request pursuant Code of Civil Procedure section 662
are DENIED in their entirety.
Introduction
Plaintiff
moved for new trial on several statutory grounds: irregularity in the proceedings
of the Court or adverse party; accident or surprise; newly discovered evidence;
inadequate damages; insufficient evidence, or decision is against the law; and
error in law during the trial. (Code
Civ. Proc. sec. 657(1), and (3) - (7).)
Further, Plaintiff alternatively requested that the Court take actions
to change or add to the FSOD, modify, or vacate the judgment, grant new trial, or
set aside the FSOD/Judgment and reopen the case for further proceedings and
introduction of additional evidence.
(Code Civ. Proc. sec. 662.) If
the Court finds that one or more of these grounds for new trial has been
established, then the Court must determine whether that ground “materially
affect[s] the substantial rights” of the moving party. (Code Civ. Proc. sec. 657.)
Discussion
Plaintiff
argued that her right to official CSR services was violated and the subsequent
transcripts produced by the CSR hired by Defendant were
fraudulent/altered. As to Plaintiff’s
right to an official CSR on the date of trial, whether the trial date is
continued or not, does not ensure that an official CSR is available and
will appear on the trial date. The Court made known to the parties in this case
of the shortage of CSR's and the need to prioritize for criminal matters. In
order to ensure Court reporting services on the actual trial date,
Defendant was ordered to secure the appearance of a CSR at their own cost and
ordered to provide transcripts to Plaintiff.
The fact that the order did not appear on the Court’s September 22, 2022,
Minute Order is of no consequence since Defendant complied with the Court’s
order. As to Plaintiff’s argument that
the transcript was fraudulently altered, Plaintiff made many contentions as to
testimony being altered; however, there is no evidence to support the
contention other than Plaintiff’s own recollection of the trial testimony
and/or an inference because of the timing of Defendant’s production of the
transcript (they were electronically forwarded to the Court and Plaintiff a few
days after their receipt.) However,
neither of these contentions, without evidence, are reliable to determine fraudulent
alteration of the transcripts either by the CSR or Defendant. The Court
received the transcript from defense counsel as a non-modifiable PDF. Even if the contention was supported,
Plaintiff fails to show that the alleged alterations materially affected
Plaintiff’s rights because the contention presumes that the Court relied solely
upon the transcripts to render its decision.
The Court’s decision was not based solely on the transcripts. The Court relied upon its own recollection
and impression of the testimony, credibility findings, and documentary evidence
presented, and weighed them against each other.
The
certified shorthand reporter (CSR) was hired and paid for by the Defendant. The CSR was appointed as an "Official
Reporter Pro Tempore" by order signed on 10/10/2022. This reporter had
also reported at least one other pretrial hearing. The record reflects that Plaintiff did not
object to this CSR at the start of trial nor at the pretrial hearing. Instead, after trial, Plaintiff
objects that this CSR was biased, that she colluded with the defense attorney
to change the record by adding and deleting testimony, and colloquy between
counsel, the Court, and her. These
assertions are not found to be supported by any credible evidence. Also, the Court
does not agree with the Plaintiff's recollection of events concerning the trial
testimony that Plaintiff claims were changed or removed from the transcript. Even so, the parts that Plaintiff claims
were "added" or "scrubbed" have no relationship to the Court's
finding that the Plaintiff's testimony about the events which she claims caused
fear conditioning was not credible. The Court does not find arguments as to
the CSR and the transcripts to be persuasive or supported by admissible
evidence.
Plaintiff
argued that the Court’s September 8, 2021, pre-trial discovery order
prohibiting expert testimony at trial was made in error. (Motion Exh. 5.) A plain review of the Court’s September 8, 2021,
order showed that Plaintiff stipulated to limiting her emotional distress
damages to those “usually associated with the alleged incident” and that expert
testimony would not be “presented at trial in support of the claim for
damages.” Plaintiff misconstrued the
Court’s discovery order and her own stipulation, and further misapplied them to
the Court’s FSOD regarding expert testimony.
Plaintiff
asserted that the Court allowing Andrea Douglas, counsel for Defendant, to
testify as to Defendant’s employee handbook, was an irregularity.
Preliminarily, the Court does not find the contention to be sufficient to
support a new trial motion. Andrea
Douglas was allowed to testify over Ms. Porter's objection about whether the HR
policies had been changed. Even so, the Court substantially restricted
her testimony to whether or not the policies had been changed during the time
that Plaintiff was employed. The Court did not find that Plaintiff had been
retaliated against, nor that she was constructively terminated due to
retaliation. The policies were not relevant to the Court's decision that Plaintiff
was not credible. The outcome of the trial did not hinge on whether the
policies had or had not been changed. There is no showing that this alleged
irregularity materially affected Plaintiff’s rights because the Court found
Plaintiff’s testimony credible regarding the alteration of the employee
handbook and failure to produce the employee handbook that she signed. (FSOD par. 48.) Because there is no showing of Plaintiff’s
rights being affected, Plaintiff’s contention regarding Ms. Douglas’ testimony
is insufficient to meet Plaintiff’s burden.
Plaintiff
argued that the Court made rulings based upon Defendant’s closing statement or
brief within the Tentative Statement of Decision and Findings of Fact
(TSOD.) However, the TSOD is no longer
the operative statement at issue since the FSOD was entered thereafter. Further, Plaintiff’s contention is not
supported by citation to the FSOD as to what finding of fact or ruling was
based solely upon Defendant’s closing statement or brief, or why reliance on
arguments in the Defendant's closing argument or brief were improper. On this defect alone, the Court does not find
the argument persuasive.
Plaintiff
argued that the Court erroneously overruled Plaintiff’s objections to the TSOD
under the guise that Plaintiff was presenting new evidence. Plaintiff’s argument is merely a dispute with
the Court’s ruling. Further, Plaintiff’s
contention mistakenly presumed that the Court’s ruling was solely based upon
Plaintiff attempting to add new evidence not presented at trial. The overruling of Plaintiff’s objections were
also because they lacked substantive merit.
Plaintiff has not met her burden on this contention.
Plaintiff
asserted that the Court’s pre-trial denial of Plaintiff’s ex parte application
to continue trial was in error. However,
Plaintiff presented no facts or evidence to show that the documents in
Defendant’s amended exhibit list and further amended exhibit list contained
undisclosed documents, or materially affected her case. Most, if not all,
exhibits used by Defendant had been disclosed in its summary judgment motion,
were created by her, sent to her or were in her possession. Plaintiff, on the other hand, delayed in providing
her own exhibits. On this contention,
the Court does not find any grounds to grant new trial.
Plaintiff
argued that Plaintiff was lulled into not presenting evidence as to fear
conditioning based upon the Court’s representation that it understood fear
conditioning. This is incorrect, Plaintiff did provide evidence of her fear
conditioning. The Court found
unnecessary to view the decades old "Little Albert" video showing an experiment
producing fear conditioning in a baby. The
Court indicated that it understood the concept of fear conditioning. The
primary basis of the Court's decision is that the Court did not believe Plaintiff's
testimony that the events she complains which are the basis of her fear
conditioning, actually occurred. Fundamentally, if these things did not happen,
there is no basis for her claims. After
due consideration of all of the evidence, including the medical records
provided by the Plaintiff and all other admitted evidence, and the credibility
of the parties and witnesses, the Court found that the Plaintiff failed to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that these events actually
happened. This includes the throat
clearing hundreds, if not thousands, of times by multiple people in her
presence, a coordinated campaign of many employees in a 300 person company color
matching her clothing, bells ringing, her car doors left open with keys in the
car, invasion of her privacy by stealing confidential information from her
wallet, the CEO chasing her down the hallway and threatening her, someone
applying for a library card in her name which showed up on her desk moments
after receiving an informational email from the library about how to apply for
a library card, light shooting from her computer into her eyes, her laptop
starting on its own, someone taking control of her computer and deleting emails,
and many other similar experiences. Most of these experiences were not reported
to anyone. None are reflected in photos or videos. There were no witnesses called to confirm
these things happened. The Court does not find credible that these incidents
happened as testified to by Ms. Porter; as a result, as these are the foundational
facts on which Ms. Porter's claim is based, the Court found there was no viable
claim against the Defendant. As the Court
stated in the decision, while the Court believes that Plaintiff believes
these things happened, the evidence does not support that they in fact
happened. Plaintiff’s contention is merely based upon the Court’s adverse
finding as to fear conditioning. (FSOD
pars. 9-10.) An adverse ruling as to
Plaintiff’s claim to fear conditioning is insufficient to show the Court’s lack
of understanding of fear conditioning. The
Court considered the evidence presented and found that it was not substantiated
by the evidence. The Court does not find that argument to be merited to support
a new trial.
In summary, the record reflects that
Plaintiff was given a full opportunity to present her
evidence.
1. The Court finds no irregularity in the
proceedings of the Court or adverse party, or any order of the Court or abuse
of discretion by which either party was prevented from have a fair trial.
2. The Court finds no accident of
surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against preventing Plaintiff
from having a fair trial.
3. The Court finds there was no newly
discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which she
could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial
resulting in the Plaintiff not receiving a fair trial.
4. The Court finds that there was no
evidence of inadequate damages resulting in the Plaintiff not receiving a fair
trial.
5. The Court finds that there was no
insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or the
verdict or other decision is against law resulting in the Plaintiff not
receiving a fair trial.
6. The Court finds there was no error in
law, occurring at the trial and excepted to by the party making the application
resulting in the Plaintiff not receiving a fair trial.
7. The Court finds that there are no
grounds for a new trial motion which “materially affect[ed] the substantial
rights” of the Plaintiff.
Plaintiff’s
arguments, addressed above, were also the grounds for Plaintiff’s alternative request
under Code of Civil Procedure section 662.
Because the same arguments were used for the alternative request, the
Court’s review above is also grounds to deny the alternative request.
The
motion for new trial and the alternative request under Code of Civil Procedure
section 662 are DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED, CLERK TO GIVE
NOTICE.