Judge: Shirley K. Watkins, Case: 20VECV01193, Date: 2022-12-15 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20VECV01193 Hearing Date: December 15, 2022 Dept: T
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JANICE LOVE et al., Plaintiffs, vs. MERCURY INSURANCE COMPANY et al., Defendants. |
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[TENTATIVE]
ORDER RE: MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR ALTERNATIVELY FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION Dept. T 8:30 a.m. December 15, 2022 |
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[TENTATIVE] ORDER: Defendant California Automobile Insurance
Company’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to the statute of
limitations defense. The alternative
motion for summary judgment and summary adjudication are MOOT.
Defendant
California Automobile Insurance Company’s Request for Judicial Notice is
GRANTED but not as to any hearsay or any facts in dispute.
Plaintiffs
Gregory and Janice Love’s Request for Judicial Notice is DENIED.
Introduction
Defendant/Doe 1 California Automobile Insurance Company
(Defendant) moved for summary judgment (MSJ) and alternatively for summary
adjudication (MSA) against Plaintiffs Janice and Gregory Love’s (Plaintiffs)
First Amended Complaint (FAC.)
Defendant’s MSA moved only against Plaintiffs’ second cause of action (COA)
for bad faith. The FAC alleged three
COAs: the first COA for breach of contract and the third COA for intentional
infliction of emotional distress (IIED.)
Procedure
Defendant argued a few procedural defects as to
Plaintiffs’ opposition: failure to file a separate statement; untimely filing
of declaration, exhibits and requests for judicial notice; and page limit
violation. As to the declaration of
Plaintiff Janice Love, Plaintiffs filed two declarations[1]. Plaintiffs did not present argument against
these procedural defects. Defendant’s
procedural arguments are merited.
However, Defendant does not show prejudice since they proceeded to
address the merits of the opposition.
The Court considered all the briefs filed by Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs requested judicial notice of weather charts
(Exhibits 1-3) and a guide published by the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) (Exhibit 4.) As to the weather
charts, the documents appear to be taken from the internet. Judicial notice of Internet pages may be
improper absent evidentiary foundation showing the following elements: 1)
Author, 2) date of creation, 3) purpose, 4) reliability, and 5) veracity. (Hartwell Corp. v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 256,
279 n. 12.) Plaintiffs did not properly
lay foundation for the webpages. As to
the EPA guide, there is insufficient showing that the facts and propositions in
the Guide are of common knowledge or are not reasonably subject to dispute or
are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of
reasonably indisputable accuracy. For
these defects, Plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice is denied.
Discussion
Defendant’s MSJ argued that there is
no triable issue of material fact as to their statute of limitations (SOL)
affirmative defense. Defendant’s SOL
argument is based upon the one-year SOL expressly within the insurance
policy. The preliminary issue is whether
the three COAs are all “on the policy.”
Defendant’s “fact” to support this contention is inadmissible evidence
because it is an improper legal conclusion.
(Defendant’s Separate Statement of Facts (DSSF) 16.) However, determining whether Plaintiffs’
allegations are “on the policy” requires a review of the allegations in the
FAC.
Bad
faith is predicated on the insurance policy and arises out of the contractual
relationship between the parties but the duty of good faith and fair dealing is
not strictly a contractual obligation.
It is an obligation imposed by law which governs the discharging of
contractual responsibilities. Arising
out of a contract and being “on the policy” are significantly different. (Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co. (1973) 9
Cal.3d 566, 573-574.) The determination
of whether the claims are “on the policy” requires a review of the allegations
and not the title of the COA. (Lawrence
v. Western Mutual Insurance Co. (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 565, 575; Velasquez
v. Truck Insurance Exchange (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 712, 719-720.) Plaintiffs’ bad faith COA alleged breaches
are for mishandling and improper denial of the claim. (FAC par. 57.) Plaintiffs’ IIED incorporated the allegations
in the previous paragraphs and alleged that the Defendant wrongfully failed to
pay their claim. (FAC par. 62-63.) These allegations show that the claims are
based upon the mishandling of the claims and wrongful denial of policy
benefits. Plaintiffs are seeking their
policy benefits. (FAC pars. 58, 59, and
61.) Because Plaintiffs are seeking policy benefits, the COAs are “on the
policy.” Plaintiffs argued that these
two COAs cannot be “on the policy” because the claims could only accrue after
the claim was denied. However,
Plaintiffs’ argument as to accrual relies upon the statutory SOL whereas
Defendant provided that the policy agreed upon a separate contractual SOL accruing
at the “date of loss.” Plaintiffs’ reliance on statutory accrual is
inapplicable. Further, determining
whether the allegations are “on the policy” is not based upon accrual or even
when the misconduct occurred. “[W]here
the bad faith action is based on allegations relating to the handling of a
claim or the manner in which it is processed, it is an action “on the policy”
and, therefore, subject to the limitations bar.” (Velasquez v. Truck Insurance Exchange,
supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 719.)
Plaintiffs’ reliance upon the statutory SOL’s accrual is
unpersuasive. Plaintiffs’ allegations
show that the claims are “on the policy” and the policy provides for its own
accrual – the date of loss.
The next issue is to determine if
the action was filed in violation of the one-year time bar. The policy provided that the SOL accrued at
the “date of loss.” Date of loss can be
defined as
“that
point in time when appreciable damage occurs and is or should be known to the
insured, such that a reasonable insured would be aware that his notification
duty [i.e., duty to notify the insurer of a covered loss] under the policy has
been triggered.” (Prudential-LMI
Commercial Insurance v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 674, 687.) Defendant's evidence showed that Plaintiffs
reported that they noticed the loss either on October 12, 2019, or October 21,
2019. (DSSF 7.) The date of loss would be either of the two
dates. The SOL is also equitably tolled
from the time the insured gives notice of the loss until the insurer formally
denies coverage in writing. (Prudential-LMI
Commercial Insurance v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 674, 687.)
Defendant provided evidence that the loss was reported on October 31,
2019. (DSSF 6.) Defendant provided that the claim was denied
by letter on January 24, 2020. (DSSF
9.) The SOL was equitably tolled for 86
days. The one-year SOL, including the 86
day tolling period, would have expired either on January 5, 2021, or January
12, 2021 (i.e. a year from October 12, 2019, plus 86 days or October 21, 2019,
plus 86 days, respectively.) On October
16, 2020, Plaintiffs filed the original Complaint against dismissed party
Mercury Insurance Company (Mercury.) (DSSF 13.) Defendant was substituted into the action as a
Doe Defendant on February 24, 2021.
(DSSF 14.) Plaintiffs’ claim is
time-barred since Defendant was substituted into the action after January 5, 2021,
or January 12, 2021. Defendant’s SOL
argument is persuasive and the burden transfers to Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs argued the doctrine of
equitable tolling to defend against the SOL.
To support the doctrine, Plaintiffs cite to Addison v. State of
California (1978) 21 Cal.3d 313 (Addison). However, the Addison case is
distinguishable from the instant action.
Addison provided for equitable tolling when plaintiff is pursuing
an alternative remedy in another forum (i.e., a federal case.) Plaintiffs have not shown that they were seeking
alternative remedies in another forum. The
Addison case is inapplicable.
In
Plaintiffs’ argument applying equitable tolling, it would appear that
Plaintiffs’ argument is grounded on Defendant’s fraud. Plaintiffs’ argument presented facts showing
that they believed Mercury was the insurer and for that reason filed the case
against Mercury.[2] “In articulating the doctrine, the courts
have had as their purpose to disarm a defendant who, by his own deception, has
caused a claim to become stale and a plaintiff dilatory.” (Regents of Univ. of Calif. v. Superior
Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 509, 533.) The
elements of equitable tolling are: 1) fraudulent conduct by the defendant
resulting in concealment of the operative facts that are the basis of the cause
of action; 2) plaintiff's failure to discover the operative facts; and 3) due
diligence by the plaintiff until discovery of those facts. (Sagehorn v. Engle (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th
452, 460-461.) Plaintiffs argued that
Defendant’s identity was concealed.
Plaintiffs asserted that all correspondence referenced Mercury and
included the Mercury banner. However,
Plaintiffs’ responsive separate statement lacks any citation to evidence. The banner at the top of correspondence
attached to Plaintiff Janice Love’s declaration does not show Defendant’s
concealment insofar as it is alleged that Defendant is a subsidiary of Mercury
Insurance Group (FAC par. 13.) Plaintiff
Janice Love’s declaration does not show that the concealment was on the part of
Defendant in that all correspondence from Defendant’s adjuster, Nicholas Pope,
is signed by Defendant. Further, the
declaration page expressly identifies Defendant, as the insurer. (DSSF 1.)
The correspondence submitted by Plaintiffs shows that Defendant was the
party adjusting Plaintiffs’ claim. Plaintiffs
did not meet their burden to show a triable issue of fact on the SOL defense.
The MSJ based upon Defendant’s SOL
argument is GRANTED.
Defendant’s MSJ separately argued
that there is no triable issue of material fact as to the element of
breach. Defendant asserted that the
claim falls under the Long-Term Leak Exclusion.
Defendant’s MSA alternatively argued that there is no triable issue of
material fact as to the second COA for bad faith based upon the defense of the
Genuine Dispute Doctrine. These two
arguments are MOOT based upon the review on the SOL argument above.
[1] The Court file shows that
Plaintiffs filed the first Janice Love declaration on December 1, 2022, without
exhibits and the second Janice Love declaration on December 5, 2022, with
exhibits.
[2] Plaintiffs seem to be saying that Mercury
Insurance Company and Mercury Insurance Group are the same entity.