Judge: Shirley K. Watkins, Case: 21STCV38869, Date: 2022-12-12 Tentative Ruling

If ALL parties submit on the tentative, then no appearance is necessary unless some other matter (i.e., Case Management Conference) is on calendar. It is not necessary to call the court to request oral argument. Oral argument is permitted on all tentative rulings.

Case Number: 21STCV38869    Hearing Date: December 12, 2022    Dept: T

            [TENTATIVE] ORDER:  Defendants Bernard and Patricia Stark’s Demurrer to the Complaint is OVERRULED.  Defendants Bernard and Patricia Stark’s Motion to Strike is DENIED. Defendants Bernard and Patricia Stark’s Request for Judicial Notice is GRANTED but not as to any hearsay or facts in dispute.  Defendants are ordered to file an Answer within 20 days. 

Introduction

            Defendants Bernard and Patricia Stark (collectively, Defendants) demurred[1] to Plaintiff Sarah Jellison’s (Plaintiff) Complaint.  The Demurrer placed into issue the first three causes of action for invasion of privacy, trespass, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.  Defendants concurrently moved to strike Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages. 

            Discussion 

            The pleading elements for intrusion into private affairs are:  1) That plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a specific place or other circumstance;  2) That defendant intentionally intruded in the specific place or other circumstance;  3) That defendant’s intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person;  4) That plaintiff was harmed; and 5) That  defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff’s harm.  (CACI no. 1800.)  Defendants argued that the alleged conduct of installing cameras on Defendants’ property that captured Plaintiff’s property does not rise to the level of intentional intrusion.  Defendants cite to Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc. (2008) 47 Cal.4th 272, 295 (Hernandez) and Mezger v. Bick (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 76 (Mezger) to support their contention.  However, the Hernandez and Mezger cases were reviewed at a different procedural posture – motion for summary judgment – where the Court could review the underlying evidence to determine intent or whether the intrusion was “highly offensive.”  The allegations of the pleading, however, provided facts to show intent and offensiveness based upon the allegation that the camera could record into Plaintiff’s dining room and the ongoing animosity between the parties.  Plaintiff alleged that Defendants harassed and intimidated Plaintiff for “several years” and more specifically since 2020 (Compl. pars. 3 and 8.)  Further, Plaintiff alleged that the cameras on Defendants’ property were directed into Plaintiffs dining room with audio capabilities wherein Defendants “alerted” Plaintiff that they were “watching them.”  Plaintiff further alleged that they raised the height of their barrier to block the view of the camera but Defendants raised the camera to see over the barrier into Plaintiff’s home.  (Compl. par. 8.)  These allegations present facts showing an intent to intrude upon Plaintiff’s privacy/home in that Defendants acted to overcome Plaintiff’s attempt to block the intrusion.  These are sufficient facts to plead intent and offensiveness.  Defendants’ argument mischaracterized the allegations and the allegations show more than just property owners setting up security cameras to protect their home.  Defendants’ argument is not persuasive.

            The pleading elements for trespass are:  1) That plaintiff owned/leased/occupied/controlled the property;  2) That defendant intentionally/, although not intending to do so, recklessly or negligently entered plaintiff’s property or 2) intentionally/, although not intending to do so, recklessly or negligently caused another person to enter plaintiff’s property; 3) That plaintiff did not give permission for the entry or that defendant exceeded plaintiff’s permission; 4) That plaintiff was actually harmed; and 5) That defendant’s entry/conduct was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff’s harm.  (CACI no. 2000.)  Defendants argued that there are insufficient facts to plead a “tangible entry.”  However, Defendants’ argument ignores the very allegation that is cited in their demurrer.  Plaintiff expressly alleged that Defendants “cut [Plaintiff’s] shrubs and trees, [and] built spite fences” on Plaintiff’s property.  The mere allegation that Defendants cut Plaintiff’s shrubs and trees is sufficient to allege an entry onto Plaintiff’s property to support trespass.  Defendants’ argument is not persuasive.

            The pleading elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) are: 1) That defendant’s conduct was outrageous;  2) That defendant intended to cause plaintiff emotional distress; or that defendant acted with reckless disregard of the probability that plaintiff would suffer emotional distress, knowing that plaintiff was present when the conduct occurred;  3) that plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress; and 4) That defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff’s severe emotional distress.  (CACI no. 1600.)  Defendants argued that Plaintiff failed to plead facts showing extreme or outrageous conduct; caused Plaintiff’s injuries; suffered severe or extreme emotional distress.  As to the outrageous conduct element, Defendants argued that there are insufficient facts as to the “degree, magnitude, and date “ of the misconduct.  Frequency, degree, magnitude, or dates are not a pleading element of IIED.  “[S]pecific dates and details . . . are properly addressed during discovery, not on demurrer.”  (People v. Highland Federal Savings & Loan (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1692, 1716.)  The allegation that Defendants invaded Plaintiff’s privacy with cameras is sufficient to allege outrageous conduct. 

            The element of causation is supported by the fact pleading regarding Defendants’ animosity toward Plaintiff by cursing at Plaintiff and filing false police reports against Plaintiff so that Plaintiff would move from her home.  (Compl. par. 3 and 21.)  Plaintiff sufficiently pled facts to support causation. 

“Emotional distress includes suffering, anguish, fright, horror, nervousness, grief, anxiety, worry, shock, humiliation, and shame.  “Severe emotional distress” is not mild or brief; it must be so substantial or long lasting that no reasonable person in a civilized society should be expected to bear it.”  (CACI no. 1604.)  Plaintiff alleged that she suffered “extreme and severe physical and mental anguish and caused her to incur medical and mental health care expenses.”  (Compl. par. 17; incorporated into the third COA by Compl. par. 19.)  The allegation that Plaintiff incurred mental health care expenses due to her anguish is sufficient to allege the severity of her distress and support the pleading element of severe emotional distress. 

            Defendants argued that the IIED claim is time-barred by the one-year statute of limitations (SOL) because the allegations do not plead any specific date and the claims date back to 2020.  (Code Civ. Proc. sec. 340.)  “'A demurrer on the ground of the bar of the statute of limitations will not lie where the action may be, but is not necessarily barred'.... It must appear clearly and affirmatively that, upon the face of the complaint, the right of action is necessarily barred.... This will not be the case unless the complaint alleges every fact which the defendant would be required to prove if he were to plead the bar of the applicable statute of limitation as an affirmative defense.”  (Lockley v. Law Office of Cantrell, Green, Pekich, Cruz & McCort (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 875, 881.)  Defendants’ SOL argument misconstrues the allegations because there are no dates pled in the Complaint to determine whether the action is “clearly and affirmatively” barred by the SOL.  Further, as to allegations surrounding the year 2020, Defendants’ argument ignores that Plaintiff alleged that the timing of the misconduct was “through 2020 and continuing to the present.”  (Compl. pars. 8, 10, 11, 12, and 16.)  As alleged, there appears to be claims of misconduct occurring within the SOL which would show that the claim is timely.  The demurrer arguments against IIED are unpersuasive.

            The Demurrer to the Complaint is OVERRULED.

            Defendants moved to strike punitive damages on the argument that Plaintiff did not plead facts to support fraud, malice, or oppression.  Defendants’ arguments are conclusory and merely relies upon the arguments made in the demurrer.  As with the demurrer, Defendants’ arguments against punitive damages are unpersuasive because Plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to show malice by pleading the invasion of privacy and the animosity directed toward Plaintiff. 

            The motion to strike is DENIED.