Judge: Shirley K. Watkins, Case: BC696215, Date: 2022-09-07 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: BC696215    Hearing Date: September 7, 2022    Dept: T

DONALD BARRON,

 

                        Plaintiff,

 

            vs.

 

WARNER BROS. RECORDS, INC., et al.,

 

                        Defendants.

 

CASE NO:  BC696215

 

[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE:

MOTION BY DEFENDANT WILLIAM MORRIS ENDEAVOR ENTERTAINMENT, LLC FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR ALTERNATIVELY FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

 

Dept. T

8:30 a.m.

September 7, 2022

 

            [TENTATIVE] ORDER:  Defendant William Morris Endeavor Entertainment, LLC’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. 

Defendant William Morris Endeavor Entertainment, LLC’s alternative Motion for Summary Adjudication is GRANTED in Part and DENIED in Part.  The motion is GRANTED as to Issues 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5; and DENIED as to Issues 6 and 7. 

Defendant William Morris Endeavor Entertainment, LLC’s Request for Judicial Notice is GRANTED only as to the existence of the two documents and not any facts in dispute or hearsay.

 

INTRODUCTION

Defendant William Morris Endeavor Entertainment, LLC (WME) moves for summary judgment (MSJ) against Plaintiff Donald Barron's (Plaintiff) First Amended Complaint (FAC).  Alternatively, WME moves for summary adjudication (MSA) as to seven issues in the first cause of action (COA) for negligence.  The first six issues assert that WME did not owe a legal duty of care.  The seventh issue asserts that WME did not cause Plaintiff’s damages.

PROCEDURE

Plaintiff objects to WME’s separate statement based upon California Rules of Court Rule 3.135(f) [sic].  The Court presumes Plaintiff meant Rule 3.1350(f).  Preliminarily, subsection (f) only applies to opposing separate statements.  The rule on separate statements applied to the moving party is Rule 3.1350(d).  Despite WME’s MSA’s separate statement incorporating the same facts identified in the MSJ’s separate statement, the Court does not find the procedural defect prejudicial to Plaintiff, especially since Plaintiff was able to respond to the facts alleged in WME’s separate statement.  Plaintiff’s objection against WME’s MSA’s separate statement is overruled.  However, counsel is admonished to follow the rules in the future.

            DISCUSSION 

WME argues that there is no triable issue of fact as to any of the duties alleged: “owned, leased, maintained, inspected, entrusted, delegated, managed, regulated, negotiated for, controlled and operated” the Bentley (Vehicle).  (FAC par. 17.)  As to MSA Issue 1, WME asserts that there is no triable issue as to whether WME “owned, inspected, or maintained” the Vehicle.  WME cites to the Court’s November 4, 2021, Ruling on Co-Defendant Troy Heidtmann’s (Heidtmann) MSJ/MSA to support their contention.  However, WME misconstrues the ruling because the Court did not make any findings of fact.  The November 4, 2021, Ruling merely identified the facts that showed whether a triable issue of fact existed or did not exist.  The facts used by the Court are at issue and it is for the trier of fact to make factual findings.  The Court only took judicial notice of the existence of the November 4, 2021, Ruling and did not take judicial notice of the facts in dispute.  However, WME provides the deposition testimony of Co-Defendant Eric Stenger (Stenger) showing that he owned the Vehicle.  (Defendant’s Separate Statement of Facts (DSSF) 23.)  Plaintiff does not present any evidence to dispute the ownership of the Vehicle.  Without any disputed facts, there is no triable issue of fact as to ownership of the Vehicle.  However, the evidence cited by WME does not present any admissible evidence as to the duty to inspect or maintain.  However, with ownership of the Vehicle, the inference, only as to the instant Motion, is that Stenger had the duty to inspect and maintain the Vehicle.  Despite the parties’ failure to provide citation to evidence in their Separate Statements regarding inspection and maintenance, Stenger’s testimony supports the contention that WME did not owe a duty as to ownership, inspection, or maintenance of the Vehicle.  There is no triable issue of material fact as to WME negligently owning, inspecting, or maintaining the Vehicle.

The MSA as to Issue 1 is GRANTED.

WME’s MSA Issue 2 argues that there is no triable issue of fact showing that WME operated the Vehicle.  Plaintiff does not present any facts to dispute that WME did not operate the vehicle at the time of the accident.  (DSSF 34.)  Without any facts to dispute the declaration of Eric Singer attesting to the fact that WME did not operate the vehicle, there is no triable issue of fact on this claim. 

The MSA Issue 2 is GRANTED. 

WME’s MSA Issue 3 argues that there is no triable issue of fact showing that WME leased the Vehicle.  WME argues that they are not a party to the Agreement (DSSF 14, 16: Exh. J.)  24, 25 

WME’s evidence shows that the Vehicle was leased to either Gazzy Garcia (Garcia), Herbert Battle (Battle), Co-Defendant Tha Lights Group (TLG) or potentially non-party Tha Lights Group Records Touring LLC (“TLGRT.”)  (DSSF 14, 16.)  Plaintiff does not dispute WME’s facts.  There is no argument or evidence showing that WME leased the Vehicle.  Stenger, the owner, testifies that his understanding was that he was leasing the Vehicle to Battle and was giving permission to Heidtmann to drive the Vehicle.  (DSSF 24 and 25.)  The facts presented by WME are not disputed by Plaintiff. Without any disputed facts to show otherwise, WME has met their burden to show that no triable issue of fact exists regarding a duty related to leasing the Vehicle and Plaintiff has not met his burden to show that a triable issue of fact exists. 

The MSA as to Issue 3 is GRANTED. 

WME’s MSA Issue 4 argues that there is no triable issue of fact as to delegating, managing, or regulating the Vehicle. 

Without facts showing that WME rented the Vehicle, there can be no triable issue of material fact as to WME delegating, managing, and regulating the Vehicle.  The authority to delegate, manage or regulate the Vehicle would necessarily be placed upon the renter by the owner limited by the agreement to rent.  A permissive driver may have authority to delegate, manage and regulate the Vehicle, again dependent upon the scope of the rental agreement,  but there are no facts presented to show authority to delegate, manage or regulate given to either the renter or the permissive driver via any terms of a rental agreement.  There is no triable issue of material fact as to WME delegating, managing, or regulating the Vehicle.

The MSA Issue 4 is GRANTED.

WME’s MSA Issue 5 argues that there is no triable issue of fact showing that WME controlled the Vehicle.  (DSSF 27, 34, 35.)  WME’s Fact 27 only relies upon the Court’s November 4, 2021, Ruling.  As reviewed above, the Court’s Ruling is only noticed as to its existence and not as to any facts in dispute.  Control of the vehicle is a fact in dispute.  However, WME’s Fact 34-35 provides evidence to show that WME did not operate or possess the Vehicle at any time.  With these facts, it is inferred that WME did not have control over the Vehicle at any time.  Plaintiff does not dispute these facts.  There is no triable issue of fact as to WME’s control over the Vehicle.

The MSA Issue 5 is GRANTED.

Although not raised as a separate issue, WME argues that the entrustment claim under the first COA is not at issue because WME’s demurrer against the second COA for negligent entrustment was sustained.  (DSSF 36.)  Plaintiff submits to and does not argue against the WME’s contention.  The claim for entrustment in the First COA is not at issue as conceded by Plaintiff. 

On WME’s MSA Issue 6, WME argues that they did not negotiate the terms of the Agreement (DSSF 12-14, 17-19.)  WME relies upon the Agreement itself and the declaration of Doug Singer.  However, Plaintiff produces conflicting evidence showing that WME negotiated the Agreement, as well as Co-Defendants TLG, Battle and Heidtmann.  Plaintiff’s evidence to dispute WME’s facts includes Battle deposition testimony stating that Heidtmann “would have looked it [the Agreement] over. William Morris should have been negotiating it.”  (Reed II Decl., Exh. A: Battle Deposition pg. 112:10-15.)  Further, Plaintiff’s evidence also includes Eric Stenger’s deposition testimony that WME “formalized” the Agreement.  (Reed II Decl., Exh. D: pgs. 20:20-21:6.)  The evidence submitted presents a triable issue of fact because WME and Battle/Tha Lights Group are in dispute whether WME “negotiated” the Agreement.  Due to this dispute in evidence, there is a triable issue of fact as to the duty of care regarding the negotiation.

WME argues that the definition of “negotiate” is limited to making a request due to the Court’s November 4, 2021, Ruling.  (DSSF 19-20.) 

The MSA Issue 6 is DENIED. 

On MSA Issue 7, WME argues that there is no triable issue of fact as to causation in the first COA for negligence.  WME again misconstrues the Court’s prior ruling.  It is made clear that the Court did not make any findings of fact in the November 4, 2021, Ruling.  The Court did not determine that the Vehicle was driven by one of two persons, as asserted by WME.  The Court only held that there was a triable issue of fact as to the operator of the Vehicle.  Whether the driver was Garcia, Taylor or Battle is an issue to be determined by the trier of fact.  Because the identity of the driver is a triable issue of fact, causation remains to be a triable issue of fact. 

            Res ipsa loquitur is a doctrine affecting the burden of producing evidence applicable to certain kinds of accidents that are so likely to have been caused by a defendant's negligence that, in the Latin equivalent, “ ‘the thing speaks for itself.’ ” ( Brown v. Poway Unified School Dist. (1993) 4 Cal.4th 820, 825, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 679, 843 P.2d 624 (Brown).) If applicable, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur establishes a presumption of negligence requiring the defendant to come forward with evidence to disprove it. ( Id. at p. 825, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 679, 843 P.2d 624; Evid.Code, § 646, subd. (b).)”  (Fields v. Yusuf (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1381, 1389.)  Res ipsa loquitur is inapplicable to WME because there is no evidence showing that WME had control over the Vehicle.  However, res ipsa loquitur is relevant in determining the person that drove the Vehicle at the time of the accident so that causation can be determined.  Again, because the identity of the driver is not yet known, causation remains to be an issue containing a triable issue of fact.  

            The MSA Issue 7 is DENIED. 

 

            IT IS SO ORDERED, CLERK TO GIVE NOTICE.