Judge: Stephanie M. Bowick, Case: 20STCV39130, Date: 2024-02-05 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 20STCV39130 Hearing Date: February 5, 2024 Dept: 19
RULING
Defendant Malin Asset Management, Inc.’s unopposed Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff’s Complaint is GRANTED, without leave to amend.
Counsel for Defendant Malin Asset Management, Inc. to give notice.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action arises out of alleged unlawful eviction. Plaintiff Abdulhakim Hassen (“Plaintiff”) brings suit against Defendant Chloe’s Apartments, LLC, Adrian Malin, Dan Zuckerman, Apartment Management Group, LLC, Eloise C. Williams, trustee of the Williams Trust (erroneously sued as Williams Trust), Gaylord Williams, and MALIN ASSET MANAGEMENT, INC. (“Malin”) alleging the following causes of action:
1. Constructive Eviction;
2. Breach Of Contract;
3. Violation Of California Civil Code Section 1942.4;
4. Violation Of California Civil Code Section 1950;
5. Violation Of Los Angeles Municipal Code Section 151.09;
6. Breach Of Warranty Of Habitability;
7. Fraud;
8. Private Nuisance;
9. Breach Of Covenant Of Quiet Enjoyment;
10. Negligence;
11. Unfair Business Practices;
12. Battery; and
13. Intentional Infliction Of Emotional Distress.
Defendant Malin filed the instant Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff’s Complaint (the “Motion”).
GROUNDS FOR MOTION
Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 435 and 436, Defendant Malin moves to strike claims for punitive damages and attorney fees.
MEET/CONFER
The Court finds that Defendant Malin substantially complied with the meet and confer requirements. (See Gregory J. Carpenter Decl., ¶¶ 3-4.)
DISCUSSION
As an initial matter, Plaintiff failed to oppose the Motion, effectively consenting to the Court granting it. (See Cal. R. Ct., 8.54(c) [“A failure to oppose a motion may be deemed a consent to the granting of the motion.”].)
I. MOTION TO STRIKE
A. Punitive Damages
“In order to state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a complaint must set forth the elements as stated in the general punitive damage statute, Civil Code section 3294.” (Turman, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at 63.) Civil Code section 3294 permits recovery of punitive damages where, in an action for breach of obligation not arising from contract, the plaintiff proves by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty “of oppression, fraud, or malice….” (Civ. Code, § 3294(a).) Malice is conduct “intended by the defendant to cause injury to plaintiff, or despicable conduct that is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard for the rights or safety of others.” (Civ. Code, § 3294(c)(1).) “Oppression” means “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.” (Civ. Code, § 3294(c)(2).) “Fraud” is “an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” (Civ. Code, § 3294(c)(3).) “The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages.” (Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166.) “Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud, or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim.” (Id.; see G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 22, 29.)
In other words, “[t]he mere carelessness or ignorance of the defendant does not justify the imposition of punitive damages.... Punitive damages are proper only when the tortious conduct rises to levels of extreme indifference to the plaintiff's rights, a level which decent citizens should not have to tolerate.” (Flyer's Body Shop Profit Sharing Plan v. Ticor Title Ins. Co. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1149, 1154; see American Airlines, Inc. v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1051 [“Punitive damages are appropriate if the defendant's acts are reprehensible, fraudulent or in blatant violation of law or policy.”].)
Similarly, punitive damages are, in general, available in claims for negligence, but “[i]n order to justify an award of punitive damages on this basis, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his conduct, and that he willfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences.” (Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 895-896.) Further, for nonintentional torts, an award of punitive damages is authorized “where defendant's conduct which causes injury is of such severity or shocking character that it warrants the same treatment as that accorded to willful misconduct-conduct in which the defendant intends to cause harm.” (Nolin v. National Convenience Stores, Inc. (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 279, 286–287.) Moreover, “[i]t has long been the rule that conduct classified only as unintentional carelessness, while it may constitute negligence or even gross negligence, will not support an award of punitive damages.” (Id. at 285-286.)
The Court agrees with Defendant Marin that the Complaint fails to state a prima facie claim for punitive damages against Defendant Marin because the Complaint is devoid of any factual allegations as to Defendant Marin. Rather, the factual allegations only concern Defendant Chloe’s Apartments, LLC. (See Compl., ¶¶ 4-20.) The Complaint merely alleges that Defendant Marin, which was substituted in for DOE 7, “is in some way responsible for Plaintiff’s damages.” (Id. at ¶ 21.) This is insufficient to state a prima facie claim for punitive damages against Defendant Marin.
Accordingly, the Motion is GRANTED as to the punitive damages claims.
B. Attorney’s Fees
For the same reasons, the Complaint also fails to allege a basis for the claims for attorney’s fees against Defendant Marin. The allegation that Defendant Marin “is in some way responsible for Plaintiff’s damages,” (Compl. at ¶ 21), is insufficient to maintain the attorney fee claims.
Accordingly, the Motion is GRANTED as to the attorney fee claims.
II. LEAVE TO AMEND
Where the defect raised by a motion to strike or by demurrer is reasonably capable of cure, leave to amend is routinely and liberally granted to give the plaintiff a chance to cure the defect in question. (Velez v. Smith (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1174; see also McKenney v. Purepac Pharmaceutical Co. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 72, 78.) The burden of demonstrating a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment “is squarely on the plaintiff.” (Id.; see also Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349 [“Plaintiff must show in what manner he can amend his complaint and how that amendment will change the legal effect of his pleading.”].)
Since, Plaintiff failed to oppose the motion, it has not been shown that Plaintiff can cure the defects by amendment by alleging factual allegations as to Defendant Marin’s alleged unlawful conduct.
Thus, leave to amend is denied.