Judge: Stephanie M. Bowick, Case: 21STCP01430, Date: 2024-11-22 Tentative Ruling
DEPARTMENT 19 LAW AND MOTION RULINGS
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Case Number: 21STCP01430 Hearing Date: November 22, 2024 Dept: 19
After consideration of the briefing filed and oral argument at the hearing, Petitioner Soleimani & Associates, APLC’s Petition to Confirm Attorney-Client Fee Arbitration Award is GRANTED.
Accordingly, after accounting for payments received by Respondent and for the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that Petitioner is entitled to entry of judgment in the total amount of $29,927.03.
However, Petitioner failed to file a proposed judgment. Counsel for Petitioner is ordered to file a proposed judgment by December 4, 2024.
The Court sets a Non-Appearance Case Review Re: Proposed Judgment ON December 6, 2024, at 8:30 a.m., in Department 19 of the Stanley Mosk Courthouse.
Respondent has not appeared and therefore no notice is required under the circumstances. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1010.)
In the instant Petition to Confirm Attorney-Client Fee Arbitration Award (the “Petition”), Petitioner Soleimani & Associates, APLC (“Petitioner”) seeks to confirm the binding $100,000.00 arbitration award dated June 29, 2020 (the “Arbitration Award”) issued in Los Angeles County Bar Association Attorney Client Mediation & Arbitration Services Case No. M-072-19-JB in favor of Petitioner and against Respondent Haim Morovati (“Respondent”).
Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1285 et seq.,
Petitioner requests that the Court confirm the Arbitration Award and enter
judgment accordingly.
DISCUSSION
I.
Procedural Requirements
The Mandatory Fee Arbitration Act (the “MFAA”), codified at Business and Professions Code section 6200 et seq., “permits a party to petition to confirm an arbitration award in the same manner that arbitration awards may be confirmed under section 1285 et seq.” (Perez v. Grajales (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 580, 585, 588.)
“Any party to an arbitration in which an award has been made may petition the court to confirm, correct or vacate the award…. The petition shall name as respondents all parties to the arbitration and may name as respondents any other persons bound by the arbitration award.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1285.) A party may seek to confirm the arbitration award at least ten days, but no more than four years, after service of the award. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1288, 1288.4.) A court has authority to entertain any petition concerning arbitration so long as a minimum of 10 days of notice was provided. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1290.2.)
A petition made pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1285 et seq. must: (a) “[s]et forth the substance of or have attached a copy of the agreement to arbitrate unless the petitioner denies the existence of such an agreement”; (b) set forth the names of the arbitrator or arbitrators; and (c) “[s]et forth or have attached a copy of the award and the written opinion of the arbitrators, if any.” (Code Civ. Proc., 1285.4.)
“A petition to confirm an award shall be served and filed not later than four years after the date of service of a signed copy of the award on the petitioner.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1288.)
Code of Civil Procedure section 1290.6 provides that:
A response
shall be served and filed within 10 days after service of the petition except
that if the petition is served in the manner provided in paragraph (2) of
subdivision (b) of Section 1290.4, the response shall be served and filed
within 30 days after service of the petition. The time provided in this section
for serving and filing a response may be extended by an agreement in writing
between the parties to the court proceeding or, for good cause, by order of the
court.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1290.6.)
Here, the Petition was brought within four (4) years after the date of service of a signed copy of the Arbitration Award on Petitioner and therefore the Petition is timely. The Petition , names as respondent the only other party to the arbitration, i.e., Respondent, and sets forth the information required by Code of Civil Procedure section 1285.4 et seq.
No response to the Petition was filed. Per the Proof of Personal Service filed on November 12, 2024, the Court is satisfied that Respondent was given proper notice of the continued hearing on the Petition.
II.
Analysis
Until an arbitration award is confirmed by court judgment, it has only the effect of a contract between the parties. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1287.6.) But “[i]f an award is confirmed, judgment shall be entered in conformity therewith.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1287.4.) If a petition or response requesting confirmation is duly filed and served, the court must confirm the award as made, unless it corrects or vacates the award or dismisses the proceeding. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1286; see Pacific Law Group: U.S.A. v. Gibson (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 577, 580; Horn v. Gurewitz (1968) 261 Cal.App.2d 255, 258-259.) Statutes set forth specific grounds upon which an arbitrator’s award may be vacated. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1286.2.) Except on these grounds, arbitration awards are immune from judicial review in proceedings to challenge or enforce the award. (Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 12–13.) Moreover, a court may not correct an award unless, among other requirements, a petition or response requesting that the award either be corrected or vacated is duly served and filed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1286.8.)
Thus, courts will not review the sufficiency of the evidence to support the award. (Morris v. Zuckerman (1968) 69 Cal.2d 686, 691.) Nor will courts pass upon the validity of the arbitrator’s reasoning. (Id.) The court simply may not substitute its judgment for that of the arbitrator. (Id.) Further, errors of fact or law committed by the arbitrator, no matter how egregious, are not grounds for challenging the arbitrator’s award under California law. (Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 11.)
Business and Professions Code section 6204 provides, in relevant part, that:
(a)
The parties may agree in writing to be bound by the award of arbitrators
appointed pursuant to this article at any time after the dispute over fees,
costs, or both, has arisen. In the absence of such an agreement, either party
shall be entitled to a trial after arbitration if sought within 30 days….
(b)
If there is an action pending, the trial after arbitration shall be initiated
by filing a rejection of arbitration award and request for trial after
arbitration in that action within 30 days after service of notice of the award.
[….]
(Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6204(a)-(b).)
Business and Professions Code section 6203, subdivision (b) provides, in relevant part, that:
Even
if the parties to the arbitration have not agreed in writing to be bound, the
arbitration award shall become binding upon the passage of 30 days after
service of notice of the award, unless a party has, within the 30 days, sought
a trial after arbitration pursuant to Section 6204.
(Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6204(b).)
Here, the Petition and Arbitration Award indicate that the Arbitration Award was mailed to Respondent on July 15, 2020. (Petition, § 7; id. at § 6, Attachment 6(c) at p. 9; see Shahram Soleimani Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. A.) There is no indication that Respondent sought a trial within thirty (30) days after such service of notice of the Arbitration Award. No response requesting the Court to dismiss the Petition or to confirm, correct or vacate the Arbitration Award has been filed. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1285.2, 1285.6, 1285.8, 1286.2, 1286.4-1287.)
Thus, the Court finds that Petitioner is entitled to entry of judgment in conformity with the Arbitration Award.
B. Calculations
The Arbitration Award awarded Petitioner “$100,000.00 plus interest in the amount of the prevailing legal rate per annum from the 30th day after the date of service of this award.” (Petition at Attachment 6(c), p. 6.)
Petitioner provides evidence that he did not receive any payment from Respondent until October 15, 2022, when Respondent paid $48,000.00, and that after additional payments of $12,000.00 on March 13, 2023 and $10,000.00 payments on May 5, 2023, May 24, 2023, September 6, 2023, and October 18, 2023, Respondent has paid the $100,000.00 award in full. (Soleimani Decl. at ¶¶ 5-6.)
Thus, except for “reasonable fees and costs incurred in obtaining confirmation,” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6203(b)), which the Court discusses below, the Court finds that Petitioner is entitled to judgment only for the prejudgment interest that accrued due to Respondent’s failure to pay the Arbitration Award within thirty (30) days after the June 15, 2020 service.
1. Interest
Thus, the Court awards interest in the reduced amount of $25,232.27 to account for the fact that interest did not begin to accrue until August 14, 2020.
2. Fees and Costs
The Court also finds that Respondent is also entitled to recover reasonable fees and costs incurred in obtaining confirmation of the Arbitration Award. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6203(b).)
i. Attorney’s Fees
Respondent requests $5,560.00 in attorney’s fees which Respondent contends reflects eight (8) hours of work reasonably expended at a rate of $695.00 per hour.
As explained by the Court of Appeal in Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315:
A trial court assessing attorney fees
begins with a touchstone or lodestar figure, based on the careful compilation
of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney ...
involved in the presentation of the case. The court tabulates the attorney fee
touchstone, or lodestar, by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended
by the reasonable hourly rate prevailing in the community for similar work.
[T]he lodestar figure may be increased or decreased depending on a variety of
factors, including the contingent nature of the fee award. …absent
circumstances rendering the award unjust, an attorney fee award should
ordinarily include compensation for all the hours reasonably spent, including
those relating solely to the fee. … ‘padding’ in the form of inefficient or
duplicative efforts is not subject to compensation.
(Id. at 1321 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
A party requesting a fee award “‘is not necessarily entitled to compensation for the value of attorney services according to [his] own notion or to the full extent claimed by [him].’” (Levy v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 807, 816 (quoting Salton Bay Marina, Inc. v. Imperial Irrigation Dist. (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 914, 950) (internal citation omitted).)
The party seeking attorney fees and costs “bear[s] the burden of establishing entitlement to an award and documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates” to show that the fees incurred were allowable and reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation. (Christian Research Institute, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at 1320 (internal citations and quotations omitted); see Levy, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at 816.) “To that end, the court may require [a] defendant[ ] to produce records sufficient to provide a proper basis for determining how much time was spent on particular claims.” (Ibid.) “The court also may properly reduce compensation on account of any failure to maintain appropriate time records.” (Id. (internal citation omitted) (quoting ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 993, 1020).) “The evidence should allow the court to consider whether the case was overstaffed, how much time the attorneys spent on particular claims, and whether the hours were reasonably expended.” (Id. (citing ComputerXpress, Inc., supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at 1020).)
A trial court has broad discretion to award attorney fees in an amount that is less than the lodestar amount and, to discourage claimants from making an unreasonable demand, may deny altogether a fee request that appears unreasonably inflated. (Id. at 1321-1322; see Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 635.)
“The basis for the trial court's calculation must be the
actual hours counsel has devoted to the case, less those that result from
inefficient or duplicative use of time.” (Horsford v. Board Of Trustees Of
California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 395.) “The law is
clear, however, that an award of attorney fees may be based on counsel's
declarations, without production of detailed time records.” (Raining Data
Corp. v. Barrenechea (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1375.) “[T]he verified
time statements of the attorneys, as officers of the court, are entitled to
credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous.” (Horsford,
supra at 396; City of Colton v. Singletary
(2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 751, 785 (same).)
“‘In
challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are
claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific
items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence.
General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do
not suffice. Failure to raise specific challenges in the trial court forfeits
the claim on appeal.’” (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230
Cal.App.4th 459, 488 (quoting Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v.
California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564).)
“[T]he trial court is in the best position to value the services rendered by the attorneys in his or her courtroom, and this includes the determination of the hourly rate that will be used in the lodestar calculus.” (569 East County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 436-437 (internal citation omitted); see, e.g., Wilkerson v. Sullivan (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 443, 448 [“The reasonableness of attorney fees is within the discretion of the trial court, to be determined from a consideration of such factors as the nature of the litigation, the complexity of the issues, the experience and expertise of counsel and the amount of time involved. The court may also consider whether the amount requested is based upon unnecessary or duplicative work.”]; Christian Research Institute, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at 1321-1322 [ascertaining the amount of attorney’s fees to be awarded is left to the sound discretion of the trial court and the trial court need not simply award the sum requested].)
In setting the hourly rate for an attorney fees award, courts are entitled to consider the rate of “fees customarily charged by that attorney and others in the community for similar work.” (Bihun v. AT&T Information Systems, Inc. (1993) 13 Cal. App. 4th 976, 997, overruled on other grounds by Lakin v. Watkins Associated Indus. (1993) 6 Cal. 4th 644, 664; see also Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1009 [“[R]ate determinations in other cases, particularly those setting a rate for the plaintiffs' attorney, are satisfactory evidence of the prevailing market rate.”].) “In making its calculation, the court may rely on its own knowledge and familiarity with the legal market, as well as the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees, the difficulty or complexity of the litigation to which that skill was applied, and affidavits from other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community and rate determinations in other cases.” (569 East County Boulevard LLC, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at 437 (internal citations omitted).)
Here, after consideration of the evidence submitted, the Court finds the $5,560.00 requested by Petitioner to be excessive. The instant action is a summary proceeding, (Code Civ. Proc., § 1290.2), is not difficult or complex, does not involve novel issues, and does not require special skill.
Given the experience of Mr. Soleimani and the evidence that he is a solo practitioner, (Soleimani Decl. at ¶¶ 1, 6), and relying on its own knowledge and familiarity with the legal market, the Court awards the requested $695.00 hourly rate.
However, the instant action was commenced by way of filling out and filing Judicial Council form ADR-103, which is a simple, three (3) page form. The Court does not find that more than two (2) hours could be reasonably expended in filling out the form and attaching the Arbitration Award. The Court also finds that no more than four (4) hours could be reasonably expended in drafting and filing the Notice of Motion, the memorandum of point and authorities, which is less than two (2) pages, and the declaration of Shahram Soleimani.
Thus, the Court awards six (6) hours at a rate of $695.00, for a total attorney fee award of $4,170.00.
ii. Costs
Petitioner also requests $524.76 in costs. (Soleimani Decl. at ¶ 7.) The Court finds that Petitioner sufficiently establishes entitlement to these costs, (id. at Ex. B), and the Court awards Petitioner $524.76 in costs.
Accordingly, for all the foregoing
reasons, the Court GRANTS the Petition and confirms the Arbitration Award for a
total judgment of $29,927.03.