Judge Stephanie M. Bowick, Case Number: 21STCV33605, Date: 2023-09-14 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Stephanie M. Bowick, Case: 21STCV33605, Date: 2023-09-14 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 21STCV33605 Hearing Date: September 14, 2023 Dept: 19

RULING

After consideration of the briefing filed and oral argument at the hearing, Cross-Defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company’s Motion To Strike Portions Of Cross-Complainant's Second Amended Cross-Complaint is DENIED.

Cross-Defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company to file an Answer within ten (10) days.

Counsel for Cross-Complainant Jacquelyn Allen to give notice.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This action arises out of contract. Plaintiff State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company brings suit against Defendant Jacquelyn Allen alleging the following cause of action:

1. Declaratory Relief.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant misrepresented and concealed material facts concerning an automobile collision occurring on or about June 4, 2019 and therefore seeks a declaration that “no rights, duties or obligations arose, exist, or may in the future arise or exist” under the insurance policy number 545 9303-A19-75A (the “Policy”) whereby Plaintiff agreed to insure Defendant because, by making the misrepresentations and concealing the material facts, Defendant alleges Plaintiff breached the terms of the insurance policy.

In the Second Amended Cross-Complaint (“SACC”) Defendant Jacquelyn Allen (hereafter, “Cross-Complainant”) alleges the following causes of action against Plaintiff State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (hereafter, “Cross-Defendant”):

1. Breach of Contract;

2. Tortious Breach of The Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing;

3. Violation of Business & Professions Code Section 17200, Et Seq.; and

4. Declaratory Relief.

Cross-Complainant alleges that Cross-Defendant breached the Policy by refusing to pay benefits under the Policy as obligated.

Cross-Defendant filed the instant Motion To Strike Portions Of Cross-Complainant's Second Amended Cross-Complaint (the “Motion”)

On July 14, 2023, Cross-Complainant dismissed the Third Cause of Action.

GROUNDS FOR MOTION

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 435 and 436, Cross-Defendant moves to strike from the SACC allegations for punitive damages and the prayers for attorney’s fees, injunctive relief, and restitution.

MEET/CONFER

The Court finds that Cross-Defendant satisfied the meet and confer requirements. (See Christy Gargalis Decl., ¶¶ 4-5.)

DISCUSSION

I. MOTION TO STRIKE

The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, “[s]trike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436(a).) The court may also “[s]trike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436(b).) A motion to strike cannot be based upon the grounds that a complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, but instead is properly based on grounds of superfluous or abusive allegations, or improprieties in form or procedure. (Ferraro v. Camarlinghi (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 509, 528-29.) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Code. Civ. Proc., § 437; Turman v. Turning Point of Central California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63 [“judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth”].)

A. Punitive Damages

“In order to state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a complaint must set forth the elements as stated in the general punitive damage statute, Civil Code section 3294.” (Turman, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at 63.) Civil Code section 3294 permits recovery of punitive damages where, in an action for breach of obligation not arising from contract, the plaintiff proves by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty “of oppression, fraud, or malice….” (Civ. Code, § 3294(a).) Malice is conduct “intended by the defendant to cause injury to plaintiff, or despicable conduct that is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard for the rights or safety of others.” (Civ. Code, § 3294(c)(1).) “Oppression” means “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.” (Civ. Code, § 3294(c)(2).) “Fraud” is “an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” (Civ. Code, § 3294(c)(3).) “The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages.” (Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166.) “Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud, or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim.” (Id.; see G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 22, 29.)

In other words, “[t]he mere carelessness or ignorance of the defendant does not justify the imposition of punitive damages.... Punitive damages are proper only when the tortious conduct rises to levels of extreme indifference to the plaintiff's rights, a level which decent citizens should not have to tolerate.” (Flyer's Body Shop Profit Sharing Plan v. Ticor Title Ins. Co. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1149, 1154; see American Airlines, Inc. v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1051 [“Punitive damages are appropriate if the defendant's acts are reprehensible, fraudulent or in blatant violation of law or policy.”].)

Here, the Court finds that Cross-Complainant cured the defects with respect to the punitive damages claim raised by the motion to strike directed to the First Amended Cross-Complaint and that the SACC alleges sufficient facts to maintain a punitive damages claim. The Court finds the allegations in paragraphs 20 through 28 are sufficient to constitute malice for purposes of overcoming a motion to strike.

Accordingly, the Court DENIES the Motion as to the punitive damages claims.

B. Prayers For Attorney’s Fees & Restitution

Although, in the Notice of Motion, Cross-Defendant moves to strike the prayers for attorney’s fees and for restitution pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 17203, the Motion does not set forth any argument as to why these prayers for relief are irrelevant, false, or improper.

Thus, the Court DENIES the Motion as to the prayer for attorney’s fees and as to the prayer for restitution pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 17203.

C. Injunctive Relief

Although, in the Notice of Motion, Cross-Defendant moves to strike the prayer for injunctive relief pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 17204, the Motion does not set forth any argument as to why the prayer for injunctive relief is irrelevant, false, or improper other than the legal assertion that “[c]onduct that would otherwise amount to unfair competition may be protected by the ‘litigation privilege’ of Civil Code section 47 subdivision (b), so that a claimant under the statute cannot state a claim for either damages, or injunctive relief” and the legal conclusion that “conduct in the Second Amended Cross Complaint is protected activity and is subject to the litigation privilege.” (Motion, p. 9.)

Defendant fails to explain with adequate legal authority and analysis how it is apparent from the face of the SACC that the conduct in the SACC is protected activity and subject to the litigation privilege. Further, Defendant suggests that only some, but not all, of the allegations may be based on “privileged conduct." Finally, the Court finds Defendant’s arguments in reply unpersuasive.

For all the foregoing reasons, the Motion is DENIED in its entirety.