Judge: Stephanie M. Bowick, Case: 21STCV45481, Date: 2023-12-06 Tentative Ruling
DEPARTMENT 19 LAW AND MOTION RULINGS
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Case Number: 21STCV45481 Hearing Date: December 6, 2023 Dept: 19
RULING:
After consideration of the briefing filed and oral argument at the hearing, Defendants Jennifer Jo Anne Clark and County of Riverside’s unopposed Demurrer to the Complaint is SUSTAINED, without leave to amend.
Counsel for Moving Defendants to submit a proposed judgment of dismissal.
The Court sets a Non-Appearance Case Review Re: Proposed Judgment of Dismissal Riverside/Clark for December 18, 2023 in Department 19 of the Stanley Mosk Courthouse.
Counsel for Moving Defendants to give notice.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an abuse of process action. Plaintiff Jason Richard Aula (“Plaintiff”) brings suit against Defendants Jennifer Jo Anne Clark and California Department of Child Support Services (erroneously named and sued as the State of California) (hereafter, “Defendants”) alleging the following cause of action:
1. Abuse Of Court Process.
The Complaint alleges that Defendants abused the court with respect to Riverside Superior Court Case Number INK1600305 which concerned Plaintiff’s child support obligations.
Defendants Jennifer Jo Anne Clark and County of Riverside (hereafter, “Moving Defendants”) filed the instant Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint.
GROUNDS FOR DEMURRER
Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (e), Moving Defendants demur to the FAC on the ground that it fails to allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
The Court GRANTS Moving Defendants’ unopposed request to take judicial notice of Exhibits 1-10. (See Evid. Code, § 452(c), (d), (h).)
DISCUSSION
As an initial matter, Plaintiff failed to file any opposition, effectively consenting to the Court sustaining the Demurrer and granting the Motion without leave to amend. (See Cal. R. Ct., 8.54(c) [“A failure to oppose a motion may be deemed a consent to the granting of the motion.”].)
I. DEMURRER
A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal. App. 4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally, with a view to substantial justice between the parties. (Code Civ. Proc. § 452; Stevens v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 594, 601.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal. App. 4th 968, 994.) “We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. We accept the factual allegations of the complaint as true and also consider matters which may be judicially noticed.” (Mitchell v. California Department of Public Health (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1000, 1007.) “The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.” (Hahn, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.) “To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff's proof need not be alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School District (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.)
Moving Defendants demur to the Complaint on the grounds that (1) Plaintiff failed to comply with the Government Claims Act; (2) Moving Defendants are immune; (3) the litigation privilege bars Plaintiff’s claims; (4) Plaintiff’s claims are barred by res judicata; and (5) Plaintiff’s claims lack merit as a matter of law. (See Demurrer, pp. 6-11.)
A. Government Claims Act
Government Code section 945.4 prescribes that “no suit for money or damages may be brought against a public entity on a cause of action for which a claim is required to be presented in accordance” with Government Code sections 900 through 915.4 “until a written claim therefor has been presented to the public entity and has been acted upon by the board, or has been deemed to have been rejected by the board, in accordance” with Government Code sections 900 through 915.4. (Govt. Code, § 945.4; see California School Employees Assn. v. Governing Bd. of South Orange County Community College Dist. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 574, 589 (citing Govt. Code, §§ 905, 945.4) [“…an action for ‘money or damages’ against a public entity may not proceed unless a written claim has first been presented to the governmental entity and the claim either has been granted or rejected.”].) “Unless a specific exception applies, ‘[a] suit for ‘money or damages' includes all actions where the plaintiff is seeking monetary relief, regardless whether the action is founded in ‘tort, contract or some other theory.’’” (California School Employees Assn., supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at 589 (quoting Hart v. County of Alameda (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 766, 788).)
“It is settled that the filing of a timely claim against the employing public entity is a condition precedent to a tort action against either the public entity or the employee.” (Mazzola v. Feinstein (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 305, 310 (citing Williams v. Horvath (1976) 16 Cal.3d 834, 838 & Harman v. Mono General Hospital (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 607, 613).)
A plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to demonstrate compliance or excuse from compliance with the claim requirements. (State of California v. Superior Court, supra, 32 Cal.4th at 1243 (quoting Burgdorf v. Funder (1966) 246 Cal.App.2d 443, 447) [“…the language of the amended claim presentation statutes ‘make[s] it clear that ... a plaintiff must still allege in his complaint that he has complied with the claim statute in order to state a cause of action against a public employee.’”].)
Here, the Court agrees with Moving Defendants that the Complaint fails to state a claim because it fails to allege compliance with the claim requirements. The Complaint is a suit for money or damages against the employee of a public entity and contains no allegation indicating compliance with the claim requirements.
Accordingly, the Court SUSTAINS Moving Defendants’ demurrer to the Complaint on the ground that it fails to allege compliance with the claim requirements.
B. Immunity
The Court agrees with Moving Defendants that it is apparent from the face of the Complaint that Moving Defendants are immune from liability for Plaintiff’s claims because it seeks to hold Moving Defendants liable for injury caused by the institution or prosecution of official proceedings against Plaintiff. (County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2009) 181 Cal.App.4th 218, 228-229, disapproved of on other grounds by Leon v. County of Riverside (2023) 14 Cal.5th 910; see Leon, supra, 14 Cal.5th at 920-931 [Government Claims Act provision immunizing public employees from claims of injury caused by wrongful prosecution protects public employees from liability only for initiation or prosecution of an official proceeding]; id. at 924-925 [explaining intent by Legislature to make public employees and public entities immune from liability for malicious prosecution based on conduct connected to the prosecution/official proceedings]; Kaplan v. LaBarbera (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 175, 180 [Government Code section 815.2 immunizes public entity for injury caused by entity’s role in collecting child support]; Custom Craft Carpets, Inc. v. Miller (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 120, 125 [attorneys exercising their discretion in the course of their employment in representing governmental entities “immune from any tort liability arising out of their conduct in preparing and initiating a civil action against plaintiffs. “].)
D. Res Judicata
“‘Res judicata’ describes the preclusive effect of a final judgment on the merits.” (Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 888, 896.) “The doctrine of res judicata has a double aspect.” (Todhunter v. Smith (1934) 219 Cal. 690, 695.) “‘In its primary aspect,’ commonly known as claim preclusion, it ‘operates as a bar to the maintenance of a second suit between the same parties on the same cause of action.’” (People v. Barragan (2004) 32 Cal.4th 236, 252 (quoting Clark v. Lesher (1956) 46 Cal.2d 874, 880).) “‘In its secondary aspect,’ commonly known as collateral estoppel, ‘[t]he prior judgment ... ‘operates' in ‘a second suit ... based on a different cause of action ... as an estoppel or conclusive adjudication as to such issues in the second action as were actually litigated and determined in the first action.’” (Id. at 252-253 (quoting Clark, supra, 46 Cal.2d at 880); see Mycogen Corp., supra, 28 Cal.4th at 896 (quoting Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341) [“Res judicata, or claim preclusion, prevents relitigation of the same cause of action in a second suit between the same parties or parties in privity with them. Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, ‘precludes relitigation of issues argued and decided in prior proceedings.’ Under the doctrine of res judicata, if a plaintiff prevails in an action, the cause is merged into the judgment and may not be asserted in a subsequent lawsuit; a judgment for the defendant serves as a bar to further litigation of the same cause of action.”].)
“‘The prerequisite elements for applying the doctrine to either an entire cause of action or one or more issues are the same: (1) A claim or issue raised in the present action is identical to a claim or issue litigated in a prior proceeding; (2) the prior proceeding resulted in a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the party against whom the doctrine is being asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior proceeding.’” (Barragan, supra, 32 Cal.4th at 253 (quoting Brinton v. Bankers Pension Services, Inc. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 550, 556).)
Here, the Court finds that it is apparent from the face of the Complaint and from matters judicially noticed that the issues raised in the instant action were litigated in prior proceedings resulting in a final judgment of the merits for which Plaintiff was a party. Namely, the Court finds that it is apparent from the face of the Complaint and from matters judicially noticed that the issue of whether there was jurisdiction over Plaintiff was previously litigated in a prior proceeding in which Plaintiff was a party and that the prior proceeding resulted in a final judgment on the merits. (RJN, Exs. 1-2, 4, 9.) Plaintiff’s claims are premised upon the allegations that the court lacked jurisdiction over Plaintiff due to failure to give him adequate notice.
Given that Moving Defendants failed to allege compliance with the claims requirements and are immune from any liability for Plaintiff’s claims, the Court need not and does not address Moving Defendants’ remaining arguments.
II. LEAVE TO AMEND
Where the defect raised by a motion to strike or by demurrer is reasonably capable of cure, leave to amend is routinely and liberally granted to give the plaintiff a chance to cure the defect in question. (Velez v. Smith (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1174; see also McKenney v. Purepac Pharmaceutical Co. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 72, 78.) The burden of demonstrating a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment “is squarely on the plaintiff.” (Id.; see also Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349 [“Plaintiff must show in what manner he can amend his complaint and how that amendment will change the legal effect of his pleading.”].)
Given that Moving Defendants are immune from any liability for Plaintiff’s claims, the Court does not find that there is a reasonable possibility that the defects can be cured by amendment.
Furthermore, the Court does not find that Plaintiff, who failed to file any opposition, demonstrates a reasonable probability that he could allege compliance with the claim requirements.
Accordingly, leave to amend is DENIED.
After consideration of the briefing filed, Defendant California Department of Child Support
Services (erroneously named and sued as the State of California)’s unopposed Special
Motion to Strike Complaint For Abuse Of Process is GRANTED.
The Court awards Moving Defendant $23,375.00 in
attorney’s fees.
The Court orders that the judgment include the $435.00 filing fee, and thereafter, Defendant shall pay the Clerk upon collection (Govt. Code section 6103.5(b).)
Counsel for Moving Defendant to file a proposed judgment within 5 court days.
The Court sets a Non-Appearance Case Review Re: Proposed
Judgment for December 19, 2023 in Department 19 of the Stanley Mosk Courthouse.
Counsel for Moving Defendant to give notice.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an abuse of process action. Plaintiff Jason
Richard Aula (“Plaintiff”) brings suit against Defendants Jennifer Jo Anne
Clark and California Department of Child Support Services (erroneously named
and sued as the State of California) (hereafter, “Defendants”) alleging the
following cause of action:
1. Abuse Of Court Process.
The Complaint alleges that Defendants abused the court with
respect to Riverside Superior Court Case Number INK1600305 which concerned
Plaintiff’s child support obligations.
Defendant California Department of Child Support Services
(erroneously named and sued as the State of California) (hereafter, “Moving
Defendant”) filed the instant Special Motion to Strike Complaint For Abuse Of
Process (the “Motion”).
GROUNDS FOR MOTION
Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, Moving
Defendant moves to strike the entire Complaint on the grounds that Plaintiff’s
claims arise out of acts in furtherance of Moving Defendant’s free speech
rights in connection with a public issue and Plaintiff cannot demonstrate a
probability of prevailing.
REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
The Court GRANTS Moving
Defendant’s unopposed request to take judicial notice of Exhibits 1-10. (See
Evid. Code, § 452(a), (c), (d), (h).)
DISCUSSION
As an initial matter, Plaintiff did not file any
opposition to the Motion, effectively consenting to the Court granting it. (See
Cal. R. Ct., 8.54(c) [“A failure to oppose a motion may be deemed a consent to
the granting of the motion.”].)
I.
TIMELINESS
“The special motion may be filed within 60 days of the
service of the complaint or, in the court’s discretion, at any later time upon
terms it deems proper.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16(f).)
The Court finds the Motion timely.
II.
ANTI-SLAPP ANALYSIS
Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16,
subdivision (b)(1): “A cause of action against a person arising from any act of
that person in furtherance of the person's right of petition or free speech
under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in
connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike,
unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a
probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (Code Civ. Proc., §
425.16(b)(1).) “In making its determination, the court shall consider the
pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which
the liability or defense is based.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16(b)(2).)
A. Prong One: Moving Defendant’s Burden
Under the anti-SLAPP statute, an “act in furtherance of a
person's right of petition or free speech under the United States or California
Constitution in connection with a public issue” includes: “(1) any written or
oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial
proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written
or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under
consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any
other official proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement
or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection
with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of
the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional
right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public
interest.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(e); see also Equilon Ent., LLC v.
Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 66.)
A moving defendant has the initial burden to demonstrate
that a cause of action is subject to a special motion to strike. (Martinez
v. Metabolife Inter. Ins. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 181, 186; Fox
Searchlight Pictures Inc. v. Paladino (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 294, 304.)
Specifically, courts decide whether a moving defendant has made a prima facie
showing that the attacked claims arise from a protected activity, including
defendants’ right of petition or free speech. (See, e.g., Healy v.
Tuscany Hills Landscape & Recreation Corp., (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1,
5; Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 278;
Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(e).) “[A] moving defendant's burden to show a cause of
action arising from is not met simply by showing that the label of the lawsuit
appears to involve the rights of free speech or petition; he or she must
demonstrate that the substance of the plaintiff's cause of action was an act in
furtherance of the right of petition or free speech.” (Jespersen v. Zubiate-Beauchamp (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 624, 630.)
“The sole inquiry under the first prong of the anti-SLAPP statute is whether
the plaintiff's claims arise from protected speech or petitioning activity.” (Castleman
v. Sagaser (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 481, 490 (citing Coretronic Corp. v.
Cozen O'Connor (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1381, 1389); see Feldman v. 1100 Park Lane Associates (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1467,
1478 [“The critical consideration is whether the cause of action is based on
the defendant's protected free speech or petitioning activity.”].)
“At this first step, courts are to ‘consider the elements
of the challenged claim and what actions by the defendant supply those elements
and consequently form the basis for liability.’” (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health
System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1009 (quoting Park v. Board of Trustees of
California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1063).) “The
defendant's burden is to identify what acts each challenged claim rests on and
to show how those acts are protected under a statutorily defined category of
protected activity.” (Id. (citing Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc.
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 884).)
The California Supreme Court in Bonni held that,
in evaluating anti-SLAPP motions directed to an entire cause of action or
complaint, each allegation of protected activity must be evaluated separately,
with the moving defendant bearing the burden of showing that each allegation
supporting a claim of recovery is one that rests on protected activity. (Id.
at 1010-1013.) “Assertions that are ‘merely incidental’ or ‘collateral’ are not
subject to section 425.16. Allegations of protected activity that merely provide
context, without supporting a claim for recovery, cannot be stricken under the
anti-SLAPP statute.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 394;
accord, Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at 1012.)
Here, Moving Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s claims fall
within Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 because they arise out of conduct
in furtherance of Moving Defendant’s exercise of their constitutional rights of
petition or free speech in connection with a public issue or issue of public
interest, reasoning that they arise out of Moving Defendant’s protected
litigation activities in seeking modification and enforcement of a judgment of
paternity and child support orders entered against Plaintiff. (Motion, pp. 13-15.)
The Complaint alleges that Defendant Clark is an employee
of Moving Defendant and a lawyer, and that Defendants harmed Plaintiff when
they abused the judicial process by bringing a motion to modify Plaintiff’s
child support obligations. (See Compl., ¶¶ 2-3, 8-9, 13-17, 19-23, 27-30, Exs.
A-E.)
The anti-SLAPP statute protects litigation-related speech
and activity, including the filing, funding, and prosecution of a civil action
and communications reasonably relevant to pending or contemplated litigation. (See,
e.g., Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1056 [anti-SLAPP
statute protects “communicative conduct such as the filing, funding, and
prosecution of a civil action,” including such acts when “committed by
attorneys in representing clients in litigation”]; accord, Cabral v. Martins
(2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 471, 479-480; Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29
Cal.4th 82, 90-95 [action whereby management company sued trustee alleging that
the trustee had committed fraud in misrepresenting his intention to be bound by
a settlement release and had committed breach of contract by filing
counterclaims allegedly subjected to the settlement release falls within
anti-SLAPP statute because it involved statements or writings made in
connection with an issue under consideration or review by a judicial body].)
In Maleti v. Wickers (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 181,
citing Booker, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at 1370, the Court of
Appeal explained that:
[S]ection 425.16 potentially may apply
to every malicious prosecution action, because every such action arises from an
underlying lawsuit, or petition to the judicial branch. By definition, a
malicious prosecution suit alleges that the defendant committed a tort by
filing a lawsuit. Likewise, since the essence of the tort of abuse of process
... [is] some misuse of process in a prior action[,] ... it is hard to imagine
an abuse of process claim that would not fall under the protection of the
[anti-SLAPP] statute.
(Id. at 200-201 (internal citations and quotations
omitted).)
Here, the Court agrees with Moving Defendant that
Plaintiff’s claims arise out of Moving Defendant’s protected litigation
activity, namely, statements and conduct in connection with the child support
action brought against Plaintiff and litigated by Moving Defendant.
Thus, the Court finds that Moving Defendant satisfies its
burden demonstrating that Plaintiff’s claims arise out of acts in furtherance
of Moving Defendant’s right of petition or free speech under the United States
Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue
and therefore subject to a special motion to strike.
The burden now shifts to Plaintiff to demonstrate a
probability of prevailing on the merits of his Complaint.
B. Prong Two: Plaintiff’s Burden
If the moving party successfully shifts the burden, then
the opposing party must demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the merits
of the complaint. (Equilon Ent., supra, 29 Cal.4th at 67; Code
Civ. Proc. § 425.16(b)(1).)
To establish a probability of prevailing, the plaintiff “must
demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a
sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the
evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.” (Navellier, supra, 29
Cal.4th at 88–89 (internal citations and quotations omitted).)
“[I]n order to defeat a special motion to strike, a
plaintiff need only present sufficient evidence showing ‘a case of ‘minimal
merit.’’” (GetFugu, Inc. v. Patton Boggs LLP (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 141,
155 (quoting Grewal v. Jammu (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 977, 989).)
However, the plaintiff must nonetheless present
admissible evidence. (Finton Construction, Inc. v. Bidna & Keys, APLC
(2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 200, 213 [“An anti-SLAPP motion is an evidentiary
motion. Once the court reaches the second prong of the analysis, it must rely
on admissible evidence, not merely allegations in the complaint or conclusory
statements by counsel.”].)
Here, Plaintiff did not file any opposition brief or
evidence. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to meet his burden demonstrating a
probability of prevailing on the merits of the Complaint.
Accordingly, the Motion is GRANTED.
A. Attorney’s Fees
The fees and costs are limited
only to those incurred on the special motion to strike, (Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle Pub. Co. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1383),
and a prevailing defendant is only entitled to such fees as the court deems
reasonable. (Robertson v. Rodriguez (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 347, 362 [“We
readily conclude section 425.16… authorizes an award of reasonable attorney
fees to the prevailing party, irrespective of whether the prevailing party is
the plaintiff or the defendant.”].)
Here, after consideration of the declaration of Darin L.
Wessel, (see Darin L. Wessel Decl., ¶¶ 18-26), the Court finds that $500.00 per
hour is a reasonable rate.
Moving Defendant requests 54.75 hours incurred “in the
preparation of this motion and supporting papers,” constituting “51.25 hours
preparing the moving papers, gathering evidence for the motion, and performing
research for the motion,” 1.25 hours spent by counsel’s supervisor, and 2.25
hours spent communicating with the client. (Id. at ¶ 18.)
Additionally, Moving Defendant request fees for six (6)
hours anticipated to be spent on a reply brief and for two (2) hours
anticipated to be spent appearing for the hearing, (id. at ¶ 20), for a
total of 62.75.
Given Mr. Wessel’s experience and the contents of the
Motion, the Court does not find that 51.25 hours expended in preparing and
drafting the instant Motion is reasonable. The vast majority of the Motion constitute
assertions of law, including asserting the standards applicable to a special
motion to strike that would not require any research by counsel with Mr.
Wessel’s experience. With respect to the first prong arguments, the Motion
includes only two (2) paragraphs of analysis, (see Motion at p. 13, lines 15-21
& p. 15, lines 8-14), and the analysis does not include any comparisons of
the facts of the instant case with the facts of the cited cases.
With respect to the second prong analysis, although it
takes up approximately five and one-half (5.5) pages, most of it constitutes
assertions of law with little case-comparison analysis, and includes an
“anticipated” argument ordinarily reserved for the reply brief. (See Motion at
pp. 15-20.)
Thus, the Court reduces the 51.25 hours requested for
preparing and drafting the Motion by ten (10) hours.
Further, since there were no opposition or reply briefs
filed, the Court also does not award the six (6) hours requested by Moving
Defendant for a drafting a reply brief.
Accordingly, the Court awards $23,375.00 in attorney’s
fees for 46.75 hours reasonably expended.
B. Costs
Government Code section 6103.5, subdivision (a) provides,
in relevant part:
Whenever a judgment is recovered by a
public agency named in Section 6103, either as plaintiff or petitioner or as
defendant or respondent, in any action or proceeding to begin, or to defend,
which under the provisions of Section 6103 no fee for any official service
rendered by the clerk of the court… the clerk entering the judgment shall
include as a part of the judgment the amount of the filing fee, and the amount
of the fee for the service of process or notices which would have been paid but
for Section 6103, designating it as such.
(Govt. Code, § 6103.5(a).)
The Court finds that Moving Defendant is a public agency
pursuant to Government Code section 6103 and orders that the $435.00 filing fee that would have otherwise been paid by Moving Defendant were
it not exempt from payment of such fees pursuant to Government Code section
6103 be included in the judgment.