Judge: Stephanie M. Bowick, Case: 23STCV10787, Date: 2024-11-08 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV10787 Hearing Date: November 8, 2024 Dept: 19
After consideration of the briefing filed and oral argument at the hearing, Plaintiff ODK Capital, LLC’s unopposed Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is GRANTED, in part.
For the reasons explained below, while the Court GRANTS the Motion, the Court also GRANTS thirty (30) days leave to amend.
Thus, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s request for judgment to be entered in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant Rita Ortiz “¿in the amount of $46,644.00 plus court costs and attorney’s fees.”
Counsel for Plaintiff ODK Capital, LLC to give notice.
This is a
breach of contract action. Plaintiff ODK Capital, LLC (“Plaintiff”) brings suit
against Defendants Organic Quinoa Products Corp. (“Organic Quinoa”) and Rita
Ortiz (collectively, “Defendants”) alleging the following cause of action:
1. Breach of Contract.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “executed a Business
Loan and Security Agreement with accompanying supplement (hereinafter ‘BLSA’)
in favor of Celtic Bank (‘Celtic’),” that Defendant Ortiz executed a Personal
Guaranty (hereinafter the 'Guaranty”), that Celtic assigned its rights to Plaintiff,
and that Defendants breached the agreements by failing to pay $46,644.00 due
under the BLSA.
Plaintiff filed the instant Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (the “Motion”).
Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 438, Plaintiff moves for judgment on the pleadings, including an award of costs and attorneys fees, on the ground that Defendant Ortiz’s Answer fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a defense.
MEET AND CONFER
The Court finds that Plaintiff satisfied the meet and confer requirements prior to filing the Motion. (Alison K. Schlick Decl., ¶¶ 7-8.)
REQUEST FOR
JUDICIAL NOTICE
The Court notes that in the Notice of Motion and in the memorandum filed in support of the Motion, Plaintiff requests that the Court take judicial notice “of the contents of its file.”
The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s request because “[a]ny request for judicial notice must be made in a separate document listing the specific items for which notice is requested and must comply with rule 3.1306(c).” (Cal. R. Ct., 3.1113(l).)
California Rules of Court, rule 3.1306, subdivision (c) provides that:
A
party requesting judicial notice of material under Evidence Code sections 452
or 453 must provide the court and each party with a copy of the material. If
the material is part of a file in the court in which the matter is being heard,
the party must:
(1)
Specify in writing the part of the court file sought to be judicially
noticed; and
(2)
Either make arrangements with the clerk to have the file in the courtroom
at the time of the hearing or confirm with the clerk that the file is
electronically accessible to the court.
(Cal. R. Ct., 3.1306(c).)
Plaintiff’s request was not made in a separate document, and Plaintiff does not specify the specific items for which notice is requested. For this reason, Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice is denied.
As an initial matter, Defendant
Ortiz failed to file any opposition, effectively consenting to the Court
granting the requested relief. (See Cal. R. Ct., 8.54(c) [“A failure to oppose
a motion may be deemed a consent to the granting of the motion.”]; Sexton v.
Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410.)
I. MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
“A motion for judgment on the pleadings performs the same function as a general demurrer, and hence attacks only defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings or by matters that can be judicially noticed.” (Burnett v. Chimney Sweep (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1064.) “A motion for judgment on the pleadings may be made either prior to trial or at trial, on the same grounds as could be urged by a general demurrer.” (Ponderosa Homes, Inc. v. City of San Ramon (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1761, 1767 (citing Stockton Newspapers, Inc. v. Redevelopment Agency (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 95, 99).) “In deciding or reviewing a judgment on the pleadings, all properly pleaded material facts are deemed to be true, as well as all facts that may be implied or inferred from those expressly alleged.” (Fire Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 446, 452.) However, the court does not accept as true “conclusions of law or fact, opinions, speculation, or allegations contrary to law or facts that are judicially noticed.” (Stevenson Real Estate Servs., Inc. v. CB Richard Ellis Real Estate Servs., Inc. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1219-20.) Further, like a general demurrer, a motion for judgment on the pleadings does not lie as to a portion of a cause of action, and if any part of a cause of action is properly pleaded, the motion will be overruled (Fire Ins. Exchange, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at 552.) “In the case of either a demurrer or a motion for judgment on the pleadings, leave to amend should be granted if there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action.” (Gami v. Mullikin Medical Ctr. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 870, 876.)
Plaintiff argues that it is entitled to judgment on the pleadings as against Defendant Ortiz because Defendant Ortiz’s Answer, filed on July 3, 2024, does not deny Plaintiff’s allegations in the Complaint, reasoning that Defendant Ortiz failed to use paragraph numbers, failed to explain, or otherwise state facts sufficient to constitute a defense to the Complaint. (Motion, pp. 2-5.)
As an initial matter, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument that the Answer is defective because, in checking box 3b, Defendant Ortiz failed to use paragraph numbers. In the Answer, Defendant Ortiz checked box 3b, stating that she admits all of the allegations in the Complaint except “ALL PARAGRAPGHS.” While Defendant Ortiz could have simply checked box 3a, the Court finds that Defendant Ortiz, in Section 3 of the Answer, sufficiently explains that she generally denies each and every paragraph in the Complaint.
However, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that the Answer fails to sufficiently plead the affirmative defenses.
California law requires an answer to plead facts with as much detail as are required for a cause of action. (FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 384; see C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School District (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872 [“To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff's proof need not be alleged.”].)
“Affirmative defenses must not be pled as ‘terse legal conclusions,’ but ‘rather ... as facts ‘averred as carefully and with as much detail as the facts which constitute the cause of action and are alleged in the complaint.’’” (Quantification Settlement Agreement Cases (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 758, 812–813 (quoting FPI Development, Inc., supra, 231 Cal.App.3d at 384).)
In Section 4 of the Answer (“Affirmative Defenses”), Defendant Ortiz asserts affirmative defenses, including that the “contract” is void and unenforceable, that Plaintiff has waived “rights to the contract,” that Plaintiff breached the “contract,” and that the contract is unconscionable.
However, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that the facts alleged in Section 4 are insufficient to constitute an affirmative defense. For example, Defendant Ortiz must allege additional factual allegations as to which “contract” she is referring to, i.e., the BSLA, the Guaranty, or both, and must allege additional factual allegations as to why the “contract” is void and unenforceable, how Plaintiff waived “rights to the contract,” how Plaintiff breached the “contract,” and how/why the contract is unconscionable.
Nonetheless, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s suggestion that Defendant Ortiz’s failure to sufficiently allege the affirmative defenses, or failure to use paragraph numbers in generally denying “ALL PARAGRAPGHS,” compels the conclusion that Defendant Ortiz does not deny Plaintiff’s allegations in the Complaint.
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion is GRANTED.
II. LEAVE TO AMEND
“In the case of either a demurrer or a motion for judgment on the pleadings, leave to amend should be granted if there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action.” (Gami, supra, 18 Cal.App.4th at 876.) After a judgment on the pleadings is granted, the same standards apply in granting leave to amend as for demurrers and leave is routinely granted. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 438(h); Virginia G. v. ABC Unified Sch. Dist. (1993) 15 Cal. App. 4th 1848, 1852 [holding that when a motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted, denial of leave to amend constitutes an abuse of discretion if the pleading does not show on its face that it is incapable of amendment].) If leave to amend is granted, the party against whom the motion is granted must be given 30 days to file an amended pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 438(h)(2).)
The Court finds that there is a reasonable possibility that Plaintiff can allege additional factual allegations with respect to the affirmative defenses and therefore GRANTS 30 days leave to amend.
Plaintiff is to give notice.