Judge: Stephanie M. Bowick, Case: 23STCV21501, Date: 2024-12-05 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV21501 Hearing Date: December 5, 2024 Dept: 19
TENTATIVE RULING
After consideration of the briefing filed and oral argument at the hearing, Defendants Lingua Franca, LLC and Appreciate You Restaurant Group, LLC’s Motion for Protective Order is DENIED in its entirety.
The Court also DENIES Plaintiff’s request for sanctions made in Opposition.
Counsel for Plaintiff to give
notice.
STATEMENT OF
THE CASE
This is
a Private Attorneys’ General Act (“PAGA”) action. Plaintiff Jennifer Batter,
individually and on behalf of all other Aggrieved Employees (“Plaintiff”)
brings suit against Defendants Lingua Franca, LLC (“Lingua”) and Appreciate You
Restaurant Group, LLC (“Appreciate”) (collectively, “Defendants”) alleging the
following cause of action:
Defendants
filed the instant Motion for a Protective Order (the “Motion”).
GROUNDS FOR MOTION
Pursuant to Code of Civil
Procedure sections ¿2017.020,
2019.030, 2030.090, 2031.060, and 2033.080, Defendants move for a protective
order on the grounds that Plaintiff’s discovery requests are ¿excessive, unwarranted,
harassing, duplicative, and intended to cause Defendants, who operate a small
local restaurant, extreme financial distress.
Additionally, pursuant to Code of
Civil Procedure sections 2017.020, 2019.030, 2030.090, and 2033.080, Defendants
request that the Court award sanctions jointly against Plaintiff and
Plaintiff’s counsel on the ground that they have abused the discovery process.
DISCUSSION
I.
Legal Standards
Code of Civil Procedure section
2017.010 provides that:
Unless otherwise
limited by order of the court in accordance with this title, any party may
obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the
subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any
motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in
evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence. Discovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party
seeking discovery or of any other party to the action. Discovery may be
obtained of the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any
discoverable matter, as well as of the existence, description, nature, custody,
condition, and location of any document, electronically stored information,
tangible thing, or land or other property.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010; see
Code Civ. Proc., § 2019.010.)
However, Code of Civil Procedure
section 2017.020, subdivision (a) provides as follows:
The court shall
limit the scope of discovery if it determines that the burden, expense, or
intrusiveness of that discovery clearly outweighs the likelihood that the
information sought will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The court
may make this determination pursuant to a motion for protective order by a
party or other affected person. This motion shall be accompanied by a meet and
confer declaration under Section 2016.040.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.020(a).)
Similarly, Code of Civil
Procedure section 2019.030, subdivisions (a) and (b) provide that:
(a) The court
shall restrict the frequency or extent of use of a discovery method provided in
Section 2019.010 if it determines either of the following:
(1) The
discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable
from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less
expensive.
(2) The
selected method of discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into
account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of
the issues at stake in the litigation.
(b) The court
may make these determinations pursuant to a motion for a protective order by a
party or other affected person. This motion shall be accompanied by a meet and
confer declaration under Section 2016.040.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 2019.030(a)-(b).)
The meet and confer declaration “shall
state facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal
resolution of each issue presented by the motion.” (Code Civ. Proc., §
2016.040.)
Here, Defendants move for a
protective order with respect to the following discovery propounded by
Plaintiff on June 14, 2024: (1) Form Interrogatories, General, against Defendant
Lingua; (2) Form Interrogatories, General, against Defendant Appreciate; (3)
Form Interrogatories, Employment, against Defendant Lingua; (4) Form
Interrogatories, Employment, against Defendant Appreciate; (5) Special
Interrogatories, Set One, against Defendant Lingua; (6) Special
Interrogatories, Set One, against Defendant Appreciate; (7) Request for
Admissions, Set One, against Defendant Lingua; (8) Request for Admissions, Set
One, against Defendant Appreciate; (9) Request for Production of Documents, Set
One, against Defendant Lingua; (10) Request for Production of Documents, Set
One, against Defendant Appreciate. (Mojan Anari Decl., ¶ 6.)
Code of Civil Procedure section
2030.090, provides, in relevant part, that:
(a) When
interrogatories have been propounded, the responding party, and any other party
or affected natural person or organization may promptly move for a protective
order. This motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under
Section 2016.040.
(b) The court,
for good cause shown, may make any order that justice requires to protect any
party or other natural person or organization from unwarranted annoyance,
embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense. This protective
order may include, but is not limited to, one or more of the following
directions:
(1) That the
set of interrogatories, or particular interrogatories in the set, need not be
answered.
(2) That,
contrary to the representations made in a declaration submitted under Section
2030.050, the number of specially prepared interrogatories is unwarranted.
(3) That the
time specified in Section 2030.260 to respond to the set of interrogatories, or
to particular interrogatories in the set, be extended.
(4) That the
response be made only on specified terms and conditions.
(5) That the
method of discovery be an oral deposition instead of interrogatories to a
party.
(6) That a
trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial
information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a certain way.
(7) That some
or all of the answers to interrogatories be sealed and thereafter opened only
on order of the court.
(c) If the
motion for a protective order is denied in whole or in part, the court may
order that the party provide or permit the discovery against which protection
was sought on terms and conditions that are just.
(Code Civ. Proc., §
2030.090(a)-(c).)
While a party may propound “[a]ny
additional number of official form interrogatories, as described in Chapter 17
(commencing with Section 2033.710), that are relevant to the subject matter of
the pending action,” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.030(a)(2)), a party is only permitted, as a matter of right, to propound
no more than thirty-five (35) specially prepared interrogatories.” (Code Civ.
Proc., § 2030.030(b).) However, Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.040
provides that:
…any party who attaches a supporting declaration as
described in Section 2030.050 may propound a greater number of specially
prepared interrogatories to another party if this greater number is warranted
because of any of the following:
(1) The complexity or the quantity of the existing and
potential issues in the particular case.
(2) The financial burden on a party entailed in conducting
the discovery by oral deposition.
(3) The expedience of using this method of discovery to
provide to the responding party the opportunity to conduct an inquiry,
investigation, or search of files or records to supply the information sought.
(Code
Civ. Proc., § 2030.040(a).)
“If the
responding party seeks a protective order on the ground that the number of
specially prepared interrogatories is unwarranted, the propounding party shall
have the burden of justifying the number of these interrogatories.” (Code Civ.
Proc., § 2030.040(b).)
The
concept of good cause requires a showing of specific facts demonstrating undue
burden, unwarranted embarrassment, oppression, or unwarranted annoyance, and
justifying the relief sought. (Goodman v. Citizens Life & Casualty Ins.
Co. (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d 807, 819-820 (citing Waters v. Superior Court
of Los Angeles County (1962) 58 Cal.2d 885, 893; Carlson v. Superior
Court of Los Angeles County (1961) 56 Cal.2d 431, 437-438).)
The
burden is on the party seeking the protective order to show “good cause” for
whatever order is sought. (Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 22
Cal.4th 245, 255 (citing Goodman, supra, 253 Cal.App.2d at 819).)
Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.060 provides, in
relevant part, that:
(a) When an inspection, copying,
testing, or sampling of documents, tangible things, places, or electronically
stored information has been demanded, the party to whom the demand has been
directed, and any other party or affected person, may promptly move for a
protective order. This motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer
declaration under Section 2016.040.
(b) The court, for good cause
shown, may make any order that justice requires to protect any party or other
person from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue
burden and expense. This protective order may include, but is not limited to,
one or more of the following directions:
(1) That all or some of the items
or categories of items in the demand need not be produced or made available at
all.
(2) That the time specified in
Section 2031.260 to respond to the set of demands, or to a particular item or
category in the set, be extended.
(3) That the place of production
be other than that specified in the demand.
(4) That the inspection, copying,
testing, or sampling be made only on specified terms and conditions.
(5) That a trade secret or other
confidential research, development, or commercial information not be disclosed,
or be disclosed only to specified persons or only in a specified way.
(6) That the items produced be
sealed and thereafter opened only on order of the court.
[….]
(g) If the motion for a
protective order is denied in whole or in part, the court may order that the
party to whom the demand was directed provide or permit the discovery against
which protection was sought on terms and conditions that are just.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.060(a)-(c), (g).)
“The
court, for good cause shown, may make any order that justice requires to
protect any party or other natural person or organization from unwarranted
annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense.” (Code
Civ. Proc., § 2033.080(b).) “If the motion for a protective order is denied in
whole or in part, the court may order that the responding party provide or
permit the discovery against which protection was sought on terms and
conditions that are just.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.080(c).)
A party
is only permitted, as a matter of right, to propound no more than thirty-five
(35) requests for admission that do not relate to the genuineness of a
document, (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.050(a)), but “may request a greater number
of admissions by another party if the greater number is warranted by the
complexity or the quantity of the existing and potential issues in the
particular case.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.040(a).) To do so, the propounding
party must provide a declaration as described in Code of Civil Procedure
section 2033.050 (the “declaration of necessity”), (Code Civ. Proc., §
2033.030), and, without a declaration of necessity, a responding party “need
only respond to the first 35 admission requests served that do not relate to
the genuineness of documents, if that party states an objection to the balance
under Section 2033.230 on the ground that the limit has been exceeded.” (Code
Civ. Proc., § 2033.030(b).) When a party propounds more than thirty-five (35)
requests for admission not relating to the genuineness of documents, the responding party may seek a protective order
under Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.080. (Code Civ. Proc., §
2033.040(a); see Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.030(c) [“The number of requests for
admission of the genuineness of documents is not limited except as justice
requires to protect the responding party from unwarranted annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden and expense.”].)
“If the responding party seeks a
protective order on the ground that the number of requests for admission is
unwarranted, the propounding party shall have the burden of justifying the
number of requests for admission.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.040(b).)
II.
Analysis
As a preliminary matter, the Court
finds that the declaration of Mojan Anari complies with Code of Civil Procedure
section 2016.040.
The Court finds that Defendants
fail to sufficiently demonstrate good cause for a
protective order with respect to the form interrogatories.
Beyond
generally arguing that a protective
order is warranted on the ground that the total amount of discovery, including
the form interrogatories, propounded in this action and in another PAGA action,
¿Elyssa Christensen v. Wax Paper, LLC, et al., Case No. 23STCV19453 (the “Christensen Action”), is ¿excessive, unwarranted,
harassing, duplicative, and/or intended to cause Defendants extreme financial
distress, (see, generally, Motion), Defendants do not
assert any argument specific to form interrogatories beyond the argument that
the requests are identical to the form interrogatories propounded in the
Christensen Action. (Motion, pp. 6-7.)
Yet,
Defendants fail to explain why, if the requests are identical to those
propounded in the Christensen Action, Defendants may not simply “copy
and paste” responses. The Court does not find a
protective order with respect to the form interrogatories is warranted merely
because the form interrogatories propounded in the instant action are identical
to the form interrogatories propounded in the Christensen Action. There is
little effort and expense required to “copy and paste” identical responses to
identical form interrogatories.
Moreover,
unlike with special interrogatories, Plaintiff may propound “[a]ny
additional number of official form interrogatories… that are relevant to the
subject matter of the pending action,” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.030(a)(2)), and
Defendants do not contend that any of the form interrogatories propounded in
the instant action are not relevant.
While Defendants argue that the
discovery requests, including the form interrogatories, seek confidential
information in violation of third parties’ rights to privacy, (Motion at p. 13), Defendants fail to explain
or demonstrate why asserting such objections to the applicable discovery
requests will be burdensome or cause undue hardship.
With respect to the special
interrogatories, Defendants argue that the 178 special interrogatories [89 for
each defendant] propounded in the instant action are excessive, reasoning that
the requests are identical to the requests propounded in the Christensen Action and “the ¿named entities are not all actual employers of
the plaintiffs in each case, and thus all discovery served on the improperly
named entities are improper and¿
simply create an additional and unnecessary burden.” (Motion at pp. 6-7;
see id. at p. 12.)
The Court rejects this argument
because each set of special interrogatories propounded in the instant action
are directed to a defendant named in this action. (Anari Decl. at Ex. D.) The Christensen Action is not before this Court, and if
Defendants believe they are entitled to a protective order in that action, then
Defendants must seek it from the Court in that action. As with the form
interrogatories, the Court does not find that a protective order is warranted
merely on the basis that identical special interrogatories were propounded in
the Christensen Action because counsel for Defendants
may merely “copy and paste” responses.
Defendants also argue that a protective order is
warranted because Plaintiff’s declaration of
necessity to propound more than thirty-five (35) special interrogatories
is “wholly” insufficient, reasoning that it “¿is
nothing more than a bare recitation of conclusory statements, which fails to
comply with the Code of Civil Procedure sections 2030.040 and 2030.050.”
(Motion at pp. 4, 7, 10-12.)
As stated above, “[i]f the responding party seeks a protective order on the
ground that the number of specially prepared interrogatories is unwarranted,
the propounding party shall have the burden of justifying the number of these
interrogatories.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.040(b).)
The
declaration of Haig B. Kazandjian attached to the propounded special
interrogatories states, in relevant part, as follows:
¿This number of questions is warranted under CCP §
2030.040(a) because of the complexity or quantity of the existing and potential
issues in this particular case, including the unclear defenses and/or
affirmative defenses Defendant will raise and the expedience of using this
method of discovery to attempt to limit the issues in the action and to provide
to the responding party the opportunity to conduct an inquiry, investigation,
or search of files or records to respond to the information which is sought.
(Anari
Decl. at ¶ D at declaration of Haig B. Kazandjian, ¶ 8.)
The
Court does not find that the declaration of Haig B. Kazandjian is “wholly”
devoid of any facts, but rather indicates that the additional special
interrogatories are warranted “because of the complexity or quantity of the
existing and potential issues in this particular case, including the unclear
defenses and/or affirmative defenses Defendant will raise….” In her Opposition
papers, Plaintiff sets forth a more detailed explanation. (Rafi Tapanian Decl.,
¶ 12; see Opposition, pp. 4-5, 9-11.) The Court notes that Defendants failed to
file any Reply brief.
Thus,
the Court finds that Plaintiff sustains her burden justifying the additional
special interrogatories.
Moreover,
Defendants do not contend that the complexity or quantity of the existing and
potential issues in the instant action do not support the additional special
interrogatories, but rather, as argued by Plaintiff, (Opposition at pp. 7-8),
merely contend that a protective order is warranted due to the total number of
discovery requests propounded in both the instant action and in the Christensen
Action. (Motion at pp. 6-7, 9-12.)
Finally, Defendants argue that the interrogatories are
vague, ambiguous, and overbroad. (Motion at pp. 12-13.) However, Defendants
fail to explain or demonstrate why asserting these objections to the applicable
discovery requests will be burdensome or cause undue hardship.
For these reasons, the Court
finds that Defendants fail to sufficiently demonstrate good
cause for a protective order with respect to the special interrogatories.
With
respect to the requests for production of documents and the requests for
admission, Defendants do not assert any additional arguments beyond the general
arguments that the total number of discovery requests propounded in both the
instant action and in the Christensen Action. (See Motion at pp. 6-12.)
As
discussed above, the Court does not find that a protective order is warranted
merely because of the amount of discovery propounded in both the instant action
and in the Christensen Action. Defendants concede that “¿[t]he requests are identical of each other in each case.”
(Motion at p. 6.) The Court does not find that having to respond to the same
discovery requests twice will cause undue burden or hardship. Plaintiff did not
propound more than thirty-five (35) requests for admissions.
For these reasons, the Court
finds that Defendants fail to sufficiently demonstrate good
cause for a protective order with respect to the requests for production of
documents or the requests for admission.
Accordingly,
for all the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Protective Order is
DENIED.
Code of Civil Procedure section 2017.020, subdivision (b)
provides that:
The court shall impose a monetary
sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party,
person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion for a
protective order under this section, unless it finds that the one subject to
the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances
make the imposition of the sanction unjust.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.020(b); accord, Code Civ. Proc.,
§§ 2019.030(c), 2025.480(j), 2030.090(d); 2033.080(d).)
“‘Substantial justification’ means ‘that a justification
is clearly reasonable because it is well grounded in both law and fact.’” (Evilsizor
v. Sweeney (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1304, 1312 (quoting Doe v. United
States Swimming, Inc. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1424).)
Given that the Court finds that Defendants failed to
establish good cause for a protective order, the Court DENIES Defendants’
request for sanctions.
In Opposition, Plaintiff argues that the Court should
impose sanctions on Defendants because “Defendants have not shown that any
particular request meets the standard for a Protective Order,” but instead
“simply rely on the number of requests at issue in the pending discovery of
this matter and in an unrelated separate matter filed by Plaintiff’s counsel on
behalf of another individual, and on unsupported privacy objection which, as
Plaintiff’s counsel proposed, can be addressed by the use of the Belaire-West
notice process.” (Opposition at pp. 11-12.)
The Court does not find that an imposition of sanctions
against Defendants is warranted under the circumstances. Although the Court
does not find that a protective order is warranted, Plaintiff still propounded
a large number of discovery requests, and the Court finds that additional facts
could have been asserted in the declaration for necessity for the special
interrogatories.
Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s request for
sanctions.