Judge: Stephanie M. Bowick, Case: 23STCV22541, Date: 2025-03-13 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV22541 Hearing Date: March 13, 2025 Dept: 19
3/13/2025
Dept. 19
Hon. Rolf Treu, Judge
presiding
PADILLA v. GM (23STCV22541)
Counsel for Plaintiffs/moving parties: SYLVIA PADILLA
and ARIEL A. PADILLA SAGASTUME (PRESTIGE LEGAL SOLUTIONS, P.C.)
Counsel for Defendant/opposing party: GENERAL MOTORS
LLC (ERSKINE LAW, APC )
MOTION TO COMPEL
FURTHER RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFFS’ REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS, SET ONE (filed 1/31/2025)
TENTATIVE RULING
Plaintiffs’ motion to compel further responses to request for
production of documents, set one, is DENIED.
I.
BACKGROUND
On
September 18, 2023, plaintiffs SYLVIA PADILLA and ARIEL PADILLA SAGASTUME
(“Plaintiffs”) filed this action against defendant GENERAL MOTORS LLC
(“Defendant”).
Plaintiffs are asserting the following causes of action:
1. VIOLATION
OF SUBDIVISION (D) OF CIVIL CODE SECTION 1793.2
2. VIOLATION
OF SUBDIVISION (B) OF CIVIL CODE SECTION 1793.2
3. VIOLATION
OF SUBDIVISION (A)(3) OF CIVIL CODE SECTION 1793.2
4. BREACH
OF THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY (CIV. CODE § 1791.1; § 1794)
The
Complaint alleges the following: On or around July 30, 2021, Plaintiffs
purchased a new 2021 Chevrolet Tahoe having defects including transmission,
electrical, and infotainment system defects, which Defendant has not repaired
after a reasonable number of attempts. (Complaint, ¶¶ 9-12.)
A. The Parties’ Arguments
On January 31, 2005, Plaintiffs filed a motion to compel
further discovery responses within 10 calendar days, without objections, arguing:
·
Plaintiffs’
requests seek documents related to Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act claims,
including documents relating to:
o
(1) Plaintiffs’
own vehicle (Request Nos. 4, 5, 8, 28 – 30, 70);
o
(2) Defendant’s
warranty and repurchase policies, procedures, and practices (Request Nos. 6, 7,
9, 39 – 44, 47, 51 – 56, 67); and
o
(3) Defendant’s
knowledge of the same or similar defects in other vehicles of the same year,
make, and model as the Subject Vehicle (Request Nos. 11 – 25, 33, 45, 46, 48,
59, 60).
·
Despite the
relevance of Plaintiffs’ document requests, Defendant asserted boilerplate
objections and failed to provide code compliant responses, in violation of the
Code of Civil Procedure.
·
In an attempt
to avoid motion practice, Plaintiffs unsuccessfully attempted to meet and
confer in good faith.
On February 27, 2025, Defendant filed an opposition,
arguing:
·
GM timely
responded and/or served valid objections to all 298 requests.
·
The documents
GM has already produced to date include:
o
GM’s Global
Warranty History Reports for Plaintiffs’ Tahoe, including that vehicle’s
Transaction History documenting all the warranty repairs for which GM—not
Plaintiffs— paid;
o
GM’s Customer
Assistance Center records reflecting communications regarding Plaintiffs’ Tahoe
(i.e., the Service Request Activity Reports);
o
the 2021
Chevrolet Limited Warranty and Owner Assistance Information (i.e., the
o
document
containing the warranty at issue);
o
BARS Invoice
reflecting the components included in Plaintiffs’ Tahoe at the time of
o
delivery and
the corresponding MSRP value;
o
the Vehicle
Summary and Repair Order Details for Plaintiffs’ Tahoe reflecting the
o
amounts paid
for warranty repairs;
o
incidentally-obtained
repair orders for Plaintiffs’ Tahoe;
o
GM’s
Transaction Detail Info Data for Plaintiffs’ Tahoe;
o
the Owner’s
Manual for the 2021 Chevrolet Tahoe; and
o
lists of
technical service bulletins (“TSBs”) and information service bulletins (“ISBs”)
for the 2021 Chevrolet Tahoe, as well as specific bulletins.
·
GM objected to
Plaintiffs’ requests to the extent that they sought (1) information that was
not within GM’s possession, custody, or control, because GM’s investigation is
ongoing and not yet complete; (2) information regarding topics, and issues
beyond and/or unrelated to the components of the subject vehicle about which
Plaintiffs made allegations in the Complaint; (3) documents that were protected
by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine, or Section 2034.010 et
seq. of the Code of Civil Procedure; and (4) information that was confidential,
proprietary, competitively sensitive, and/or trade secret. (Id.)
·
On January 30,
2025, without in good faith providing GM sufficient time to respond to
Plaintiffs’ sole meet-and-confer letter, Plaintiffs filed the present Motion to
Compel. (Davis -Decl. ¶ 5.)
On March 6, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a reply, arguing:
·
Defendant
failed to provide the entirety of a non-confidential and confidential document
production.
·
Defendant’s
responses to Request Nos. 6, 7, 9, 12-18, 20-23, 28, 29, 31, 37-51, 53, 54,
56-58, 65, and 68 consist of boilerplate objections and responses that are not
Code-compliant.
·
Defendant has
not produced an email, memoranda, data or investigation that could help
Plaintiffs establish Defendant’s knowledge of the same or similar defects in
other vehicles of the same year, make, and model.
·
This evidence
will establish Defendant’s knowledge and inability to repair the defects, as
well as its failure to repurchase the Subject Vehicle despite Defendant’s
inability to repair the vehicle within a reasonable number of repair
opportunities. (Grigoryan Decl., ¶ 17.)
·
Defendant chose
to ignore Plaintiffs’ meet and confer efforts, even after Plaintiffs’ meet and
confer letter offered Defendant an extension to provide code-compliant
supplemental responses and responsive documentation.
A.
Legal
Standard
Where
respondents object or respond inadequately as to discovery requests, a motion
lies to compel further responses, as to which respondent has the burden to
justify the objections. (Fairmont Ins.
Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255; Code Civ. Proc., §
2030.300, subd. (a) [motion to compel further responses lies “[o]n receipt of a
response to interrogatories….”); and § 2031.310, subd. (a) (motion to compel
further responses lies “[o]n receipt of a response to an inspection
demand….”].)
A
document response must consist of: 1) an agreement to comply, stating whether
the productions or inspection will be allowed “in whole or in part,” and that
all documents or things in the possession, custody or control of the
respondent, as to which no objection is made, will be included, by the date set
for inspection (unless informally extended in writing, or the designated timing
is subject to objection); 2) a representation of inability to comply, with a
specification of any person believed or known to have possession of documents;
or, 3) objections and specification of withheld documents. (Code Civ. Proc., §§
2031.210, subd. (a), 2031.220, 2031.270, 2031.280.)
“‘Discovery
statutes vest a wide discretion in the trial court, and exercise of that
discretion will be disturbed only when it can be said there has been an abuse
of discretion.” (Cadiz Land Co. v. Rail
Cycle (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 74, 117.)
B.
Relevance
and Overbreadth
Plaintiffs argue that all
discovery is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence, including for showing Defendant’s knowledge and inability to repair
the defects, and failure to repurchase the subject vehicle despite Defendant’s
inability to repair the vehicle within a reasonable number of repair
opportunities.
“‘An
order compelling discovery must rest on a showing that the discovery is
reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence….’” (Cadiz Land Co. v.
Rail Cycle (2000) 83 Cal. App. 4th 74, 117. Similarly, as to overbreadth objections involving no
claim of privilege, courts determine whether the discovery is “‘reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence’”, generally
resolving doubt in favor of permitting discovery. (Williams v. Sup. Ct.
(2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 542.)
As
for whether documentation from other
vehicle purchases, beyond Plaintiff’s, is discoverable, there is no
governing California case cited on point. “A legal proposition asserted without
apposite authority necessarily fails.” (People v. Taylor (2004) 119
Cal.App.4th 628, 643.)
Plaintiffs
typically rely on opinions that did not involve any issue about scope of
discovery in automobile defect cases. (See, e.g., Santana
v. FCA US, LLC (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 334, 346 [in support of
punitive damages, based on concealment, plaintiffs needed evidence that, prior
to purchase of the vehicle, the defendant manufacturer was aware of a defect it
was either unwilling or unable to repair]; Doppes v. Bentley Motors,
Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 996 [the trial court had to impose
terminating sanctions once it was learned during trial that Bentley still had
failed to comply with discovery orders and directives and Bentley's misuse of
the discovery process was even worse than previously known.”]; Donlen v.
Ford Motor Company (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 138, 154 [“Ford asserts the trial
court abused its discretion when it denied Ford's in limine motions to exclude
evidence of other vehicles and of the nonwarranty repair. We have already
concluded the court did not abuse its discretion….”]; Berroteran v. Sup. Ct.
(2019) 41 Cal. App. 5th 518, 536 [“the former testimony concerned Ford’s
6.0-liter diesel engine, policies and procedures for warranty claims,… For all
these reasons, the trial court abused its discretion in granting Ford’s motion
to exclude the entire depositions ….”]; Oregel v. American Isuzu Motors,
Inc. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1105 [“evidence would permit a jury to
infer that Isuzu impedes and resists efforts by a consumer to force Isuzu to
repurchase a defective car, regardless of the presence of an unrepairable
defect, and that Isuzu's decision to reject Oregel's demand was made pursuant
to Isuzu's policies rather than to its good faith and reasonable belief….”].)
Likewise,
defendants may rely on an unhelpful opinion, which did not address whether
discovery regarding other vehicles is proper, but distinguishably ruled that a
plaintiff failed to show prejudice by not having such discovery available for
trial. (See MacQuiddy v.
Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (2015) 233 Cal. App. 4th 1036, 1045 [“He also argues
courts have found relevant discovery requests seeking a car manufacturer's
warranty policies and procedures, policies on buyback requests, and other
customer complaints. Yet he does not show that, in this case, had the trial
court compelled responses to his requests or denied the protective order, it is
reasonably probable the jury would have found Mercedes-Benz willfully failed to
repurchase or replace his car.”]. Another opinion involved trial, not
discovery, and addressed no evidence of other customers, but did mention
evidence types in relation to the plaintiff customer, only. (See Kwan
v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 174, 185, 186
[Civil Code Section 1794 civil penalty for a willful violation may be shown if,
“evidence showed … [the manufacturer] failed to investigate the repair history of
the car,” “if the manufacturer reasonably believed the product did
conform to the warranty, or a reasonable number of repair attempts had not been
made, or the buyer desired further repair rather than replacement or
refund,” or, if there was a “lack of a written policy,…” ].) (Underscoring
added.) Another case sometimes cited by the defense, distinguishably involved
trial testimony and exhibits received from one dealer about the plaintiff’s
car, without any reference to conducting discovery or evidencing other
customers’ transactions. (See Lukather v. General Motors, LLC (2010) 181
Cal.App.4th 1041, 1051-1052 [“testimony and GM's telephone logs permitted the
trial court to make … reasonable inferences: GM knew or reasonably should have
known from information available from the dealer … that the Cadillac was a
‘lemon’….”].)
Regarding
these objections related to relevance and overbreadth, the Court observes that
the discovery mostly seeking information about other customers’
purchases is overly broad in addressing more than Plaintiff’s transaction and
fishing for an overly broad array of documents that are unlikely to show
Defendant’s knowing willfulness in not replacing the Plaintiff’s vehicle.
Even
as to some document requests that Plaintiff contends directly relate to the
subject vehicle, the documents would extend out to other purchasers. For
instance, document request number 28 states: “All DOCUMENTS which refer to,
reflect, or relate to any warranty extension that has been issued for concerns
which PLAINTIFFS presented the SUBJECT VEHICLE to YOU for diagnosis and/or
repair.” In other words, the request includes any warranty extension for
concerns that Plaintiffs presented, not just documents that relate to a
warranty extension issued only to Plaintiffs. (See reply, 1:8 (“Plaintiffs’ own
vehicle (Request Nos. 4, 5, 8, 28 – 30, 70).)
Hence,
the motion is denied, based upon the relevance-related objections.
C. Discovery Objections
The parties
dispute whether the other discovery objections should be sustained or
overruled.
1. Burdensome
The
parties dispute whether the objections based upon burdensome and oppressive
discovery apply.
“Oppression exists where there is ‘some
showing either of an intent to create an unreasonable burden or that the
ultimate effect of the burden is incommensurate with the result sought.’” (Day
v. Rosenthal (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 1125, 1171.) Objecting parties must file
evidence detailing the amount of work involved, in order to support objections
based upon burden and oppression. (West
Pico Furniture Co. v. Sup. Ct. (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417.) For example, an opinion reasoned that a trial
court, in its discretion, reasonably rejected a “burden” discovery objection
that responding would require “‘tens of thousands of man hours.’” (Lopez v.
Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. (2016) 246
Cal.App.4th 566, 594.) Another court found a document request to be oppressive,
where the response would require reviewing 13,000 insurance files, by five
employees, working for six weeks. (See Mead
Reinsurance Co. v. Sup. Ct. (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 313, 318.)
Here,
Defendant’s declaration fails to address how much work it would take to
respond.
Thus,
the Court overrules the objections that are based upon burden in responding.
2. Attorney-Client
Privilege and Work Product
The
parties disagree as to whether the privilege objections should be sustained or
overruled.
“[I]f
documents responsive to a document request are withheld on privilege grounds, a
privilege log or some equivalent specification of any asserted privilege
objection ‘shall’ be supplied.” (Roche v. Hyde (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th
757, 813.) “[L]egislation amended subdivision (c)(1) of Code of Civil Procedure
section 2031.240 to require the preparation of a privilege log ‘if necessary’
to ‘provide sufficient factual information for other parties to evaluate the
merits’ of a claim of privilege or protected work product.” (Bank of Amer.,
N.A. v. Sup. Ct. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1098.) Courts may require a
specific privilege log as to documents withheld. (Best Prods., Inc. v. Sup. Ct. (2004)
119 Cal.App.4th 1181, 1188-1189.) However, respondents get a second
chance to support privilege objections, because failures to provide a privilege
log or to set forth specific privilege objections are not grounds for finding
waivers of the objections. (Korea Data Systems Co. v. Sup. Ct. (1997) 51
Cal.App.4th 1513, 1516-1517.)
The
instant opposition fails to include evidence or a privilege log addressing the
attorney-client and work product objections.
Therefore,
the Court overrules these objections.
3. Trade
Secrets and Sensitive Commercial Information
The parties dispute whether
the trade-secrets objection should be overruled or sustained.
The party asserting
trade-secret objections has the burden to establish their existence. (Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Sup. Ct.
(1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1384, 1390.) Evidence Code Section 1061(b)(1)
requires parties seeking protective orders in criminal cases to submit an
affidavit based on personal knowledge listing qualifications to opine,
identifying alleged trade secrets and documents disclosing trade secrets, and
that section should be followed in a civil action. (Stadish v. Sup. Ct.
(1999) 71 Cal. App. 4th 1130, 1144-1145.) Similarly, the party claiming a
qualified privilege, such as confidential commercial information, has the
burden to show that the information falls within the privilege. (Lipton v.
Sup. Ct. (1996) 48 Cal. App. 4th 1599, 1618-1619.) Courts have limited
discretion with regard to granting motions to compel sensitive commercial
information over objections thereto. (Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Sup. Ct.
(1991) 233 Cal. App. 3d 1138, 1141 [court abused discretion in compelling
responses that may contain sensitive commercial information, without first
reviewing them in camera to ascertain relevance, and whether sensitive matter
should be redacted].)
Here, the opposing
declaration of counsel fails to be competent to support the trade-secret and
commercial-information objections. For example, the declaration of counsel
fails to show personal knowledge of the Defendant’s manufacturing business and
to address the elements of trade secrets.
In sum, the Court
readily finds that the defense attorney declaration did not address and support
objections, as to burden, attorney-client privilege, trade secrets and
sensitive commercial information.
Therefore,
the Court overrules such objections.
D. Meet and Confer
The parties
dispute whether meet and confer efforts were in good faith regarding duration
and communications.
A discovery motion should not be denied automatically based
upon the reason that the moving parties failed to meet and confer in good
faith. (Obregon v. Superior Court
(1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424, 434. But
see Townsend v. Superior Court
(1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1431, 1439 [motion must be denied where lack of meet and
confer].) “‘A determination of whether an attempt at informal resolution is
adequate . . . involves the exercise of discretion.’” (Stewart v. Colonial W. Agency (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1016.
Accord, Clement v. Alegre (2009) 177
Cal.App.4th 1277, 1293-1294.)
The adequacy of
the limited extent of meeting and conferring is debatable. Here, requiring more
meeting and conferring would not appear to be useful where the Court determines
that the subject discovery requests are unusually broadly sweeping, even for a
Lemon Law case.
Hence, the Court
will not deny the motion based on the issue of meeting and conferring.
III. DISPOSITION
Plaintiffs’ motion to compel further responses to request
for production of documents, set one, is DENIED.