Judge: Stephanie M. Bowick, Case: 23STCV27644, Date: 2024-05-29 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV27644 Hearing Date: May 29, 2024 Dept: 19
RULING
Cross-Defendant Michel Amar’s Motion to Strike Portions of the Cross-Complaint is DENIED.
Cross-Complainant Holloway Drive, LLC to file and serve an Answer within ten (10) days.
The Case Management Conference is advanced from 06/03/2024 and CONTINUED TO 08/06/2024, at 8:30 a.m.
Counsel for Cross-Complainant to give notice.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a breach of contract action. Plaintiff Michel Amar (“Plaintiff”) brings suit against Defendants Holloway Drive, LLC (“HD”) and Lubov Azria (collectively, “Defendants”) alleging the following causes of action:
1. Specific Performance;
2. Breach of Contract.
The Complaint alleges that, on or about August 27, 2020, Plaintiff and Defendant HD, through its agent Defendant Azria entered into a written contract (the “Purchase Agreement”) in which Defendant HD agreed to sell and Plaintiff agreed to buy the real property located at 8451 Carlton Way, Los Angeles, CA 90069 (the “Property”) for $1,250,000.00 (the “Purchase Price”).
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant HD is now seeking to rescind the Purchase Agreement “because instead of proceeding to trial against Zohar as required under the terms of the Purchase Agreement, Zohar, on the one hand and HD and Lubov Azria, on the other, have agreed to settle the Zohar Action in which, Plaintiff is informed and believes and on that basis alleges HD has agreed to sell the Property to Zohar notwithstanding HD’s contractual obligation to Plaintiff to defend against the Zohar Action so that Plaintiff can purchase the Property.”
Plaintiff now seeks to compel specific performance of the Purchase Agreement.
Defendant Holloway Drive, LLC (hereafter, “Cross-Complainant”) filed a Cross-Complaint (the “CC”) against Plaintiff (hereafter, “Cross-Defendant”) alleging the following causes of action:
1. Nuisance; and
2. Breach of Contract.
Cross-Defendant filed the instant Motion to Strike Portions of the Cross-Complaint (the “Motion”).
GROUNDS FOR MOTION
Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 435 and 436, Cross-Defendant moves to strike (1) punitive damages allegations; and (2) prayer for attorney’s fees.
MEET/CONFER
The Court finds that Defendant substantially complied with the meet and confer requirements. (See Adam S. Rossman Decl., ¶¶ 3-4.)
DISCUSSION
I. MOTION TO STRIKE
The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, “[s]trike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436(a).) The court may also “[s]trike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436(b).) A motion to strike cannot be based upon the grounds that a complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, but instead is properly based on grounds of superfluous or abusive allegations, or improprieties in form or procedure. (Ferraro v. Camarlinghi (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 509, 528-29.) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Code. Civ. Proc., § 437; Turman v. Turning Point of Central California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63 [“judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth”].)
A. Punitive Damages
“In order to state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a complaint must set forth the elements as stated in the general punitive damage statute, Civil Code section 3294.” (Turman, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at 63.) Civil Code section 3294 permits recovery of punitive damages where, in an action for breach of obligation not arising from contract, the plaintiff proves by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty “of oppression, fraud, or malice….” (Civ. Code, § 3294(a).) Malice is conduct “intended by the defendant to cause injury to plaintiff, or despicable conduct that is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard for the rights or safety of others.” (Civ. Code, § 3294(c)(1).) “Oppression” means “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.” (Civ. Code, § 3294(c)(2).) “Fraud” is “an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” (Civ. Code, § 3294(c)(3).) “The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages.” (Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166.) “Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud, or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim.” (Id.; see G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 22, 29.)
In other words, “[t]he mere carelessness or ignorance of the defendant does not justify the imposition of punitive damages.... Punitive damages are proper only when the tortious conduct rises to levels of extreme indifference to the plaintiff's rights, a level which decent citizens should not have to tolerate.” (Flyer's Body Shop Profit Sharing Plan v. Ticor Title Ins. Co. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1149, 1154; see American Airlines, Inc. v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1051 [“Punitive damages are appropriate if the defendant's acts are reprehensible, fraudulent or in blatant violation of law or policy.”].)
Here, the Court finds the allegations that Cross-Defendant intentionally blocked Cross-Complainant’s Easement, thereby depriving Cross-Complainant from having full use and enjoyment of its property are sufficient to state a prima facie claim for punitive damages. (CC, ¶¶ 6-10.)
B. Attorney’s Fees
The Court also finds, as argued by Cross-Complainant, that the prayer for attorney’s fees is not improper. Cross-Defendant did not demur to the Second Cause of Action on the ground that it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and the Second Cause of Action seeks to defend against the breach of contract claims asserted by Cross-Defendant in the Complaint. (CC at ¶¶ 17-21.) Since Cross-Defendant alleges in the Complaint that it is entitled to attorney’s fees, the Court agrees with Cross-Complainant that the prayer for attorney’s fees is not improper. (Van Slyke v. Gibson (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1296, 1297-1299.)
Accordingly, the Motion is DENIED.