Judge: Stephanie M. Bowick, Case: 24STCV20149, Date: 2024-11-18 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV20149    Hearing Date: November 18, 2024    Dept: 19

DEWEY DEMETRO, JR. v. ROBERT RAMIREZ


TENTATIVE RULING 

After consideration of the briefing filed and oral argument at the hearing, Defendant Robert Ramirez’s unopposed Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint is SUSTAINED in its entirety. Leave to amend is DENIED. 

Counsel for Defendant to submit a proposed judgment of dismissal. 

The Court sets a Non-Appearance Care Review Re: Proposed Judgment of Dismissal for November 27, 2024. At 8:30 a.m., in Department 19 of the Stanley Mosk Courthouse. 

Counsel for Defendant to give notice. 

STATEMENT OF THE CASE 

This action alleges denial of due process. Plaintiff Dewey Demetro, Jr. (“Plaintiff”) brings suit against Defendant Robert Ramirez (“Defendant”). 

The Complaint does not comply with California Rules of Court, rule 2.112 and the Court cannot discern any specific cause of action alleged. 

Plaintiff generally alleges that Defendant Ramirez improperly rejected a request for entry of default and/or default judgment that Plaintiff sought by way of Judicial Council Form CIV-100 filed in a different action. 

Defendant filed the instant Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint (the “Demurrer”). 

GROUNDS FOR DEMURRER 

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivisions (e) and (f), Defendant demurs to the Complaint on the grounds that it fails to allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and is uncertain. 

MEET/CONFER 

The Court finds that Defendant satisfied the meet and confer requirements. (See Lindsay N. Fraxier-Krane Decl., ¶¶ 2-4.) 

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 

The Court GRANTS Defendant’s unopposed request to take judicial notice of Exhibits 1-14. (Evid. Code, § 453(d), (h).) 

DISCUSSION 

As an initial matter, Plaintiff failed to file an opposition, effectively consenting to the Court sustaining the Demurrer without leave to amend. (See Cal. R. Ct., 8.54(c) [“A failure to oppose a motion may be deemed a consent to the granting of the motion.”]; Sexton v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410.) 

I.      DEMURRER 

A.    Demurrer for Uncertainty 

A demurrer to a pleading lies where the pleading is uncertain. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10(f).) “Uncertain” includes ambiguous and unintelligible. (Id.) “A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616; see Code Civ. Proc. §430.10(e); see also Weil & Brown, Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group) § 7:85 [“A demurrer for uncertainty will be sustained only where the complaint is so bad that defendant cannot reasonably respond--i.e., he or she cannot reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what counts or claims are directed against him or her."].) Moreover, “[a] special demurrer should be overruled where the allegations of the complaint are sufficiently clear to apprise the defendant of the issues which he is to meet.” (Gressley v. Williams (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 636, 643.) “Generally, the failure to specify the uncertain aspects of a complaint will defeat a demurrer based on the grounds of uncertainty.” (Fenton v. Groveland Comm. Services Dist. (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 797, 809, (disapproved on other grounds in Katzberg v. Regents of Univ. of Calif. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 300, 328, fn. 30) (citing Code Civ. Proc., § 430.60 & Coons v. Thompson (1946) 75 Cal.App.2d 687, 690).) 

The Court agrees with Defendant that the Complaint is so uncertain that Defendant cannot reasonably respond. The Court finds, as argued by Defendant, that the Complaint is largely unintelligible, fails to identify any causes of action, and fails to allege “facts with sufficient clarity to inform defendant Ramirez of the issues to be met.” (Demurrer, p. 7.) 

Accordingly, the Court SUSTAINS Defendant’s demurrer to the entire Complaint on the ground that it is uncertain. 

B.    Demurrer for Sufficiency 

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal. App. 4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally, with a view to substantial justice between the parties. (Code Civ. Proc. § 452; Stevens v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 594, 601.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal. App. 4th 968, 994.) “We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. We accept the factual allegations of the complaint as true and also consider matters which may be judicially noticed.” (Mitchell v. California Department of Public Health (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1000, 1007.) “The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.” (Hahn, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.) “To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff's proof need not be alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School District (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.)

 Defendant demurs to the entire Complaint on the ground that it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, arguing that (1) pursuant to the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity, Defendant is immune and cannot be held liable on the Complaint; and (2) it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute any cause of action. (Demurrer at pp. 4-7.) 

1.     Quasi-Judicial Immunity 

The Court agrees with Defendant that it is apparent from the face of the Complaint and matters judicially noticeable that Defendant is immune and cannot be held liable on the Complaint. 

As explained by the Court of Appeal in Howard v. Drapkin (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 843: 

The concept of judicial immunity is longstanding and absolute, with its roots in English common law. It bars civil actions against judges for acts performed in the exercise of their judicial functions and it applies to all judicial determinations, including those rendered in excess of the judge's jurisdiction, no matter how erroneous or even malicious or corrupt they may be. The judge is immune unless he has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. Beyond doubt, the doctrine of civil immunity of the judiciary in the performance of judicial functions is deeply rooted in California law.

(Id. at 851–852 (internal citations and quotations omitted).) 

“Under the concept of ‘quasi-judicial immunity,’ California courts have extended absolute judicial immunity to persons other than judges if those persons act in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity.” (Id. at 852-853.) As explained by the Court of Appeal in Howard:

 …courts look at the nature of the challenged act which a judge has performed to determine if it is truly judicial and therefore deserving of judicial immunity. So also, in determining whether a person is acting in a quasi-judicial fashion, the courts look at ‘the nature of the duty performed [to determine] whether it is a judicial act—not the name or classification of the officer who performs it, and many who are properly classified as executive officers are invested with limited judicial powers.’ (Pearson v. Reed [(1935) 6 Cal.App.2d 277] at pp. 286-287.) In Pearson, the court found that a prosecutor, in examining evidence submitted to him and in determining whether to prosecute a case against a defendant, is performing an act that is judicial in nature, thus making him both a quasi-judicial officer and an executive branch officer. (Ibid.)

(Id.) 

Here, the Complaint challenges that the rejection of Plaintiff’s request for entry of default and/or default judgment in an action pending in the Los Angeles Superior Court. The Court finds, as argued by Defendant, that the rejection of Plaintiff’s request was a judicial in nature and therefore Defendant, pursuant to the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity, cannot be held liable on Plaintiff’s Complaint. 

2.     Failure to State a Claim 

Additionally, for the same reasons discussed above in the analysis on Defendant’s demurrer for uncertainty, the Court agrees with Defendant that the Complaint “¿does not identify any cause of action,” and “does not state facts, even liberally construed, sufficient to constitute any cause of ¿action against Ramirez.” (Demurrer at pp. 5-6.) 

For all the foregoing reasons, the Court SUSTAINS Defendant’s demurrer to the Complaint in its entirety. 

II.   LEAVE TO AMEND 

Where the defect raised by a motion to strike or by demurrer is reasonably capable of cure, leave to amend is routinely and liberally granted to give the plaintiff a chance to cure the defect in question. (Velez v. Smith (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1174; see also McKenney v. Purepac Pharmaceutical Co. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 72, 78.) The burden of demonstrating a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment “is squarely on the plaintiff.” (Id.; see also Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349 [“Plaintiff must show in what manner he can amend his complaint and how that amendment will change the legal effect of his pleading.”].) 

Given that Defendant is immune from liability, the Court does not find that there is a reasonable possibility that the defects can be cured by amendment. Moreover, by failing to file any opposition, Plaintiff failed to request leave to amend and fails to demonstrate a reasonable possibility that the defects can be cured by amendment. 

Accordingly, leave to amend is DENIED. 

Defendant to give notice.