Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case: 18STCV07163, Date: 2023-02-16 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 18STCV07163 Hearing Date: February 16, 2023 Dept: 39
Evelyn
Moreno v. Jewel Mehlman, et al.
Case
No. 18STCV07163
Motion
to Quash
Plaintiff
Evelyn Moreno (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Jewel Mehlman and Felicia
Bander asserting causes of action for wage theft; failure to pay minimum wage; violations
of Labor Code sections 1194.2, 202, and 203; and unfair competition in
violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200. The initial complaint was filed on December
4, 2018, and the operative second amended complaint was filed on August 4,
2020.
Jewel
Mehlman passed away on March 12, 2021.
(Declaration of Joel Bander, ¶ 10.)
Joel Bander, who was Jewel Mehlman’s son-in-law and an attorney, opened
probate proceedings in May 2021, serving as the trustee of her estate. (Id., ¶ 11.)
Plaintiff filed a creditor’s claim against the estate on June 21,
2021. (Id., ¶ 12 & Exh. J.) Bander rejected the claim on July 19,
2021. (Id., ¶ 12 & Exh. K.) Then, on August 2, 2021, Plaintiff filed a
Doe amendment naming Joel Bander as a defendant in the instant case. (Id., ¶ 13 & Exh. K.) Plaintiff served Joel Bander by publication
on September 16, September 23, September 30, and October 7, 2022. The proof of publication was filed on
November 9, 2022.
Now,
Joel Bander specially appears and moves to quash service of the summons and
complaint. There is no dispute that
Plaintiff is not seeking to name Joel Bander based upon any direct liability on
his part. For this reason, the three-year
service rule is not applicable. Rather,
Plaintiff seeks to name Joel Bander in place of Jewel Mehlman as her personal representative
following her death.
A cause of action against a
decedent that survives death may be asserted against the decedent’s personal
representative. (Code Civ. Proc., §
377.40.) In order to do so, a plaintiff
must comply with the Probate Code’s requirements on filing creditor’s
claims. (Code Civ. Proc., §
377.41.)
An action or proceeding
pending against the decedent at the time of death may not be continued against
the decedent’s personal representative unless all of the following conditions
are satisfied: [¶] A claim is first filed as provided in part; [¶] The claim is
rejected in whole or in part; [¶] Within three months after notice of rejection
is given, the plaintiff applies to the court in which the action or proceeding
is pending for an order to substitute the personal representative in the action
or proceeding.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 9370(a).) Section 9370 includes no limitation on how a
plaintiff “applies” to this Court to substitute a personal representative for a
deceased defendant. In the absence of
such a limitation, the Court interprets Plaintiff’s Doe amendment as satisfying
this requirement. The Court does so for
several reasons. First, the process of
substituting a personal representative for a deceased defendant is ministerial
in nature. Indeed, the Court has no
discretion but to allow a plaintiff to do so.
“On motion, the court shall allow a pending action or proceeding against
the decedent that does not abate to be continued against the decedent’s
personal representative . . . .” (Code
Civ. Proc., § 377.41.) For this reason, the
Court does not interpret the Probate Code as requiring an ex parte application. Second, the Court relies upon the principle
that cases should be resolved on the merits.
Finally, the Court finds no undue prejudice to Joel Bander, as he faces
no personal liability, since he is only being named as the personal
representative of Jewel Mehlman.
Based
upon the foregoing, the Court construes Plaintiff’s Doe amendment as her “applying”
to the Court to substitute Joel Bander as the personal representative for Jewel
Mehlman. The Court finds that Plaintiff did
so within 90 days of her creditor’s claim having been rejected. Accordingly, the Court orders that Joel
Bander, Trustee of the Mehlman Family Trust, be substituted as the personal representative
of Defendant Jewel Mehlman, who is deceased.
Joel
Bander has not stipulated to having been served. Therefore, the Court must address his
argument that service by publication was ineffective. Unlike other service methods, a plaintiff must obtain a court order prior to
serving a defendant via publication.
Strict compliance with the statutory requirements is required. (County of Riverside v. Sup. Ct.
(1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 443, 450.) To
obtain an order for publication, the plaintiff must show reasonable diligence
in serving the defendant by some other manner.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 415.50, subd. (a).)
The plaintiff must establish reasonable diligence via the testimony of
an individual with personal knowledge of the efforts to serve the
defendant. (Olvera v. Olvera
(1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 32, 42.) In her
application, Plaintiff advanced declarations of non-service from Plaintiff’s
attorney service, in which the registered process server—Frank Harrigan—stated under
penalty of perjury that he attempted to serve Defendant ten times between February
10, 2022, and March 23, 2022. (See Amended
Application for Publication, Exhs. #5 and #6.)
Defendant advances evidence that he was at the location where the process
server purportedly attempted to serve him on seven of the ten occasions, and
that Defendant would have answered the door if the process server had
knocked. (Declaration of Joel Bander, ¶¶
18-33.) The Court finds Plaintiff’s
process server’s declarations to be credible with respect to his efforts to
serve Joel Bander. By contrast, the Court
did not find Joel Bander’s declaration to be credible and finds that he was
intentionally evading service for several reasons. First, the declaration of Joel Bander appears
to be contrived given the level of detail in attempting to establish that he
was home when the process server arrived and that he was not evading
service. “[The gentleman] doth protest
too much, methinks.” Second, Joel Bander
has a motive to evade service, and he does not deny having known about this litigation. Such a representation would not be credible, given
that Felicia Bander was served, and she was previously represented by Joel Bander’s
counsel, and Joel Bander purportedly sent Plaintiff’s counsel a letter acknowledging
that he was aware of this litigation. Finally,
even now, Joel Bander, an attorney who now clearly has notice of these
proceedings, has not agreed to simply accept service through his counsel or via
email. Instead, he seeks to quash service
of the summons and complaint and require Plaintiff to serve him personally. These are not the actions of someone who is
willing to be served in this manner, consistent with his professional
obligation as an attorney. This is especially
true given that Plaintiff’s counsel can simply attempt to serve him again,
given that the service deadline is not until August 2, 2024. For these reasons, the Court finds that Joel
Bander’s declaration is not credible and finds that he was evading service in
this matter.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Based upon the foregoing, the Court
orders as follows:
1. The
Court orders that Joel Bander, Trustee of the Mehlman Family Trust, be
substituted as the personal representative of Defendant Jewel Mehlman, who is
deceased.
2. The Court deems Joel Bander to have
been served and denies his motion to quash.
3. The Court shall hold a case management
conference on March 22, 2023, at 8:30 a.m.
4. The Court re-issues its Order to Show Cause
why the deadline under Code of Civil Procedure section 583.310 should not be January
28, 2025, for the reasons stated in its order of October 26, 2022. The Court incorporates that order by reference. The Court shall hold a hearing on this issue
on March 22, 2023, at 8:30 a.m. Absent
good cause, the Court intends to re-set the five-year deadline for both
defendants as January 28, 2025.
5. Plaintiff’s counsel shall provide
notice and file proof of such with the Court.