Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case: 19STCP05186, Date: 2024-11-15 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 19STCP05186 Hearing Date: November 15, 2024 Dept: 82
Association for Los Angeles Case No. 19STCP05186
Deputy Sheriffs, et al.
v.
Hearing:
November 15, 2024
Location:
Stanley Mosk Courthouse
Department:
82
County of Los Angeles, et al. Judge:
Stephen I. Goorvitch
[Tentative] Order Sustaining Demurrer to
Writs Causes of Action
[Tentative] Order Continuing Remaining
Motions
[Tentative] Order Staying Non-Writs Causes
of Action
INTRODUCTION
John Doe I, John Doe II, and Jane
Doe were deputy sheriffs for the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department who
were terminated for misconduct. Each
petitioner appealed to the Civil Service Commission, and during the
disciplinary proceedings, “management representatives” of the Sheriff’s
Department agreed to convert the terminations to suspensions. However, the County of Los Angeles (the
“County”) never approved these “settlements.”
In fact, the County Counsel, the Director of Personnel, and/or the Board
of Supervisors expressly vetoed two of the three settlement agreements. Petitioners filed this action against the
County, as well as the Board of Supervisors, the Sheriff, the County Counsel,
the Director of Personnel, and the Auditor-Controller (collectively,
“Respondents”), asserting writs causes of action under Code of Civil Procedure
section 1085 as well as contractual claims.
The court (Beckloff, J.) sustained a demurrer to the writs causes of
action without leave to amend, and the District Court of Appeal reversed,
holding that the court should have afforded leave to amend. However, Petitioners still have not stated
viable writs causes of action.
Therefore, the court sustains the demurrer to the writs causes of action
with leave to amend. The court takes the
remaining motions off-calendar and stays the non-writs causes of action pending
resolution of the writs-causes of action.
BACKGROUND
Deputy John Doe I, Deputy John Doe II, and
Deputy Jane Doe (hereafter, the “Deputies”) were sworn peace officers and
permanent employees of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department
(“Department”). (Second Amended Petition
for Writ of Mandate (“SAP”) ¶¶ 8-10.) In
2017, after participating in pre-deprivation hearings pursuant to Skelly v.
State Personnel Board (1975) 15 Ca1.3d 194, each deputy was terminated by
the Department for alleged misconduct. (Id.
¶¶ 49-50, 55, 63.) The Deputies
appealed their discipline to the Civil Service Commission (the “Commission”)
and were granted evidentiary hearings. (Id.
¶¶ 51, 57, 65.)
In
2019, during the pendency of the Commission proceedings, the Deputies executed
separate settlement agreements with high-ranking members of the Department, e.g.,
Chief Steven Gross or Chief Joseph Dempsey.
(Id. ¶¶ 52, 58, 66.)
Pursuant to the agreements, the Department agreed to reduce the
Deputies’ discipline from termination to suspension and reinstate them. (Ibid.) However, the Board of Supervisors never
approved these settlement agreements. (Id.
¶¶ 52, 60, 68.) In fact, the County
Counsel, the Director of Personnel, and/or the Board of Supervisors expressly
vetoed two of the three settlement agreements.
(Id., ¶¶ 60, 68.) The
County refused to reinstate the Deputies or comply with the terms of the
settlement agreements. (Id. ¶¶ 53,
60, 68.) Respondents “contend that they
are not legally obligated to comply with the terms of such settlement
agreements.” (Id. ¶ 114.)
In December 2019, Petitioners filed
a verified petition for writ of mandate and complaint alleging causes of action
for writ of mandate, breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and declaratory
relief. The case was first handed in
Department 86 (Beckloff, J.) and then in Department 40 (Sotelo, J.) Both judges sustained the Respondents’
demurrers without leave to amend. Among
other reasons, the trial court ruled that the settlement agreements were void
because the County Counsel did not approve them. Petitioners appealed the judgment of
dismissal entered by the trial court.
In 2023, the Court of Appeal reversed
the judgment of dismissal and directing the trial court to issue a new order
sustaining the demurrers and granting leave to amend. The Court of Appeal summarized its ruling as
follows:
We hold that section 21 [of the County Charter] does
not confer upon county counsel exclusive authority to settle appeals of
discipline decisions pending before the commission.
Nevertheless, appellants have failed to demonstrate
that the sheriff and his chiefs were authorized to execute on the county’s
behalf the settlement agreements at issue here. For that reason, the trial
court did not err in sustaining the demurrers to appellants’ claims for breach
of contract and mandamus. We reject appellants’ contention that even if the
settlement agreements were invalid, we should nonetheless reverse the order
sustaining the demurrer on their causes of action for promissory estoppel and declaratory
relief.
Given (a) our conclusion that section 21 does not
confer upon county counsel exclusive authority to settle appeals before the
commission, and (b) the fact that the department has apparently taken the
position that its personnel may execute these settlements without approval of
other county officials, we conclude there is a reasonable possibility that
appellants could amend their initial petition/complaint to establish that the
sheriff and his subordinates have that authority. Respondents fail to
demonstrate that affording appellants an opportunity to amend would be an idle
act. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court abused its discretion in denying
appellants leave to amend as to their contract, mandamus, and estoppel claims.
We also hold appellants should be granted leave to replead their declaratory
relief cause of action, except insofar as it is predicated on their legally
defective procedural due process theory.
(Association for Los Angeles Deputy
Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 764, 777-778
[hereafter, “ALADS”].)
Following
remand, the case was reassigned to Department 40 (Richardson, J.) On March 26, 2024, Petitioners filed a second
amended petition for writ of mandate and complaint asserting ten causes of
action as follows:
Petition
for Writ of Mandate by John Doe I
Breach
of Contract by John Doe I
Promissory
Estoppel by John Doe I
Petition
for Writ of Mandate by John Doe II
Breach
of Contract by John Doe II
Promissory
Estoppel by John Doe II
Petition
for Writ of Mandate by Jane Doe
Breach
of Contract by Jane Doe
Promissory
Estoppel by Jane Doe
Declaratory
Relief by all Petitioners
Because the case involved writs causes of
action, the case was reassigned to Department 82 (Goorvitch, J.) for resolution
of those claims first.
EVIDENTIARY ISSUES
Respondents’
request for judicial notice of the County Charter, annotated edition, and
Exhibits C, D, E, G, and H is granted. Respondents’
request for judicial notice of Exhibit F, a trial court order sustaining a
demurrer in a different case, is denied.
(Cal. Rules of Court, Rule
8.1115(a); B.F. v. Superior Court (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 621, 627, fn. 2
[denying judicial notice because “trial court decisions are not precedent”].)
Option #1
The parties reference the County
Charter but neither party requested that the court take judicial notice. The court assumes this was an oversight. In the tentative order, which was posted in
advance of the hearing, the court provided notice of its intention to take
judicial notice of the County Charter and offered to continue the hearing and
permit the parties to object in writing.
At the hearing, the parties waived notice and opportunity to be heard on
this issue and stipulated that the court may take judicial notice of the County
Charter.
Option
#2
The parties
reference the County Charter but neither party requested that the court take
judicial notice. Therefore, the court
provides notice of its intention to take judicial notice of the County
Charter. The court continues the hearing
to December 13, 2024, at 1:30 p.m. and authorizes the parties to file
objections on or before December 2, 2024.
DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard
A demurrer tests the sufficiency of a pleading, and the
grounds for a demurrer must appear on the face of the pleading or from
judicially noticeable matters. (Code Civil Proc. § 430.30, subd. (a); Blank
v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) “We assume the truth of the
allegations in the complaint, but do not assume the truth of contentions,
deductions, or conclusions of law.” (California Logistics, Inc. v.
State (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 242, 247.) “A demurrer must dispose of an
entire cause of action to be sustained.”
(Poizner v. Fremont General Corp. (2007)
148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119.) “A demurrer
tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic
matters.” (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) The
allegations in the petition must be liberally construed in favor of Petitioners
on demurrer. (See Mobil Oil
Corp. v Exxon Corp. (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 942, 947.)
B. The Writs Causes of
Action
Petitioners seek writs of mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section
1085 to enforce the County’s ministerial duties that are triggered by the
settlement agreements. “There are two essential requirements to the issuance of a
traditional writ of mandate: (1) a clear, present and usually ministerial duty
on the part of the respondent, and (2) a clear, present and beneficial right on
the part of the petitioner to the performance of that duty.” (California Ass’n for Health
Services at Home v. Department of Health Services (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th
696, 704.) Although a writ cannot be used to enforce purely contractual
rights, a party may pursue a writ of traditional mandate “as a means to compel
a public agency to take a nondiscretionary action necessary to comply with a
contractual obligation.” (ALADS, supra, 94
Cal.App.5th at 809, citations omitted.)
For example, if the settlement agreements are valid and binding, the
director of personnel may have a ministerial duty to reinstate
Petitioners. (Id. at 810.) By contrast, Respondents
contend that the settlement agreements executed between the Department and the
Deputies are not enforceable because they were not approved by the County’s
Board of Supervisors, and therefore, no ministerial duties are triggered by
these agreements. Accordingly, the court
limits its discussion to that issue.
As
a charter county, the County’s powers derive from state law and its charter. (County Charter art. I, § 1.) One of those powers is to “[m]ake contracts.” (Gov. Code § 23004(c).) The County exercises “its powers only through
the board of supervisors or through agents and officers acting under authority
of the board or authority conferred by law.” (Gov. Code
§ 23005.) Thus, as the District Court of Appeal recognized,
“the validity of the deputy appellants’ settlement agreements hinges on whether
the chiefs executing them were ‘acting under authority of the board or
authority conferred by law’ for the purposes of Government Code section 23005.”
(ALADS, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at 794.) This is because “[n]o government, whether
state or local, is bound to any extent by an officer’s acts in excess of his
... authority.” (Ibid., citing Katsura
v. City of San Buenaventura (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 104, 109.)
There
is no dispute that the Board of Supervisors did not approve the Deputies’
settlement agreements. (See SAP ¶¶ 23,
49-70.) Rather, the SAP asserts four
legal theories to support Petitioners’ claim that the chiefs who executed the
settlement agreements for the Department were acting under authority of the
Board or authority conferred by law. (See
Id.
¶¶ 16-48.)
1. Past Practice
and ALADS’ MOU
Petitioners allege that “[s]ince at
least 1980, all parties to the ALADS MOU, including the … Sheriff’s Department,
have established and followed a lawful, consistent practice of resolving …
disciplinary disputes, by the means of executing a written settlement agreement
between the Captain or Chief making the disciplinary decision and the
individual ALADS member affected by the disciplinary decision.” (SAP ¶ 21.)
This same allegation was included in the original writ petition, which
the Court of Appeal held did not state a cause of action. (See Petition (“Pet.” ¶ 20.) The Court of Appeal held that leave to amend
should have been granted because Petitioners “could potentially discover the
legal basis (if any) for the department's alleged long-standing
apparent belief that its personnel have authority to settle commission appeals
on their own.” (ALADS, supra, 94
Cal.App.5th at 772 [emphasis added].) Thus,
the District Court of Appeal’s opinion makes clear that alleged past practice
is not sufficient, standing alone, to establish that the chiefs who executed the
settlement agreements for the Department were acting under authority of the
Board or authority conferred by law.
Petitioners allege that “the
grievance procedure in the ALADS MOU has allowed for the resolution of
individual grievances on any topic, including the issue of proposed
disciplinary action against any ALADS member, by a Sheriff’s Department manager
or executive holding the rank, or equivalent civilian position, of Captain or
Chief.” (SAP ¶ 20.) As argued in the demurrer, the grievance
process included in the MOU is “not applicable in areas outside the authority
of this department such as interpretation of the Los Angeles County Code or in
areas where appeal procedures already exist, such as unsatisfactory performance
evaluations and certain specified disciplinary actions” including “discharge.”
(Dem. 16, citing Brody Decl. Exh. G at App. B, § 3.) Appeal procedures exist for the Deputies to
challenge their terminations before the Commission. (See County Civil Service Rules, Rule
4.03(A).) Accordingly, the MOU grievance
process does not authorize a Department captain or chief to settle a
disciplinary discharge and reinstate the employee. Petitioners develop no argument to the
contrary. (See Sehulster Tunnels/Pre-Con v. Traylor Brothers, Inc. (2003) 111
Cal.App.4th 1328, 1345, fn. 16 [failure to address point is “equivalent to a
concession”].)
Finally, Petitioners allege on information
and belief that the County and the Board have “previously taken actions assenting
to, acquiescing to, in accordance with, and otherwise evidencing an
understanding that the Sheriff has the power and authority to resolve and/or
settle disciplinary appeals pending before the Civil Service Commission….” (SAP ¶ 48.)
This is simply another way of phrasing that there has been a “past
practice” of allowing the Department to execute settlements of Commission
matters.
2. Department’s
Manual of Policy and Procedures
Petitioners allege that section
3-04/020.080 of the Department’s Manual of Policy and Procedures (“MPP”) “is a delegation
of authority to the Sheriff (as the appointing power/authority) and the
Sheriff’s designees with the power and authority to settle disciplinary appeals
pending before the Civil Service Commission.”
(SAP ¶ 39.) Section 3-04/020.080
provides, in relevant part, that “[i]f discipline has been imposed and the
discipline is being appealed to the Civil Service Commission and there are
discussions about settling the case, the division chief or division director
shall consult with a constitutional policing advisor and then obtain
concurrence from the Undersheriff prior to entering into a settlement
agreement.” (Id.
¶ 47.)
The District Court
of Appeal already considered some of Petitioners’ contentions related to section
3-04/020.080 and concluded that they did not state a cause of action. Specifically, the Court of Appeal asked the
parties to provide supplemental briefing on several issues, including: “3. Is
the Sheriff or his chief authorized to execute settlement agreements on the
County's behalf?” (ALADS, supra,
94 Cal.App.5th at 776.) In response,
Petitioners provided documents they identified as excerpts from the MPP dated
October 26, 2022, and they argued that section 3-04/020.080 authorized the
Sheriff’s subordinates to settle matters pending before the Commission. (Id. at 794.) The Court found Petitioners’ reliance on
section 3-04/020.080 to be “unavailing” for several reasons, specifically: (1)
the MPP cited by Petitioners postdated the settlements agreements; (2) the
language of section 3-04/020.080 is ambiguous and is “susceptible to a reading
that following consultation, further approval of the settlement agreement (by
the board or someone else) is required”; and (3) even if Petitioners’
interpretation was correct (an issue the Court of Appeal did not decide),
Petitioners “do not establish that (1) the manual is a proper delegation of
authority from the board of supervisors to department personnel to settle
appeals of discipline, or (2) the manual otherwise lawfully authorizes
department personnel to bind the county to those settlements.” (Id. at 795.)
In the SAP, Petitioners now allege
that section 3-04/020.080 was included in the MPP since July 13, 2018, before
the settlement agreements were executed.
(SAP ¶ 45.) However,
Petitioners have not pleaded sufficient facts to address the second and third
reasons that the District Court of Appeal found Petitioners’ reliance on section
3-04/020.080 to be unavailing. As the
Court observed, section 3-04/020.080 itself is ambiguous and may be read to require
approval of a settlement agreement by the Board or someone authorized by the
Board. More broadly, the MPP governs
internal processes of the Department and Petitioners do not allege in the SAP
that the Board approved it. (See SAP ¶¶
37-48 and Brody Decl. Exh. H, § 1-01/010.00 [“The official manual of the
Department is a consolidation of existing orders and manuals which are
Departmental in scope.”].) Petitioners
also cite no authority, in the SAP or opposition, that the Department’s
promulgation of an internal policy manual “constitutes the sort of ‘law’ that
for the purposes of Government Code section 23005, could ‘confer’ upon the sheriff
and his subordinates the power to act on behalf of the county.” (ALADS, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at 795.)
Petitioners have added one
allegation to the SAP concerning MPP section 3-04/020.080 that was not considered by
the Court of Appeal in its decision.
Specifically, Petitioners now allege that MPP section
3-04/020.080 was subject to the meet-and-confer process under the
Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (the “MMBA”). (SAP
¶¶ 45, 47.) Petitioners then allege that “because MPP
section 3.04/020.80 was subject to the meet and confer process required by the
MMBA and [Employee Relations Ordinance], the resultant agreement to adopt and
implement MPP section 3.04/020.80 is binding on the County and the Board of
Supervisors, who have given actual and/or ostensible and/or apparent authority
to its management representatives who met and conferred with ALADS.” (Id. ¶ 47.)
This argument is not
persuasive. As Respondents note, “the MPP plainly governs internal processes; it does not
purport to control outside County officers that are indisputably in a
supervisory role of authority over the Department—i.e., the Board.” (Dem. 17:10-12.)
The purposes of the
[MMBA] are to promote full communication between management
and labor and improve employer-employee relations. According to the Act, these purposes will be
effectuated by establishing methods to resolve labor disputes and by providing
a uniform basis for recognizing the right of public employees to organize and
be represented by employee organizations.
The Act sets forth certain principles which public agencies must follow.
These primarily include the recognition
of employee organizations in representing public employees, and the mutual
obligations of public agencies and “recognized employee organizations” to meet
and confer in good faith regarding wages, hours and other conditions of
employment, and to reduce their agreements to binding written memoranda of
agreement.
(Relyea
v. Ventura County Fire Protection Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 875, 880,
emphasis added.) The MMBA states in relevant
part:
The governing body of a
public agency, or such boards, commissions, administrative officers or other
representatives as may be properly designated by law or by such governing body,
shall meet and confer in good faith regarding wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment with representatives of such recognized employee
organizations, as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 3501, and shall consider
fully such presentations as are made by the employee organization on behalf of
its members prior to arriving at a determination of policy or course of action.
(Gov.
Code § 3505.) Similarly, Government Code
section 23005 makes clear: “A county may exercise its powers only through the
board of supervisors or through agents and officers acting under authority of
the board or authority conferred by law.”
(Gov. Code § 23005.)
Pursuant to the MMBA’s express
authority, the Board promulgated the ERO to govern employer-employee relations
within Los Angeles County. (County Code
§ 5.04.010 et seq.; see Gov. Code § 3507.) The ERO defines the “management
representatives” who are authorized to negotiate on behalf of the County as “a
department head as defined in Section 2.02.190 of this code, the
administrative code of the county of Los Angeles, and includes the chief
executive officer and the director of personnel, or any duly authorized
representative of such department head or officer.” (County Code § 5.04.030(M).) The County Code defines a “department head”
as: (1) The director of planning; (2) The executive officer of the business
license commission; (3) The director of personnel; (4) The director of the Los
Angeles County Museum of Natural History; (5) The director of the Otis Art
Institute of Los Angeles County; (6) The executive officer of the Superior
Court; (7) The chairpersons of a commission or committee other than the
regional planning and civil service commissions or their designees; (8) The
director of the Los Angeles County Museum of Art; (9) The executive director of
the commission on human relations; and (1) “the actual head of a
department,” i.e., the Sheriff himself, not his representatives. (County Code § 2.02.190, emphasis added.)
In this case, Petitioners allege that “management representatives”
met-and-conferred with their union. (See,
e.g., SAP ¶ 47.) Petitioners do not
allege any facts, even generally, concerning the statutory authority of these “management
representatives” to bind the Board and the County to the provisions of the MPP. (See SAP ¶¶ 42-45.) Thus, Petitioners have not sufficiently
alleged that these individuals were authorized by the Board to agree to a
policy under which the Department allegedly has authority to settle appeals of
discipline pending before the Commission.
(Gov. Code § 23005.) Petitioners also
cite no authority that mere participation in the meet-and-confer process under
the MMBA is the type of “law” that “confers” such authority on the
Department. (See ALADS, supra, 94
Cal.App.5th at 795; Gov. Code § 23005; and Charter § 2.)
Separately, even if section
3-04/020.080 constituted a delegation of authority from the Board to the
Department’s “management representatives” to settle appeals of discipline, it
imposes conditions precedent to any such settlement, including that “the division chief
or division director shall consult with a constitutional policing advisor and
then obtain concurrence from the Undersheriff prior to entering into a
settlement agreement.” (SAP ¶ 47.) Petitioners do not allege that these conditions
were satisfied. (See id. ¶¶ 37-48.) In opposition, Petitioners argue that “there
is no allegation in the SAC that those signatories to the relevant settlement
agreements failed to comply with the requirements in the Manual” and “[t]his
would be the County’s burden to prove.” (Oppo.
11.) Petitioners are incorrect. Although evidentiary detail is not required, Petitioners
failed to plead all the ultimate facts regarding the conditions precedent of
section 3-04/020.080 necessary to state a claim.
3. The Report of
the Office of Inspector General
Petitioners allege
that the Board “was made aware of the past practice of settling pending
administrative disciplinary appeals” because it received, in or about February
2021, a report of the Office of Inspector General titled “Los Angeles County
Sheriff’s Department: Review and Analysis of Misconduct Investigation and
Disciplinary Process” (hereafter, “Report”). (SAP
¶¶ 25, 29, Exh.
A.) Petitioners allege as follows:
In its report, the OIG analyzed 66 settlement
agreements entered into by the County and deputies between 2015 and 2019. . .
. The OIG then stated that there were 21
settlement agreements for matters then pending before the Civil Service
Commission. . . . The OIG further noted
that only five of the settlement agreements ‘were signed by the counsel the
County had retained.
(SAP ¶ 27.) Petitioners argue that the Report “is
evidence of the Board’s understanding and acknowledgment that it had already
delegated the settlement authority to the Sheriff to settle disciplinary
appeals pending before the Commission.” (Oppo.
12-13.)
As an initial matter, the Report
does not confirm that the settlements are valid. To the contrary, the Report states that some
settlement agreements were “unwritten,” “intrinsically troubling,” had not been
“signed by County Counsel,” and “appeared to be unlawful and therefore
unenforceable.” (Oppo. 18, citing SAP
Exh. A at 109-115.) Putting that aside, the
Board could not consent to or ratify the Deputies’ settlement agreements by
inaction. “[B]ecause the statutes in
question specifically set forth the ways in which the [County] may enter into
contracts, any other methods of contract formation—even though not
explicitly prohibited by the statutes—are invalid.” (G.L. Mezzetta, Inc. v. City of American
Canyon (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1087, 1094; accord South Bay Senior
Housing Corp. v. City of Hawthorne (1997) 56 Cal. App. 4th 1231, 1236.) To the extent Petitioners cite the Report as
evidence of a “past practice” of allowing the Department to execute settlements
of Commission matters, those allegations are not sufficient in themselves to
state a cause of action for writ of mandate, as discussed above. (See Pet. ¶ 20; SAP ¶ 21.) Petitioners must plead “the legal basis
(if any) for the department’s alleged long-standing apparent belief
that its personnel have authority to settle commission appeals on their own.” (ALADS, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at 772
[emphasis added].)
4. The County
Charter
Finally, Petitioners allege that
because the Sheriff is identified as an “appointing power” in the Charter and
the County Code, the Sheriff must necessarily have the authority to settle
disciplinary actions that are pending before the Commission. (SAP ¶¶ 30-36.) Petitioners rely on sections 12, 51, and 41
of the Charter and sections 2.02.100 and 2.04.070 of the County Code.
The Charter identifies the Sheriff
as an elective County officer. (Charter
§ 12.) Section 51 of the Charter states:
Each
County or township officer, Board or Commission shall appoint, from the
eligible civil service list, for either permanent or temporary service, all
assistants, librarians, deputies, clerks, attaches and other persons in the
office or department of such officer, board or commission, as the number
thereof is fixed and from time to time changed by the Board of Supervisors;
provided that appointments to the unclassified service in their respective
offices and departments shall be made by such officers, boards and commissions,
without reference to such eligible list.
Section 41 of the Charter states: “No
person in the classified service, or seeking admission thereto, shall be
appointed, reduced or removed or in any way favored or discriminated against
because of race, color, national origin, political or religious opinions or
affiliations.” Footnote 112 to that
section states, in pertinent part: “County
officers have the right to appoint deputies and employees except as limited by
the charter. . . . The officer is
limited in his power to discharge in that the discharge may not be based upon
an employee’s political or religious opinion, affiliation, and the officer must
present the deputy or employee with the reason for his discharge and give him a
reasonable time to reply thereto. . . .”
As summarized in the petition, County Code sections 2.02.100 and
2.04.070 similarly state that the Sheriff is an “appointing officer” with
authority to “delegate to subordinates the exercise of judgment or discretion
to impose discipline or take any other personnel action on behalf of the
appointing officer.” (See SAP ¶¶ 34-35.)
Although the
Charter and County Code identify the Sheriff as an “appointing power,” they do
not support Petitioner’s argument that the Sheriff necessarily has authority to
settle disciplinary matters that are pending before the Commission.
The rules governing
statutory construction are well settled. We begin with the fundamental premise
that the objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate
legislative intent. To determine
legislative intent, we turn first to the words of the statute, giving them
their usual and ordinary meaning. When the language of a statute is clear, we
need go no further.
(Nolan v. City of Anaheim (2004)
33 Cal.4th 335, 340, internal citations omitted.) These statutes do not state that the Sheriff
has exclusive authority over Department employees. To the contrary, the Charter vests the
Board with authority to adopt rules for the County’s Civil Service
Commission. (Charter, § 35.) The Civil Service Rules “shall provide for,”
among other things: “Establishment and maintenance of a
classification plan and the classification of all positions which are included
in the system”; and “Civil Service Commission hearings on appeals of discharges
and reductions of permanent employees.” Petitioners
have not cited any provisions from the Charter, the County Code, or the Civil
Service Rules delegating authority to the Sheriff or Department personnel to
settle disciplinary matters pending before the Commission independently and
without approval from the Board.
Based on the foregoing, Petitioners
have still not alleged “the legal basis (if any)
for the department's alleged long-standing apparent belief that its personnel
have authority to settle commission appeals on their own.” (ALADS, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at
772.) Accordingly, the demurrer to the
first, fourth, and seventh causes of action is sustained.
C. Leave to Amend
A demurrer may be sustained without leave to amend when there
is no reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311,
318.) In assessing whether leave
to amend should be granted, the burden is on the complainant to show the court
that a pleading can be amended successfully.
(Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348-349.) “Liberality in permitting amendment is the rule.” (McDonald
v. Superior Court (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 297, 303; see also Kittredge Sports Co. v. Sup.Ct. (1989)
213 Cal.App.3d 1045, 1048 [“even if the proposed legal theory is a novel
one, ‘the preferable practice would be to permit the amendment and allow the
parties to test its legal sufficiency by demurrer….’”].) However, leave to amend may be denied if “the
complaint shows on its face that it is incapable of amendment.” (City of Stockton v. Superior Court (2007)
42 Cal.4th 730, 747.)
The court will
grant leave
to amend on limited grounds, i.e., those identified by Petitioners. In concluding that leave to amend should be
granted, the District Court of Appeal observed that Petitioners promulgated
discovery on Respondents that possibly could have uncovered “the potential
underpinnings of the department’s alleged position that its personnel can
settle civil service commission appeals. (ALADS, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at
802.) Moreover, as the Court observed,
“the excerpts from the manual described [above] are arguably consistent with
[Petitioners’] theory that the department has taken the position that its
personnel are authorized to settle disciplinary appeals before the commission.” (Ibid.) Petitioners have amended the petition to
include additional allegations about the MPP that further “support the
reasonable inference that there may exist other documents potentially
establishing that the sheriff and his subordinates have this authority.” (Ibid.) Finally, as discussed above, Petitioners may
be able to allege additional facts regarding the individuals involved in the
meet-and-confer process pursuant to the MMBA and to plead that the Department
satisfied the conditions precedent of section 3-04/020.080. Indeed, Petitioners indicate that they could
amend the petition to include such facts. (See Oppo. 12:1-4, 19:7-10.) Accordingly, the court grants leave to
amend the writs causes of action on these issues.
D. The Remaining Causes of Action
Pursuant to the
local rules, which designate Department 82 a specialized writs and receivers
department, only a cause of action for writ of mandate and other “special
proceedings” are properly assigned to this department. (LASC Local Rules 2.8(d) and 2.9.) Local Rules 2.8(d) and 2.9 do not include
causes of action for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, or declaratory
relief as a special proceeding assigned to the writs departments. In addition, Respondents have demanded a jury
trial, which cannot be held before Department 82. (See Demand for Jury Trial filed April
24, 2024.)
Based upon the
foregoing, the court stays all remaining causes of action pending resolution of
the writs causes of action. Afterwards,
the court will transfer this case to Department One for reassignment back to
Department 40 or another individual calendar court for trial on the remaining
causes of action. The court also takes
Petitioners’ motion to use pseudonyms and motion for a protective order, as
well as Respondents’ motion to strike, off-calendar. The court will re-set these motions in
Department 82 when it resolves the next demurrer or will transfer these motions
to Department 40.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Based
upon the foregoing, the court orders as follows:
1. The court sustains Respondents’
demurrer.
2. The court grants leave to amend on the
narrow issues identified by Petitioner’s counsel.
3. The court stays the remaining causes of
action pending a decision on the writs causes of action.
4. The court takes the remaining motions
off-calendar.
5. The court continues the trial setting
to ________, 2025, at 9:30 a.m.
6. Respondents’ counsel shall provide
notice and file proof of service with the court.
IT IS SO ORDERED
Dated: November 15,
2024 ______________________
Stephen
I. Goorvitch
Superior
Court Judge