Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case: 19STCV26668, Date: 2022-08-31 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 19STCV26668    Hearing Date: August 31, 2022    Dept: 39

Lillibeth Navarro, et al. v. Bell Cab Company, Inc., et al.

Case No. 19STCV26668

Access Services’ Motion for Summary Judgment

Access Services’ Motion for Attorney’s Fees

INTRODUCTION

            Plaintiffs Lillibeth Navarro, Victoria Lim, and Myla Lim (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed this action against Access Services (“Access Services” or “Defendant”), as well as three taxi companies, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”), The Unruh Civil Rights Act (the “Unruh Act”), and the California Disabled Persons Act (the “Disabled Persons Act”).  Now, Defendant moves for summary judgment, as well as attorney’s fees, which Plaintiffs oppose.  The Court grants Defendant’s motion for summary judgment but denies Defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

            Plaintiffs are disabled and cannot drive.  (Plaintiffs’ Separate Statement, ¶¶ 1-3.)  Plaintiffs made arrangements to watch a movie at the Grove on November 24, 2018, which started at 7:15 p.m.  (Id., ¶ 6.)  Lillibeth Navarro made arrangements with the LA Yellow Cab Company (“Yellow Cab”) to pick them up at home at 6:15 p.m. and pick them up at the Grove at 10:00 p.m.  (Ibid.)  However, Yellow Cab did not arrive on time for the pick-up so Plaintiffs took the bus to the Grove.  (Id., ¶ 7.)  At the conclusion of the movie, Yellow Cab again did not pick them up.  (Id., ¶ 8.)  Lillibeth Navarro called Bell Cab Company, Inc. (“Bell Cab”), which declined the service and referred her to the LA Taxi Cooperative, Inc. (“LA Taxi”).  (Ibid.)  LA Taxi informed her that no service could be provided.  (Ibid.) 

            Lillibeth Navarro made three telephone calls to Access Services, a public agency administered by Los Angeles County.  (Id., ¶ 9.)  “She invoked the duty of Access Services to provide rescue services to her and Myla [Navarro] because their ride left them stranded.”  (Ibid.)  The representative of Access Services informed her that “they were not obligated to provide rescue services under the circumstances.”  (Ibid.)  Lillibeth Navarro then said she and her companions would wait and asked to be picked up at 12 Midnight.  (Id., ¶ 10.)  The representative declined and stated that the reservations line was closed.  (Ibid.)  The representative stated that Plaintiffs “could not be picked up until [the] Reservation Line opened at 6:00 a.m.”  (Ibid.)  Plaintiffs were forced to navigate their way to the bus stop on Third Street and Fairfax to catch the last bus at 1:00 a.m.  (Id., ¶ 11.)  The bus took them to the Vermont and Wilshire stop at approximately 1:20 a.m., where they disembarked.  (Id., ¶ 12.)  Lillibeth Navarro’s house is approximately a half mile from the stop, but it took Plaintiffs about one hour because Myla Navarro was using a walker rather than her wheelchair.  (Ibid.)  Plaintiffs reached Lillibeth Navarro’s house at approximately 2:20 a.m.  (Id., ¶ 13.) 

LEGAL STANDARD

“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law[.] There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.”  (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.)  “[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.”  (Ibid.)  

DISCUSSION

            This motion raises a purely legal issue: Whether the County is required to provide “rescue services” to disabled persons who are stranded not because of the County’s poor service, but rather because a private carrier did not retrieve them as promised.  The Court answers this question in the negative.  

            Defendant is a public entity.  Therefore, this case is governed by Title II of the ADA, and not Title III, which applies to private entities.  (See Cohen v. City of Culver City, 754 F.3d 690, 694 (9th Cir. 2014); Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002).)  Under Title II, a public entity must provide transportation service to disabled individuals that is comparable to those offered to the general public.  Specifically, Defendant must offer service “which is comparable to the level of designated public transportation services provided to individuals without disabilities using such system” and “in the case of response time, which is comparable, to the extent practicable, to the level of designated public transportation services provided to individuals without disabilities using such system.”  (42 U.S.C. § 12143; see also Boose v. Tri-County Metropolitan Transportation District of Oregon, 587 F.3d 997, 1001 (9th Cir. 2009).) 

            As an initial matter, Plaintiffs’ counsel does not explain why the regular bus service does not satisfy the County’s obligations under the ADA with respect to Plaintiff Victoria Lim.  It is undisputed that there was regular bus service, i.e., regular routes and regular times, and that Plaintiffs were able to ride these buses to and from the Grove to the same extent as individuals without disabilities.  Only Lillibeth Navarro and Myla Lim qualified for Defendant’s services based upon “their inability to functionally ride the accessible fixed route buses and light rail in Los Angeles County . . . .”  (Declaration of Hector Rodriguez, ¶ 4.)  Plaintiffs’ separate statement concedes that only “Lillibeth Navarro and Myla Lim are eligible Access Services paratransit riders.”  (Plaintiffs’ Separate Statement, ¶ 6.)  Plaintiffs’ counsel advances no evidence suggesting that the County’s regular bus service does not comply with the ADA with respect to Plaintiff Victoria Lim.  Therefore, the Court grants summary judgment on Victoria Lim’s ADA claim on this basis.

            Putting that aside, the Court finds that Defendant’s services comply with the ADA.  There is no dispute that Defendant operates 24 hours a day, seven days per week.  (Declaration of Hector Rodriguez, ¶ 5.)  Rather, Plaintiffs predicate their case on the reservation system.  Access Services is a “shared ride” system that requires reservations be made the previous day.  (Ibid.)  The reservation line operates from 6:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m., every day, including weekends and holidays.  (Ibid.)  Access Services will perform “rescue services” if the rider had arranged transport through its service.  “If an Access rider misses their return trip or the Access vehicle does not arrive by the estimated time of arrival, Access Services will find a way to get the rider back home.”  (Id., ¶ 7.)  However, Access Services does not schedule same-day service or perform rescue service for riders stranded by other ride services.  (Ibid.)

            Plaintiffs do not dispute that they could have made a reservation the day before the movie, and Access Services would have transported them to and from the Grove.  Nor do Plaintiffs dispute that had Access Services left them stranded, or if they had missed their ride from Access Services for other reasons, Access Services would have provided “rescue services” and transported them home.  Rather, Plaintiffs seek to impose an obligation on Access Services to offer emergency transportation services when other carriers leave riders stranded.  This is not required under the ADA.  “[T]he entity shall schedule and provide paratransit services to any ADA paratransit eligible person at any requested time on a particular day in response to a request for service made the previous day.”  (Anderson v. Rochester-Genesee Regional Transportation Authority, 337 F.3d 201, 207, citing 49 C.F.R. § 37.131(b).)  The Court also finds that the reservation system—open from 6:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m.—does not violate the ADA.  “The entity shall make reservation service available during at least all normal business hours of the entity’s administrative office, as well as during times, comparable to normal business hours, on a day when the entity’s officers are not open before a service day.”  (Ibid.)    

            The Court has considered Plaintiffs’ remaining arguments and finds none to be persuasive.  Therefore, the Court finds that Defendant has complied with the ADA, and is not required to provide last-minute or “rescue service” for a disabled person who is stranded due to the malfeasance of a private carrier.  Because Plaintiff’s remaining claims are predicated upon the same facts as the ADA claim, the Court grants summary judgment.

            Defendant moves for attorney’s fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1038, which authorizes attorney’s fees “[i]f the court should determine that the proceeding was not brought in good faith and with reasonable cause . . . .”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 1038(a).)  The Court cannot conclude that this action was meritless on its face.  The facts establish that Plaintiffs had a good-faith dispute.  Moreover, there appears to have been a meritorious legal issue, even though the Court resolved the issue in favor of Defendant.  Indeed, Defendant cited no binding authority on this issue.  Therefore, Defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees is denied.

            Based upon the foregoing, the Court orders as follows:

            1.         Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted.

            2.         Defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees is denied.

            3.         Defendant’s counsel shall provide notice and file proof of such with the Court.