Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case: 20STCV00823, Date: 2023-06-29 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20STCV00823 Hearing Date: March 14, 2024 Dept: 39
Joseph Camarillo
v. City of Los Angeles, et al.
Case No.
20STCV00823
Order #1 of 2
Motion for Summary
Judgment
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff
Joseph Camarillo (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against the City of Los
Angeles and the City of Riverside after he was terminated from his employment
as a Los Angeles Fire Department officer.
Plaintiff previously worked for Riverside, and alleges that Riverside’s
employees intentionally interfered with his employment with the City of Los
Angeles by communicating false information about him. Plaintiff asserts the following cases of
action against the City of Riverside:
Fifth COA – Intentional Interference with Contractual
Relations
Sixth COA – Intentional Interference with Prospective
Economic Advantage
Seventh COA – Negligent Interference with Prospective
Economic Advantage
Now, the City of Riverside moves for summary judgment on multiple
independent grounds. The Court grants
the City of Riverside’s motion for summary judgment.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In May
2017, Plaintiff was hired as a probationary firefighter with the Riverside Fire
Department. (Plaintiff’s Response to
Defendant’s Separate Statement, ¶ 1.) On
Plaintiff’s first day of orientation, which was May 5, 2017, Plaintiff
experienced an episode of heat-related illness.
(Id., ¶ 2.) During a deposition,
Plaintiff testified as follows:
“Towards the end of our second trip
I started getting really fatigued getting real tired. And then, at one point, it felt like I just
kind of -- I was there, but I got tunnel vision. I kind of started seeing stars. And I wasn’t really in control at that
point. I remember kind of wobbling,
catching my balance. And the next thing
I remember I was woke up, and all my gear was off . . . . I think I lost [consciousness] -- I was not
aware where I was at. . . . I was really
out of it. I couldn’t comprehend what
they were saying at that point.”
(Declaration of Sean Murphy, Exh. #4, pp. 38:23-39:15; see
also Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Separate Statement, ¶ 18.) Although Plaintiff disputes whether he ever
“fully lost consciousness,” he does not dispute that he was hospitalized for
three days. (See Plaintiff’s Response to
Defendant’s Separate Statement, ¶¶ 2, 19.)
Plaintiff continued to experience
health related issues, including an overexertion episode on August 21,
2017. (Id., ¶ 3.) During this time period, Plaintiff
acknowledged to a fellow firefighter that his fatigue could result in his own
injury, saying, “if there was a fire, [he] might go down inside the
building.” (Id., ¶ 4.) As a result, Plaintiff decided to go see a
doctor and started treating with Dr. Jason Dugan. (Id., ¶ 5.)
Plaintiff saw Dr. Dugan on August 23, 2017. (Declaration of Joseph Camarillo, Exh.
#8.) Dr. Dugan’s notes reflect diagnoses
of “lightheadedness,” “chest pain,” “abnormal echocardiogram,” elevated liver
enzymes,” and “increased creatine kinase level.” (Id., Exh. #8.) On August 23, 2017, Dr. Dugan took Plaintiff
off work to conduct further evaluation to determine his medical condition. (Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Separate
Statement, ¶ 8; see also Declaration of Joseph Camarillo, Exh. #7.) Among other things, Plaintiff was given a
prescription for albuterol treatment with an inhaler. (Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Separate
Statement, ¶ 9.) Plaintiff also was
prescribed Q-var as a steroid for his respiratory “exercise-induced bronchial
constriction.” (Id., ¶ 12.) Dr. Dugan did not certify Plaintiff to return
to work until November 23, 2017, which was three months later. (Id., ¶ 13.)
Plaintiff was required to complete
a “fit-for-duty” test in order to return to work. (Id., ¶ 14.)
Dr. Prakash Bondade conducted the examination on April 6, 2018. (See Declaration of Joseph Camarillo, Exh.
#13.) Plaintiff’s “chief complaint” was
“exercise-induced asthma.” (Id., p. 3.) Plaintiff also experienced “mild intermittent
asthma.” (Id., p. 4.) The “onset” of these problems was January 16,
2018. (Id., p. 5.) Dr. Bondade wrote: “[Plaintiff] does have
symptoms of exercise induced asthma which was controlled with albuterol.” (Id., p. 6.)
Dr. Bondade also wrote: “[Plaintiff] seems to have mild asthma or
reactive airways disease controlled with Q var.” (Ibid.)
Plaintiff consulted with a
cardiologist, Dr. Nicholas N. Doan Van, on August 31, 2017. (See Declaration of Joseph Camarillo, Exh.
#9, p. 1.) According to Dr. Van’s notes,
an echocardiography “showed a low normal left ventricular systolic function,
right atrial and right ventricular enlargement and mule tricuspid
regurgitation.” (Id., Exh. #9, p. 3.) Dr. Van diagnosed Plaintiff with “right
ventricular enlargement” and “right atrial enlargement.” (Ibid.)
Plaintiff filed a workers’
compensation claim against the City of Riverside. (Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Separate
Statement, ¶ 17.) As of July 3, 2018,
Plaintiff was still taking albuterol and Q-var and admitted that they were
helpful in alleviating his respiratory symptoms, though he maintains the
benefit was psychological. (Id., ¶
22.) On May 20, 2018, Plaintiff settled
his workers’ compensation claim, admitting that he suffered from the following
specific injuries: Heat exhaustion/heat stroke, chest tightness, exhaustion,
exercise induced asthma and reactive airway disease, asthma, reactive airway
disease, injury to kidney, injury to liver, and injury to heart. (Id., ¶. 23.)
On May 12, 2016, Plaintiff applied
for a position with the Los Angeles Fire Department. (Id., ¶ 24.)
During the process, Plaintiff indicated that he understood the City of
Los Angeles might contact his prior employers and that “honesty and integrity”
would be evaluated. (Id., ¶¶
25-26.) Plaintiff acknowledged that any
“failure” to provide honest and forthcoming responses “will result in
disqualification.” (Id., ¶ 27.) Plaintiff signed various releases. (Id., ¶ 28.)
On January 31, 2018, Plaintiff was
issued a conditional job offer with the Los Angeles Fire Department. (Id., ¶ 29.)
Plaintiff was informed that “any negative background information” could
result in the conditional job offer being rescinded. (Id., ¶ 30.)
Plaintiff was informed that the City of Los Angeles would schedule a
medical appointment and that he would be required “to comply with all requests
for information and records as quickly as possible.” (Id., ¶ 31.)
Plaintiff was informed: “If you have a history of, current or past, of
any of the conditions listed on the attached page, you will need to provide
copies of your medical records relating to your diagnosis and treatment.” (Ibid.)
The list included the following “conditions for which copies of medical
records will be required” in connection with the medical examination, among
others: (1) Asthma, (2) “Fainting Spells or any Loss of Consciousness;” and (3)
“Heart Condition.” (Plaintiff’s Response
to Defendant’s Separate Statement, ¶ 32; see also Declaration of Sean B.
Murphy, Exh. #11.) During his
deposition, Plaintiff admitted that he had copies of his medical records. (See Declaration of Sean B. Muphy, Exh. #5, pp.
182-183.) Plaintiff testified that he
“believe[d]” that he asked Dr. Dugan for his records. (Id., Exh. #5, pp. 183:14-20, 184:11-13.)
Plaintiff did not submit Dr.
Dugan’s records to the City of Los Angeles.
(Id., Exh. #5, p. 184:8-10; see also Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s
Separate Statement, ¶ 35.) Plaintiff did
not submit any records relating to his heart condition. (See Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s
Separate Statement, ¶ 34.) Nor did
Plaintiff submit any medical records related to his asthma, heart condition, or
any of the issues related to his injury with the Riverside Fire
Department. (Id., ¶ 36.)
Plaintiff
completed a medical questionnaire on February 1, 2018. (Id., ¶ 37.)
The instructions required Plaintiff to check “YES” or “NO” to each item. (Id., ¶ 38.)
Plaintiff denied that he had ever experienced “asthma” by checking the
“NO” box. (Id., ¶ 39.) Plaintiff denied that he ever had “shortness
of breath” by checking the “NO” box.
(Id., ¶ 40.) Plaintiff denied
that he ever had “chest tightness” by checking the “NO” box. (Id., ¶ 41.)
Plaintiff denied that he ever had “Pain or discomfort in Chest” by
checking the “NO” box. (Id., ¶ 43.) Plaintiff denied that occasionally uses or
current takes any prescription by checking the “NO” box. (Id., ¶ 47.)
Plaintiff denied that he had ever been hospitalized overnight by
checking the “NO” box. (Id., ¶ 48.) Plaintiff denied that he had ever missed more
than five days’ work due to medical reasons by checking the “NO” box. (Id., ¶ 50.)
Plaintiff certified: “I certify that I supplied the above information
and that it is true and correct to the best of my knowledge. I understand that any omission or
falsification of any medical information may disqualify me.” (Id., ¶ 51.)
Plaintiff began his temporary training with the Los Angeles Fire
Department on July 23, 2018. (Id., ¶
53.)
On or about
September 14, 2018, the City of Riverside issued a subpoena to the Los Angeles
Fire Department for Plaintiff’s employment records to evaluate his workers’
compensation claims. (Id., ¶ 56.) The workers’ compensation docket reflects two
claims, both of which involve injuries to Plaintiff’s respiratory system. (Id., ¶ 57.)
On October 23, 2018, Plaintiff was removed from the drill tower and
placed in administrative leave. (Id., ¶
59.) Plaintiff was asked to complete
another medical questionnaire for the Los Angeles Fire Department. (Id., ¶ 60.)
Plaintiff again denied having experienced the same medical conditions
that he denied on February 1, 2018.
(Id., ¶ 61.) Plaintiff signed
another release of medical information, dated October 23, 2018. (Id., ¶ 62.)
Plaintiff signed various waivers.
(Id., ¶¶ 64-65.)
On January
15, 2019, the Chief of the Los Angeles Fire Department approved the
recommendation to terminate Plaintiff for his “failure to meet the following
LAFD standards: Honesty, Integrity, and Personal Ethics.” (Id., ¶ 66.)
This action followed.
LEGAL STANDARD
“[T]he party moving for summary
judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of
material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law[.] There
is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a
reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party
opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.”
(Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.)
“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of
production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable
issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a
shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of
his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of
material fact.” (Ibid.)
DISCUSSION
There is no
dispute that Plaintiff completed a medical questionnaire on February 1, 2018,
in which he denied having experienced asthma, shortness of breath, chest
tightness, and pain or discomfort in chest, among other things, symptoms which
do not require a medical diagnosis to comprehend. Plaintiff denied ever having been
hospitalized or having missed work for more than five days for medical reasons,
which is demonstrably untrue. Nor did
Plaintiff disclose the medical records associated with these issues. Then, on October 23, 2018, Plaintiff again
denied all of these issues, which resulted in his termination from the City of
Los Angeles. Afterwards, he filed this
action against the City of Los Angeles and the City of Riverside.
As an
initial matter, Plaintiff signed a waiver—which was notarized—releasing the
City of Riverside from liability concerning the information it provided to the
City of Los Angeles concerning Plaintiff’s employment. (See Declaration of Sean B. Murphy, Exh.
#12.) Plaintiff authorized the City of
Los Angeles “to obtain any information pertaining to [his] employment, credit
history, education, residence, academic achievement, personal information, work
performance, all examination materials and results, background investigations,
polygraph examinations, any and all internal affairs and disciplinary records,
including any files which are deemed to be confidential and/or sealed.” (Ibid.)
The waiver is addressed to: “To Whom It May Concern,” and the language
makes clear that the City of Los Angeles may present this waiver to Plaintiff’s
“employer” or “former employer” in order to obtain the records. (Ibid.)
Plaintiff waived “any right or opportunity to read or review any of the
information provided in response to this investigation.” (Ibid.)
Plaintiff also released the City of Riverside from liability concerning
the information it provides to the City of Los Angeles:
“I hereby release you, as my employer [or] former employer .
. . from any and all liability for damage of whatever kind, which may at any
time result to me, my heirs, or my assigns because of compliance with this
authorization and request to release information, or any attempt to comply with
it.”
(Ibid.)
The Court
need not rely on this waiver in order to resolve the motion because Plaintiff’s
claims fail on multiple independent grounds.
First, Plaintiff’s claims against the City of Riverside are predicated
upon allegations that it provided false information to the City of Los Angeles
in connection with his hiring process. Such
communications are privileged under Evidence Code section 1040. A public entity has a privilege to refuse to
disclose “official information.” (Evid.
Code, § 1040, subd. (b).) Official
information is information a public employee acquired in confidence in the
course of his or her official duties, which has not been disclosed to the
public. Evid. Code, § 1040, subd. (a).)
The privilege applies to information that cannot be disclosed under an
act of Congress or a California statute, or that should not be disclosed
“because there is a necessity for preserving [its] confidentiality ... that
outweighs the necessity for disclosure in the interest of justice.” (Evid. Code, § 1040, subd. (b).) The Court finds that there is a necessity in
maintaining their confidentiality per section 1040(b). A public safety agency
must conduct background investigations of candidates to ensure fitness for
duty. Absent confidentiality, potential
sources likely will not provide candid information about such issues. This necessity is not outweighed by the
necessity for disclosure.
Second, the
Court finds that the City of Riverside has immunity under Government Code
section 818.8. This section states: “A
public entity is not liable for an injury caused by misrepresentation by an
employee of the public entity, whether or not such misrepresentation be negligent
or intentional.” (Gov. Code, § 818.8.) This section bars Plaintiff’s claims against
the City of Riverside. (See Los Angeles
Equestrian Center, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 432, 449.)
Plaintiff tries to circumvent this
law by arguing that the City of Riverside waived this defense by failing to
raise it in the answer. Plaintiff is,
quite simply, incorrect. The City of
Riverside’s answer states: “[T]he answering party is immune from liability
pursuant to the provisions of the California Government Code, including but not
limited to, Section[] . . . 818.8.”
(City of Riverside’s Answer, ¶ 56.)
Plaintiff argues that the City of Riverside waived the defense by
failing to cite Government Code section 818.6 in response to Plaintiff’s tort
claim. A public entity must notify the
claimant of any failure to include the required information set forth in
Government Code section 910, to sign the
claim, and/or to pay the fee. (See Phillips
v. Desert Hospital Dist. (1989) 49 Cal.3d 699, 705.) The failure to cite section 818.6 in denying
Plaintiff’s claim does not waive the defense.
Plaintiff argues that the City of Riverside failed to raise this defense
in response to Plaintiff’s written discovery.
But as Plaintiff concedes, the City of Riverside did not provide a
substantive response. (See Plaintiff’s
Memorandum of Points & Authorities, pp. 15-16.) Finally, Plaintiff does not brief the issue
whether Government Code section 818.6 can be waived by public entities. Government Code section 818.6 is law.
Third, Plaintiff cannot establish
any causation or related damages. Plaintiff
received a conditional job offer, and the condition was that any negative
background information could result in termination. It cannot be disputed that Plaintiff was not
truthful on his medical questionnaire of February 1, 2018, or October 23, 2018,
and did not provide the underlying medical records that would have revealed his
fraud. Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that
he was terminated as a result of any false or malicious statement by the City
of Riverside or that he would not have been fired in the absence of such
alleged false statements.
Finally, the underlying
communications are privileged under Civil Code section 47(c). This section sets
forth a privilege for “a communication, without malice, to a person interested
therein, (1) by one who is also interested, or (2) by one who stands in such a
relation to the person interested as to afford a reasonable ground for
supposing the motive for the communication to be innocent, or (3) who is
requested by the person interested to give the information.” (Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (c).) “Communications made in a commercial setting
relating to the conduct of an employee have been held to fall squarely within
the qualified privilege for communications to interested persons.” (Cuenca v. Safeway San Francisco Employees
Fed. Credit Union (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 985, 995.)
Plaintiff argues that this section
does not apply to a communication concerning the speech or activities of an
applicant for employment if the speech or activities are constitutionally
protected, or otherwise protected by Section 527.3 of the Code of Civil
Procedure or any other provision of law.”
(Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (c).)
Plaintiff argues that section 47(c) does not bar this action because his
conduct is protected by Government Code section 12920, which promotes
“eliminating unlawful discrimination.” Plaintiff
is incorrect. In fact, section 12940
states that the Government Code “does not prohibit an employer from refusing to
hire or discharging an employee who, because of the employee’s medical
condition, in unable to perform the employer’s essential duties even with
reasonable accommodation, or cannot perform those duties in a manner that would
not engage the employee’s health or safety or the health and safety of others
even with reasonable accommodation”
(Gov. Code, § 12940(a)(2).) More
important, section 12940.1 states: “[I]t shall be presumed that an individual
with heart trouble . . . applying for either a firefighter position . . . could
not perform those duties in a manner that would not engager the individual’s
health or safety or the health or safety of others.” (Gov. Code, § 12940.1.) Plaintiff argues that section 47(c) does not
apply because the City of Riverside acted with malice. There is insufficient evidence to give rise
to a triable issue on this point.
Plaintiff requests a continuance. If the party opposing a summary judgment
submits declarations showing that evidence “may exist but cannot, for reasons
stated, then be presented, the court shall deny the motion”, or continue it for
a reasonable period, or “make any other order as may be just.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (h).) The declarations must include: facts to
support the argument that controverting evidence may exist and why the
information sought is essential to opposing the motion; the specific reasons
why the party cannot present the evidence before the current deadline to file
opposition papers; an estimate of the time necessary to obtain such evidence;
and the specific procedures the opposing party intends to use to seek the
evidence. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd.
(h).) The grant of a continuance is
“virtually mandated” if the opposing party makes the required showing. (Dee v. Vintage Petroleum, Inc. (2003)
106 Cal.App.4th 30, 34, internal quotations omitted.) However, Plaintiff’s counsel does not satisfy
this standard.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Plaintiff was not truthful on his
medical questionnaire of February 1, 2018, or October 23, 2018, and did not
provide the underlying medical records that would have revealed his fraud. Then,
after the City of Los Angeles discovered the issue and terminated him, he sued
the City of Riverside for providing information in connection with the hiring
process. Plaintiff’s claims fail for
multiple independent reasons. Therefore,
the Court grants the City of Riverside’s motion for summary judgment. The City of Riverside shall provide notice
and file proof of such with the Court.
Order #2 of 2
Motion for
Protective Order
The City of
Los Angeles (the “City”) moves for a protective order to preclude Plaintiff’s
counsel from inquiring into certain matters during the Battalion Chief Jamie
Brown’s deposition. For the reasons
discussed in the Court’s order of June 29, 2023, as well as the Court’s order
granting the City of Riverside’s motion for summary judgment, the Court grants
the motion and signs the proposed order.
The City
seeks monetary sanctions in the amount of $7,000 against the Plaintiff, but not
Plaintiff’s counsel, in connection with this motion. The Court finds that there has been no
substantial justification for the opposition to this motion. Indeed, Plaintiff counsel’s recalcitrance on
this issue constitutes an abuse of the discovery process in light of the
Court’s order of June 29, 2023, which clarified the Court’s view on this
issue. However, the Court denies the
request for several reasons. First, the
City requested sanctions against Plaintiff—not Plaintiff’s counsel—and it is
clear that the latter is the one responsible for this issue. Second, the City provides no clarification in
terms of how it reached the request for $7,000, i.e., there is no discussion of
the hours and billing rate. Finally, the
request is defective because it seeks “to discourage future misconduct.” Discovery sanctions are remedial in nature,
to compensate an opposing counsel for having to litigate an issue. Deterrence is not a permissible basis for
discovery sanctions.
Based upon
the foregoing, the Court orders as follows:
1. The Court grants the City’s motion for
a protective order and signs the proposed order.
2. The Court denies the City’s request for
sanctions.
3. Counsel for the City of Los Angeles
shall provide notice.