Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case: 21STCV21616, Date: 2023-03-08 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV21616    Hearing Date: March 8, 2023    Dept: 39

Vixente Medrano Medina v. Los Angeles Unified School District

Case No. 21STCV21616

Motion for Summary Judgment

BACKGROUND

            Plaintiff Vixente Medrano Medina (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against his employer, the Los Angeles Unified School District (“Defendant”).  Plaintiff dismissed certain causes of action on July 26, 2022, and now pursues the following causes of action against Defendant:

1.         Disability discrimination under FEHA

2.         Failure to provide reasonable accommodation

3.         Failure to engage in the interactive process

4.         Failure to prevent discrimination

5.         Retaliation under FEHA

6.         Hostile work environment under FEHA

Now, Defendant moves for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication of each cause of action.  Plaintiff opposes the motion, which is granted in part and denied in part.

LEGAL STANDARD

“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law[.] There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.”  (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.)  “[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.”  (Ibid.)  

“A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if the party contends that the cause of action has no merit, that there is no affirmative defense to the cause of action, that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).) 

DISCUSSION

A.        Disability Discrimination and Retaliation under FEHA

Plaintiff’s first cause of action is for disability discrimination under FEHA, and his fifth cause of action is retaliation under FEHA.  When deciding issues of adverse employment actions, such as discrimination and retaliation, the court applies the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792 shifting burdens test.  (Caldwell v. Paramount Unified School Dist. (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 189, 203; Loggins v. Kaiser Permanente Intern. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1108–09.)  Under the three-part test developed in McDonnell, if the employee successfully shows a prima facie case exists, the burden shifts to the employer to provide evidence that there was a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the adverse employment action.  (Morgan v. Regents of University of California (2000) 88 Cal.App.4th 52, 68.)  If the employer produces evidence showing a legitimate reason for the adverse employment action, the presumption of retaliation drops out of the picture and the burden shifts back to the employee to provide “substantial responsive evidence” that the employer’s proffered reasons were untrue or pretextual.  (Loggins v. Kaiser Permanente Internat. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1109.)

Plaintiff does not satisfy his initial burden because he was not terminated but instead applied for, and received, a disability retirement.  There is no dispute that Plaintiff had a serious heart condition that twice required hospitalization.  (Declaration of Vixente Medrano Medina, ¶ 15.)  At some point, Plaintiff took workers’ compensation leave due to his heart condition.  (Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Separate Statement, ¶ 40.)  Plaintiff was out on workers’ compensation leave for more than four semesters.  (Id., ¶ 41.)  Defendant does not allow a certified employee to be out more than four semesters, but will extend the leave for two additional semesters under certain conditions.  (Id., ¶ 42.)  In fact, Defendant allowed Plaintiff to extend his leave for the additional two semesters in August 2019.  (Id., ¶ 43.)  At that point, Plaintiff applied for a disability retirement through CalSTRS, the pension plan for state educational workers.  (Id., ¶ 44.)  Plaintiff applied for disability retirement voluntarily without consulting Miguel Garza, Defendant’s assistant director for certified assignments.  (Id., ¶¶ 44, 50.)  Plaintiff submitted the application in October 2019, and CalSTRS informed him in April 2020 that it had been approved.  (Declaration of Vixente Medrano Medina, ¶ 17.)  The retirement was effective as of October 1, 2019.  (Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Separate Statement, ¶ 44.)  Accordingly, there was no termination. 

Plaintiff appears to predicate his claim upon his inability to rescind his application for a disability pension and return to work.  Even assuming Plaintiff satisfied his initial burden, Defendant proffers sufficient evidence that there was no discrimination or retaliation.  After receiving a disability retirement, Plaintiff changed his mind upon learning that he had to work only three more months to qualify for lifetime medical benefits.  (Declaration of Vixente Medrano Medina, ¶ 20.)  Plaintiff then sought to “undo” his disability retirement.  (Ibid.)  Given the length of Plaintiff’s leave of absence, he was required to make an appointment with Defendant’s medical director and present a note from his doctor clearing him to return to work.  (Id., ¶¶ 3, 6.)  Plaintiff was unable to be cleared by a doctor to return to work.  (Id., ¶ 6.)  This was based upon Defendant’s policies and not based on decisions specific to Plaintiff.  (Declaration of Miguel Garza, ¶¶ 2-3, 6.)  Defendant’s evidence shifts the burden back to Plaintiff to proffer evidence that Defendant’s reasons were false or pretextual. 

Plaintiff relies on a report from Edward L. Spencer, M.D.  There are several problems with this report.  First, it is not admissible.  Plaintiff did not submit a declaration, signed under penalty of perjury.  Second, the report relies on a variety of case-specific hearsay.  (See People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 684.)  Finally, it does not provide any basis to conclude that Defendant’s evidence is false or pretextual.  Plaintiff concedes that his treating physician did not approve his return to work within the pertinent time period.  (See Declaration of Vixente Medrano, ¶ 19.)  Plaintiff argues that he needed, but did not receive, additional time to present this documentation.  (Ibid.)  This does not give rise to a triable issue of disability discrimination.   

            The Court also considered Plaintiff’s claim, to the extent it is predicated upon other alleged treatment, but there is insufficient evidence to give rise to a triable issue.  Plaintiff states that he “felt” that Defendant disciplined Plaintiff due to his disability.  (See Declaration of Vixente Medrano, ¶ 3.)  Plaintiff cannot raise triable issues of material fact by citing inferences “derived from speculation, conjecture, imagination, or guesswork.”  (Joseph E. Di Loreto, Inc. v. O'Neill (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 149, 161.)  There also is an insufficient record of disciplinary action or harassment based upon his alleged disability (or based on any other factor).  According to Mary Seimears, Plaintiff never received discipline or a poor performance review.  Declaration of Mary Seimears, ¶ 4.)  Although Seimears spoke to Plaintiff about not being able to locate him on the locator system, she states that the discussion was not disciplinary, and there is no evidence in the record that it formed the basis of an adverse employment action.  (See ibid.)  Therefore, the Court grants summary adjudication of the first and fifth causes of action.    

B.        Failure to provide reasonable accommodation

Plaintiff’s second cause of action is for failure to provide a reasonable accommodation.  The elements of this cause of action are as follows: (1) Plaintiff had a disability; (2) Defendant knew that Plaintiff suffered from a disability; (3) Plaintiff was able to perform the essential job duties with reasonable accommodation; (4) Defendant failed to provide a reasonable accommodation; (5) Plaintiff was harmed; and (6) Defendant’s failure to provide a reasonable accommodation was a substantial factor in causing that harm.  (Shirvanyan v. Los Angeles Community College District (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 82, 95.)  A “reasonable accommodation” is one necessitated by a person’s disability that enables the person to perform the essential job functions of the position.  (Nealy v. City of Santa Monica (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 359, 373.)  Where the disability, resulting limitations, and necessary reasonable accommodations are not open, obvious, and apparent to the employer, the employee must specifically identify the disability and resulting limitations, and suggest a reasonable accommodation.  (Scotch v. Art Institute of California (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 986, 1013; see also Kao v. University of San Francisco (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 437, 450; King v. United Parcel Service, Inc. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 426, 444.) 

            Defendant relies on the declaration of Mary Seimears.  She states that Plaintiff asked for a riser desk, a floor pad, and an extra monitor.  (Declaration of Mary Seimears, ¶ 5.)  She states that “Plaintiff never asked for any other accommodations or to participate in the interactive process after this.”  (Ibid.)  Siemears stated that all specialists received a riser desk, but she does not state that a floor pad and extra monitor were provided.  (Ibid.)  Plaintiff presents a different view: He did not receive a floor mat and extra monitor, and had to purchase these items with his own money.  (Declaration of Vixente Medrano Medina, ¶ 12.)  He also states that he did not receive a riser desk for two months.  (Ibid.)  There is a triable issue on this point, so the motion for summary adjudication of the second cause of action is denied. 

C.        Failure to engage in the interactive process

Plaintiff’s third cause of action is for failure to engage in the good faith interactive process.  The elements of this cause of action are as follows: (1) Plaintiff was a qualified individual; (2) Plaintiff requested an accommodation for a disability or medical condition; (3) Plaintiff was willing to engage in an interactive process to determine effective reasonable accommodations; (4) Defendant failed to engage in a timely, good-faith interactive process, and (5) A reasonable accommodation was available.  (Nealy, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 373.)  Defendant presents evidence that it engaged in the interactive process with Plaintiff.  (Declaration of Mary Seimears, ¶ 5.)  Plaintiff’s own testimony suggests that Defendant engaged in the interactive process.  (See Declaration of Adam A. Grable, Exh. A, p. 63; see also Declaration of Vixente Medrano Medina, ¶ 12.)  Therefore, the Court grants summary adjudication of the third cause of action. 

D.        Failure to prevent discrimination

Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action is failure to prevent discrimination.  Having granted summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s discrimination claim, the Court also grants summary adjudication of the fourth cause of action. 

E.         Hostile work environment under FEHA

            Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action is for hostile work environment under FEHA.  Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s agents harassed him based upon race and religion, among other things.  Assuming Defendant satisfied its burden on summary judgment, Plaintiff proffers sufficient evidence to give rise to a triable issue.  According to Plaintiff, his supervisor called him “Pollo Loco” and “Tequila.”  (Declaration of Vixente Medrano Medina, ¶ 4.)  Plaintiff is of Mexican descent.  (Ibid.)  Plaintiff also states that his supervisor called other employees derogatory names based on race and religion.  (Id., ¶¶ 4-5.)  This evidence is sufficient to give rise to a triable issue.  “In many cases, a single offensive act by a co-employee is not enough to establish employer liability for a hostile work environment.  But where that act is committed by a supervisor, the result may be different.”  (Dee v. Vintage Petroleum (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 30, 36.) 

Therefore, the motion for summary adjudication of the sixth cause of action is denied.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

            Based upon the foregoing, the Court orders as follows:

            1.         The Court grants summary adjudication of the first, third, fourth, and fifth causes of action.

            2.         The Court denies summary adjudication of the second and sixth causes of action.  The case shall proceed to trial on Plaintiff’s causes of action for failure to provide a reasonable accommodation and hostile work environment under FEHA.

            3.         Defendant’s counsel shall provide notice and file proof of such with the Court.