Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case: 21STCV43450, Date: 2023-09-18 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV43450 Hearing Date: September 18, 2023 Dept: 39
Rudolf Bjileveld,
et al. v. Lorraine Beth Johnson, et al.
Case No.
21STCV43450
[TENTATIVE] Final
Status Conference Order
Plaintiffs
Rudolf Bijleveld and Michelle Crames (“Plaintiffs”) filed this action against
Lorrane Beth Johnson (“Defendant”) asserting causes of action for quiet title,
trespass, nuisance, negligence, reformation of written instrument, declaratory
relief, and injunctive relief.
Plaintiffs and Defendant own adjacent properties. Plaintiffs concede: “At the time they
purchase [their] property, in or about February 2017, Plaintiffs were made
aware that a portion of the house and improvements thereto, including, without
limitation, a portion of one of the bedrooms, and a portion of the front yard
and side yard, were located on Defendant Johnson’s Property, and that a portion
of Defendant Johnson’s backyard was actually located on Plaintiffs’
property.” (Complaint, ¶ 7.) Nevertheless, Plaintiffs purchased the
property. (Ibid.) The parties apparently lived in harmony for
almost two years, but in November 2018, Defendant “entered onto the land in
front of Plaintiffs’ house and removed certain improvements in front of their
house, including a stone walkway that had been there since the 1950’s, and then
graded the area and leveled the soil.”
(Complaint, ¶ 10.) This action
followed.
In
response, Defendant filed a cross-complaint seeking removal of all encroaching
structures on her land. Defendant
alleges that she has allowed Plaintiffs and the prior owner of their property
to use her land. (Cross-Complaint, ¶
18.) Defendant alleges that she has paid
the property taxes associated with this land.
(Cross-Complaint, ¶ 19.) Now,
Defendant seeks removal of all encroaching structures on her land, including a
fence and part of the bedroom at issue.
The Court
has reviewed the parties’ joint witness list, which anticipates that the
testimony will take approximately eight (8) hours. The Court has reviewed the parties’ exhibit
list, which contemplates approximately 74 exhibits. The parties’ trial estimate appears to be
excessive, given the narrow scope of the issues truly before this Court.
Plaintiff
seeks an order adjusting the lot lines to reflect the existing as-built
boundaries of the properties or, in the alternative, an order awarding the
parties’ reciprocal easements over the portions of each other’s property. (Complaint, p. 9, ¶ 3.) The former is a possessory interest in
Defendant’s property, which requires proof of adverse possession. In order to establish adverse possession, Plaintiffs
must have paid the property taxes on the claimed land. (See, e.g., McLear-Gary v. Scott
(2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 145, 152.) In
their complaint, Plaintiffs do not allege that they did so. In Defendant’s cross-complaint, she alleges
that she, not Plaintiffs or Plaintiffs’ predecessors, paid the property taxes. This does not appear to be in dispute.
By
contrast, an easement is non-possessory interest in property that gives its
owner the right to use the land of another or to prevent the property owner
from using his land. (See, e.g., Beyer
v. Tahoe Sands Resort (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1458, 1472.) “An easement is a nonpossessory
interest in the land of another that gives its owner the right to use the land
of another . . . .” (Kazi v. State
Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (2001) 24 Cal.4th 871, 880, citation
omitted.) “An easement right is akin to
goodwill, an anticipated benefit of a bargain, or an investment, none of which
is considered tangible property.”
(Ibid.)
With
respect to the side yard—which Plaintiffs allege is bordered by an existing
fence—and the encroaching bedroom, Plaintiffs essentially seek a possessory
interest in that land under an easement theory.
In general, there are no exclusive prescriptive easements. (See Romero v. Shih (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th
326, 350, citations omitted.) In such
cases, a plaintiff must satisfy the elements of adverse possession:
Unsurprisingly, claimants have often tried to obtain the
fruits of adverse possession under the guise of a prescriptive easement to
avoid having to satisfy the tax element. . . .
The law prevents this sophistry with the following rule: If the
prescriptive interest sought by a claimant is so comprehensive as to supply the
equivalent of an estate, the claimant must establish the elements of adverse
prescription, not those of a prescriptive easement. . . . In other words, the law simply does not allow
parties who have possessed land to ignore the statutory requirement for paying
taxes by claiming a prescriptive easement.
(Hansen v. Sandridge Partners, L.P.
(2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1020, 1033, citations and quotations omitted.) In this case, Plaintiff essentially seeks to
own that land. “Because [the plaintiff]
enclosed and possessed the land in question, his claim to a prescriptive
easement is without merit.” (Kapner
v. Meadowlark Ranch Ass’n (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1182, 1187.) “[A]n exclusive prescriptive easement, which
as a practical matter completely prohibits the true owner from using his land
will not be granted in a case . . . involving a garden variety residential
boundary encroachment.” (Harrison v.
Welch (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1093, citation and internal quotations
omitted.) Simply, an exclusive
prescriptive easement had “no application to a simple back yard dispute.” (Silacci v. Abramson (1996) 45
Cal.App.4th 558, 564.) Because
Plaintiffs essentially seek a possessory interest in this land, the dispositive
issue is whether Plaintiff paid the taxes on this land.
The
dispute involving the front yard is more conducive to a prescriptive easement
because Plaintiffs’ theory is that they have the right to use this space. In order to obtain a prescriptive easement,
Plaintiffs must prove use of the property for the statutory period of five
years which has been open and notorious, continuous and uninterrupted, hostile
to the true owner, and under claim of right.
(Main Street Plaza v. Cartwright & Main, LLC (2011) 194
Cal.App.4th 1044, 1054.) “Claim of
right” means “that the property was used without permission of the owner of the
land.” (Felgenhauer v. Soni
(2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 445, 450.) The
dispositive issue is whether Plaintiffs were using this land without permission
of the owner. However, based upon the
allegations in the complaint and the cross-complaint, it appears that Defendant
consented to their use of the front yard until they filed this lawsuit. Nevertheless, there may be an equitable or
implied easement to cross this space to enter Plaintiffs’ house.
In
appropriate cases in which the requirements for traditional easements are not
present, California courts have the authority to exercise their equitable powers
to fashion protective interests in land belonging to another. (See Tashakori
v. Lakis (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1003, 1008 (collecting cases); Linthicum v. Butterfield (2009) 175
Cal.App.4th 259, 262-27 (Gilbert, P.J.).)
This interest is commonly called an “equitable easement.” Although most such cases involve a
determination whether a defendant should be ordered to remove physical
encroachments located on the plaintiff’s land, courts may exercise their equity
powers to fashion an affirmative interest in the owner’s land which will
protect the encroacher’s use. (Tashakori,
supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 1009 (citing Hirshfield
v. Schwartz (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 749, 771, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 861.) Courts apply the “relative hardship” test to
determine whether to grant an equitable easement in cases involving both
physical encroachments on another’s property and disputed rights of access over
a neighbor’s property. (Id. at pp. 1009-10 (citing Linthicum, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at pp.
262-27; Hirshfield, supra, 91
Cal.App.4th at p. 759; Miller v. Johnson
(1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 289, 292, 75 Cal.Rptr. 699.)
To create an equitable easement, three
factors must be present. First, the [party
seeking the easement] must be innocent.
That is, his or her encroachment must not be willful or negligent. The court should consider the parties’
conduct to determine who is responsible for the dispute. Second, unless the rights of the public would
be harmed, the court should [deny access] if the [landholder] will suffer
irreparable injury . . . regardless of the injury to [the party seeking the
easement]. Third, the hardship to the
[party seeking the easement] from [denying access] must be greatly
disproportionate to the hardship caused [the landholder] by the continuance of
the encroachment and this fact must clearly appear in the evidence and must be
proved by the [party seeking the easement].
(Ibid. (citing Hirshfield, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 759, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 861)
(internal quotation marks omitted).) The
Court may grant an equitable easement without any preexisting use by the
landowner seeking the easement. (See Hinrichs v. Melton (2017) 111
Cal.App.5th 516, 519, 218 Cal.Rptr.3d 13 (Gilbert, P.J.).) In this case, Plaintiffs admit that they
purchased the land with knowledge of the issues, which raises questions whether
they can establish that they are “innocent.”
Moreover, there is no “free” equitable easement. Even if Plaintiff prevails, the Court still
must
Based upon the foregoing, the
dispositive issues are relatively narrow.
The basic facts do not appear to be in dispute, e.g., the details of
Plaintiffs’ purchase of their property, the property surveys, the condition of
the properties, etc. The parties may
need to introduce exhibits showing the property lines and respective uses. Regardless, the following issues appear to be
dispositive:
1. Did
Plaintiffs or the prior owner of the property pay the property taxes for the
portions of Defendant’s land enclosed by the fence, which includes the portion
of the side bedroom encroaching on Defendant’s property?
2. Did
Defendant consent to Plaintiffs’ use of the front yard prior to the filing of
this lawsuit?
3. Did
Defendant trespass on Plaintiffs’ property or remove anything on Plaintiffs’
property in November 2018?
4. Are
Plaintiffs “innocent” for purposes of determining whether there is an equitable
easement? If so, is there irreparable
harm to Plaintiffs and does the balancing of the hardships favor Plaintiffs?
5. Can
Plaintiffs reasonably access their house without an easement over the front
yard?
6. If
the Court grants an equitable easement for the encroaching second bedroom, what
is the diminution in value of Defendant’s land, i.e., how much compensation
should Defendant receive for this easement?
7. If
the Court grants an equitable easement for crossing the front yard to access
Plaintiffs’ house, what is the diminution in value of Defendant’s land, i.e.,
how much compensation should Defendant receive for this easement?
8. What
is the diminution in value of Defendant’s land for the remaining easements that
Plaintiff seeks?
“Some litigants
are of the mistaken opinion that when they are assigned to a court for trial
they have camping rights. . . . This view is not only contrary to law but
undermines a trial judge’s obligation to be protective of the court’s time and
resources as well as the time and interests of . . . jurors and other litigants
waiting in line to have their cases [tried].” (California Crane School, Inc.
v. National Com. For Certification of Crane Operators (2014) 226
Cal.App.4th 12, 20.) This concern is
critical, as Department #39 currently has 649 open cases, which gives rise to
constant jury trials and heavy motions calendars. Excessive trial estimates deprive other
litigants of access to justice.
Based upon the
foregoing, the Court orders as follows:
1. The parties shall prepare a stipulation
of facts and shall bring copies on the morning of trial.
2. The parties shall meet-and-confer and identify
the exhibits that shall be pre-admitted, i.e., the exhibits for which there is
no dispute concerning authenticity and admissibility.
3. The parties shall have two (2) hours
for each side, absent unforeseen circumstances or other good cause.
4. The Court’s clerk shall provide notice
via email.