Judge Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case Number: 22STCP02764, Date: 2024-05-22 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case: 22STCP02764, Date: 2024-05-22 Tentative Ruling

Petitioner Michael Lynn Waters (“Petitioner”) was charged with shooting at his then-girlfriend with the intention of murdering or seriously injuring her. The case proceeded to trial in 1998, but there was a disposition between the People and Petitioner. The probation department prepared a “pre-plea report.” The report states: “In accordance with the Court’s order prohibiting probation department interviews with defendants for pre-plea probation reports in Los Angeles County, the Defendant in this case has not been interviewed.” Petitioner is still in custody and has been denied parole by the Parole Board. Petitioner previously filed a petition for habeas corpus arguing that “the Board used a false probation officer’s report when determining Petitioner’s suitability for parole.” The court (Ryan, J.) denied the petition on October 28, 2019, finding “Preliminarily, the Board is entitled to rely on the probation officer’s report.” The court also noted that Petitioner “was provided the chance during his [parole] hearing to present mitigation evidence, which the Board took into consideration in rendering its decision.”

Now, Petitioner has filed a writ of mandamus against the Probation Department (the “Probation Department” or “Respondent”) due to “racial discrimination, fraud, and [under the] Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Petitioner seeks an order directing “the Probation Department to forward a copy of the order they received, prohibiting Probation Department from interviewing Defendants in Los Angeles County for the presentencing report, (within) (30) days after receiving the order . . . .” (Petition for Writ of Mandate (“Pet.”) at 9.) In the alternative, Petitioner seeks an order recommending resentencing. (Ibid.)

The court (Beckloff, J.) noticed its own motion for judgment on the pleadings, as authorized by Code of Civil Procedure section 438(b)(2). The court reviewed Petitioner’s opposition brief. Following a hearing, the court grants the motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismisses this case with prejudice.

The court may upon its own motion grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Code Civ. Proc. § 438(b)(2). The court may grant the motion in favor of the respondent when the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that respondent. (Code Civ. Proc. § 438(c)(3)(B)(ii). “The grounds for motion provided for in this section shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 438(d).)

In ruling on the motion, “[the court] assume[s] the truth of the allegations in the complaint, but … not … the truth of contentions, deductions, or conclusions of law.” (California Logistics, Inc. v. State (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 242, 247.) “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters.” (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) The allegations in the petition must be liberally construed in favor of Petitioner on demurrer. (See Mobil Oil Corp. v Exxon Corp. (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 942, 947.)

Although Petitioner does not specify whether he seeks a writ under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 or 1085, it appears that Petitioner seeks relief under section 1085, which authorizes writ relief “to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 1085(a).) There are two essential requirements to the issuance of an ordinary writ of mandate under section 1085: (1) a clear, present, and ministerial duty on the part of the respondent, and (2) a clear, present, and beneficial right on the part of the petitioner to the performance of that duty. (California Ass’n for Health Services at Home v. Department of Health Services (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 696, 704.) “Generally, mandamus is available to compel a public agency’s performance or to correct an agency's abuse of discretion when the action being compelled or corrected is ministerial.” (AIDS Healthcare Foundation v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Public Health (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 693, 700.) “A ministerial act is an act that a public officer is required to perform in a prescribed manner in obedience to the mandate of legal authority and without regard to his or her own judgment or opinion concerning such act’s propriety or impropriety, when a given state of facts exists.” (Ibid.)

The petition seeks a writ directing Respondent to produce a copy of the court’s order prohibiting the probation department from interviewing defendants for pre-plea probation reports. As an initial matter, in the court’s experience taking felony pleas, defendants are not interviewed for pre-plea probation reports in order to preserve their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Because that rule exists for the protection of defendants, presumably, the court would have made an exception had Petitioner requested leave from the court to speak with the probation officer. But there is no record that Petitioner ever challenged that order during the criminal proceedings.

Regardless, the petition seeking a copy of the court’s order from the Probation Department is defective. Even assuming that the Probation Department still has a copy of the court’s order—which was issued at least 26 years ago—there is no legal basis upon which the Probation Department would have a clear, present, and ministerial duty to produce the order to Petitioner at this juncture, decades after his criminal trial and conviction. Petitioner does not allege that he made a request for the order pursuant to a discovery procedure authorized by law. (See e.g. Penal Code § 1054.9.) Nor does Petitioner allege that he served a California Public Records Act (“CPRA”) request upon the Probation Department or that any such request was denied.[1] Accordingly, the petition does not allege that Respondent has a clear, present, and ministerial duty to produce the court’s order to Petitioner.

The petition also seeks, in the alternative, an order directing Respondent to “recommend resentencing.” (Pet. 9.) On the cover page of the petition, Petitioner alleges that the petition is “due to racial discrimination, fraud, and [sic] equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”, and that if such is shown, “the Compton Probation Department must recommend that the Petitioner be resentenced before his elderly parole hearing on (Aug 29, 2022).” (Pet. 1.) In the “Argument” sections of his petition, Petitioner asserts that: (1) statistical data would show that the Compton Probation Department has never placed a false document into a white defendants’ central prison file, whereas Petitioner’s presentence report was “completely false”; (2) sentencing determinations must be based on reliable evidence, not speculation or unfounded allegations; (3) certain parts of the testimony of the alleged victim in Petitioner’s criminal trial, Karen Evans, were “physically impossible”; and (4) Respondent never received an order from “anyone” prohibiting Respondent from interviewing “Defendants” in Los Angeles County for the purpose of presentencing reports. (Pet. 1-8.) In his opposition brief filed March 21, 2024, Petitioner argues that he was denied a due process right to review the “false probation report” during or after sentencing; that the false report is the “heart” of this case; that “false evidence” was used in Petitioner’s criminal trial and at sentencing; and that Petitioner was denied counsel during his presentencing interview, a “critical stage” of the criminal proceedings. (Oppo. filed 3/21/24 at 1-4.)

Petitioner’s request for a writ directing Respondent to recommend resentencing is, in effect, a collateral attack on his criminal conviction. Petitioner cannot attack his criminal conviction in this civil action. “[Petitioner’s] civil challenge to his criminal conviction is barred by the established rule that civil actions may not be used to challenge ‘the validity of outstanding criminal judgments.’” (Brown v. County of Los Angeles (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 320, 322.) “Using a civil suit to collaterally attack an outstanding criminal conviction contravenes the ‘strong judicial policy against the creation of two conflicting resolutions arising out of the same or identical transaction.’” (Id. at 323.) To raise civil claims related to his criminal conviction, “a [civil] plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” (Id. at 322-323.) Petitioner does not allege that any such challenges to his criminal conviction have been sustained. Further, the court (Ryan, J.) has already ruled that it was not improper for the Parole Board to rely on a probation report prepared without interviewing Petitioner because he had an opportunity to present testimony during the parole hearing.

2. The court denies leave to amend, as no amendment would cure the deficiencies in this petition.

4. Respondent’s counsel shall provide notice and file proof of service with the court.

[1] Petitioner provides a letter rejecting a CPRA request, but this request was served on the California Department of Justice, not the Los Angeles County Probation Department.