Judge Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case Number: 22STCP04303, Date: 2024-05-17 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case: 22STCP04303, Date: 2024-05-17 Tentative Ruling

On August 10, 2018, following an investigation, the County of Los Angeles (the “County”) found that Sandra Barton was the lawful owner of a tax-defaulted property located at 4904 4th Avenue in Los Angeles, California (the “Property”). The County conducted a tax sale on October 21, 2019, resulting in excess proceeds in the amount of $357,875.74. Barton then assigned her rights to Petitioner Global Discoveries Ltd. (“Petitioner”), which relied on the County’s finding that Barton was the lawful owner of the property.

Petitioner filed a claim for the excess proceeds, per Tax and Revenue Code section 4675. The County and Keith Knox, as treasurer and tax collector of the County of Los Angeles (“Knox”) (collectively “Respondents”) denied the claim. Contrary to its initial position, the County now takes the position that Sandra Barton may not have been the true owner of the Property. After Petitioner filed a petition for writ of mandate before this court, Respondents rescinded the denial and requested that Petitioner provide documentation proving that Barton was the lawful owner of the Property. When Petitioner failed to do so, Respondents denied the claim again. Petitioner filed a supplemental petition for writ of mandate to encompass the second denial. Petitioner seeks a writ of mandate ordering Respondents to set aside both decisions to deny the claim. The supplemental petition for writ of mandate is granted.

On May 2, 2011, the court (Shook, J.) issued a quiet title judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 764.010 in Sandra Barton v. Gladys Hoffman-Blackwell, et al., Case Number BC428033. The judgment declared that as of May 1, 2011, Sandra Barton was the owner in fee simple of the Property (the “Judgment”). The Judgment was entered after a default prove-up hearing and declared that the Defendants, including Gladys Hoffman-Blackwell and her successors, “own no title, right, estate, lien, or any interest whatsoever in the subject Property.” (AR 1655-56.) The Judgment was recorded on August 2, 2011, in the Official Records of the Recorder’s Office of Los Angeles County as document number 20111034369. (Supplemental Petition (“Suppl. Pet.”) ¶ 8; Answer ¶ 8.)

On or about January 14, 2014, the California Attorney General’s Office (the “AG’s Office”) filed a felony complaint alleging that Barton and several other co-defendants conspired to unlawfully obtain quiet title judgments to roughly two dozen properties throughout California, one of which was the Property now at issue. (AR 340–483.) The AG’s Office subsequently dismissed all counts relating to the Property on or about March 2, 2015. (See Petitioner’s Opening Brief (“OB”) 8:7-8, citing AR 359–360.)[1] The County conducted an internal investigation to determine of the Judgment was valid. (See AR 2268-2229, 2280-2281.) After a lengthy investigation, the County’s Office of the Assessor concluded on August 10, 2018, that “Sandra Barton is the correct owner of record for the above referenced parcel per Court Case Number BC428033 on document number 1034369 recorded August 2, 2011.” (AR 2280.)

On October 21, 2019, after concluding its internal investigation and providing notice as required by law, the County conducted a sale of the Property (the “Tax Sale”). (Suppl. Pet. ¶ 6; Ans. ¶ 6; AR 2080.) A tax deed granting the Property to William Little was recorded on January 14, 2020, in the Official Records of the Recorder’s Office of Los Angeles County as Document Number 20200053010. (Suppl. Pet. ¶ 6; Ans. ¶ 6.) The tax deed expressly acknowledged that the Property was “last assessed to, BARTON, SANDRA.” (AR 2080.) The Tax Sale “resulted in excess proceeds in the amount of $357,875.74, which is subject to distribution in accordance with Revenue and Taxation Code section 4675.” (Ans. ¶ 7.) The County then prepared and served a notice dated January 15, 2020, as required by Revenue and Taxation Code section 4675, to all “Parties of Interest,” including Barton, identifying Barton as the last assessee of the Property and advising such parties of their right to file a claim for the excess proceeds resulting from the Tax Sale. (AR 6.)

In October 2020, Petitioner filed a claim for the excess proceeds with the County. (AR 9-21.) Petitioner’s claim included a copy of the Judgment and an assignment of the rights to the excess proceeds from Barton to Petitioner. (AR 13-18.) The assignment was notarized in October 2020, months after the tax deed was recorded and the County gave the notice required by section 4675 in January 2020. (AR 17-18.) Petitioner’s claim also included an affidavit by Barton stating: “I do not have nor can I provide at this time any original or copies of Tax Bills, Title Insurance Policies, Utility Bills, or other supporting documentation to reference previously reporting to the [Property] . . . .” (AR 17.)

On September 16, 2022, the County sent a letter to Petitioner stating: “This is to inform you that your claim for excess proceeds resulting from the sale of the above-referenced property at the Tax Collector's Public Auction held on October 21, 2019 has been denied as of the date of this letter. [¶] After careful review of our records, you failed to provide the required documents to substantiate your legal interest to this sold property pursuant to California Revenue and Taxation Code Section 4675. [¶] If you do not agree with our denial, you have 90 days from the date of this letter to file legal action with the Superior Court” (hereafter “September 2022 Decision”). (AR Vol. 8, 1939.)

On December 8, 2022, Petitioner filed its original petition for writ of mandate challenging the County’s September 2022 Decision. On May 18, 2023, the County sent a letter to Petitioner stating, in part, that County “hereby rescinds its September 16, 2022, denial of the claim of Global Discoveries, Ltd . (Global) for excess proceeds resulting from the sale of the above-referenced property (subject property) at the Tax Collector’s Public Auction held on October 21, 2019, in order to provide Global with an additional opportunity to provide the necessary information and proof to establish its rights to the excess proceeds.” (AR Vo. 18, 4169.) The County granted Petitioner 30 days to provide 15 categories of information and proof to establish Petitioner’s rights to the excess proceeds, including:

· “Written affidavit or declaration from Ms. Barton signed under penalty of perjury and notarized, which sufficiently explains how she continuously occupied and claimed the subject property for five years starting from August 2004 while simultaneously occupying and claiming the property at 595 E. Howard, Pasadena, CA 91104, assessor's parcel number 5838-033-015, for five years,” among other properties.

· “Proof of all payments Ms. Barton made from August 2004 through December 14, 2009, for property taxes assessed and/or levied against the subject property.”

· “Copies of all utility bills (electric, gas, telecommunications) from August 2004 through December 14, 2009, which identify Ms. Barton as the account holder and the subject property as the service address.”

· “Copies of all documents evidencing any benefit, consideration, payment, and/or value Global exchanged with Ms. Barton in exchange for her assignment of the excess proceeds to Global.”

On July 17, 2023, after Petitioner failed to submit the requested information, the County again denied Petitioner’s claim for excess proceeds for a second time (hereafter “July 2023 Decision”). (AR Vol. 20, 4752.) The County explained its second denial as follows: “More than 30 days have passed since the [County’s] May 18, 2023 notice and request. Global failed to submit any of the requested information and proof; failed to demonstrate that Ms. Barton did not fraudulently obtain title to the subject property through the unlawful acts that she was charged with in People v. Craig Merrill Mortensen, et al., Fresno Superior Court case number F14900385; and failed to establish that either Ms. Barton or Global, as Ms. Barton's assignee, are rightfully entitled to the excess proceeds. As a result, Global’s claim for the excess proceeds is denied.” (Ibid.)

Petitioner filed the original petition for writ of mandate on December 8, 2022. Petitioner then filed a supplemental petition for writ of mandate on October 13, 2023, to address the County’s July 2023, decision. Respondents filed an answer to the supplemental petition. On November 13, 2023, Petitioner filed its opening brief in support of the writ petition on November 13, 2023; Respondents filed their opposition on December 13, 2023; and Petitioner filed its reply on December 28, 2023. The court has received the administrative record lodged by the parties on August 31, 2023.

Respondents seek judicial notice of nine sets of documents. (See Respondents’ Request for Judicial Notice, ¶¶ 1-9.) The court denies the Request for Judicial Notice. The documents referenced in Paragraph One through Paragraph Eight are part of the certified administrative record, so judicial notice is not necessary. The court sustains Petitioner’s objection to the substitution of counsel form referenced in Paragraph Nine. A request for judicial notice cannot be used to circumvent the rules constraining the admission of extra-record evidence. (Ballona Wetlands Land Trust v. City of Los Angeles (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 455, 475, fn. 10.) Regardless, this document is not relevant to the court’s decision on the writ.

Petitioner’s objections to the Declaration of Nichole Alcaraz are sustained. Respondents concede that this proceeding is governed by Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. (Oppo. 4:25-26.) “As a general rule, a hearing on a writ of administrative mandamus is conducted solely on the record of the proceeding before the administrative agency.” (Richardson v. City and County of San Francisco (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 671, 702.) Relevant evidence may be admitted if, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, it could not have been produced or was improperly excluded at the administrative hearing. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5(e).) “If the moving party fails to make the required showing, it is an abuse of the court's discretion to [augment the record].” (Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Center v. Sup. Ct. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 93, 102.) Respondents do not address the requirements of section 1094.5(e) with respect to the Alcaraz declaration and they have not shown that such requirements are met. Furthermore, the Alcaraz declaration predominately summarizes documents from within the administrative record and therefore is not relevant. Regardless, the court would reach the same decision even if it considered this declaration.

“A petition for writ of administrative mandamus (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5) is the appropriate means for overturning the denial of a claim for excess proceeds from a default tax sale.” (Carloss v. County of Alameda (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 116, 126.) Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5(b), the pertinent issues are whether the respondent has proceeded without jurisdiction, whether there was a fair trial, and whether there was a prejudicial abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion is established if the agency has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5(b).)

Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion (California Youth Authority v. State Personnel Board (2002) 104 Cal. App. 4th 575, 584-85), or evidence of ponderable legal significance which is reasonable in nature, credible and of solid value. (Mohilef v. Janovici (1996) 51 Cal. App. 4th 267, 305 n. 28.) Under the substantial evidence test, “[c]ourts may reverse an [administrative] decision only if, based on the evidence …, a reasonable person could not reach the conclusion reached by the agency.” (Sierra Club v. California Coastal Com. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 602, 610.) “On questions of law arising in mandate proceedings, [the court] exercise[s] independent judgment.’” (Christensen v. Lightbourne (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1239, 1251.) The interpretation of statute or regulation is a question of law. (See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Quackenbush (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 65, 77.) “A challenge to the procedural fairness of the administrative hearing is reviewed de novo on appeal because the ultimate determination of procedural fairness amounts to a question of law.” (Nasha L.L.C. v. City of Los Angeles (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 470, 482.)

As discussed below, the petition primarily raises legal questions concerning the County’s authority to disregard a quiet title judgment, which is final, in its determination on a claim for excess proceeds pursuant to Revenue and Taxation Code section 4675. Because the petition raises legal questions upon which the court exercises its independent judgment, and because the court also finds that County’s decisions are not even supported by substantial evidence, the court need not determine whether a claim for excess proceeds implicates a fundamental vested right such that the “weight of the evidence” standard applies. (See OB 15:13-18 and Reply 11, fn. 4.)[2]

Petitioner contends that the County abused its discretion and violated due process in denying the claim for the excess proceeds because the Judgment finally and conclusively determined that Barton was the title owner to the Property. (OB 13-16.) Petitioner contends that County is equitably estopped from claiming that Barton was not the title owner of the Property. (OB 16-18.) Finally, Petitioner contends that County had no jurisdiction to reconsider its September 2022 Decision once it was final and after Petitioner had filed their petition for writ of mandate pursuant to Revenue and Taxation Code section 4675(g). (OB 18-19.) In opposition, Respondents contend that the Judgment was not “dispositive,” and that evidence refutes Barton’s ownership of the Property. (Oppo. 6-9.) Respondents contend that the May 2023 rescission of the initial denial of Petitioner’s claim was “proper” and not in excess of County’s jurisdiction under section 4675. (Oppo. 9-11.) However, Respondents do not oppose Petitioner’s argument that County must be equitably estopped from claiming that Barton was not the fee title owner of the Property. (See Oppo. generally.)

Claims for and the distribution of excess proceeds following the sale of tax-defaulted property are governed by Revenue and Tax Code section 4675. (Carloss v. County of Alameda (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 116, 127-128.) The distribution of excess proceeds from a tax sale is governed by Revenue and Tax Code section 4675. That section states that “[a]ny party of interest in the property may file with the county a claim for the excess proceeds” and “a party of interest may assign their right to claim the excess proceeds.” (Rev. & Tax Code § 4675(a), (b).) A claim for excess proceeds shall “contain any information and proof deemed necessary by the board of supervisors to establish the claimant’s rights to all or any portion of the excess proceeds.” (Id. § 4675(d).)

The County must distribute excess proceeds “no sooner than one year following the recordation of the tax collector’s deed to the purchaser.” (Id. § 4675(e)(1).) The statute defines “parties of interest” and their “order of priority.” (Ibid.) First, the County must distribute excess proceeds to “lienholders of record prior to the recordation of the tax deed to the purchaser in the order of priority.” (Id. § 4675(e)(1)(A).) Then, the County must distribute excess proceeds to “any person with title of record to all or any portion of the property prior to the recordation of the tax deed to the purchaser.” (Id. § 4675(e)(1)(B).)

Revenue and Tax Code section 4675.1 states: “The board of supervisors of any county may, by resolution, authorize any county officers to perform on its behalf any act required or authorized to be performed by the board of supervisors under Section 4675.” In January 1979, the County Board of Supervisors adopted a resolution, which authorized the County Department of the Treasurer and Tax Collector to perform on the Board’s behalf all acts required and/or authorized to be performed by the Board under Revenue and Taxation Code section 4675. (See Oppo. 5:7-10 and AR 4779-4783.)

In the September 2022 Decision, County informed Petitioner that it had denied Petitioner’s claim because Petitioner “failed to provide the required documents to substantiate [its] legal interest to this sold property pursuant to California Revenue and Taxation Code Section 4675.” (AR Vol. 8, 1939.) In the letter, County did not identify which documents or types of documents were needed to complete Petitioner’s application. (See ibid.)

Petitioner’s claim included a copy of the Judgment and an assignment of the rights to the excess proceeds from Barton to Petitioner. (AR 13-18.) Respondents have not argued, or made any finding, that the assignment of rights from Barton to Petitioner was deficient or failed to comply with section 4675(b). Thus, the September 2022 Decision presumably was based on a finding that the Judgment failed to establish Barton’s ownership in the Property and that the assignment did not convey the excess proceeds to Petitioner. (See Oppo. 6:21-22 [“The information and documents that the County reviewed refute that Ms. Barton validly acquired title to the subject property.”].)

The County abused its discretion in denying Petitioner’s claim on this basis. The Judgment declared that, as of May 1, 2011, Sandra Barton was the owner in fee simple of the Property and that the defendants, including Gladys Hoffman-Blackwell and her successors, “own no title, right, estate, lien, or any interest whatsoever in the subject Property.” (AR 1655-56.) The Judgment was recorded on August 2, 2011, in the Official Records of the Recorder’s Office of Los Angeles County as document number 20111034369. (Suppl. Pet. ¶ 8; Answer ¶ 8.) In other words, this judgment established that Barton was “a[] person with title of record to all or any portion of the property,” per Tax and Revenue Code section 4675(e)(1)(B).

As a general matter, judgments are final and conclusive. “The effect of a judgment or final order in an action or special proceeding before a court or judge of this state … having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or order, is … [i]n case of a judgment or order against a specific thing … conclusive upon the title to the thing….” (Code of Civil Procedure § 1908.) Quiet title judgments are also governed by California’s Quiet Title Act, Code of Civil Procedure section 764.010, et seq. (the “Act”). “Enacted in 1980, the Act creates a special mechanism for obtaining quiet title judgments that operate in rem—and hence are binding not only against the parties to the quiet title proceeding, but also against all the world.” (Ridec LLC v. Hinkle (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1182, 1195, citation and internal quotations omitted.) The Legislature’s intent in adopting the Act was “to empower courts to issue in rem decrees because in rem decrees have greater permanence . . . [and] enhance the marketability of the property . . . .” (Id. at 1195-1196, citation and internal quotations omitted.) Such judgments bind other who did not participate in the litigation. (Ibid.)

In this case, the Judgment is final and conclusive. Code of Civil Procedure section 764.030, entitled “Conclusiveness of Judgment,” states:

The judgment in the action is binding and conclusive on all of the following persons, regardless of any legal disability:

(a) All persons known and unknown who were parties to the action and who have any claim to the property, whether present or future, vested or contingent, legal or equitable, several or undivided.

(b) Except as provided in Section 764.045, all persons who were not parties to the action and who have any claim to the property which was not of record at the time the lis pendens was filed or, if none was filed, at the time the judgment was recorded.

Respondents advance no evidence that the defendants in the quiet title action, including Gladys Hoffman-Blackwell and her successors, ever appealed or sought to set aside the Judgment. Further, there is no evidence in the record that any non-party had any claim to the Property that was “of record” at the time the lis pendens was filed or at the time the Judgment was recorded. Accordingly, pursuant to section 764.030, the Judgment is binding and conclusive as to the defendants to the quiet title action and also “against all the world.” (Ridec LLC, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at 1195-96.) Indeed, consistent with section 764.030 and the Act, the County acknowledged the binding effect of the Judgment. Specifically, The County concluded on August 10, 2018, that “Sandra Barton is the correct owner of record for the above referenced parcel per Court Case Number BC428033 on document number 1034369 recorded August 2, 2011.” (AR 2280.) On October 21, 2019, after its investigations, the County conducted the Tax Sale of the Property. (Suppl. Pet. ¶ 6; Ans. ¶ 6; AR 2080.) The tax deed expressly acknowledged that the Property was “last assessed to, BARTON, SANDRA.” (AR 2080.)

After Petitioner submitted a claim for the excess proceeds, the County apparently reached a different conclusion on the issue of whether Barton was a “person with title of record.” However, the County did not provide any justification in the September 2022 Decision for disregarding the conclusive and binding effect of the Judgment. Nor did County identify which further documentation was needed for Petitioner to support its claim. (AR Vol. 8, 1939.) Indeed, given the binding and conclusive effect of the Judgment, it is unclear what further documentation would have been relevant to Petitioner’s claim. Accordingly, the September 2022 Decision is not supported by the findings or by substantial evidence in the record. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5(b).)

Respondents argue that the County properly denied Petitioner’s claim because of “the Treasurer and Tax Collector’s concerns regarding the validity of Ms. Barton’s purported interest in the subject property.” (Oppo. 6:4-5; see also Alcaraz Decl. ¶ 26.) Respondents rely on allegations in the criminal complaint, but those charges were dismissed and therefore have no evidentiary value. Respondents also cite Barton’s allegations from other quiet title actions claiming that she occupied multiple other properties at the same time, as well as evidence that Blackwell’s grandson was living in the Property at the time Barton obtained title by adverse possession. (Oppo. 6-8.) Respondents argue that Petitioner has not provided copies of utility bills or insurance policies to prove Barton’s ownership. Essentially, Respondents seek to re-litigate the quiet title case and revisit the County’s own internal investigation. Notably, Respondents never respond to Petitioner’s discussion of the conclusiveness of quiet title judgments pursuant to section 764.030 and the Act. (See OB 14-15; Sehulster Tunnels/Pre-Con v. Traylor Brothers, Inc. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1328, 1345, fn. 16 [failure to address point is “equivalent to a concession”].) Further, Respondents do not develop an argument that—pursuant to section 764.030 and the Act—the Judgment is not binding and conclusive under the circumstances of this case. Although there are certain narrow exceptions to the conclusive effect of a quiet title judgment, Respondents do not develop an argument that any of those exceptions apply to this case. (See generally Rutter Guide, Cal. Prac. Guide: Real Property Transactions, Ch. 11-H, ¶¶ 11:534-11:543 and Nickell v. Matlock (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 934, 944.) Finally, Respondents cite no authority that County’s beliefs about the validity of Barton’s interests in the Property have any legal effect given the conclusiveness of the Judgment. (Oppo. 8:14-15) Because Respondents have not shown that a challenge to the validity of the Judgment could be made in the administrative proceedings, or that any exceptions to the conclusiveness of the Judgment apply in this case, the court need not consider the merits of Respondents’ contentions that extrinsic evidence suggests Barton was not the proper owner of the Property.

Respondents argue that the Judgment was not “dispositive” in light of the Court of Appeal’s decision in Carloss v. County of Alameda (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 116 and also the discretion vested in the County pursuant to Revenue and Taxation Code section 4675(d) to determine the information and proof necessary for a claim for excess tax proceeds. (Oppo. 6.) Respondents’ arguments fail. In Carloss, the county seized and sold tax-defaulted residential property. Jerome Carloss, the son of the deceased former resident of the property, filed a claim for exceeds proceeds. Although “Carloss’s mother was listed as the property owner in county tax records and had lived in the house for over 50 years[,] [t]he county denied the claim because no deed appears in the county records.” (Id. at 120.) After Carloss challenged the county’s denial in a writ petition, the trial court sustained the county’s demurrer without leave to amend on the basis that Carloss could not state a claim because, in the absence of a recorded grant deed, there is no right to excess proceeds from a tax sale. In reversing the trial court, the Court of Appeal held:

We conclude … that a recorded grant deed is not the exclusive means of proving a person’s title of record. While such a deed is the normal means of establishing title of record, and proving title may be difficult in the absence of such a deed, in unusual circumstances such as Carloss has alleged here, title of record may be established by recorded instruments of various types, the assessor's records, and testimony that, as a whole, proves that the claimant or the claimant's predecessor in interest held title of record.

When read in the context of its legislative history, it is clear that the reference in section 4675 to “title of record” was not intended to restrict the class of claimants to those who can produce a recorded grant deed…. “Title of record” must be proven, and a recorded grant deed will most often be the best and simplest form of evidence to establish that fact. But when for some reason the grant deed cannot be produced, that proof may consist of recorded instruments of various types, the assessor's records, and testimony that, as a whole, establishes that the claimant or the claimant’s predecessor in interest held title of record immediately prior to the tax-default sale.

(Id. at 130-131.) Carloss considered whether a claimant for excess proceeds may prove that he or she holds “title of record” if a grant deed cannot be located. The Court of Appeal did not consider whether the county board of supervisors may, in deciding a claim for excess proceeds, disregard a quiet title judgment that is final and has not been challenged by anyone in a court of law. “It is axiomatic that language in a judicial opinion is to be understood in accordance with the facts and issues before the court. An opinion is not authority for propositions not considered.” (People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 154-55, citation omitted.)

Respondents’ reliance on section 4675(d) is also misplaced. (See Oppo. 6:18-19.) Section 4675(d) states that “[t]he claims shall contain any information and proof deemed necessary by the board of supervisors to establish the claimant's rights to all or any portion of the excess proceeds.” Although the statute vests discretion in the County to determine which information and proof is “necessary” to establish the claimant’s rights, that discretion must be exercised reasonably and consistent with other relevant statutes, including the Act. Because County lacked any legal basis to disregard or collaterally attack the Judgment in the administrative proceedings, and because County has not identified any further “information and proof” that was necessary to establish Petitioner’s claim, section 4675(d) does not support County’s denial of Petitioner’s claim in the September 2022 Decision.

In sum, Respondents ask this court to disregard a final and conclusive judgment making Barton a “person with title of record” to the Property and to make a contrary finding based upon, for example, allegations in a criminal complaint that was dismissed. The court finds that the County prejudicially abused its discretion in the September 2022 Decision because County did not proceed in the manner required by law, the decision is not supported by any findings, and the decision is not supported by substantial evidence. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5(b).)[3] Thus, the September 2022 Decision must be set aside. In light of this conclusion, the court does not reach Petitioner’s contention that the September 2022 Decision violated Petitioner’s rights to due process. (OB 15-16.)

Petitioner contends that “County is precluded from reconsidering its September 16, 2022, denial of Global’s Claim because it did not have statutory authority to do so, and, even if it did, the County’s attempted reconsideration was untimely.” (OB 18.) The court agrees with Petitioner.

Generally, an administrative agency may reconsider an administrative decision issued after an evidentiary hearing only if authorized to do so by statute. (See CCP § 1094.6(b); Olive Proration Program Committee for Olive Proration Zone No. 1 v. Agricultural Prorate Commission (1941) 17 Cal.2d 204, 208-210 [in the absence of statutory authority allowing reconsideration, the subject agency “had no jurisdiction to retry the question and make a different finding at a later time.”]; Rutter Guide, Administrative Law, Chapter 9-I, Reconsideration ¶ 9:375 [“An agency may reconsider its decision only if authorized to do so by statute. Agencies have no inherent power to grant reconsideration.”].) Further, even when a statute authorizes reconsideration, the agency’s power to reconsider a decision is not indefinite and expires on the “effective date” of the decision or the date the decision becomes “final.” (See CCP § 1094.6(b); Gov. Code § 11521; Bonnell v. Medical Bd. of Calif. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1255, 1261-1263.)

Respondents contend that “[s]ection 4675 contains no restriction prohibiting the County from rescinding its initial denial to request further information.” (Oppo. 9:23-24.) However, there is no provision in section 4675 authorizing reconsideration of a county’s decision on a claim for excess proceeds. Further, “[a]ny action or proceeding to review the decision of the board of supervisors, or the county officer to whom the board delegated authority pursuant to Section 4675.1, to accept or deny the claim shall be commenced within 90 days after the date of that decision of the board of supervisors or the county officer.” (§ 4675(g).) Respondents’ interpretation of section 4675 to authorize reconsideration of the agency’s decision for an indefinite period of time conflicts with section 4675(g) and would interfere with the jurisdiction of the trial court if a petition for writ of mandate has been filed. Indeed, in this case, County purported to “rescind” the September 2022 Decision months after Petitioner filed this action on December 8, 2022.

Respondents contend that County’s rescission of the September 2022 Decision and reconsideration of the matter was proper because “there was no formal hearing on Global’s claim for excess proceeds.” (Oppo. 11.) Although County did not hold an evidentiary hearing, it nonetheless issued a final decision on Petitioner’s claim. In addition, Respondents concede that this proceeding is governed by CCP section 1094.5, the administrative mandamus statute, which suggests that the general rules governing reconsideration should apply. (Oppo. 4:25-26.) Because Respondents do not cite any statutory authority for reconsideration of a decision under section 4675, the court concludes that County failed to proceed in the manner required by law when it “rescinded” the September 2022 Decision and issued the July 2023 Decision. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5(b).) Thus, the July 2023 Decision must be set aside because County proceeded without jurisdiction. (Ibid.) In the alternative, even if County had authority to reconsider the September 2022 Decision, the court finds that the July 2023 Decision was an abuse of discretion for the same reasons discussed above. Specifically, County lacked any legal basis to disregard or collaterally attack the Judgment in the administrative proceedings, and County has not identified any further “information and proof” that was necessary to establish Petitioner’s claim. For all of these reasons, the July 2023 Decision must be set aside.

Petitioner contends: “[T]he County moved forward with the Tax Sale on the basis that Barton was the owner of the Property and is now, for its own financial benefit, attempting to change positions and claim that Barton is not the owner of the Property. The County’s attempt to change its position for its own benefit, and to the detriment of Global and others, presents a classic textbook example for the application of equitable estoppel.” (OB 18:7-11.)

The requisite elements for equitable estoppel … are: (1) the party to be estopped was apprised of the facts, (2) the party to be estopped intended by conduct to induce reliance by the other party, or acted so as to cause the other party reasonably to believe reliance was intended, (3) the party asserting estoppel was ignorant of the facts, and (4) the party asserting estoppel suffered injury in reliance on the conduct. “[T]he doctrine of equitable estoppel may be applied against the government where justice and right require it.”

(Medina v. Board of Retirement (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 864, 868, citation omitted.) “The government may be bound by an equitable estoppel in the same manner as a private party when the elements requisite to such an estoppel against a private party are present and, in the considered view of a court of equity, the injustice which would result from a failure to uphold an estoppel is of sufficient dimension to justify any effect upon public interest or policy which would result from the raising of an estoppel.” (City of Long Beach v. Mansell (1970) 3 Cal.3d 462, 496-497.)

Here, prior to the tax sale of the Property, County undertook internal investigations to determine if the Judgment was valid. (See AR 2268-2229, 2280-2281.) The investigations uncovered information that Barton was one of the defendants in a pending criminal case pertaining to the Property. (See OB 8-9; AR 2268.) Nonetheless, after an investigation, the County concluded that “Sandra Barton is the correct owner of record for the above referenced parcel per Court Case Number BC428033 on document number 1034369 recorded August 2, 2011.” (AR 2280.) On October 21, 2019, after its investigations, the County conducted the Tax Sale of the Property. (Suppl. Pet. ¶ 6; Ans. ¶ 6; AR 2080.) The tax deed expressly acknowledged that the Property was “last assessed to, BARTON, SANDRA.” (AR 2080.)

The County cannot now take a different position. This undisputed evidence shows that County was “apprised of the facts” and intended for the public to rely on its published information concerning the Tax Sale. Because the County’s initial actions and Tax Sale were consistent with the Judgment and applicable law, the court finds that Petitioner was ignorant that County would later change its position and disregard the binding and conclusive effect of the Judgment. Further, the record shows that Petitioner relied, to its detriment, on County’s statements in connection with the Tax Sale to acquire an assignment of the rights to the excess proceeds from Barton. (AR 13-18.) Finally, injustice would result from a failure to uphold an estoppel against County under the circumstances of this case. For these additional reasons, the September 2022 Decision and the July 2023 Decision must be set aside.

1. The supplemental petition for writ of mandate is granted. The court will issue a writ directing Respondents to set aside the September 2022 and July 2023 Decisions and the denial of Petitioner’s claim for excess proceeds. On remand, Respondents shall reconsider Petitioner’s claim for excess proceeds in a manner not inconsistent with this court’s opinion and judgment. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5(f).)

3. Petitioner contends that it is entitled to attorney’s fees pursuant to statute. (See OB 19:22-23). Petitioner shall file a noticed motion for attorney’s fees which shall be heard on _______, 2024, at 9:30 a.m.

[1] The court has not located a dismissal at pages of 359-360 of the administrative record, cited by Petitioner. Nonetheless, Respondents have not disputed that all counts related to the Property were dismissed and that Barton was not prosecuted or convicted of those counts. (See e.g. AR 4169 [County letter acknowledging that “the counts against Ms. Barton specifically as to the subject property were dismissed pursuant to a plea negotiation”].)

[2] For this same reason, the court reaches the same result on the petition even if it is governed by Code of Civil Procedure section 1085. (See OB 13:6-14; see County of Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 643, 654 [Under section 1085, “[a] court must ask whether the public agency's action was arbitrary, capricious, or entirely lacking in evidentiary support, or whether the agency failed to follow the procedure and give the notices the law requires.”].)

[3] In the alternative, to the extent this action is governed by Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, the September 2022 Decision “was arbitrary, capricious, [and] entirely lacking in evidentiary support.” (County of Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 643, 654.)