Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case: 22STCV01751, Date: 2022-07-27 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV01751    Hearing Date: July 27, 2022    Dept: 39

Zoilo Raymundo v. Hyundai Motor America, et al.

Case No. 22STCV01751

Motion to Compel Arbitration

            Plaintiff Zoilo Raymundo (“Plaintiff”) filed this case against Defendants Hyundai Motor America (“Hyundai”) and Keyes Hyundai of Van Nuys (the “Dealership”) (collectively, “Defendants”) asserting causes of action under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act.  Now, Defendants move to compel arbitration. 

The moving party on a motion to compel arbitration “bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by a preponderance of the evidence, while a party opposing the petition bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence any fact necessary to its defense.  The trial court sits as the trier of fact, weighing all the affidavits, declarations, and other documentary evidence, and any oral testimony the court may receive at its discretion, to reach a final determination.”  (Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Group, Inc. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836, 842, internal citations omitted.)

Defendants rely on an agreement between Plaintiff and “Hyundai Lease Titling Trust.”  The agreement provides that Plaintiff arbitrate “a claim or dispute between [Plaintiff] and us  (including our respective agents, employees, officers, directors, affiliates, subsidiaries and parents) . . . whether in contract, tort, statute, or otherwise, arising under or relating to this Lease or the Leased Vehicle . . . .”  (Declaration of Soheyl Tahsildoost, Exhibit 2.)  Plaintiff argues that neither Hyundai nor the dealership is a signatory to the agreement.

The Court grants the motion.  This issue has been resolved by Felisilda v. FCA US LLC (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 486.  That case held that the doctrine of equitable estoppel permitted a non-signatory automobile manufacturer to enforce such an arbitration clause.  The Court is bound to follow the holding of Felisilda. 

In the alternative, the Court finds that Defendants are third-party beneficiaries of the arbitration agreement.  A non-signatory to an arbitration agreement may enforce an arbitration agreement if the non-party is a third-party beneficiary.  (Jenks v. DLA Piper Rudnick Gray Cary US LLP (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 1, 9-10; see also Civ. Code, § 1559.)  To establish that it is a third-party beneficiary to a contract, a party must “plead a contract which was made expressly for his benefit and one in which it clearly appears that he was a beneficiary . . . .”  (Luis v. Orcutt Town Water Co. (1962) 204 Cal.App.2d 433, 441.)  The arbitration agreement makes clear that it applies to claims “relating to the Lease or the Leased Vehicle” against the signatory’s affiliates, which includes Defendants. 

The Court has considered Plaintiff’s remaining arguments and finds them to be without merit. 

Based upon the foregoing, the Court orders as follows:

1.         Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration is granted.  The Court orders the parties to proceed with the arbitration forthwith.

2.         The Court takes the case management conference off-calendar.  The Court sets an Order to Show Cause why this case should not be dismissed following arbitration for January 3, 2023, at 8:30 a.m.  The Court provides notice that if Plaintiff’s counsel does not appear, remotely or in-person, the Court will assume the case has been resolved by way of arbitration or settlement and shall dismiss the case with prejudice.

3.         Defendants’ counsel shall provide notice and file proof of such with the Court.