Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case: 22STCV02773, Date: 2023-07-20 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV02773    Hearing Date: July 20, 2023    Dept: 39

Alba Lopez v. Envision NWK Toy Auto, LLC

Case No. 22STCV02773

Motion for Summary Judgment

BACKGROUND

            Plaintiff Alba Lopez (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Envision NWK Toy Auto, LLC (“Defendant”) asserting the following causes of action: (1) Violation of the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act, Civil Code section 1780, (2) Fraud, (3) Violation of California Code of Regulations sections 255.00, 266.00, 260.2(a), and 260.03, (4) Violation of Civil Code section 1632, and (5) Injunctive relief pursuant to the Consumer Legal Remedies Act and Business and Professions Code section 17200.  Defendants move for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication, which Plaintiff opposes.  The motion is granted in part and denied in part.

LEGAL STANDARD

“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law[.] There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.”  (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.)  “[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.”  (Ibid.)

“A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if the party contends that the cause of action has no merit, that there is no affirmative defense to the cause of action, that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).) 

DISCUSSION

            A.        First Cause of Action  

            Plaintiff’s first cause of action is under the Consumer Legal Remedies Act, Civil Code section 1780 (the “CLRA”), which prohibits sellers from making misleading misrepresentations in connection with the sale of goods.  (Civ. Code, § 1770(a)(4).)  This cause of action is predicated upon two theories.  First, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s representative misrepresented that the vehicle was suitable for use as an Uber vehicle.  Plaintiff does not have standing to predicate her claim on this theory because the CLRA applies to a consumer “who seeks or acquires, by purchase or lease, any goods or services for personal, family, or household purposes.”  (Civ. Code., § 1761(a); see also Kalta v. Fleets 101, Inc. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 514, 517.)  By definition, a plaintiff cannot predicate a CLRA claim on a misrepresentation concerning commercial use.

Second, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s misrepresented that the vehicle was free from prior collision damage.  Defendant relies on evidence that the sales representative disclosed the damage.  According to the declaration of Juan Urieta, he presented Plaintiff and her then-husband copies of a Carfax Vehicle History Report and a Used Vehicle Disclosure which stated that the vehicle had damage.  (Declaration of Juan Urieta, ¶ 4.)  Urieta also “explained to them in Spanish that the Prius had prior accident damage.”  (Ibid.)  Plaintiff admitted in her deposition that she received and signed the Carfax Vehicle History Report.  (Declaration of Jamie L. Keeton, Exh. #3 (Plaintiff’s Deposition), p. 33:5-24.)  Plaintiff also admitted that she received and signed the Used Vehicle Disclosure.  (Id., Exh. #3 (Plaintiff’s Deposition, p. 34:8-23.)  These documents disclose the damage.  (Id., Exh. #10 (NWK000097 to NWK000108).)  The documents are explicit.  Not only do they disclose in multiple locations that the vehicle has front-end damage, there is a diagram titled “Damage Location” that shows the front of the vehicle was damaged.  (Id., Exh. #10 (NWK000101.)  This is sufficient to satisfy Defendant’s burden, shifting the burden to Plaintiff. 

Plaintiff argues that she did not understand these disclosures.  A party who signs a document is presumed to have read it and understood its contents.  (See, e.g., Baker v. Italian Maple Holdings, LLC (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1152, 1162.)  “Ordinarily, one who accepts or signs an instrument, which on its face is a contract, is deemed to assent to all its terms, and cannot escape liability on the ground that he has not read it.  If he cannot read, he should have it read or explained to him.”  (Randas v. YMCA of Metropolitan Los Angeles (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 158, 163, internal quotations and citations omitted.) 

There is a potential exception in cases involving fraud.  “In the absence of fraud, the fact that an offeree cannot read, write, speak, or understand the English language is immaterial to whether an English-language agreement the offeree executes is enforceable.”  (Morales v. Sun Constructors, Inc., 541 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2008), citing Paper Express, Ltd. v. Pfankuch Maschinen, 972 F.2d 753, 757 (7th Cir. 1992).  Plaintiff does not establish fraud.  There is no evidence that Urieta misrepresented or concealed the contents of these documents.  Rather, Plaintiff testified that Urieta “never explained anything to [her] that was on these documents.”  (Declaration of Jamie L. Keeton, Exh. #3 (Plaintiff’s Deposition), p. 31:5-9.)  Plaintiff admitted that she “didn’t ask any question[s]” about the documents.  (Id., Exh. #3 (Plaintiff’s Deposition, p. 31:10-16.)  During her deposition and in her declaration, Plaintiff does not state that she requested translations of these documents and was denied.  Nor does Plaintiff state that there was anything preventing her from seeking a translation on her own, i.e., there is nothing suggesting it was a “limited time offer” or that there were coercive sales tactics that dissuaded her from seeking translations.  In fact, Plaintiff signed these documents, including next to diagram showing a car which a shaded line in front and the term “damage” above it.  Based upon the foregoing, there is no triable issue, and the Court grants summary adjudication of the first cause of action.

2.         Second Cause of Action

Plaintiff’s second cause of action is for fraud based upon the same two misrepresentations.  Where separate causes of action are comingled into one, the court may grant summary adjudication of the individual claims.  (See Dominguez v. Washington Mutual Bank (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 714, 727, citing Lilienthal & Fowler v. Superior Court (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1848, 1854-1855.)

The Court denies summary adjudication with respect to the first theory: Defendant misrepresented that the vehicle would be suitable for Uber in order to induce Plaintiff to purchase the vehicle.  Defendant does not satisfy its burden on summary adjudication: It does not reference this issue in the separate statement or advance any evidence on this point.  For example, the declaration of Juan Urieta does not address this issue at all.  Nor is there a declaration from Ricardo Acuna denying the allegation.  Regardless, Plaintiff advances sufficient evidence to give rise to a triable issue.  Plaintiff and her ex-husband both state that Ricardo Acuna identified the vehicle and represented that it would be “perfect” for use as an Uber vehicle.  (Declaration of Alba Lopez, ¶ 5; Declaration of Rafael Salinas, ¶ 5.)  Defendant concedes this fact in its separate statement: “The day after plaintiff purchased the Prius, Salinas learned it did not qualify for Uber because Uber requires five to eight seat belts and the Prius only had four.”  (Defendant’s Separate Statement, ¶ 8.)  However, the Court grants summary adjudication with respect to the second theory—that there was undisclosed damage—for the reasons stated above.

3.         Third Cause of Action

Plaintiff’s third cause of action is for violation of California Code of Regulations, sections 255.00, 260.00, 260.02(a), and 260.03 et seq.  None of these regulations state that a plaintiff may bring a cause of action under the regulations.  “A statute creates a private right of action only if the enacting body so intended.  (Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 842, 849.)  Accordingly, the Court grants summary adjudication of the third cause of action.

4.         Fourth Cause of Action

Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action is for violation of Civil Code section 1632.  The Act provides that where a seller negotiates a contract for the sale of an automobile in Spanish, the seller must provide the purchaser with a copy of the contract in Spanish before the purchaser executes the contract.  (Civ. Code, § 1632, subd. (b)(1).)  The evidence demonstrates that Defendant did so.  Plaintiff signed a “Foreign Language Transaction Acknowledgment.”  (Declaration of Jamie L. Keeton, Exh. #10 (NWK000017).)  Defendant has provided a copy of the contract in Spanish, which Plaintiff signed.  (Id., Exh. #10 (NWK000089 to NWK00084).)  Defendant admitted in her deposition that she received these documents.  (Id., Exh. #3 (Plaintiff’s Deposition, pp. 30:13-31:20.)  Therefore, the Court grants summary adjudication of the fourth cause of action.

5.         Fifth Cause of Action

Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action is for unfair competition under Business and Professions Code section 17200.   The Court denies summary adjudication to the extent this cause of action is predicated upon allegations that Defendant misrepresented the suitability of Uber vehicles.  The Court grants summary adjudication in all other respects for the reasons discussed.

6.         Punitive Damages

Plaintiff seeks punitive damages in the complaint.  Defendants did not seek summary adjudication of the claim for punitive damages in the notice of motion.  Therefore, the case shall proceed to trial on the issue of punitive damages. 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

            Based upon the foregoing, the Court orders as follows:

            1.         The Court denies summary adjudication of the second cause of action (fraud) and the fifth cause of action (unfair competition) to the extent these claims are predicated upon Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant misrepresented the suitability of the vehicle for use as an Uber vehicle.

            2.         The Court grants summary adjudication in all other respects except with respect to punitive damages.  The case shall proceed to trial on the issue of punitive damages.

            3.         The Court orders the parties to meet-and-confer whether they wish to settle the case or proceed to trial.  The Court continues the trial setting conference to September 19, 2023, at 8:30 a.m.

            4.         Defendants’ counsel shall provide notice and file proof of such with the Court.