Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case: 22STCV13023, Date: 2022-10-19 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV13023    Hearing Date: October 19, 2022    Dept: 39

Kenneth Oleesky v. Lithia Motors, Inc., et al.

Case No. 22STCV13023

Motion to Strike

            Plaintiff Kenneth Oleesky (“Plaintiff”) filed this case against Lithia Motors, Inc. (“Lithia”) and Van Nuys-L, Inc. (“Van Nuys-L”) asserting seven causes of action under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”) and one cause of action for failure to pay timely wages upon discharge, per Labor Code section 201(a).  Lithia was named as a defendant in the original complaint.  Plaintiff added Van Nuys-L by way of a Doe amendment on June 8, 2022.  Defendants now move to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages and related allegations.

            Although the Fair Employment and Housing Act does not authorize punitive damages, California’s punitive damages statute—Civil Code section 3294—applies to actions brought under FEHA.  (Commodore Home Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court (1982) 32 Cal.3d 211.)  To state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a plaintiff must allege the elements set forth in the statute.  (Coll. Hosp., Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721.)  Per Civil Code section 3294, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud or malice.  (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).)  “Malice is defined in the statute as conduct intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.”  (Coll. Hosp., Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725.)  “The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages.  Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim.”  (Grieves v. Superior Ct. (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166, internal citations and footnotes omitted.)

In this case, Plaintiff alleges that he contracted COVID-19 and suffered “severe and debilitating impairments” as a result.  (Complaint, ¶ 16.)  Plaintiff alleges that his employers failed to take adequate safety precautions during the COVID-19 pandemic.  (Complaint, ¶ 17.)  Plaintiff alleges that he submitted “a request for a medical leave of absence for treatment and recovery from his disabilities,” as well as “medical documentation verifying his disabilities and placing him off work for approximately six weeks.”  (Complaint, ¶¶ 20-21.)  Plaintiff’s medical leave was extended several times.  (Complaint, ¶ 21.)  However, on or about December 13, 2021, Lithia allegedly terminated Plaintiff “because of his disabilities and need for reasonable accommodation.”  (Complaint, ¶ 24.)  Plaintiff alleges that Lithia’s representative told him that his medical leave posed an undue hardship for the company.  (Ibid.)  Plaintiff also alleges that he should have been offered an open position when he was cleared to return to work.  (Complaint, ¶ 25.) 

Plaintiff states sufficient facts to seek punitive damages against Lithia, because, if true, they establish that Plaintiff was terminated for an improper reason.  Moreover, the allegations suggest that the person who decided to terminate Plaintiff was a managing agent, since that person had authority to terminate Plaintiff.  Indeed, Plaintiff has alleged as much as someone in his position would know at this stage.  The doctrine of less particularity provides that “[l]ess particularity [in pleading] is required when it appears that defendant has superior knowledge of the facts, so long as the pleading gives notice of the issues sufficient to enable preparation of a defense.”  (Okun v. Superior Court (1981) 29 Cal.3d 442, 458.)  The complaint provides sufficient notice to Lithia.

However, the Court grants the motion to strike with respect to Van Nuys-L.  Unlike Lithia, the complaint provides no clarity concerning the basis of liability for punitive damages against Van Nuys-L.  This is especially true since Lithia and Van Nuys-L are separate corporate entities.  Separate corporate entities are presumed to have separate existences, and the corporate form will be disregarded only when the ends of justice require this result.  (Laird v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 727, 737, overruled on other grounds by Reid v. Google, Inc. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 727.)  Plaintiff alleges that he was employed by Lithia, and Lithia made the decision to terminate him.  This does not implicate Van Nuys-L.

Based upon the foregoing, the Court orders as follows:

1.         The motion to strike is denied with respect to Lithia.

2.         The motion to strike is granted with respect to Van Nuys-L.

3.         Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint within twenty (20) days.

4.         Defendants’ counsel shall provide notice and file proof of such with the Court.