Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case: 22STCV17934, Date: 2023-02-02 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV17934 Hearing Date: February 2, 2023 Dept: 39
Jane Orcutt v.
5800 Harold LLC
Case No.
22STCV17934
Demurrer
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff
Jane Orcutt (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against 5800 Harold LLC
(“Defendant”) asserting causes of action for breach of the implied warranty of habitability,
breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, nuisance, negligence, violation of
Civil Code section 1940.2, intentional infliction of emotional distress
(“IIED”), violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), and
violation of Los Angeles Municipal Code section 45.33. Defendant demurs to the IIED claim and moves
to strike the prayer for punitive damages.
The demurrer is overruled but the motion to strike is granted.
LEGAL STANDARD
“It is black letter law that a
demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint.”
(Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.) In
ruling on a demurrer, the court must “liberally construe[]” the allegations of
the complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 452.)
“This rule of liberal construction means that the reviewing court draws
inferences favorable to the plaintiff, not the defendant.” (Perez v.
Golden Empire Transit Dist. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1238.)
Any party, within the time allowed
to respond to a pleading, may serve and file a motion to strike the whole
pleading or any part thereof. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1322, subd. (b).) On a motion to strike, the court may: (1)
strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading;
or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in
conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the
court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd.
(a)-(b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42
Cal.2d 767, 782.)
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s
sixth cause of action is for intentional infliction of emotional distress. “The
elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1)
extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing,
or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2)
the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual
and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous
conduct. Conduct to be outrageous must
be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized
community. The defendant must have
engaged in conduct intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the
realization that injury will result.” (Potter
v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 965, 1001, internal
quotations and citations omitted.)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to address dangerous conditions
in Plaintiff’s apartment, including “ineffective waterproofing and
weather protection of roof and exterior walls; building, grounds, and
appurtenances not kept clean, sanitary, and/or free from all accumulations of
debris, filth, rubbish, garbage, rodents, and/or vermin; general dilapidation
or improper maintenance; and various nuisances (including but not limited to
persistent water leaks and harassment).”
(First Amended Complaint, ¶ 9.) Plaintiff
alleges that she repeatedly notified Defendant of the defective and dangerous
conditions, but Defendant “failed and refused to repair the conditions, and/or
have done so in a negligent, unprofessional, and shoddy fashion.” First Amended Complaint, ¶ 10.) Plaintiff alleges that once she notified
Defendant in October 2020 that “she is in recovery from a prescription drug addiction,
[Defendant’s agents’] demeanor toward Plaintiff became friendly and
harassing.” (First Amended Complaint, ¶
12.) Plaintiff alleges that she was
entitled to Covid-19 protections, but Defendants’ agents “called Plaintiff on
the phone, berated her, hung up on Plaintiff, and less than a week later,
served Plaintiff with a malicious and frivolous Notice of Lease Violation . . .
.” (First Amended Complaint, ¶ 14.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ agents
attempted to constructively evict her with “aggressive harassment.” (First Amended Complaint, ¶ 16.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ agents
“screened” her telephone calls and ignored her correspondence for over one week
concerning a rat infestation. (First
Amended Complaint, ¶ 18.) Plaintiff alleges
that Defendants’ agents excessively abused their right to access her unit. (First Amended Complaint, ¶ 20.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ agents
unlawfully entered her unit at 5:00 a.m., terrifying Plaintiff and her guest,
as well as her blind dog. (Ibid.) Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant
illegally attempted to evict Plaintiff without cause with only two weeks’
notice. (First Amended Complaint, ¶
21.) Plaintiff’s allegations suffice for
pleading purposes.
However, the Court grants
Defendant’s motion to strike the prayer for punitive damages. To
state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a plaintiff must allege the
elements set forth in the punitive damages statute, Civil Code section
3294. (Coll. Hosp., Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704,
721.) Per Civil Code section 3294, a
plaintiff must allege that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud
or malice. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd.
(a).) “Malice is defined in the statute
as conduct intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable
conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious
disregard of the rights or safety of others.”
(Coll. Hosp., Inc. v. Superior
Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725.)
“The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient
to warrant an award of punitive damages.
Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud or malice, but
facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim.” (Grieves
v. Superior Ct. (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166, internal citations and
footnotes omitted.)
Here, Defendant is an entity. “[T]he imposition of punitive damages upon a
corporation is based upon its own fault.
It is not imposed vicariously by virtue of the fault of others.” (City
Products Corp. v. Globe Indemnity Co. (1979) 88 Cal. App. 3d 31, 36.) “Corporations are legal entities which do not
have minds capable of recklessness, wickedness, or intent to injure or
deceive. An award of punitive damages
against a corporation therefore must rest on the malice of the corporation’s
employees. But the law does not impute
every employee’s malice to the corporation.
Instead, the punitive damages statute requires proof of malice among
corporate leaders: the officers, directors, or managing agents.” (Cruz
v. Home Base (2000) 83 Cal. App. 4th 160, 167, internal quotations and
citation omitted.)
Plaintiff alleges that the events
she complains of occurred under “the supervision, direction, and/or direct
involvement of managing members and corporate officers of the 5800 Harold 5800
Harold LLC, including but not limited to Managing Member Lucas Moen, Corporate
Officer Melissa Stevens, Corporate Officer and Owner Joshua White, Corporate
Officer and Owner Blair Tanner, Director of Member Services Puja Patel, and
Defendant’s Finance and Legal Teams commissioned via property management
company Common Living, Inc.” (First
Amended Complaint, ¶ 23.) However,
Plaintiff does not allege specific facts to support this conclusion. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not alleged facts
to support her claim for punitive damages.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Based upon
the foregoing, the Court orders as follows:
1. Defendant’s demurrer is
overruled.
2. Defendant’s
motion to strike is granted. Plaintiff
may file a first amended complaint within twenty (20) days. In the alternative, Plaintiff may elect not
to do so and may take discovery on whether there was malice by Defendant’s
officers, directors, or managing agents.
If Plaintiff develops such evidence, she may file a motion for leave to
amend to add a claim for punitive damages at that point.
3. If
Plaintiff elects not to file an amended complaint, Defendant shall file an
answer within twenty (20) days of that deadline.
4. The
Court continues the case management conference to March 29, 2023, at 8:30 a.m.
5. Defendant’s
counsel shall provide notice and shall file proof of such with the Court.