Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case: 22STCV34236, Date: 2024-05-03 Tentative Ruling



Case Number: 22STCV34236    Hearing Date: May 3, 2024    Dept: 82

RH Properties v. Sandra K. McBeth

Case No. 22STCV34236

 

Motion for an Order 1) Approving and Settling the Receiver’s Final Report and Accounting; 2) Approving Final Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses; 3) Authorizing Receiver to Issue Receiver’s Certificate; 4) Exonerating All Bonds; 5) Terminating the Receivership Appointment; and 6) Retaining Jurisdiction re This Receivership Appointment

 

BACKGROUND

 

            Plaintiff RH Properties (“Plaintiff”) owns the property located at 5532 West 62nd Street in Los Angeles, California (the “Property”).  Plaintiff filed this action against Sandra K. McBeth (“Defendant”) and all persons unknown claiming any legal or equitable right to the Property.  Plaintiff asserts causes of action for trespass, ejectment, quiet title, and slander of title.  Defendant acquired title to the Property on or about January 17, 2007, through an interspousal transfer deed.  Eventually, the Property fell into foreclosure, and Plaintiff acquired the Property on or about January 3, 2022. 

 

Plaintiff moved for appointment of a receiver to take possession of the Property and collect the rents.  The court (Beckloff, J.) held a hearing on the motion on April 21, 2023.  Prior to the hearing, Judge Beckloff issued a written tentative granting the receivership “to preserve the Property (including the rents) while this litigation is pending.”  In the tentative ruling, however, Judge Beckloff questioned “whether the Property generates sufficient funds to pay the receiver’s fees” and noted that Plaintiff had not nominated a receiver.  After discussion with the parties at the hearing, the court adopted its tentative ruling and appointed Kevin Singer as receiver (the “Receiver”).  The court issued an order on July 13, 2023, approving hourly rates of $295 for the Receiver and $275 per hour for project managers and $85 to $150 per hour for accounting and administrative staff.    

 

Plaintiff obtained summary judgment on August 30, 2022, and Plaintiff obtained possession on March 1, 2024, which eliminates the need for the Receiver.  Now, the Receiver    moves for an order (1) approving and settling the Receiver’s final report and accounting, (2) approving final compensation and reimbursement of expenses, (3) authorizing the Receiver to issue a Super-Priority Deed of Trust and accompanying Receiver’s Certificate of Indebtedness to secure funding for the Receivership Estate’s outstanding costs of administration, (4) exonerating all bonds, (5) terminating the Receivership appointment, and (6) retaining jurisdiction regarding this Receivership appointment.  The Receiver’s total fees and expenses in this matter from April 21, 2023, through April 3, 2024, are $121,604.96, comprised of $118,948 in fees and $2,656.96 in expenses.  To date, the Receiver has been paid $28,453.03, so there remains an outstanding balance of $93,151.93, as of April 3, 2024.  The Receiver incurred an additional $4,027 in fees and expenses between April 4 and April 26, 2024, so the total outstanding balance is $97,178.93.  

 

Plaintiff opposes the motion, arguing that Defendant should be responsible for the Receiver’s fees and expenses, and that the Receiver’s total request is unreasonable.  Defendant joins in Plaintiff’s opposition on the basis that the Receiver’s total request is unreasonable. 

 

EVIDENTIARY ISSUES

 

On April 29, 2024, four court days before the hearing, Plaintiff filed an untimely supplemental declaration of Derek Tabone.  Plaintiff did not request leave of court to file a sur-reply or a supplemental declaration and the court did not authorize the filing of supplemental evidence.  Accordingly, Receiver’s objection to the supplemental declaration of Derek Tabone is sustained.  The court does not consider the supplemental declaration.  Regardless, even if the court considered this declaration, it would not change the court’s decision.   

 

LEGAL STANDARD

 

In order to terminate and discharge the receivership, Receiver must prepare, serve and file (by noticed motion or stipulation of all parties) a “final account and report, a request for discharge, and a request for exoneration of the receiver’s surety.”  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1184(a).)  Notice must be provided to every person or entity known to the receiver to have a substantial, unsatisfied claim that will be affected by the order, “whether or not the person or entity is a party to the action or has appeared in it.”  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1184(c).)  “If any allowance of compensation for the receiver or for an attorney employed by the receiver is claimed in an account, it must state in detail what services have been performed by the receiver or the attorney and whether previous allowances have been made to the receiver or attorney and the amounts.”  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1184(d).) 

 

In addition, “[i]nterim fees are subject to final review and approval by the court.  The court retains jurisdiction to award a greater or lesser amount as the full, fair, and final value of the services rendered.”  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1183(a).  Unless good cause is shown, objections to a receiver's interim report and accounting must be made within 10 days of notice of the report and accounting, must be specific, and must be delivered to the receiver and all parties entitled to service of the interim report and accounting.”  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1183(b).) 

 

DISCUSSION

 

            A.        The Reasonableness of the Fees and Expenses

 

            Starting on June 27, 2023, Receiver filed interim reports with the court summarizing the duties he performed pursuant to the Appointment Order and Amended Appointment Order, and documenting the Receiver’s fees and expenses.  These reports were served on counsel for Plaintiff and Defendant.  In the instant motion and accompanying declaration, Receiver also summarizes the work and duties he or his staff performed pursuant to the Appointment Order.  (Receiver’s Decl. ¶ 8.)  Receiver also documents, in detail, additional fees and expenses incurred since March 2024.  (Id. ¶ 9, Exh. 3-4.) 

 

Receiver has shown, in detail, that the Receiver’s total fees and expenses in this matter from April 21, 2023, through April 3, 2024, are $121,604.96, comprising $118,948.00 in fees and $2,656.96 in expenses.  (Id. ¶¶ 9-10.)  To date, the Receiver has been paid $28,453.03 toward his total fees and expenses of $121,604.96 for this appointment.  (Id. ¶ 14.) Receiver also incurred an additional $4,027 in fees and expenses between April 4 and April 26, 2024.  (Receiver’s Suppl. Decl. ¶ 15, Exh. 3.)  Accordingly, there remains an outstanding balance owed to the Receiver in the amount of $97,178.93. 

 

In opposition, Plaintiff acknowledges that Receiver is entitled to recover the fees and expenses he incurred on behalf of the Receivership Estate.  (Oppo. 2-3.)  Nonetheless, Plaintiff objects that the amount of fees and expenses claimed by Receiver is “unreasonable in light of the results achieved.”  (Oppo. 4.)  According to Plaintiff, “Mr. Singer's intervention, however well intentioned, did not shorten the time it took Plaintiff to obtain possession by even one day; did not result in the collection of even $1.00 to help defray the cost of McBeth’s continued wrongful possession; did not result in any improvement in the condition of the property when Plaintiff obtained possession.”  (Ibid.)  Plaintiff asserts that even though Receiver was granted control of the Property, he “never had that control” and “it was Plaintiff's principal who got rid of each set of squatters.”  (Id. 4-5.)  Plaintiff suggests that Receiver should have withdrawn or stopped performing his duties when it became clear that Receiver could not restore possession of the Property to Plaintiff.  (Ibid.)

 

Plaintiff’s arguments objections are procedurally improper.  On October 13, 2023, the court (Beckloff, J.) granted Receiver’s ex parte application for an order directing Plaintiff to pay Receiver’s outstanding fees and expenses of $53,055.10, as of September 30, 2023.  (See Singer Decl. Exh. 9.)  Plaintiff did not move for reconsideration of that order, which is final.  Further, Receiver had previously served copies of each of his billing invoices through February 2024 and received no objections from Plaintiff.  (Receiver Decl. ¶ 11.)  As noted, Receiver filed and served multiple interim reports documenting Receiver’s fees and expenses.  Pursuant to the Rules of Court, “[u]nless good cause is shown, objections to a receiver’s interim report and accounting must be made within 10 days of notice of the report and accounting, must be specific, and must be delivered to the receiver and all parties entitled to service of the interim report and accounting.”  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1183(b).)  Because it failed to file a timely or specific objection, Plaintiff is barred from objecting to Receiver’s fees and expenses incurred through the report filed February 29, 2024. 

 

Even if Plaintiff could now object to some or all of Receiver’s fees and expenses, its objections are not persuasive.  Based on the court’s review of the Receiver’s reports, declaration, and billing invoices, as well as Plaintiff’s opposition, the court does not find any basis to reduce or disallow the fees and expenses claimed by Receiver.  Significantly, Plaintiff opposed Receiver’s ex parte application to terminate the receivership in October 2023.  (See Receiver’s Suppl. Decl. ¶ 8.)  Receiver was not authorized by the Appointment Orders to expel Defendant from the Property himself.  Plaintiff develops no argument to the contrary.  Receiver incurred reasonable fees and expenses performing the duties that were assigned to him, including inspecting the Property, installing security cameras, communicating with neighbors, investigating Defendant’s claim of ownership and rental activities, installing an on-site manager, coordinating the rental of a room at the Property, and preparing and filing status reports with the court, among other duties.   (Receiver’s Decl. ¶ 9; Receiver’s Suppl. Decl. ¶¶ 8-10.)  Plaintiff has not identified any specific billing item for work that was either not performed by Receiver or was unreasonable under the circumstances.  (See Oppo. 4-5.)

 

In sum, Plaintiff insisted that Judge Beckloff appoint the Receiver, notwithstanding his concern that the property would not generate sufficient income to pay the fees.  Judge Beckloff previously approved the hourly rates, and this court will not revisit that decision.  Plaintiff did not object to any of the Receiver’s past reports or Judge Beckloff’s prior approval of approximately $53,000, as of September 30, 2023.  Plaintiff opposed the Receiver’s efforts to terminate his work in October 2023, after Plaintiff prevailed on summary judgment.  Plaintiff criticizes the Receiver for not undertaking work not included in the appointment order.  Based upon this record, Plaintiff has no basis to complain about having to pay the rates set by Judge Beckloff.   

 

Finally, Plaintiff asserts that it paid Receiver $37,498.66, and “not the lesser amount indicated by the Receiver.”  (Oppo. 5 and Ritvo Decl. ¶ 3.)  In response, Receiver declares: “Plaintiff has provided a total of $34,671.32 in funding for this receivership, not $37,498.66. Of that amount, $28,453.03 was applied toward my fees and expenses as presented in my monthly billing statements. An additional $5,730.76 was paid to third parties for bond services, locksmith fees, property management fees, and cloud storage services for the Property’s security cameras, as reflected in my monthly financial statements (which were included with my interim reports).”  (Receiver’s Suppl. Decl. ¶ 12.)  Receiver’s accounting is detailed and supported by multiple reports, to which Plaintiff did not object.  Plaintiff has not shown any error in Receiver’s accounting of the fees and expenses incurred or in his accounting of the payments made by Plaintiff toward the fees and expenses. 

 

Based on the foregoing, the Receiver’s motion is granted.  The court finds that the Receiver’s fees are reasonable and that the expenses were necessary and appropriate.  The court approves Receiver’s final accounting and Receiver’s request for reimbursement of Receiver’s fees and expenses.  Plaintiff’s objections are overruled.

 

B.        The Means of Payment  

 

            The Receiver moves for an order “authorizing the Receiver to issue a Super-Priority Deed of Trust and accompanying Receiver’s Certificate of Indebtedness to secure funding for the Receivership Estate’s outstanding costs of administration.”  (Mot. 2.)  Because the Receiver’s outstanding fees and expenses remain unpaid, Receiver proposes the following: “[T]o borrow up to $120,000 from Receivership Lending, LLC (‘Lender’) on those terms, to be secured by the Deed of Trust and Certificate, with a loan term of 1 year. Upon receipt of the loan proceeds, the Receiver would pay the Receiver’s Outstanding Balance, plus any additional fees and expenses later incurred, and release the remainder to Plaintiff, which would have 1 year to repay Lender.”  (Mot. 10.)

 

            “Receivers are entitled to compensation for their own services and the services performed by their attorneys. (Venza v. Venza (1951) 101 Cal.App.2d 678, 680.)  Generally, the costs of a receivership are paid from the property in the receivership estate.  (See Andrade v. Andrade (1932) 216 Cal. 108, 110; McCarthy v. Poulsen (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 1212, 1219–1220, fn. 3.)  However, courts may also impose the receiver costs on a party who sought the appointment of the receiver or “ ‘apportion them among the parties, depending upon circumstances.’ ” (Baldwin v. Baldwin (1947) 82 Cal.App.2d 851, 856, 187 P.2d 429.)  Courts are vested with broad discretion in determining who is to pay the expenses of a receivership, and the court’s determination must be upheld in the absence of a clear showing of an abuse of discretion.”  (City of Chula Vista v. Gutierrez (2012), 207 Cal.App.4th 681, 685-686.) 

 

            In paragraph 14, the Amended Appointment Order states: “If there are insufficient funds in the Receivership Estate to pay expenses of the receivership, the expenses of the receivership estate shall be paid by the Plaintiff or advanced to the Receiver by the Plaintiff or a 3rd party lender and the Receiver shall issue receiver’s Certificates of Indebtedness to the Plaintiff in the amount of any such payments or advances with interest paid at 12% annual rate and 3 points. Any such Certificates of Indebtedness issued by the Receiver to the Plaintiff shall not be the personal obligation of the Receiver but the obligation of the Receivership Estate. Any receiver’s Certificates issued may be secured by the Property, which shall become a first lien on the Property superior to all preexisting private liens and encumbrances.”  (Receiver’s Decl. Exh. 2.)  Plaintiff did not challenge this condition.   

 

On October 13, 2023, the court (Beckloff, J.) granted Receiver’s ex parte application for an order directing Plaintiff to pay the Receiver’s outstanding fees and expenses of $53,055.10, as of September 30, 2023.  (See Singer Decl. Exh. 9.)  The court’s minute order states: “Plaintiff is ordered to pay the sum of $53,055.10 to the Receiver to satisfy his outstanding fees and expenses through September 30, 2023, within seven calendar days of entry of this order. If Plaintiff fails to make the Payment to the Receiver within seven calendar days of entry of this order, the Receiver is authorized to immediately record a super-priority lien on title for the Property to secure his fees and expenses in the amount of $53,055.10, which Lien shall have super priority as to any preexisting private lien(s) and encumbrances, except against federal, state, and county tax lien(s).”  (Ibid. [bold italics added.])  Plaintiff did not move for reconsideration of this order and did not pay the amounts due. 

 

Plaintiff concedes that “where the estate lacks the funds needed to pay the receiver the court has the authority to impose those fees upon one or more of the parties to the litigation.”  (Oppo. 3.)  However, Plaintiff argues that Defendant should pay the Receiver’s fees because her actions made the appointment necessary.  (Ibid.)  The court will not revisit Judge Beckloff’s decisions requiring Plaintiff to pay for the Receiver for several reasons: (1) Judge Beckloff has already ruled; (2) Plaintiff insisted on the appointment of the Receiver and opposed the Receiver’s efforts to terminate his work; (3) Plaintiff does not demonstrate that Defendant has the financial ability to pay any of the Receiver’s fees; (4) It would not be fair to the Receiver to make him attempt to collect a judgment against Defendant; and (5) Plaintiff has a remedy because Plaintiff is already seeking a judgment against Defendant which includes the Receiver’s fees and expenses. 

 

Based upon the foregoing, the court authorizes the Receiver to issue a Super-Priority Deed of Trust and accompanying Receiver’s Certificate of Indebtedness to secure funding for the Receivership Estate’s outstanding costs of administration.  Because the Receiver’s outstanding fees and expenses remain unpaid, the court authorizes the Receiver to borrow up to $100,000 (not $120,000, as requested by the Receiver, because the outstanding amount is only approximately $97,000). 

 

            C.        Additional Orders

 

            Finally, the court discharges the Receiver, terminates the receivership appointment, and retains jurisdiction over receivership matters.  “A receivership terminates upon completion of the duties for which the receiver was appointed; or at any time, upon court order.”  (Rutter, Civ. Pro. Before Trial ¶ 9:774; see generally Code Civ. Proc. § 568 [receiver is “under the control of the Court”] and O’Flaherty v. Belgum (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1044, 1053, 1062.) “As a general proposition a receiver has no official duties and is not a proper party to any action after being discharged by the court…. The discharge order operates as res judicata as to any claims of liability against the receiver in her official capacity.”  (Vitug v. Griffin (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 488, 494.)  The court also exonerates the Receiver’s bond. 

 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

 

            Based upon the foregoing, the court orders as follows:

 

            1.         The Receiver’s motion is granted.

 

            2.         The court orders Plaintiff to pay the Receiver $97,178.93 within ten days.

 

            3.         If Plaintiff fails to do so, the Receiver is authorized to: (1) Issue a Super-Priority Deed of Trust and accompanying Receiver’s Certificate of Indebtedness to secure funding for the Receivership Estate’s outstanding costs of administration; (2) Borrow up to $100,000 from Receivership Lending, LLC (‘Lender’) on those terms, to be secured by the Deed of Trust and Certificate, with a loan term of one year; (3) Pay the outstanding balance plus any additional fees and expenses later incurred; and (4) Release the remainder to Plaintiff, which would have one year to repay the Lender.

 

            4.         The court signs the Receiver’s proposed order with one modification (changing the loan amount from $120,000 to $100,000).

           

            5.         The Receiver shall provide notice and file proof of service with the court.