Judge Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case Number: 23STCP02247, Date: 2024-10-18 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case: 23STCP02247, Date: 2024-10-18 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCP02247 Hearing Date: October 18, 2024 Dept: 82

Compton Property Group LLC Case No. 23STCP02247

v. Hearing: October 18, 2024

Location: Stanley Mosk Courthouse

Department: 82

The City of Compton Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch

[Tentative] Order Denying Motion for Attorney’s Fees

Petitioner Compton Property Group (“Petitioner”) filed a petition for writ of mandate under the Housing Accountability Act, codified at Government Code section 65589.5, directing Respondent the City of Compton (the “City” or “Respondent”) to process Petitioner’s Builder Remedy application for new development. Petitioner alleged that the City’s housing element plan was not substantially in compliance with state law. Petitioner filed the instant petition on June 27, 2023. On July 18, 2023, the City agreed to accept Petitioner’s preliminary application. Now, Petitioner seeks attorney’s fees under three different code sections: (1) Government Code section 65589.5; (2) Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5; and (3) Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420.

A. Government Code section 65589.5 – DENIED

Petitioner is not entitled to attorneys’ fees under Government Code section 65589.5. Subdivision (k) sets forth that an applicant, including a housing organization, may bring an action to enforce the Housing Accountability Act. (Gov. Code § 65589.5, subd. (k)(1)(A)(i).) If the court finds the local agency disapproved a housing development project without making the findings required by this section or without making findings supported by a preponderance of the evidence, the court can order compliance with this section. (Gov. Code § 65589.5, subds. (k)(1)(A)(i)(I), (k)(1)(A)(ii).) The court “shall award reasonable attorney’s fees and costs of suit to the plaintiff or petitioner . . . .” (Gov. Code § 65589.5, subd. (k)(1)(A)(ii).)

Government Code section 65589.5, subdivision (h)(6) defines “disapprove the housing development project as any instance in which a local agency does any of the following:

“(A) Votes on a proposed housing development project application and the application is disapproved, including any required land use approvals or entitlements necessary for the issuance of a building permit.

(B) Fails to comply with the time periods specified in subdivision (a) of Section 65950. An extension of time pursuant to Article 5 (commencing with Section 65950) shall be deemed to be an extension of time pursuant to this paragraph.

(D) (i) Fails to make a determination of whether the project is exempt from the California Environmental Quality Act (Division 13 (commencing with Section 21000) of the Public Resources Code), or commits an abuse of discretion…

(E) Fails to adopt a negative declaration or addendum for the project, to certify an environmental impact report for the project, or to approve another comparable environmental document . . . .”

(Gov. Code § 65589.5, subd. (h)(6).) None of the five situations it does identify have occurred in this case, so Petitioner is not entitled to attorneys’ fees.

B. Government Code section 1021.5 – DENIED

Petitioner is not entitled to attorneys’ fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. In order to obtain fees, Petitioner must demonstrate three things: (1) the action has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest, (2) a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary has been conferred on the general public or a large class of persons and (3) the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement are such as to make the award appropriate. (See In re Conservatorship of Whitley (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1206, 1214, internal quotations and citation omitted.) “In order to be eligible for attorney fees under section 1021.5, a plaintiff must not only be a catalyst to defendant's changed behavior, but the lawsuit must have some merit, as discussed below, and the plaintiff must have engaged in a reasonable attempt to settle its dispute with the defendant prior to litigation.” (Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, 560-561.)

Petitioner is not entitled to attorneys’ fees under section 1021.5. Petitioner had ample financial incentive to pursue this case, which makes this case inappropriate for attorneys’ fees.

In evaluating the element of financial burden, the inquiry before the trial court is whether there were insufficient financial incentives to justify the litigation in economic terms. If the plaintiff had a personal financial stake in the litigation sufficient to warrant the decision to incur significant attorney fees and costs in the vigorous prosecution of the lawsuit, and award under section 1021.5 is inappropriate. Section 1021.5 was not designed as a method for rewarding litigants motivated by their own pecuniary interests who only coincidentally protect the public interest.

(Millview County Water Dist. v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 759, 768-769, internal quotations, alterations, and citations omitted.) Moreover, Petitioner did not make sufficient efforts to resolve the case before filing this action. Plaintiff attempted to submit the preliminary application via email on Thursday, June 22, 2023, but the City does not accept preliminary applications via email. (See Delgadillo Decl. ¶ 2.) Plaintiff submitted a preliminary application on Monday, June 26, 2023, but because the City had not set the fee, the planning technician could not accept the application. (See id. ¶¶ 3-4.) This action was filed the next day, on Tuesday, June 27, 2023, at 10:02 a.m. Respondent’s counsel claims that he “reached out before the litigation was filed, but there was no response.” (Jacobs Decl. ¶ 18.) Counsel provides no details, and the court finds that the chronology—that lawsuit having been filed no more than 24 hours later—does not support any finding of good faith efforts to resolve this matter. Therefore, the court denies the motion under section 1021.5.

C. Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420 – DENIED

Previously, the court granted Petitioner’s motion to compel further responses to Petitioner’s requests for admission (“RFAs”) and awarded $1,100 in discovery sanctions for that motion. (See Court’s Order, dated January 31, 2024.) Then, Respondent admitted several of the RFAs as true. (See Jacobs Decl. ¶ 15 & Exh. 3.) Now, Petitioner seeks “cost of proof” sanctions.

If a party fails to admit the genuineness of any document or the truth of any matter when requested to do so under this chapter, and if the party requesting that admission thereafter proves the genuineness of that document or the truth of that matter, the party requesting the admission may move the court for an order requiring the party to whom the request was directed to pay the reasonable expenses incurred in making that proof, including reasonable attorney’s fees.

(Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.420(a).) Petitioner never proved the genuineness of any matter that Respondent denied; the case has been resolved by Respondent accepting Petitioner’s preliminary application. Moreover, the matters which Respondent denied in their amended/supplemental responses were not so substantive as to warrant cost of proof sanctions. Therefore, the motion is denied.

D. Prevailing Party and Interlocutory Judgment

Petitioner asks the court to deem it the prevailing party with respect to the first cause of action and to issue an interlocutory judgment in its favor. The court declines to do so. The case has not concluded, so it would be premature to determine who is the prevailing party. Under the “one judgment” rule, the court cannot issue an interlocutory judgment. More important, it appears that the first and second causes of action are moot. Petitioner sought a writ to require the City of Compton to accept and process its preliminary application. The City has done so.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Based upon the foregoing, the court orders as follows:

1. Petitioner’s motion for attorneys’ fees is denied. The court declines to find that Petitioner is the prevailing party at this point.

2. Pursuant to the order to show cause, the court dismisses the first and second causes of action as moot. This order is without prejudice to Petitioner filing a new petition for writ of mandate challenging any unlawful denial of the application.

3. The court bifurcates the third cause of action and transfer that claim to an independent calendar court for trial.

4. Petitioner’s counsel shall provide notice and file proof of service with the court.

IT IS SO ORDERED

Dated: October 18, 2024 __________________________

Stephen I. Goorvitch

Superior Court Judge