Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case: 23STCP02754, Date: 2024-05-15 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCP02754    Hearing Date: May 15, 2024    Dept: 82

Compton Property Group LLC                              Case No. 23STCP02754

                                                                                    Related to Case No. 23STCP02247

v.                                                                                

                                                                                    Hearing Date: May 15, 2024, at 9:30 a.m.

The City of Compton, et al.                                     Location: Stanley Mosk Courthouse

                                                                                    Department: 82

                                                                                    Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch

[Tentative] Order Sustaining Demurrer to First Amended Petition for Writ of Mandate

BACKGROUND

            Petitioner Compton Property Group, LLC (“Petitioner”) has filed two cases against the City of Compton.  Petitioner filed the first case (Case Number 23STCP02247) against the City of Compton and Trinidad Bravo (who is incorrectly identified as “a Planning Technician for the City of Colton”).  (First Amended Petition, ¶¶ 10-11.)  On June 22, 2023, Petitioner submitted a Builder’s Remedy application for the property located at 1601 West El Segundo Boulevard in Compton, California (the “Property”).  (Id., ¶ 38.)  Petitioner alleges that Trinidad Bravo refused to accept the application.  (Id., ¶¶ 44-49.)  Petitioner filed the first action on June 27, 2023, and the City of Compton agreed to accept and process the application on July 19, 2023.  (Id., ¶ 50.)

            Petitioner’s preliminary application affords “vesting rights pursuant to SB 330, the Housing Crisis Act of 2019.”  (Respondents’ Request for Judicial Notice, Exh. 1, P. 22.)  In other words, submitting the preliminary application “freezes fees and development standards as of this date unless exceptions per Government Code § 65889.5(o) are triggered.”  (Ibid.)  A preliminary application must be followed by a full application, which was disclosed to Petitioner: “After submitting this Preliminary Application to the local agency, an application has 180 days to submit a full application or the Preliminary Application will expire.”  (Ibid.) 

            On July 18, 2023, Robert Delgadillo, Senior Planner for the City of Compton, sent a letter stating: “[T]he City of Compton is accepting the materials that you have submitted as your Preliminary Application (PA) for a proposed residential project located at 1601 W. El Segundo Blvd.”  (Petitioner’s Request for Judicial Notice, Exh. 2.)  The letter also states:

“We look forward to receiving your formal application for the proposed project, including all necessary submittals associated with the formal application.  For your use, attached is the ‘General Application’ for the General Plan Amendment, Zone Change, and Conditional Use Permit that will be required when you submit the formal applications.  It contains all of the supplemental requirements and explains how the plans should be prepared.  Please also complete the CEQA questionnaire with the General Application.  This will assist us in determining the proper environmental document for this project.”

(Ibid.)  As a result, Petitioner filed the second case (Case Number 23STCP02754) against the City of Compton and Robert Delgadillo (incorrectly identified as a “Senior Planner for the City of Colton”) seeking a writ of mandate to require the City of Compton to process the application without requiring the General Plan Amendment, Zone Change, and Conditional Use Permit. 

LEGAL STANDARD  

A demurrer tests the sufficiency of a pleading, and the grounds for a demurrer must appear on the face of the pleading or from judicially noticeable matters. (Code Civil Proc. § 430.30, subd. (a); Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) “We assume the truth of the allegations in the complaint, but do not assume the truth of contentions, deductions, or conclusions of law.”  (California Logistics, Inc. v. State (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 242, 247.)  “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters.”  (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)  The allegations in the petition must be liberally construed in favor of Petitioner on demurrer.  (See Mobil Oil Corp. v Exxon Corp. (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 942, 947.)  “A demurrer must dispose of an entire cause of action to be sustained.”  (Poizner v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119.)

DISCUSSION

            A.        Code of Civil Procedure section 1085

            Although Petitioner does not specify whether it seeks relied under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 or 1085, it appears that Petitioner seeks relief under the latter section, which authorizes writ relief for “an[y] act which the law specially enjoins.”  (Code Civ. Proc. § 1085(a).)  There are two essential requirements for an ordinary writ of mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085: (1) a clear, present, and ministerial duty on the part of the respondent, and (2) a clear, present, and beneficial right on the part of the petitioner to the performance of that duty. (California Ass’n for Health Services at Home v. Department of Health Services (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 696, 704.)  “Generally, mandamus is available to compel a public agency’s performance or to correct an agency’s abuse of discretion when the action being compelled or corrected is ministerial.”  (AIDS Healthcare Foundation v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Public Health (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 693, 700.)  “A ministerial act is an act that a public officer is required to perform in a prescribed manner in obedience to the mandate of legal authority and without regard to his or her own judgment or opinion concerning such act’s propriety or impropriety, when a given state of facts exists.”  (Ibid.)

            B.        Ripeness and Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies   

            Respondents argue that this case is not yet ripe because Petitioner has not submitted a full application.  “[A] basic prerequisite to judicial review of administrative acts is the existence of a ripe controversy.”  (Pacific Legal Foundation v. California Coastal Com. (1982) 33 Cal.3d 158, 169, 188 Cal.Rptr. 104.)  “The ripeness doctrine is based upon the recognition that judicial decisions are best made in the context of an actual set of facts so that the issues will be framed with sufficient definiteness to enable the court to make a decree finally disposing of the controversy.”  (Id. at p. 170.)  “The controversy must be definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. [Citation.] It must be a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.”  (Id. at pp. 170–171.)  “A controversy is ‘ripe’ when it has reached, but has not passed, the point that the facts have sufficiently congealed to permit an intelligent and useful decision to be made.”  (Santa Teresa Citizen Action Group v. City of San Jose (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 689, 708.)

            Similarly, a petitioner must exhaust administrative remedies before seeking review by this court.  Exhaustion of administrative remedies is “a jurisdictional prerequisite to judicial review.”  (Cal. Water Impact Network v. Newhall County Water Dist. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1464, 1489.)  “The exhaustion requirement applies whether relief is sought by traditional (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085) or administrative (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5) mandamus.”  (Eight Unnamed Physicians v. Medical Executive Com. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 503, 511.) 

            C.        Government Code section 65941.1

            Government Code section 65941.1 requires a developer to submit a formal development application within 180 days after submitting a preliminary application for development.  Specifically, subdivision (d) of section 65941.1 provides, in relevant part:

(d)(1) Within 180 calendar days after submitting a preliminary application with all of the information required by subdivision (a) to a city, county, or city and county, the development proponent shall submit an application for a development project that includes all of the information required to process the development application consistent with Sections 65940, 65941, and 65941.5.

(2) If the public agency determines that the application for the development project is not complete pursuant to Section 65943, the development proponent shall submit the specific information needed to complete the application within 90 days of receiving the agency's written identification of the necessary information. If the development proponent does not submit this information within the 90-day period, then the preliminary application shall expire and have no further force or effect.

(Gov. Code § 65941(d)(1) & (2).) 

            D.        Analysis  

            This dispute is not ripe.  In the first amended petition, Petitioner alleges that it submitted a preliminary application on June 22, 2023, and Respondent accepted the application on July 19, 2023.  (First Amended Petition ¶¶ 38, 50.)  Petitioner does not allege that it submitted the full application within 180 days (and it is undisputed that Petitioner did not do so).  Instead, Petitioner relies on Delgadillo’s letter to argue that the City is refusing to process the application without the General Plan Amendment, Zone Change, and Conditional Use Permit.  That is not so.  The letter does not state that the application will not be processed in the absence of these documents.  The court agrees with Respondent’s argument:

“If Petitioner believes so strongly that Petitioner’s formal application should be granted without the need for any other supporting application or documents, then Petitioner could submit its formal application, have the City render a final administrative decision, and if Petitioner is dissatisfied with that decision, Petitioner would then be open to seeking a writ of mandate from this Court.  At bottom, there is no ripe controversy in the absence of a final administrative decision from the City of the violation of a ministerial duty.”   

(Respondent’s Reply Brief, p. 4:19-24.)  This dispute is not ripe, and Petitioner has not exhausted its administrative remedies, until Petitioner submits a full application and the City of Compton refuses to process the application or denies the application in violation of the law.  Indeed, the court is concerned that it will not be able to resolve this dispute effectively without an administrative record, i.e., understanding the reasons why the City refuses to process or denies Petitioner’s full application.  Therefore, the demurrer to the first cause of action is sustained.  The court also sustains the demurrer to the second and third causes of action, which are derivative of the first cause of action.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

            Based upon the foregoing, the court orders as follows:

            1.         Respondent’s demurrer is sustained.

            2.         The court denies leave to amend, as no amendment would cure the defect in this case.

            3.         This order shall not preclude Petitioner from filing a new petition for writ of mandate if it submits a full application and the City of Compton refuses to process the application or denies the application in violation of law.

            4.         Either party may lodge a proposed judgment if necessary.

            5.         Respondent’s counsel shall provide notice and file proof of service with the court.