Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case: 23STCP03902, Date: 2025-03-14 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCP03902    Hearing Date: March 14, 2025    Dept: 82

Fausto Ortiz                                                              Case No. 23STCP03902

v.                                                                     Hearing: March 14, 2025

                                                                                    Location: Stanley Mosk Courthouse

Unemployment Insurance                                        Department: 82

Appeals Board                                                           Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch

[Tentative] Order Denying Petition for Writ of Mandate

BACKGROUND

            Petitioner Fausto Ortiz (“Petitioner”), a self-represented litigant, filed this petition for writ of mandate against the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (“Respondent” or the “Board”).  Petitioner received unemployment insurance benefits from November 24, 2019, to November 21, 2020.  (AR 2.)  Petitioner subsequently made a new claim for unemployment benefits with an effective date of November 22, 2020.  (Ibid.)  The Employment Development Department (the “EDD”) denied the new claim because Petitioner did not meet the criteria under Unemployment Insurance Code section 1277.  (Ibid.)  Specifically, the EDD found that Petitioner did not earn sufficient wages nor perform work during the relevant time period of the claim, between November 24, 2019, and November 21, 2020, as required.  (Ibid.)  Petitioner appealed the EDD’s adverse determination, and an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) held a hearing on November 7, 2022.  (AR 16-95.)  On November 14, 2022, the ALJ issued a decision and found that Petitioner was not eligible for unemployment benefits for the new claim.  (AR 96.)  Petitioner appealed that decision to the Board, which issued a decision upholding the ALJ’s ruling.  (AR 137-138.)  This petition for writ of mandate followed.

LEGAL STANDARD

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5(b), the pertinent issues are whether the respondent has proceeded without jurisdiction, whether there was a fair trial, and whether there was a prejudicial abuse of discretion.  An abuse of discretion is established if the agency has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5(b).)

Unemployment benefits of the nature involved here have long been held to be subject to the independent judgment standard of review.  (Douglas v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 110, 114.)  Under the independent judgment test, “the trial court not only examines the administrative record for errors of law, but also exercises its independent judgment upon the evidence disclosed in a limited trial de novo.”  (Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal. 3d 130, 143.)  The court must draw its own reasonable inferences from the evidence and make its own credibility determinations.  (Morrison v. Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles Board of Commissioners (2003) 107 Cal. App. 4th 860, 868.)  However, “in exercising its independent judgment, a trial court must afford a strong presumption of correctness concerning the administrative findings, and the party challenging the administrative decision bears the burden of convincing the court that the administrative findings are contrary to the weight of the evidence.”  (Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal. 4th 805, 817.) 

Petitioner bears the burden of proof to demonstrate, by citation to the administrative record, that the weight of the evidence does not support the administrative findings.  (Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28, 32; Steele v. Los Angeles County Civil Service Commission (1958) 166 Cal. App. 2d 129, 137.)

On questions of law arising in mandate proceedings, the court exercises independent judgment.  (See Christensen v. Lightbourne (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1239, 1251.)  The interpretation of statute or regulation is a question of law.  (See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Quackenbush (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 65, 77.)   

DISCUSSION

            A.        Petitioner Did Not File an Opening Brief

An agency is presumed to have regularly performed its official duties.  (See Evid. Code

§ 664.)  The petitioner seeking administrative mandamus has the burden of proof and must cite to the administrative record to support its contentions.  (See Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal. 3d 130, 143; Steele v. Los Angeles County Civil Service Commission, (1958) 166 Cal. App. 2d 129, 137; see also Alford v. Pierno (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 682, 691 [“[T]he burden of proof falls upon the party attacking the administrative decision to demonstrate wherein the proceedings were unfair, in excess of jurisdiction or showed prejudicial abuse of discretion.”].) 

“[A] trial court must afford a strong presumption of correctness concerning the administrative findings.” (See Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal. 4th 805, 817.)   A reviewing court “will not act as counsel for either party … and will not assume the task of initiating and prosecuting a search of the record for any purpose of discovering errors not pointed out in the briefs.” (Fox v. Erickson (1950) 99 Cal.App.2d 740, 742.)

A memorandum of points and authorities is required for a noticed mandamus motion. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 1094; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1113(a).)   The absence of a memorandum is an admission that the motion is not meritorious and may be denied.  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1113(a).)  “The memorandum must contain a statement of facts, a concise statement of the law, evidence and arguments relied on, and a discussion of the statutes, cases, and textbooks cited in support of the position advanced.”  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1113(b); Quantum Cooking Concepts, Inc. v. LV Associates, Inc. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 927, 934 [Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1113 “rests on a policy-based allocation of resources, preventing the trial court from being cast as a tacit advocate for the moving party's theories”].)  Petitioner did not file an opening brief.  Therefore, the petition is denied on this basis. 

B.        The Board Properly Affirmed the ALJ’s Decision to Deny Benefits

In the alternative, the Board properly affirmed the ALJ’s decision to deny Petitioner’s second claim for unemployment insurance benefits.  The ALJ found:

In this case, where the claimant did not do any work or receive any wages in the previous benefit year from November 24, 2019 through November 21, 2020, and where he did receive benefits under that original claim, his new claim for benefits effective November 22, 2020 is invalid under the lag test of code section 1277 due to not having sufficient work and wages. 

(AR 99.)  The Board affirmed this decision.  (AR 138.)  These decisions are supported by the evidence in the record.  Petitioner testified that he did not work and did not earn any wages during the period of November 24, 2019, through November 21, 2020.  (AR 25-28.)  Therefore, in the alternative, the petition is denied on this basis.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

            Based upon the foregoing, the court orders as follows:

            1.         The petition for writ of mandate is denied.

            2.         Respondent’s counsel shall prepare and lodge a proposed judgment.

            3.         The court’s clerk shall provide notice.

IT IS SO ORDERED

Dated:  March 14, 2025                                              _______________________

                                                                                    Stephen I. Goorvitch

                                                                                    Superior Court Judge