Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case: 23STCP03922, Date: 2024-07-16 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCP03922    Hearing Date: July 16, 2024    Dept: 82

Kevin Mancia,                                                           Case No. 23STCP03922

v.                                                                     Hearing Date: July 16, 2024

                                                                                    Location: Stanley Mosk Courthouse

City of Los Angeles, et al.                                        Department: 82

                                                                                    Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch

[Tentative] Order Granting Petition for Writ of Mandate

INTRODUCTION

             Petitioner Kevin Mancia (“Officer Mancia” or “Petitioner”) is an officer with the Los Angeles Police Department (the “LAPD”).  Petitioner and his partner, Sebastian Salsgiver (“Officer Salsgiver”), responded to a call for assistance from the Los Angeles County Psychological Evaluation Team (the “PET Team”).  The PET Team determined that Carlos Santos Jr. (“Santos”) satisfied the criteria for a hold under Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150.  While Petitioner attempted to “build a rapport” with Santos, Officer Salsgiver separated himself from Petitioner and positioned himself behind Santos “to prevent Santos from escaping.”  (AR 303.)  Notwithstanding Petitioner’s efforts, Santos pulled out a can of pepper spray and sprayed Petitioner.  Petitioner used his taser on Santos, which was ineffective, and then used his own pepper spray, which resolved the situation. 

            The watch commander determined that Petitioner’s use of force and tactics were within policy but counseled both officers on “creating a crossfire situation had it escalated to deadly force.”  (AR 303.)  The command staff disagreed with the finding on tactics, culminating in a Board of Rights hearing.  The hearing officer commended Petitioner for his “overall professional behavior in managing a difficult situation.”  (AR 404.)  The hearing officer found that Officer Salsgiver—not Petitioner—“created separation between the two officers leading to a crossfire configuration.”  (Ibid.)  According to the testimony, Officer Salsgiver was not investigated and did not receive an adverse finding for poor tactics.  (AR 93, 142-143.)  The hearing officer noted that such an outcome “could appear to be unfair to Officer Mancia” but found that “Officer Mancia is responsible for acting within policy regardless of what any other officer might do.”  (AR 404.)  The hearing officer sustained the administrative disapproval of tactics. 

            In order to do so, there must have been a “substantial deviation” from training or policy without justification.  Contrary to the hearing officer’s finding, there was no “separation” within the meaning of the policy because the officers were close enough to render aid to each other.  Nor was there any tactical decision that was a “substantial deviation” from the policy.  The mere existence of a crossfire situation is not a violation of training or policy.  Rather, officers must recognize and address the crossfire potential, which occurred in this case.  Moreover, the hearing officer did not consider whether there was justification for the tactics, viz., the need to prevent Santos from escaping and the need for Petitioner to maintain position because he had “taken the lead” on talking to Santos.  Therefore, the court grants the petition and remands the case to the Board of Rights for reconsideration in light of the court’s opinion and judgment.    

BACKGROUND

            On June 10, 2022, Petitioner and his partner, Officer Salsgiver, responded to a call for police assistance from the PET Team.  (AR 11, 17-18, 298.)  The comments of the call stated, “Subject, Santos, Carlos. Male Hispanic. 27 years old. Placed on a hold refusing to go. Paranoid/delusional.” (AR 18.)  The PET team requested a police presence while Santos was placed on a psychiatric hold pursuant to section 5150 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. (AR 17-18.)

Petitioner activated his body worn camera (the “camera”) when he arrived on scene.  (See AR 283.)  He spoke with a PET team member, who told Petitioner that Santos had a diagnosis of paranoia and schizophrenia but no history of drugs, alcohol, or violent tendencies.  (AR 20; AR 283 at 17:43-17:40.)  According to the PET team member, Santos had told his family he was an assassin and was going to start killing people. (AR 21.)

A PET Team member led Petitioner and Officer Salsgiver to Santos, who was located on a narrow walkway on the side of his house.  (See AR 283 at 18:04:25-42.)  Santos told the PET Team member and officers to “go away” and went inside the house through the backdoor along this walkway.  (Ibid.)  Petitioner heard screaming inside the residence, so he and Officer Salsgiver went through the front door to see what was happening.  (AR 42, 391, 283 at 18:04-18:05.)  Shortly thereafter, Santos exited the residence through the backdoor.  (Ibid.)  Officer Salsgiver and Petitioner asked Santos’s father to lock the back door to prevent Santos from coming back inside the house.  (Ibid.)  Petitioner and Officer Salsgiver then exited the residence through the front door and walked back to the narrow pathway on the side of the house to meet Santos.  Petitioner turned to Officer Salsgiver and stated, “It looks like we’re going to be chasing this guy in circles.”  (AR 43, 391, 283 at 18:06:02.) 

Petitioner met Santos at the narrow walkway behind the residence.  (AR 23-24.)  Santos stood in the middle of the walkway near the locked back door to the residence, about 25 feet from Petitioner.  (AR 27, 62.)  While Petitioner was talking with Santos, Officer Salsgiver separated himself from Petitioner.  (AR 27-29, 62, 81-85; see AR 283 at 18:06:02-18:06:32.)  Officer Salsgiver walked back around the front of the house, leaving Petitioner and Santos, and then positioned himself at the far side of the narrow walkway, opposite from Petitioner and about 25 feet from Santos.  (Ibid.)  Officer Salsgiver did not inform Petitioner that he was going to leave his position behind Petitioner.  (AR 28.)  Petitioner did not realize Officer Salsgiver had left his position until Petitioner “turned to the left . . . and realized that only the PR, the employee from the Department of Mental Health [was] the only one standing next to [him].”  (Ibid.)  Petitioner did not call Officer Salsgiver back after he left his position.  (AR 62.)

Because Petitioner had been told Santos had no history of violence, Petitioner made the decision to approach Santos “to see if [he] could build a rapport with the subject and see if he would listen to [him].”  (AR 30, 43.)  Notwithstanding Petitioner’s efforts, Santos closed the distance to Petitioner, pulled out a can of pepper spray, and sprayed Petitioner.  (AR 22, 30; see AR 283 at 18:06:35-50.)  At that point, Petitioner used his taser on Santos, which was ineffective.  (AR 30.)  Petitioner tasered Santos a second time, which was also ineffective.  (AR 32.)  Petitioner then used his own can of pepper spray on Santos. (AR 32.)  Around this time, Officer Salsgiver told Santos to “drop” the pepper spray.  (AR 283 at 18:07:44-51.)  Santos eventually complied with the command.  (Ibid.; see also AR 392 [investigative report stating that Santos complied with Salsgiver’s command to drop the pepper spray].)  Shortly thereafter, Petitioner and Officer Salsgiver both approached Santos, handcuffed him, and placed him in custody.  (AR 404; see AR 283 at 18:07:51-18:08:08.)  While positioned at the other end of the narrow pathway, Officer Salsgiver was beyond the range of Petitioner’s taser darts and pepper spray.  (AR 84-85.)

            The LAPD initiated a “use of force investigation” because Petitioner had used his taser and pepper spray against Santos.  Because the LAPD was investigating Petitioner’s use of force, it also investigated his tactics. (AR 142-43.)  The watch commander, Lieutenant Gus Barrientos, determined that both Petitioner’s use of force and his tactics were within policy. (AR 303.)  Lieutenant Barrientos noted that the “[o]fficers were effective and showed restraint.”  (Ibid.)  Lieutenant Barrientos also noted that Officer Salsgiver had approached Santos from the opposite side “[i]n an effort to prevent Santos from escaping.”  (Ibid.)  Lieutenant Barrientos counseled the officers that by doing so, Officer Salsgiver had created “a crossfire situation had it escalated to deadly force.”  (Ibid.)    

            Captain I Scott Williams disagreed with Lieutenant Barrientos’s finding that the tactics were within policy.  Captain Sonia Monico III found that Officer Mancia and his partner separated, “causing a crossfire situation.”  (AR 304.)  Captain Monico “recommended that the tactics should be classified as Administrative Disapproval/Training.”  (Ibid.)  Commander Jonathan Pinto, the Assistant Commanding Officer of the West Bureau, concurred with Captain Monico’s “recommendations.”  (AR 305.)  However, only Officer Mancia received an adverse finding.  (AR 93, 142-43.)  Notwithstanding the findings that the officers used poor tactics, Officer Salsgiver was not disciplined.  (AR 93, 142-43.) 

Petitioner’s counsel represents that a disapproval of tactics could prevent promotion or assignment to a specialized unit.  Therefore, Petitioner appealed the discipline to the Board of Rights, and a hearing was held on April 14 and April 25, 2023.  The hearing officer commended Petitioner for his professionalism and restraint in “managing a difficult situation” and agreed that the use of force was appropriate.  (AR 404.) 

I commend Officer Mancia for his overall professional behavior in managing a difficult situation which could have been more difficult had he not acted as he did to restrain the suspect.  He used as little force as necessary to achieve the suspect’s detention.  The Use of Force was appropriate.  The objective was achieved with no significant injury to anyone involved, and the suspect was safely delivered to the medical team.

(Ibid.)  The hearing officer found that Officer Salsgiver—not Petitioner—created the separation that led to a potential crossfire situation.  (Ibid.)  The hearing officer noted that disciplining only Officer Mancia “could appear to be unfair” given that Officer Salsgiver created the problem.  (Ibid.)  Nevertheless, the hearing officer sustained the disapproval of tactics because the hearing officer found that Petitioner should have addressed the situation created by his partner.  (Ibid.)

On July 19, 2023, the Chief of Police adopted the hearing officer’s recommendation to sustain the administrative disapproval.  (AR 401.)  This petition for writ of administrative mandate followed. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5(b), the pertinent issues are whether the respondent has proceeded without jurisdiction, whether there was a fair trial, and whether there was a prejudicial abuse of discretion.  An abuse of discretion is established if the agency has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5(b).)

Because the administrative disapproval concerns a fundamental vested right in Petitioner’s employment with Department, the court exercises its independent judgment on the administrative findings.  (See Wences v. City of Los Angeles (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 305, 314; Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 143.)  Under the independent judgment test, “the trial court not only examines the administrative record for errors of law, but also exercises its independent judgment upon the evidence disclosed in a limited trial de novo.”  (Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal. 3d 130, 143.)  The court may draw its own reasonable inferences from the evidence and make its determinations as to the credibility of witnesses.  (Morrison v. Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles Board of Commissioners (2003) 107 Cal. App. 4th 860, 868.)  “In exercising its independent judgment, a trial court must afford a strong presumption of correctness concerning the administrative findings, and the party challenging the administrative decision bears the burden of convincing the court that the administrative findings are contrary to the weight of the evidence.”  (Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal. 4th 805, 817.)

Petitioner bears the burden of proof to demonstrate, by citation to the administrative record, that the weight of the evidence does not support the administrative findings.  (Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28, 32; Steele v. Los Angeles County Civil Service Commission (1958) 166 Cal.App.2d 129, 137.) A reviewing court “will not act as counsel for either party to an appeal and will not assume the task of initiating and prosecuting a search of the record for any purpose of discovering errors not pointed out in the briefs.” (Fox v. Erickson (1950) 99 Cal.App.2d 740, 742.) 

“On questions of law arising in mandate proceedings, [the court] exercise[s] independent judgment.’”  (Christensen v. Lightbourne (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1239, 1251.)  The interpretation of statute or regulation is a question of law.  (See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Quackenbush (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 65, 77.) 

DISCUSSION

            A.        There must be a substantial deviation from training or policy without justification 

            The parties do not dispute that an administrative disapproval must be based upon a “substantial deviation” from the LAPD’s training or policies without justification.  (OB 14-15; Oppo. 8; AR 206.)  The administrative disapproval was based on Petitioner’s tactics related to his partner’s decision to separate, which created a “crossfire situation.”  (AR 304.)  However, the command staff did not specify the relevant LAPD policy or directive upon which the discipline was based.  (See AR 303-305.)  Neither did the hearing officer or Chief of Police in the final administrative decision.  (AR 401-404.) 

            B.        The cited policy applies to “foot pursuits,” which did not occur

            At the hearing, the LAPD relied on LAPD Directive No. 3.2, titled “Los Angeles Police Department Tactics, Use of Force—Tactics Directive, Foot Pursuit Concepts.” (AR 63-64, AR 284-90, 316-18.)  Presumably, the decisions are based upon purported violations of this policy.  However, this policy applies when officers are “[c]hasing a feeling suspect on foot.”  (AR 284.)  This is clear from the content of the policy.  For example, the directive states:

From the initiation of a good pursuit, officers should continually assess the tactical situation, consider their options and decide on a course of action to facilitate the suspect’s apprehension.  This Directive will discuss the general tactical concepts to aid in decision making during foot pursuits to reduce the risk to officers and the public.

(AR 284.)  The directive advises: “Officers must be able to articulate the reasonable suspicion for their detention of a fleeing suspect.”  (Ibid.)  The directive requires: “Officers should realize that flight alone does not provide reasonable suspicion to detain.” (Ibid.)

            Neither the command staff nor the hearing officer made the requisite finding that Santos was fleeing or that Petitioner was engaged in a “foot pursuit” within the meaning of Directive 3.2.  (See AR 303-305, 401-404.)  Respondents’ counsel argues that the directive applies because there was, in fact, a “foot pursuit” within the meaning of this policy because “the officers followed a dangerous Subject on foot.”  (Oppo. 9:8-9.)  Respondents’ counsel’s argument is not supported by the weight of the evidence. 

            Petitioner and Officer Salsgiver responded to a call for police presence while the PET team placed Santos on a psychiatric hold, not a call to apprehend a “suspect.”  The court’s review of the body camera video does not support the argument that Santos was “fleeing” because he never left the house or its curtilage and moved at a slow pace.  To the contrary, Santos positioned himself in the house or the side alley and demanded instead that the officers leave.  Moreover, during the hearing, the LAPD’s own witness—Sergeant II Mario Rojas, the Wilshire Training Coordinator—testified that the officers “were not in a foot pursuit” within the meaning of the policy.  (AR 133-134.)  When asked by the hearing officer whether the officers were “pursuing” Santos when he exited the house to the side walkway, Sergeant Rojas responded: “I wouldn’t describe it like that…. Again, I would describe especially dealing with someone who suffered from mental illness more of a noncompliant person… [r]ather than a fleeing or pursuit person.”  (AR 138-139.)  Sergeant Rojas stated that he “wouldn’t even describe it as a pursuit.” (Ibid.)

              Based upon the foregoing, the court is not persuaded that there was a “foot pursuit” within the meaning of Directive 3.2.  Respondent’s counsel relies on Petitioner’s comment to his partner that “we’re going to be chasing this guy in circles.”  (AR Oppo. 5:17-18; see AR 283 at 18:06:02.)  However, that statement must be interpreted in the context of the video, which shows the officers walking around the house to make contact with Santos and to persuade him to submit to the psychiatric hold. 

            Nevertheless, Petitioner and his expert witness, Sergeant Barbara Riggs, acknowledged that certain concepts from Directive 3.2 were applicable to the tactics used by Petitioner, including with respect to the “separation issue.”  (AR 43-45, 205-206.)[1]  Sergeant Rojas also agreed that certain concepts from Directive 3.2 were relevant to the administrative disapproval.  (AR 123-139.)  Given this testimony, the court assumes without deciding that concepts from Directive 3.2 may be applied to Petitioner’s tactics during incident even though he was not engaged in a foot pursuit of a fleeing suspect. 

            C.        There was no “separation” within the meaning of the policy

            Directive 3.2 defines “separation (split up)” as follows: “Separation occurs whenever the distance between the two officers is so great that one cannot render aid to the other when confronted by the suspect or barriers exist that would unreasonably delay the partner officer from being able to render aid.”  (AR 289.)  Directive 3.2 also states that “[w]hile in containment mode, partner officers may separate a reasonable distance for the limited purpose of setting up a perimeter, as long as they have line of sight of each other.”  (AR 289-290.)

            Based upon the court’s review of the record, including the body camera video, there was no deviation from this policy, let alone a substantial deviation that would support formal discipline.  The officers never “split up” to the point that one could not render aid to the other.  Sergeant Rojas testified that when Officer Salsgiver elected to leave Petitioner and went to the other side of the narrow walkway, Salsgiver was still in a position to render aid to Petitioner if it became necessary. (AR 120, 133.)  That is clear from the court’s review of the body camera video.  When asked how he could do that, Rojas responded, “By simply walking down that same corridor toward Officer Mancia and the subject.” (AR 133.)  Sergeant Riggs similarly testified that the officers could have rendered aid to one another if necessary.  (AR 197.)  Prior to approaching Santos, Petitioner and Officer Salsgiver were positioned approximately 50 feet part on either side of the narrow walkway.  (See AR 27, 62, 84-85.)  Simply, the expert testimony, photographs, and body camera video demonstrate that Officer Salsgiver never strayed so far that he could not render aid to Officer Mancia.  In fact, they were within sight of each other for the majority of the encounter, including when Santos used his pepper spray on Petitioner.  Moreover, there were no physical barriers that would unreasonably delay the officers from rendering aid to each other.

            Respondents cite no evidence to the contrary.  Nor does Respondent’s counsel address the policy’s permission to separate “for the limited purpose of setting up a perimeter, as long as they have a line of sight of each other.”  Respondents argue that “Officer Salsgiver would have been late rendering aid and Officer Salsgiver actually chose not to do so here because their positioning had created a cross-fire danger.”  (Oppo. 9:18-21, citing AR 199.)  The limited distance between the two officers does not support the conclusion that Officer Salsgiver would have been “late” in rendering aid.  More important, the cited testimony of Sergeant Riggs concerns crossfire potential, not whether a separation occurred within the meaning of Directive 3.2.  (AR 199.)  The court will address the crossfire issue separately.  Respondents’ argument that a separation occurred within the meaning of Directive 3.2 is not supported by the weight of the evidence. 

            D.        There was no “tactical decision” that was a substantial deviation from policy

            Although there was no “separation” within the meaning of Directive 3.2, Petitioner received an administrative disapproval because the officers “deployed on opposite sides of the residence, causing a crossfire situation.”  (AR 304-305.)  In fact, Officer Salsgiver created the crossfire potential by leaving Petitioner’s side without telling him and moving behind Santos.  Nevertheless, the hearing officer sustained the administrative disapproval on the grounds that “Officer Mancia had options” to address the situation.  (Ibid.)  The hearing officer found that Petitioner could have mitigated the crossfire situation by changing the “layout” and “by adjusting his own position….”  (AR 404.) 

            The weight of the evidence does not support the hearing officer’s conclusion that the failure to change position constituted a substantial deviation of training or policy.  In a discussion of “Perimeter Concepts,” Directive 3.2 states that “it is important to ensure that no crossfire situation exists.”  (AR 288.)  However, the mere existence of a crossfire situation is not the issue.  According to the LAPD’s own witness, Sergeant Rojas, the Department’s expectation in a crossfire situation is that officers are aware of it, “evaluate what is happening,” and “make adjustments if they feel is [sic] necessary.”  (AR 152-153, 157.)  Sergeant Rojas opined that, in this case, it was appropriate for the officers to continue in their positions at opposite ends of the walkway in order to contain Santos, i.e., there was no substantial deviation from the training or policy.   (AR 142, 150-151.)  Sergeant Riggs concurred, testifying that officers are “in crossfires all the time. . . .  When we approach people on the street, we end up in crossfires.” (AR 199.)  She continued:

So if something happens, it’s up to recognize [sic] I’m in a bad spot. I need to change my position. So when Salsgiver saw the OC spray being sprayed, he recognized that he might be in a bad position and redeployed back because what started as, we’re going to go put hands on him and handcuff him, now the subject pulled out pepper spray and my partner’s deploying OC and a taser maybe I’m not in a great spot. Let me redeploy…. So if something happens, it’s like, oh, I’m in a bad spot, I need to change my position which Salsgiver ultimately did.

(AR 199.)  Thus, the testimony of the LAPD and Petitioner’s witnesses are consistent: Petitioner did not need to change position to address Officer Salsgiver’s move.  Indeed, the potential crossfire situation lasted for about 12 seconds, per the body camera video, and both officers remained close enough to their respective edges of the house, which allowed them to escape around the corners (which they did when it became necessary). 

            Moreover, the hearing officer did not consider potential justifications for the tactics, which is required because an administrative disapproval requires a substantial deviation without justification.  The justification is an important component because the LAPD’s training and policies acknowledge that deviations may be necessary to address the realities of an evolving situation.  For example, Directive 3.2—upon which the LAPD relied at the Board of Rights hearing—states: 

Deviation from these basic concepts sometimes occurs due to the fluid and rapidly evolving nature of law enforcement encounters and the environment in which they occur. Deviations may range from minor, typically procedural or technical, to substantial deviations from Department tactical training. Any deviations are to be explained by the involved officer(s), and justification for substantial deviation from Department tactical training shall be articulated and must meet the objectively reasonable standard of the Department’s Use of Force policy.

(AR 290.)  The hearing officer did not address Officer Salsgiver’s necessity for changing position in the first place, which was “to prevent Santos from escaping.”  (AR 303.)  More important, although the hearing officer suggested that Petitioner should have taken cover behind the wall, the hearing officer apparently did not consider the fact that Petitioner was attempting to “build a rapport” with a delusional man who needed to be hospitalized.  In other words, there was no consideration of whether Petitioner should have maintained his position, and Officer Salsgiver should have moved (which he eventually did), because Petitioner had “taken the lead” on attempting to achieve a peaceful resolution of the situation. 

            In sum, the weight of the evidence does not support the finding that Petitioner’s failure to change positions was a substantial deviation in the LAPD’s training or policies without justification.  The policy does not prohibit crossfires; the policy requires officers to be aware of the potential and respond to it, which Officer Salsgiver eventually did.  The crossfire situation lasted about 12 seconds; each officer had an “out” because they remained close enough to the house’s corners to escape; and the hearing officer failed to consider the reasons for any deviations from the policy, like the need to prevent Santos from escaping and the fact that Petitioner—not Officer Salsgiver—was attempting to persuade a delusional man to submit to a psychiatric hold.  Even if there was a deviation from the policy, the record does not support the conclusion that there was a “substantial deviation,” as required.  Nor was there proper consideration of potential justifications in light of “the fluid and rapidly evolving nature of law enforcement encounters and the environment in which they occur.”

            E.         The failure to call for backup was not a basis for the administrative disapproval

            The hearing officer also found that Petitioner should have “called for backup so that there would be sufficient personnel to safely contain the suspect and render aid expeditiously should it be necessary.”  (AR 404.)  The hearing officer explained: “It would have taken time, but the two officers were at the scene 13 minutes after receiving the radio call, so it probably would not be an excessive amount of time. The suspect was in a reasonably contained space, and even if the worst had happened and he used a weapon before the backup team arrived, it could have been useful to have more officers present to assist.”  (Ibid.)  However, Petitioner received an administrative disapproval because the officers “deployed on opposite sides of the residence, causing a crossfire situation.”  (AR 304-305.)  The command staff did not cite the failure to call for backup as a basis for the administrative disapproval. 

            The weight of the evidence does not support the hearing officer’s (implicit) finding that calling for backup would have resolved the crossfire situation, which was the basis for the administrative disapproval.  The hearing officer seemingly relied on testimony of Sergeant Rojas, who opined that once Santos began to evade the officers, it would have been the “best case scenario to ask for additional units to help contain [Santos].”  (AR 172 [bold italics added].)  As a preliminary matter, that the officers may not have achieved the “best case scenario” does not mean that their actions substantially deviated, without justification, from Department policy or training.  Nor does this directly address how it would have eliminated the crossfire potential.  Significantly, Sergeant Rojas did not opine that it substantially deviated from any LAPD policy or training for Petitioner to approach Santos, rather than call for backup, after Officer Salsgiver separated and moved to the opposite side of the pathway. 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER 

            Based upon the foregoing, the court orders as follows:

            1.         The petition is granted.

            2.         The court shall issue a writ directing Respondents to set aside the administrative decision and reconsider the case in light of the court’s opinion and judgment, per Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5(f).

            3.         Petitioner’s counsel shall lodge a proposed judgment and proposed writ as necessary.

            4.         Petitioner’s counsel shall provide notice and file proof of service with the court. 

IT IS SO ORDERED 

Dated:  July 16, 2024                                                  ________________________

                                                                                    Stephen I. Goorvitch

                                                                                    Superior Court Judge