Judge Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case Number: 23STCP04009, Date: 2024-05-01 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case: 23STCP04009, Date: 2024-05-01 Tentative Ruling

The Board of Trustees for the Hacienda La Puente Unified School District (the “District” or “Petitioner”) terminated Jose Martinez (“Martinez”), who worked as a security guard at the school, after he failed to comply with a resolution mandating all District employees be vaccinated against Covid-19 by October 15, 2021. Martinez appealed his termination to the Personnel Commission of the District. Following a hearing, the Personnel Commission adopted the recommendation of the hearing officer and ordered Martinez’s reinstatement with backpay. Petitioner filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging that decision, and Martinez filed a separate petition for writ of mandate (which is Case Number 23STCP04413) seeking a writ to compel the District to comply with the hearing officer’s order and to amend the Personnel Commission’s decision to include backpay for an additional period of time. Now, both Petitioner and Martinez seek provisional relief from this court. Petitioner filed an ex parte application (which the court treated as a noticed motion) to stay the instant case pending resolution of a federal case or, in the alternative, the court’s decision on the writs. Martinez filed a motion to compel the District to comply with the Personnel Commission’s order. The court grants the Petitioner’s motion to stay this case pending the outcome of the writ proceedings and therefore denies Martinez’s motion. The court denies Petitioner’s motion to stay this case pending the outcome of the federal case, as the court has no authority to do so under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5(g).

Martinez was employed by the District until May 5, 2022, when District terminated his employment for failure to comply with District’s Covid-19 vaccine mandate policy. (Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate (“Pet.”) ¶ 18.) Martinez appealed the termination to the Personnel Commission, which appointed a hearing officer to preside over an evidentiary hearing. (Id. ¶ 21.) On August 7, 2023, the Personnel Commission adopted the recommendations of the hearing officer and ordered District to reinstate Martinez with full back pay and benefits from the date of his termination. (Id. ¶¶ 23-25; see Martinez’s Verified Answer (“Ans.”) Exh. A.) The District and Board have not yet complied with the Personnel Commission’s order. (See Pet. and Ans. generally.)

On November 6, 2023, the District filed the instant petition for writ of mandate challenging the Personnel Commission’s decision under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. On December 6, 2023, Martinez filed his own petition for writ of mandate on December 6, 2023, seeking to enforce the Personnel Commission’s decision under section 1085(a). Martinez also challenged the Personnel Commission’s decision not to award backpay for a limited period of time, per section 1094.5.

On March 25, 2024, Martinez filed his motion to compel compliance with the Personnel Commission’s order of reinstate and backpay. The next day, the District filed an ex parte application to stay this matter pending a decision on the writ, as well as resolution of a federal case challenging the District’s failure to grant exemptions from its vaccination requirement. The court (Beckloff, J.) elected to treat the District’s ex parte application as a noticed motion.

The court “may stay the operation of the administrative order or decision pending the judgment of the court, or until the filing of a notice of appeal from the judgment or until the expiration of the time for filing the notice, whichever occurs first.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5(g).) “However, no such stay shall be imposed or continued if the court is satisfied that it is against the public interest.” (Ibid.) The administrative stay provision of section 1094.5(g) “requires the superior court to weigh the public interest in each individual case.” (Sterling v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd. (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 176, 187.) Pursuant to section 1094.5(g), the court is not required to consider Board’s or Martinez’s likelihood of success on the merits. (See Canyon Crest Conservancy v. County of Los Angeles (2020) 46 Cal. App. 5th 398, 406-07.)

In reply, Martinez argues that the stay provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5(h)(1)—which require a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits—apply to the District. Section 1094.5(h)(1) states that the court “may stay the operation of the administrative order or decision of any licensed hospital or any state agency made after a hearing required by statute to be conducted under the Administrative Procedure Act….” Martinez does not show that a school district is a state agency within the meaning of section 1094.5(h). None of the cases cited by Martinez support that proposition. Notably, a school district is defined as a “local agency” pursuant to statute. (Gov. Code § 54951.) That school districts may operate as local agents of the state for purposes of public schooling does not establish that school districts are state agencies. Further, Martinez does not address whether the administrative hearing was conducted under the Administrative Procedures Act. Finally, section 1094.5(h)(1) applies when a party impacted by a state agency’s order seeks a stay. Here, a local agency seeks to stay a decision of its own Personnel Commission. Section 1094.5(h) does not apply in these circumstances.

Regardless, the court cannot evaluate the merits of the parties’ respective writs at this stage. Neither side provides a comprehensive discussion of the Commission’s findings or the evidence in the administrative record. The parties also have not lodged the certified administrative record. In an administrative mandate proceeding, “a trial court must afford a strong presumption of correctness concerning the administrative findings, and the party challenging the administrative decision bears the burden of convincing the court that the administrative findings” are not supported by the evidence. (Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal. 4th 805, 817.) In general, “a hearing on a writ of administrative mandamus is conducted solely on the record of the proceedings before the administrative agency.” (Toyota of Visalia, Inc. v. New Motor Vehicle Bd. (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 872, 881; Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5(e).) Because Petitioner need not show a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits, and because the court has not received the administrative record or comprehensive briefing on the merits, the court does not consider whether the District is likely to prevail on the underlying petitions.

The District seeks to stay seeks to stay the Personnel Commission’s order pending resolution of Plaintiff’s federal case or, in the alternative, until the court decides the writ petitions. The motion for stay is brought under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5(g), which only authorizes a stay of the administrative order “pending the judgment of the court, or until the filing of a notice of appeal from the judgment or until the expiration of the time for filing the notice, whichever occurs first.” The court lacks authority under the statute to stay the Commission’s order for a different period of time, and Petitioner cites no authority to the contrary. Accordingly, the court denies the motion to stay this case pending resolution of the federal case and considers the motion only to the extent it seeks a stay pending the court’s decision on the writs.

The District seeks to stay the Personnel Commission’s order on the following grounds: (1) to maintain the status quo “while competing lawsuits are allowed the opportunity to be decided”; (2) to avoid harm to District and/or Martinez from paying backpay to Martinez before a final determination of the merits of the District’s petition; (3) to avoid harm to District’s employment interests and an employee that was allegedly hired to fill the security officer position previously held by Petitioner; and (4) because the Personnel Commission allegedly exceeded its jurisdiction and abused its discretion in the administrative decision and order. (See Motion to Stay (“Mot.”) 3-8; see also Pet. at 16 [discussing irreparable harm].)

The court is not persuaded that a stay is necessitated by “competing lawsuits” because the two writs are related and will be decided by the same judge, which prevents inconsistent decisions. Nor is the court persuaded by the District’s argument that the Personnel Commission exceeded its jurisdiction and abused its discretion, because the court does not consider likelihood of success on the merits under section 1094.5(g). Nevertheless, the District’s remaining grounds favor a stay.

Absent a stay, the District would be required to pay Martinez the backpay ordered by the Personnel Commission. Because the cost of any backpay award will ultimately be borne by taxpayers, there is a public interest in staying the award of backpay until Petitioner’s challenge to the Commission’s order can be adjudicated. If the backpay were paid to Martinez, and then the Commission’s order set aside, Board may need to pursue additional legal or collection actions to recoup the backpay. Those legal costs would also be borne by taxpayers and it is uncertain whether Martinez could fully satisfy any adverse judgment. Martinez has not filed a declaration or other evidence claiming any irreparable harm if the backpay award is not stayed pending the court’s adjudication of the writ. Notably, if the court affirms the Commission’s order, Martinez would then be awarded backpay up to the time of his reinstatement. (Ans. Exh. A at 63.) He may also be entitled to pre-judgment interest. (Civ. Code § 3287(a); San Diego County Deputy Sheriffs Assn. v. San Diego County Sheriff’s Dept. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1086 [pursuant to section 3287(a), “when an administrative agency determines an employee's employment was wrongfully terminated, and reinstates the employee's employment with backpay, the agency must include interest in the award of wrongfully withheld backpay”].) Thus, the District demonstrates that a stay would be in the public interest, and Martinez does not show that he would suffer economic harm if the award of backpay is stayed.

Moreover, the court agrees that if a stay is not granted, there would be prejudice “stemming from the premature enforcement of a determination that may be later found to have been wrong.” (Mot. 5, citing Daly v. San Bernardino County Bd. of Supervisors (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1030, 1035.) A stay would preserve the status quo pending the court’s decisions on the writs. Conversely, denying a stay would change the status quo and irreparably harm District’s interests as an employer, necessitating personnel changes and changes in enforcement of the District’s policies. In this sense, a stay is in the public interest. Conversely, Martinez has not filed a declaration explaining how he would be irreparably harmed if the Commission’s order is stayed. In fact, the District’s counsel represents that “Martinez is currently on disability and cannot work due to an injury,” and Martinez does dispute that representation in his opposition or in a declaration. (Mot. 8.) If Martinez cannot return to work immediately, he would not be harmed by a stay of the order of reinstatement.

Finally, the court finds that a stay would not be against the public interest because the only person impacted by a stay is Martinez. Any harm to him from a stay of the Personnel Commission’s order is an individual one and does not impact the public interests.[1]

The court denies Martinez’s motion to compel the District to comply with the Personnel Commission’s decision for two reasons. First, because the court grants the District’s motion to stay that order, it necessarily denies Martinez’s motion to enforce that order. Second, in the alternative, the court denies Martinez’s motion on the merits.

The trial on this administrative writ petition will inquire into the validity of Personnel Commission’s order. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5(a), (b).) Thus, by seeking to compel compliance with Commission’s order prior to trial, Martinez effectively seeks a preliminary mandatory injunction. (See Daly, supra, 11 Cal.5th at 1050 [injunction is mandatory if it “command[s] the employer to take affirmative steps to remedy an alleged legal violation”]; see also Davenport v. Blue Cross of Calif. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 435, 448 [“The general rule is that an injunction is prohibitory if it requires a person¿to refrain from a particular act and mandatory if it compels performance of an affirmative act that changes the position of the parties.”].)

The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo pending a decision on the merits. (Major v. Miraverde Homeowners Ass’n. (1992) 7 Cal. App. 4th 618, 623.) In deciding whether or not to grant a preliminary injunction, the court looks to two factors, including “(1) the likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits, and (2) the relative balance of harms that is likely to result from the granting or denial of interim injunctive relief.” (White v. Davis (2003) 30 Cal.4th 528, 553-54.) The factors are interrelated, with a greater showing on one permitting a lesser showing on the other. (Dodge, Warren & Peters Ins. Services, Inc. v. Riley (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1414, 1420.) The party seeking the injunction bears the burden of demonstrating both a likelihood of success on the merits and the occurrence of irreparable harm. (Savage v. Trammell Crow Co. (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1562, 1571.) Irreparable harm may exist if the plaintiff can show an inadequate remedy at law. (Code Civ. Proc. § 526(a).) “The granting of a mandatory injunction pending trial is not permitted except in extreme cases where the right thereto is clearly established.” (Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n v. Furlotti (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1487, 1493.)

As discussed, Martinez does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits. Nor does Martinez demonstrate irreparable harm. Martinez does not dispute that he cannot return to work anyway due to his disability, and he has an adequate remedy to recover the backpay. To the contrary, the balance of potential harm favors the District. Accordingly, Martinez is not entitled to a preliminary mandatory injunction.

2. The court stays the Personnel Commission’s decision pending the judgment of this court on the petitions for writ of mandate in this case and Case Number 23STCP04413.

3. The court denies the District’s motion to the extent it seeks a stay of the instant case pending resolution of the federal action.

4. The court denies Martinez’s motion to enforce compliance with the Personnel Commission’s decision.

5. Counsel for the District shall provide notice and file proof of service with the court.

[1] Martinez argues that a stay would be against the public interest because of alleged prejudice to another “terminated employee,” Nelly Corcio, who reportedly agreed to a continuance of her own administrative appeal until this court decides the instant writ petition. (Oppo. 3.) Martinez does not submit a declaration or other evidence supporting this contention. Also, a stay of Commission’s order would not impact the amount of time required for the instant writ petition to be adjudicated. Martinez does not show that Corcio’s individual interests weigh against a stay.