Judge Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case Number: 23STCP04246, Date: 2024-08-02 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case: 23STCP04246, Date: 2024-08-02 Tentative Ruling

Petitioner Verliseya Morris (“Petitioner”), a self-represented litigant, petitions for a writ of administrative mandate directing the California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (“Respondent” or the “CUIAB”) to set aside its decisions denying Petitioner’s claim for unemployment benefits pursuant to the California Training Benefits (“CTB”) program set forth in Unemployment Insurance Code section 1269.1.[1] Petitioner’s writ is based upon a misinterpretation of the pertinent statutory requirement, so she does not establish a prejudicial abuse of discretion in Respondent’s decision.

Petitioner worked as a deli associate for Walmart for six years. (See Petition for Writ of Mandate (“Pet.”) pp. 2 and 12 of 17.) Petitioner lost her employment with Walmart and became a full-time student in the California State University, Los Angeles, with a major in criminal justice. (Id. at 12; see also Petitioner’s Opening Brief (“OB”) 2.)

Petitioner filed a claim for unemployment benefits under the CTB program. Of relevance to the petition, an individual qualifies for the CTB program when:

One of the substantial causes of the individual’s unemployment is a lack of sufficient current demand in the individual’s labor market area for the occupational skills for which the individual is fitted by training and experience or current physical or mental capacity, and that the lack of employment opportunities is expected to continue for an extended period of time, or, if the individual’s occupation is one for which there is a seasonal variation in demand in the labor market and the individual has no other skill for which there is current demand.

The Employment Development Department (the “EDD”) denied Petitioner’s claim for CTB benefits and Petitioner filed an administrative appeal. (Pet. 13.) After an administrative hearing, the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) upheld the EDD’s determinations. As relevant to the writ petition, the ALJ reasoned as follows: “[T]here is no lack of demand in the labor market in the retail/food service industry so the claimant is not eligible for the CTB program under code section 1269.1(b). As such, the claimant has failed to meet all elements of code section 1269.1. Accordingly, the claimant is not eligible for training benefits under code section 1269.1.” (Pet. 13.) Because Petitioner did not meet the initial CTB eligibility requirements, the ALJ also affirmed the EDD’s determination that Petitioner did not qualify for a training benefit extension under section 1271(a). (Id. 16.)

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5(b), the pertinent issues are whether the respondent has proceeded without jurisdiction, whether there was a fair trial, and whether there was a prejudicial abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion is established if the agency has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5(b).)

Unemployment benefits of the nature involved here have long been held to be subject to the independent judgment standard of review. (Douglas v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 110, 114.) Under the independent judgment test, “the trial court not only examines the administrative record for errors of law, but also exercises its independent judgment upon the evidence disclosed in a limited trial de novo.” (Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal. 3d 130, 143.) The court must draw its own reasonable inferences from the evidence and make its own credibility determinations. (Morrison v. Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles Board of Commissioners (2003) 107 Cal. App. 4th 860, 868.) However, “in exercising its independent judgment, a trial court must afford a strong presumption of correctness concerning the administrative findings, and the party challenging the administrative decision bears the burden of convincing the court that the administrative findings are contrary to the weight of the evidence.” (Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal. 4th 805, 817.)

Petitioner bears the burden of proof to demonstrate, by citation to the administrative record, that the weight of the evidence does not support the administrative findings. (Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28, 32; Steele v. Los Angeles County Civil Service Commission (1958) 166 Cal. App. 2d 129, 137.) A reviewing court “will not act as counsel for either party to an appeal and will not assume the task of initiating and prosecuting a search of the record for any purpose of discovering errors not pointed out in the briefs.” (Fox v. Erickson (1950) 99 Cal.App.2d 740, 742.)

“On questions of law arising in mandate proceedings, [the court] exercise[s] independent judgment.’” (Christensen v. Lightbourne (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1239, 1251.) The interpretation of statute or regulation is a question of law. (See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Quackenbush (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 65, 77.)

Petitioner cannot demonstrate that the CUIAB abused its discretion.[2] The ALJ found that Petitioner did not qualify for the CTB program because “there is no lack of demand in the labor market in the retail/food service industry so the claimant is not eligible for the CTB program under code section 1269.1(b).” (Pet. 13.) Petitioner argues that section 1269.1(b) does not disqualify her from eligibility because she sought further education in the criminal justice field to increase her career opportunities and move into a “high demand” occupation. (OB 2-3.) As phrased by Petitioner, she enrolled in school full-time to increase her opportunities “for long-term employment” and because her work in “minimum-wage jobs … was still not enough.” (Reply 2-3.) Thus, Petitioner contends that section 1269.1(b) should be interpreted such that CTB benefits are available for a person who becomes unemployed and who seeks retraining to enter a different occupation that has greater employment and career prospects.

The rules governing statutory construction are well settled. We begin with the fundamental premise that the objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent. To determine legislative intent, we turn first to the words of the statute, giving them their usual and ordinary meaning. When the language of a statute is clear, we need go no further.

(Nolan v. City of Anaheim (2004) 33 Cal.4th 335, 340, citations omitted.) The statute clearly states that a person only qualifies for the CTB program if one of the “substantial causes” of the unemployment is a “lack of sufficient current demand” in the field and there is a lack of employment opportunities in the field that is “expected to continue for an extended period of time.” (Ins. Code § 1269.1(b).) The court cannot ignore the second requirement in interpreting the statute. (See People v. National Auto. and Cas. Ins. Co. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 277, 282.)

Petitioner does not demonstrate that the weight of the evidence does not support the ALJ’s finding that there is demand for labor in the retail/food service industry. At the administrative hearing, Petitioner testified that Walmart terminated her employment because it lacked hours that would accommodate her school schedule. (AR 31.) Petitioner testified that she stopped working at Walmart because she “want[ed] to make an investment in [her] future” and because of the conflict with her school schedule. (AR 31-32; see also AR 44.) Petitioner’s testimony demonstrates that she did not lose her job at Walmart due to a lack of market demand

for deli associates or other personnel in retail/food services. Petitioner also presented no evidence of any lacking demand for workers in the retail/food service industry. Accordingly, the court concludes that the weight of the evidence supports the ALJ’s findings that “there is no lack of demand in the labor market in the retail/food service industry” and that Petitioner did not meet the criteria for CTB eligibility in section 1269.1(b).

The court shares Respondent’s view that Petitioner’s decision to return to school to pursue successful long-term employment is admirable. (See Oppo. 5.) Petitioner argues that the CTB program should be applied more broadly to persons seeking retraining to enter a new field. The court must apply the statute as drafted and enacted, so Petitioner’s argument must be directed to the Legislature.

Based upon the foregoing, the court finds that Petitioner has not demonstrate a prejudicial abuse of discretion in Respondent’s findings and decision, per Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5(b). Therefore, the petition is denied. Respondent’s counsel shall provide notice and file proof of service with the court.

[1] Unless otherwise stated, all subsequent statutory citations are to the Unemployment Insurance Code.

[2] Petitioner did not lodge the administrative record. “In a section 1094.5 proceeding, it is the responsibility of the petitioner to produce a sufficient record of the administrative proceedings.” (Elizabeth D. v. Zolin (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 347, 354.) Otherwise, the “presumption of regularity” will prevail. (Ibid.; see also Eureka Citizens for Responsible Government v. City of Eureka (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 357, 366 [“Failure to provide an adequate record concerning an issue challenged on appeal requires that the issue be resolved against the appellants.”]) The court received a courtesy copy from Respondent’s counsel and decides the petition on the merits.