Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case: 23STCP04331, Date: 2024-08-08 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCP04331    Hearing Date: August 8, 2024    Dept: 82

Christian Williams, et al. v. City of Los Angeles
Case No. 23STCP04331

NO TENTATIVE ORDER

INTRODUCTION

Christian Williams (“Williams”) and Jorge Trejo (“Trejo”) (collectively, “Petitioners”) are officers with the Los Angeles Police Department (the “LAPD” or the “Department”).  Petitioners filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate directing the City of Los Angeles (“Respondent” or the “City”) to set aside an administrative decision imposing a five-day suspension without pay on Williams and a ten-day suspension without pay on Trejo. 

The court has no tentative order on this petition.  The parties should be prepared to discuss the issues in this “tentative.” 

BACKGROUND 

            Petitioners were disciplined for their use of lethal force and tactics during an officer involved shooting on December 26, 2021.  As of that date, Williams was a probationary police officer.  (AR 236.)  Trejo had been a police officer for approximately nine years.  (AR 336.)  It was the second day Petitioner had worked together.  (AR 236-37, 393.)

            At approximately 18:03 hours, Petitioners received a radio call from the Fire Department requesting police assistance.  (AR 239, 663-664.)  Petitioners received the following information from the Communications Division before arriving on the scene:

            18:03:48 Hours           The Fire Department requested a Code Three response for a “combative male”

            18:05:54 Hours           The suspect had “slit his throat” and it was unknown if the suspect was armed with the knife

            18:06:22 Hours           An LAPD supervisor was requested to respond, per the “Edged Weapon Protocol”

            18:06:42 Hours           The Fire Department reported that “the suspect has a self-inflicted laceration to the throat and it’s unknown if the suspect is still armed . . . .” 

(AR 664.)  Petitioners arrived at the scene at 18:10 hours.  (AR 664.)  In transit, Petitioners did not discuss a plan for using less-than-lethal force.  (AR 252, 345.)  They did not discuss a tactical plan for confronting the suspect.  (AR 345.)  According to Trejo, the officers only discussed “a plan to get there and meet with the fire department personnel and assess the situation from there.”  (AR 345.)  The court’s review of the body camera videos does not reveal much, if any, conversation between Petitioners.  (AR 719 [BWV].)   

Williams, who was driving, parked their vehicle approximately 30 feet behind Ruitz’s vehicle.  (AR 562, 918.)  According to Petitioners’ body worn video, Ruiz was sitting in his vehicle and members of the Fire Department were nearby.  (AR 719 [Department’s Exhibit 13: Body Worn Video of Trejo and Williams (“BWV”)].)  The knife was not visible at that point, and Petitioners exited their vehicle without drawing their own weapons.  (See ibid.)  Then,   

Ruiz stepped out of his vehicle holding a 15-inch kitchen knife.  (See ibid.)  Fire Department personnel backed away from Ruiz and alerted Petitioners that Ruiz had a knife.  (See ibid.)  Petitioners unholstered their weapons and took cover behind their open vehicle doors.  (See ibid.; see also AR 563, 568; 669.) 

Ruiz stood in front of his vehicle for approximately 50 seconds.  (AR 254, 669, 719.)   His arms were extended from his sides as he held the knife in his right hand with the blade pointed down.  (AR 669.)  Ruiz repeatedly said or mouthed the words, “Shoot me.”  (AR 669.)  During this 50-second time period, Williams requested backup.  (AR 58, 251.)  Trejo rolled down the passenger window of their police vehicle.  (AR 72.)  Both Petitioners adjusted their spotlights on their vehicle.  (AR 161, 719.)  Petitioners gave repeated commands to Ruiz to drop the knife.  (AR 125; see AR 719 [BWV].)  Petitioners observed a visible injury to Ruiz’s neck and that he was covered in blood.  (AR 253, 323, 825.) 

After about 50 seconds, Ruiz then started to walk towards Petitioners’ vehicle in a “slow and steady gait.”  (AR 254, 387.)  As shown in the body worn videos of Williams and Trejo, Ruiz was severely injured by self-inflicted knife wounds and his movements were “slow and lethargic.”  (See AR 719; see also 686-687.)  In his report to the Board of Police Commissioners, the Chief of Police described the ensuing actions of the officers and Ruiz, as follows:

Despite repeated commands from both officers, Ruiz refused to stop or drop the knife. Ruiz continued to close the distance and bumped into the front of the police vehicle. Ruiz then looked in Officer Trejo’s direction and stepped to his left, toward the passenger side of the police vehicle where Officer Trejo was standing behind his ballistic door. Believing that Ruiz was going to harm Officer Trejo, Officer Williams discharged two rounds from his service pistol at Ruiz from approximately 11 feet. Believing that Ruiz was close enough to “kill” him or cause “serious bodily injury.” Officer Trejo discharged one round from his service pistol at Ruiz from approximately eight feet. Officer Trejo's round was discharged after Officer Williams’ second round. After being struck by gunfire, Ruiz fell to the ground and dropped the knife.

…. Approximately fifteen seconds after Ruiz was handcuffed, LAFD personnel began Advanced Life Support (ALS) procedures on Ruiz. Rescue Ambulance 12 then transported Ruiz to Huntington Memorial Hospital, where he was pronounced deceased by Doctor Kwon.

(AR 669-670; see also AR 719 [BWV] & AR 276-283, 360 [testimonies of Williams and Trejo].)

The autopsy report concluded that Ruiz’s self-inflicted laceration to his neck was a fatal wound.  (AR 57-58.) The autopsy report also concluded that the three bullets that Petitioners fired were the immediate cause of Ruiz’s death. (AR 65.)  A PowerPoint presentation prepared by the LAPD for the Police Commission states that Ruiz’s toxicology results were positive for methamphetamine.  (AR 604.)

The five-member Use of Force Review Board (“UOFRB”) unanimously found that Petitioners’ drawing and exhibiting their firearms was within policy.  (AR 428, 662-667.)  The majority also found that Petitioners’ tactics and shooting were within policy.  (AR 66, 665, 667.)  The minority came to a different conclusion:

The minority opine[d] that the tactics used by Officers Williams and Trejo, which lead-up [sic] to the use of deadly force, specifically the tactical planning and tactical communication, substantially deviated from Department training and procedure.  In addition, the minority opine[d] that the use of deadly force in this incident was not objectively reasonable or necessary.

(AR 662.)  The Chief of Police adopted the minority opinion in his report to the Board of Police Commissioners.  (AR 67; see also AR 668-689.)

            A Board of Rights (the “Board”) hearing considered two charges against Petitioners:

Count 1: On or about December 26, 2021, you, while on duty, utilized lethal force that reached a finding of out of policy, Administration Disapproval.

Count 2: On or about December 26, 2021, you, while on duty, utilized tactics that were a substantial deviation, without justification, from Department approved tactical training that reached a finding of Administrative Disapproval.

(AR 6.)  The Board found Petitioners guilty on both charges.  (AR 542.)  The Board found as follows:

Officer Trejo has been an officer for 19 [sic] years.  Officer Williams had only been out of the Academy six months prior to this incident.  As the more senior officer, Officer Trejo, therefore, bears greater responsibility that Department policy is complied with, particularly with regard to creating a tactical plan, which includes using non-lethal force when responding to a call for service.  The officers had over four minutes before arriving on scene to formulate a plan to deal with a potentially combative, injured person armed with a knife.  Based on their training, a plan to contact Mr. Ruiz should have been discussed and considered, which would have included a plan to use less than lethal means, if necessary.  Instead, both officers failed to communicate, failed to plan, and were unprepared for this situation.  The officers never engaged in any planning prior to or after arriving on the scene.

. . .

The Board also finds that there was an opportunity to use non lethal force; but because of their poor planning, both officers failed to take advantage of that opportunity and instead resorted to lethal force contrary to Department Policy.

(AR 543-544.)  The Board recommended a ten-day suspension for Trejo and a five-day suspension for Williams.  (AR 545.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5(b), the pertinent issues are whether the respondent has proceeded without jurisdiction, whether there was a fair trial, and whether there was a prejudicial abuse of discretion.  An abuse of discretion is established if the agency has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5(b).)

Because the suspensions imposed on Petitioners concern a fundamental vested right in Petitioners’ employment with the LAPD, the court exercises its independent judgment on the administrative findings.  (See Wences v. City of Los Angeles (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 305, 314; Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal. 3d 130, 143.)  Under the independent judgment test, “the trial court not only examines the administrative record for errors of law, but also exercises its independent judgment upon the evidence disclosed in a limited trial de novo.”  (Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal. 3d 130, 143.)  The court may draw its own reasonable inferences from the evidence and make its determinations as to the credibility of witnesses.  (Morrison v. Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles Board of Commissioners (2003) 107 Cal. App. 4th 860, 868.)  “In exercising its independent judgment, a trial court must afford a strong presumption of correctness concerning the administrative findings, and the party challenging the administrative decision bears the burden of convincing the court that the administrative findings are contrary to the weight of the evidence.”  (Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal. 4th 805, 817.)

Petitioners bear the burden of proof to demonstrate, by citation to the administrative record, that the weight of the evidence does not support the administrative findings.  (Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28, 32; Steele v. Los Angeles County Civil Service Commission (1958) 166 Cal. App. 2d 129, 137.) A reviewing court “will not act as counsel for either party to an appeal and will not assume the task of initiating and prosecuting a search of the record for any purpose of discovering errors not pointed out in the briefs.” (Fox v. Erickson (1950) 99 Cal.App.2d 740, 742.) 

“On questions of law arising in mandate proceedings, [the court] exercise[s] independent judgment.’”  (Christensen v. Lightbourne (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1239, 1251.)  The interpretation of statute or regulation is a question of law.  (See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Quackenbush (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 65, 77.)   

DISCUSSION

A.        The Board’s Factual Findings

The Board made the following factual findings in support of its conclusions that Petitioners were guilty of both counts:

After receiving the radio call, the officers failed to discuss who would be the “contact” officer and who would be the “cover” officer. More importantly, the radio communications indicated that Ruiz was combative and that an “edge weapon” protocol was needed. This put the officers on notice that the use of non-lethal force might be necessary. However, the officers did not discuss the potential use of non-lethal force and a tactical plan for a combative male who may be armed. They did not assign one of them to deploy non-lethal force.

When they arrived at the scene, Ruiz exited his vehicle almost immediately with a knife in his hand. He was approximately 30 feet away from the officers. The LAFD personnel had moved away from Ruiz. Had they discussed the use of non-lethal force, the officers might have been prepared to immediately deploy a taser or a 40-millimeter less lethal launcher [“LLL”]. However, neither officer deployed these non-lethal devices.

Ruiz stood outside his vehicle for approximately 50 seconds. Although he may have been out of range for the use of a taser or a 40-millimeter LLL, it was sufficient time for one of the officers to deploy these devices while Ruiz stood there and before he began to move toward the officers.

Ruiz moved slowly toward the officers with a knife in his right hand, pointing down, and with his arms outstretched while saying “shoot me.” He made no movement toward the LAFD personnel and made eye contact with the officers. Ruiz’s wounds indicated that he likely had already tried to kill himself. Other than the fact he was holding a knife, he did not give the impression that he wished to attack the officers. Instead, it appeared that he was carrying a knife to induce the officers to shoot him. This gave every indication that Ruiz was attempting “suicide by cop” and was not attempting to attack the officers.

Ruiz was moving very slowly. It took approximately 20 seconds to move 30 feet needed to reach the officers’ police vehicle. After he had moved approximately nine feet, he was within the range of non-lethal force. Had one of the officers deployed a non-lethal device at this time, if the device failed, Ruiz would still have been approximately 20 feet from the police vehicle, allowing one of the officers sufficient time to discharge his pistol at Ruiz.

Further, both officers had already deployed behind their vehicle doors, thus providing protection had the non-lethal device failed. Although Ruiz eventually bumped up against the front of the police vehicle after 20 seconds, to get at the officers, he still would have had to go around the vehicle door, which would have provided more time to the officers. Therefore, even if the non-lethal device failed, there was still sufficient time for an officer to discharge his pistol at Ruiz. As Ruiz approached the police vehicle, there was also sufficient time for an officer to drop a non-lethal device and unholster his pistol.

The Board does recognize that this was a fluid and dynamic situation. However, given that they had notice of a possibly armed combative male, they should have discussed non-lethal force and assigned one of them to this role. Had they done so, they might have been more prepared to quickly react to Ruiz.

But even after arriving at the scene, they had almost a minute to assess the situation and attempt to use non-lethal force. They had a window of time before Ruiz reached the police vehicle to utilize a taser or a 40-millimeter LLL, had they already prepared the tactical plan and deployed one of these devices while Ruiz stood outside his vehicle.

(AR 951-954.)

            B.        Count Two – NO TENTATIVE

            Petitioners were charged in Count Two with having “utilized tactics that were a substantial deviation, without justification, from Department approved tactical training.”  This charge appears to have been based on the failure to discuss a tactical plan before arriving on the scene and the failure to consider less-than-lethal responses to Ruiz. 

            The court has no tentative order on the petition with respect to this charge. 

The court shares Petitioner’s counsel’s concern that the Board was applying 20-20 hindsight to this situation.  The court notes that this was not a call for service to apprehend an armed suspect.  Rather, this was a call to provide support to the Fire Department that was trying to treat a “combative” suspect with injuries.  The use of the term “combative” in this situation does not necessarily mean there was a danger.  Moreover, the information received by Petitioners was that Ruiz had a self-inflicted laceration to his throat and it was unknown if he was still armed.  This is not necessarily the type of call that would have necessitated tactical planning other than to make contact with the Fire Department and provide assistance.  Ruiz did not act in a threatening manner until after the officers arrived.  For this reason, the court has difficulty faulting the officers for not discussing alternatives to lethal force in advance, i.e., the information they received did not necessarily suggest that any force would be necessary.  As their own expert testified, the only information they had was that the Fire Department needed assistance to deal with someone who had a self-inflicted knife wound who was acting “combative.” 

At the same time, the court shares Respondent’s concern that there was no discussion, even about contacting the Fire Department, between the officers. 

            C.        Count One – NO TENTATIVE  

            Petitioners were charged with use of lethal force outside of policy.  Petitioners argue that the majority and minority of the UOFRB concluded that Petitioners’ actions in “drawing and exhibiting their firearms” was appropriate and within policy, and that testimony showed that once Petitioner unholstered their firearms, they could not safely switch to less-lethal weapons.  (OB 10-14 and Reply 6-7; see e.g. AR 435, 678-680.)  Respondents did not clearly respond to this issue in opposition.  (See Reply 7:5-6.) 

            The court has no tentative order on the petition with respect to Count Two. 

The court acknowledges the facts relied upon by the Board in determining there was an unlawful use of force: 

·       The BWVs of Williams and Trejo show that Ruiz was severely injured by self-inflicted knife wounds and that his movements were “slow and lethargic.”  (See AR 719, Williams video at 6:00-7:47 and AR 686-687.) 

·       In their testimony, Petitioners admitted that they observed a visible injury to Ruiz’s neck and that he was covered in blood.  (AR 253, 323, 825.) 

·       Although Ruiz held a large knife, he held it to his side in a manner that suggested he was not seeking to attack anyone.  (See AR 719, Williams video at 6:00-7:47.)  He also stood in front of his own vehicle for approximately 50 seconds without approaching Petitioners.  (Ibid.)  Fire personnel had backed away from Ruiz, who was not a threat to Petitioners or anyone else during this period of time.  (See also AR 254, 669.) Accordingly, Petitioners had sufficient time for one of the officers to deploy non-lethal force.

·       Even once Ruiz started moving towards Petitioners, the evidence shows that he was moving “very slowly,” he held the knife at his side, and that his intent was to commit “suicide by cop.”  Ruiz did not give the impression that he was seeking to attack the officers.  (See AR 953, 719, 686-687, 380.)   

·       “It took approximately 20 seconds [for Ruiz] to move 30 feet needed to reach the officers' police vehicle. After he had moved approximately nine feet, he was within the range of non-lethal force. Had one of the officers deployed a non-lethal device at this time, if the device failed, Ruiz would still have been approximately 20 feet from the police vehicle, allowing one of the officers sufficient time to discharge his pistol at Ruiz.”  (AR 953.) 

At the same time, the Board did not appear to acknowledge other factors that support the use of force.  The Department’s policy sets forth multiple factors for determining the objective reasonableness of a particular use of force, including “the potential for injury to citizens, officers, or suspects.”  Petitioners confronted a mentally ill suspect who was acting irrationally, had harmed himself, and expressed an intentional to engage in “suicide by cop” behavior.  Although he was walking slowly and not brandishing the weapon in a threatening manner, that easily could have changed in an instant, and he was close enough to the officers and members of the Fire Department to have posed a threat.  Indeed, the officers did not shoot Ruiz until he was in close proximity to them after multiple commands to stop and drop the weapon.  While he was close enough for the officers to have used less-than-lethal force, doing so may have posed a danger to the officers.  In other words, Ruiz was so close that he could have attacked while the officer was drawing his taser or if the taser failed, and the other officer could not have protected his partner, given the position of the vehicle.