Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case: 23STCP04550, Date: 2024-04-19 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCP04550 Hearing Date: April 19, 2024 Dept: 82
The Boeing Company Case
No. 23STCP04550
v. Date/Time:
April 19, 2024 at 9:30 a.m.
Location: Stanley Mosk Courthouse
Regional Water Quality Control Department: 82
Board, Los Angeles Region Judge:
Stephen I. Goorvitch
Order #1 of 2
Motion to
Intervene
The court has no tentative order on
this motion. However, the motion appears
to be deficient because the proposed intervenors have not filed a proposed
pleading in intervention as required by the statute. Specifically, Code of Civil Procedure section
387(c) provides as follows: “A nonparty shall petition the court for leave to
intervene by noticed motion or ex parte application. The petition shall include
a copy of the proposed complaint in intervention or answer in
intervention and set forth the grounds upon which intervention
rests.” (bold italics added.) Because the word “shall” is used in the
statute, this requirement appears to be mandatory. Further, even if the requirement is
directory, failure to submit a proposed pleading is grounds to deny a motion to
intervene. (See Sutter Health Uninsured
Pricing Cases (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 495, 513 [intervention properly denied
because moving party failed to submit complaint in intervention].) The court intends to discuss the motion with
the parties at the hearing.
Order #2 of 2
[Tentative] Order
Granting in Part and Denying in Part
Petitioner’s
Application for Stay
INTRODUCTION
Petitioner
The Boeing Company (“Petitioner” or “Boeing”) filed a petition for writ of
mandate under California Water Code section 13330 and California Code of Civil
Procedure section 1094.5 challenging waste discharge requirements (the “WDR”) for
the Santa Susana Field Laboratory (“SSFL”) set by the Regional Water Quality
Control Board, Los Angeles (“Respondent” or the “Regional Board”). Now, Boeing seeks to stay five conditions
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5(g). The motion is granted in part and denied in
part. The Court stays Condition Two as
it relates to a pond infiltration studies of the Silvernale and R-1 ponds because:
(1) Studies of the ponds have already been completed; (2) The study of the
Silvernale pond showed “essentially zero” infiltration; (3) The study of the
R-1 pond showed “very small” amounts of infiltration, equivalent to “clay
soils;” (4) The contaminants of concern at the ponds are “particulates” that do
not migrate downward through soil to groundwater; (5) The staff of the
Regional Board testified that additional studies of the ponds are not necessary
and could interfere with ongoing remediation efforts; and (6) The Regional
Board demonstrates no harm to the public interest in delaying the studies until
after the trial, which should occur this year, especially given the results of
the recent studies. However, the Court denies
the stay with respect to the remaining conditions, which relates to monitoring
requirements to prevent contamination of the environmental and water
supply.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. The Santa Susana Field Laboratory
“The Santa Susana Field
Laboratory (SSFL) occupies approximately 2,850 acres located at the top of
Woolsey Canyon Road in the Simi Hills of Ventura County, California. During wet weather, SSFL has the potential to
discharge stormwater runoff impacted by constituents from the facility. As
such, stormwater discharges from SSFL are currently regulated by the Los
Angeles Regional Water Quality Control Board.”
(See Bower Decl. ¶ 9, Exh. B at 4 [Expert Panel report].)
“The SSFL site (the ‘Site’) is
jointly owned by the Boeing Company (Boeing) and the federal government. The
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) administers the portion of
the property owned by the federal government…. [T]he site is divided into four
administrative areas (Areas I, II, III, and IV), with undeveloped land area
surrounding the Site to the north and south. Administrative Areas I and III are
operated by Boeing, who owns the majority of Area I and all of Area III….
Industrial operations at the Site have ceased, and current activities include
environmental monitoring and sampling, demolition, remediation, and ongoing
remedial planning.” (Id., Exh. B at 5.)
“The developed portion of the
site comprises approximately 1,500 acres. Boeing and its predecessors’
operations at SSFL included research, development, assembly, disassembly, and
testing of rocket engines, and chemical lasers. During the 1950s to the mid-1970s,
volatile organic compounds were utilized for the cleaning of hardware and
rocket engine thrust chambers, and for the cleaning of other equipment. These
solvents migrated into the subsurface, contaminating groundwater primarily with
trichloroethylene (TCE) and 1,2- dichloroethylene (1,2-DCE).” (Bower Decl. Exh. A at F-5, p. 102 of 561
[WDRs].)
“SSFL has the potential (based
on a 24-hour duration, 10-year return storm event) to discharge approximately
187 million gallons per day (MGD) of stormwater runoff that may contain
pollutants from the Facility.” (Id. Exh.
A at F-6.) The stormwater discharges
from the Site through “Discharge Points,” which are also referred to as
“Outfalls.” (Id. F-6, F-7, and
F-15.) “Approximately 60% of the
discharge exits the property via two southerly discharge points (Discharge
Points 001 and 002) to Bell Creek, a tributary to the Los Angeles River, a
water of the United States…. Upstream outfalls that contribute to the discharge
at Discharge Points 001 and 002 include Discharge Points 011 and 018.” (Id. at F-6.)
“Stormwater runoff flows naturally to Silvernale Pond for treatment,
monitoring and discharge via Discharge Point 018.” (Ibid.)
In addition, “stormwater runoff naturally flows to R-1 Pond for
treatment, monitoring, and discharge via Discharge Point 011.” (Ibid.)
B. Surface Water Expert Panel
As required by the Regional
Board, Petitioner has funded the services of a Surface Water Expert Panel (the “Expert
Panel”) to support and advise the Regional Board, and to make recommendations
to Petitioner to improve surface water quality at SSFL. (Bower Decl. ¶ 9.) The Expert Panel’s most recent report, issued
in October 2023, “addresses, among other things, aluminum in soil and
stormwater at SSFL, and groundwater infiltration analyses by the Expert
Panel.” (Id., ¶ 9 & Exh.
B.)
C. Waste Discharge Requirements Order No. R4-2023-0359
Petitioner and the SSFL Site are
subject to waste discharge requirements under the federal Clean Water Act and
California’s Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act. (See generally Mot. 2-3; Oppo 4-5.) “The Clean Water Act is a ‘comprehensive
water quality statute designed ‘to restore and maintain the chemical, physical,
and biological integrity of the Nation's waters.’” (City of Burbank, supra, 35 Cal.4th at
620; see also Sweeney v. California
Regional Water Quality Control Bd. (2021)
61 Cal.App.5th 1093, 1113 [discussing Porter-Cologne Act].)
“Part of the federal Clean Water
Act is the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), ‘[t]he
primary means’ for enforcing effluent limitations and standards under the Clean
Water Act. [Citation.] The NPDES sets
out the conditions under which the federal EPA or a state with an approved
water quality control program can issue permits for the discharge of pollutants
in wastewater. (33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) & (b).) In
California, wastewater discharge requirements established by the regional
boards are the equivalent of the NPDES permits required by federal law.” (City of Burbank, supra, 35 Cal.4th at
620-621, citing Water Code § 13374.)
Petitioner has managed
stormwater at the SSFL for decades under waste discharge requirements orders
issued by the Regional Board. (Verified
First Amended Petition (“FAP”) ¶ 16; Corbett Decl. Exh. I at 226.) The previous set of waste discharge
requirements was issued on April 1, 2015, and was set to expire on March 31,
2020. (Bower Decl., Exh. A at F-4.) The
terms and conditions of the prior order were administratively extended until
the new permit was issued. (Ibid.)
“The process leading up to the
adoption of the WDRs that are the subject of this writ proceeding began on
September 26, 2019, when Boeing submitted an application for renewal of its
prior WDRs, which had been adopted in 2015. Following receipt of Boeing’s
application, the Regional Board conducted site visits on August 20, 2020, and
June 14, 2021, to observe operations and collect additional data to develop
permit limitations and requirements for the waste discharges, and drafted
tentative WDRs for public review and comment. On December 8, 2021, the Regional
Board published the tentative WDRs for the SSFL site, solicited public comment,
and scheduled a public hearing for February 10, 2022.” (Newman Decl., ¶ 3 & Exh. A.)
In response to significant
public testimony, the Regional Board elected to postpone its consideration of
the Tentative WDRs until it could analyze additional stormwater data collected
by Petitioner during the 2022-23 rainy season, and to provide additional
opportunity for community input. (Newman Decl. ¶ 7, Exh. E, F.) Based on this
data, the Regional Board made further revisions to the Tentative WDRs,
solicited and responded to dozens of additional comments, and held two
additional hearings on September 28 and October 19, 2023, before issuing final
WDRs for the SSFL site. (Id. ¶¶ 9-10,
Exh. F, H.)
Among other conditions, the WDR
imposed five new monitoring and effluent requirements on Petitioner: (1) New
monitoring requirements for PCBs using Method 1668c (“Condition One”); (2) New
requirements for groundwater infiltration studies at the Silvernale and R-1
Ponds (“Condition Two”); (3) New monitoring requirements for constituents
designated “Chemicals of Potential Concern” in the Department of Toxic
Substances’ (“DTSC”) “Standardized Risk Assessment Methodology” for the SSFL
Site (“Condition Three”); (4) New effluent limits at Discharge Points 001 and
002 (“Condition Four”); and (5) New effluent limits for aluminum (“Condition Five”).
(Bower Decl. Exh. A § 4.1 and E-7, E-14, E-29, F-29.)
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On November 29, 2023, Petitioner
filed a petition for review with the State Water Resources Control Board (the “State
Board”), seeking review of these new requirements. (FAP ¶ 10.) Petitioner also filed a request for a stay. (Ibid.) Both were deemed dismissed by operation of law
on February 19, 2024. (Ibid.)
Accordingly, Petitioner has exhausted its administrative remedies. (Ibid.; see also Oppo. 6.)
Petitioner filed a petition for
writ of mandate on December 19, 2023, and filed a first amended petition on
March 1, 2024. Petitioner filed a motion
for a stay of the five conditions under Code of Civil Procedure section
1094.5(g) on March 8, 2024.
LEGAL STANDARD
The
court “may stay the operation of the administrative order or decision pending
the judgment of the court….” (Code Civ.
Proc. § 1094.5(g).) “However, no such
stay shall be imposed or continued if the court is satisfied that it is against
the public interest.” (Ibid.) The administrative stay provision of Section
1094.5(g) “requires the superior court to weigh the public interest in each
individual case.” (Sterling v. Santa
Monica Rent Control Bd. (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 176, 187.)
DISCUSSION
A. The Merits of the Petition
Petitioner
argues that the Regional Board abused its discretion, and acted against the
weight of the evidence, in imposing certain conditions. A motion under Code of Civil Procedure
section 1094.5(g) is not an appropriate way to address the merits of the
underlying petition. Pursuant to the
plain language of section 1094.5(g), the court is not required to consider
Petitioner’s likelihood of success on the merits. (See Canyon Crest Conservancy v. County of
Los Angeles (2020) 46 Cal. App. 5th 398, 406-07.) Moreover, in an administrative mandate
proceeding, “a trial court must afford a strong presumption of correctness
concerning the administrative findings, and the party challenging the
administrative decision bears the burden of convincing the court that the
administrative findings are contrary to the weight of the evidence.” (Fukuda
v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal. 4th 805, 817.) In
general, “a hearing on a writ of administrative mandamus is conducted solely on
the record of the proceedings before the administrative agency.” (Toyota of Visalia, Inc. v. New Motor Vehicle
Bd. (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 872, 881; Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5(e).) Nor does the court have a sufficient record
to evaluate these arguments. In its
motion for stay, Petitioner has not provided a comprehensive discussion of the
Regional Board’s findings or the record evidence supporting such findings.[1] Given the technical nature of the
administrative findings at issue, the presumption of correctness, and the lack
of comprehensive legal briefing regarding the findings and record evidence,
Petitioner has not persuaded the court that an assessment of its likelihood of
success is appropriate, or necessary, for resolution of this motion for a stay.
B. Condition One – DENIED
Condition
One imposes
new monitoring requirements for PCBs, for “informational purposes,” using
Method 1668C. (Bower Decl. Exh. A § 4.1
and E-7, E-14.)[2] PCBs are chemicals commonly used in
industrial applications, that persist in the environment, and that accumulate
in small organisms that may be consumed by humans and wildlife. (Newman Decl. ¶
18.) The prior WDR required Petitioner
to utilize Method 608.3, which has been approved by the EPA, to monitor PCB in
stormwater from the Site. Method 608.3
is “lower resolution” and detects commercial mixtures of PCB congeners, known
as “aroclors.” (Newman Decl. ¶ 18; see
Bower Decl. Exh. A at E-14.) Using Method
608.3, PCBs have never been detected in stormwater at SSFL, and Regional Board
did not set effluent limitations on PCBs in the current WDR. (Corbett Decl. Exh. J at 29; Corbett Decl.
Exh. I at 240 and Exh. K at No. 19a.) By
comparison, Method 1668c is higher resolution and tests for the presence of PCB
compounds known as “congeners.” (Newman
Decl. ¶ 18.)
Petitioner contends that staying
Condition One would not be against the public interest because PCBs have not
previously been detected in stormwater at SFFL and Regional Board has not set
effluent limits for SFFL. (Mot. 7.) However, in the same testimony cited by
Petitioner, the Regional Board staff member testified that “the reporting
limits for methods for Aroclors [i.e., Method 608.3] are higher than the
California Toxics Rule Criteria.”
(Corbett Decl. Exh. I at 239:20-25.)
The Board staff testimony is corroborated by Jenny Newman, Regional
Board’s Assistant Executive Officer of the Surface Water Division, who declares
that because Method 608.3 “can only detect aroclors of PCBs, it can only detect
PCBs occurring at concentrations that are over 1000x higher than the federal
water quality criteria for PCBs.”
(Newman Decl. ¶ 18.) In light of
this evidence that Method 608.3 that can only detect PCBs in concentrations
higher than the applicable water quality standards, the court finds that
staying Condition One would be against the public interest.
Petitioner contends that Method
1668c has not been approved to measure Petitioner’s compliance under the WDR,
is unreliable, and has “extremely high sensitivity,” and can only be used for
“informational purposes.” (Mot.
7-9.) Petitioner suggests that Regional
Board lacks “authority” to include Method 1668c as a condition in the WDR for
“informational purposes” or that Regional Board abused its discretion by
including an “unreliable” method for testing for PCB. (Mot. 7:19-24; see also
FAP ¶ 25(e).) The court has considered
Petitioner’s evidence, including the declaration of Sylvan Long and exhibits. Long opines
that a “primary concern” with Method 1668c “is that it is likely to generate
‘false positive’ results due to its high sensitivity and the ubiquity of
low-level background PCB contamination, including in analytical labs.” (Long Decl. Exh. 1 at 3.) Method 1668c can detect PCBs in
concentrations as low as 0.007 parts per trillion (or ng/L). (Id. at 6.) By comparison, “published measurements of
PCBs in rainwater in Galveston Bay, Texas, near Houston, have detected mean
concentrations of approximately 1.29 ng/l,” and “published measurements of PCBs
in rainwater at rural locations in the Great Lakes have identified even greater
issues with atmospheric contamination, with an annual volume-weighted mean
concentration of 10 ng/l.” (Ibid.)
The court denies Petitioner’s
request to stay Condition One. As
discussed, the court does not consider Petitioner’s likelihood of success on
the merits for a motion for stay pursuant to section 1094.5(g). (See Canyon Crest Conservancy, supra, 46
Cal. App. 5th at 406-07.) Regardless, the court is not persuaded by
Petitioner’s arguments. The
Environmental Protection Agency (the “EPA”) has not finalized regulations
approving Method 1668c as a method of testing for PCB for compliance
purposes. (See Long Decl. Exh. 1 at
3-4.) However, contrary to Petitioner’s
assertion, the EPA has not disclaimed or discredited Method 1668c for use in
stormwater permits in all circumstances.
Rather, the EPA has acknowledged that “this method is being used in some
states in their regulatory programs . . . with good success,” and that its
decision “does not negate the merits of this method for the determination of
PCB congeners in regulatory programs.” (77
Fed. Reg. 29757, 29763 (May 18, 2012).)
The EPA has acknowledged that Method 1668c “may be appropriate and
useful in certain situations.” (88 Fed.
Reg. 59662, 59668 (Aug. 29, 2023).) Moreover,
in comments for the WDR at issue in this case, an EPA representative stated
that additional PCB monitoring for informational purposes, using Method 1668c,
was appropriate. (See Newman Decl. Exh.
H at 284-285.) Given the EPA
representative’s position before the Regional Board and EPA’s statements that
Method 1668c may be appropriate in some situations, the fact EPA has not
formally approved Method 1668c for compliance purposes does not support
Petitioner’s position that Condition One should be stayed.[3]
Further, even
if Method 1668c can only be used for “informational purposes,” the court is not
persuaded that Regional Board necessarily lacks authority to include conditions
for informational purposes in the WDR.
Petitioner’s cited authorities, 40 CFR section 122.44(i) and Water Code
section 13376, do not appear to address, at least explicitly, whether
conditions for “informational purposes” may be included in a WDR. (See also Oppo. 14, citing Water Code §
13383(b) [Regional Board may require discharger to “provide other information
as may be reasonably required”].)
Simply, Petitioner
has not demonstrated that Method 1668c is necessarily unreliable or that the
Regional Board cannot impose requirements for informational purposes. Accordingly, Petitioner has not satisfied its
burden of proving that a stay would be consistent with the public
interest. To the contrary, Respondent
has demonstrated that a stay would be against the public interest because it
would prevent early detection of PCBs and risk introducing PCBs into the environment
and water supply.
PCBs are chemicals commonly used
in industrial applications, which persist in the environment and accumulate in
small organisms that may be consumed by humans or wildlife. (Newman Decl., ¶ 18.) Because of its sensitivity, Method 1668c can
detect individual PCB compounds (called “congeners”) at concentrations in line
with applicable water quality criteria whereas the prior method cannot. (Id., ¶ 18.) This is especially important because of “the
inconsistent and unpredictable nature of rainfall in California from year to
year, and the time-lag associated with enacting future monitoring or effluent
requirements aimed at protecting human health and the environment based on the
data that the current monitoring requirements will yield.” (Id., ¶ 35.) In addition, Petitioner concedes it already “has
collected stormwater samples during the 2024 rainy season, and has analyzed, or
is in the process of analyzing, them, as required by the Contested
Conditions.” (Reply 7:2-3; see also
Bower Decl. ¶7 and Exh. A at E-7.) The
court agrees with Respondent that these factors weigh against staying Condition
One because the stay would deprive Regional Board and the public, for the
pendency of this writ action, of recently collected data about possible PCB
contamination at the Site.
Petitioner argues that “[i]t
does not serve the public interest to generate and spread incomplete or
inaccurate information about sources of PCBs in the Los Angeles region.” (Mot. 7-9.)
Petitioner’s concerns about the public being misled by test results from
Method 1668c are speculative and unsupported by the record. As discussed, Petitioner does not establish
that use of Method 1668c would lead to incomplete or inaccurate
information. Petitioner assumes, without
foundation, that Regional Board will be unable to provide the proper context
for interpreting the monitoring data collected by Petitioner. Petitioner also ignores the likely benefit to
the public of providing information about the presence or absence of PCBs at
the Site, and also the public harm of depriving Regional Board and the public
of PCB data, which has already been collected, from the most recent rainy
season.
In reply, Petitioner argues, for the first
time, that court may condition any stay order to require Petitioner to
“preserve all data and samples it already has obtained.” (Reply 7.)
“The salutary rule is that
points raised in a reply brief for the first time will not be considered unless
good cause is shown for the failure to present them before.” (Balboa Ins. Co. v. Aguirre (1983) 149
Cal.App.3d 1002, 1010.) Petitioner does
not show good cause to raise this new argument in reply. It also cites no authority that the court may
impose such conditions on a stay pursuant to section 1094.5(g). Further, Petitioner’s proposed preservation
order would still deprive Regional Board and the public of the benefits of PCB
monitoring data for the pendency of this case.
In
sum, Petitioner asks this court to ignore the “strong presumption of
correctness” and preliminarily overrule the Regional Board’s administrative
findings before reviewing the complete administrative record in this case. To that end, Petitioner asks this court to
stop the implementation of a method for testing PCBs that is consistent with
applicable water criteria in favor of using a method that is less precise and
risks introducing PCBs into the environment and water supply, in the face of
conflicting evidence that does not clearly support its position. Based upon this record, the court finds that a
stay would be against the public interest and therefore denies the motion as it
relates to Condition One.
C. Condition Two – GRANTED
Condition Two imposes new
requirements for groundwater infiltration studies at the Silvernale and R-1
Ponds. (Bower Decl., Exh. A at
E-29.) Specifically, this condition
provides as follows:
The Discharger shall conduct a
study, pursuant to Section 13267(b)(1) of CWC, to determine the potential for
infiltration of stormwater discharges collected at Silvernale Pond and R-1 Pond
to reach groundwater, and to evaluate any necessary design modifications to
these ponds to eliminate any potential for infiltration prior to clean up of
the soils and groundwater affected by the ponds. The Discharger shall submit a
work plan to evaluate infiltration rates and potential impacts within three
months from the permit effective date to the Los Angeles Water Board for
Executive Officer approval. At a minimum, the workplan shall include the steps
and measures to determine the rate of infiltration and an assessment of
contaminants of concern in stormwater runoff and its potential for ongoing
impacts to groundwater contamination at the Facility. The Discharger may
utilize already available information that is currently being collected by the
surface or groundwater expert panel or other federal, state, or local agencies
to support or augment this study. The study shall be long enough to reflect
seasonal effects but not longer than one year.
The Discharger shall also
conduct a design feasibility study to assess potential design modifications,
such as a liner, that could be implemented at the Silvernale and R-1 ponds to
alleviate any infiltration concerns at the ponds. The design feasibility study
shall be submitted to the Los Angeles Water Board within six months after the
results of the infiltration study are concluded.
(Bower Decl. Exh. A at E-29.)
Petitioner contends that “[a]
stay of the duplicative pond infiltration study requirements is not against the
public interest, based on the compelling evidence in the record that no such
study is needed, let alone urgently needed, because (i) infiltration is not
occurring, (ii) the non-infiltrating constituents in the ponds, if any, are
already part of cleanup efforts overseen by DTSC, and (iii) any such study may
actively harm DTSC’s ongoing efforts and could potentially exacerbate
conditions.” (Mot. 9.)
Petitioner cites testimony of
Dr. Michael Stenstrom, a member of the Expert Panel, that “the infiltration
rate at Silvernale is essentially zero” and that the contaminants of concern at
the ponds are “particulates” that do not migrate downward through soil to
groundwater. (Corbett Decl., Exh. J at
27:6-8.) Similarly, Dr. Stenstrom
testified that infiltration rate at the other ponds is “0.7 inches per day,
which is equivalent to clay soils.” (Id.,
Exh. J at 27:9-12.) In its October 2023
report, the Expert Panel characterized this infiltration as “very small.” (See Declaration of Michael O. Bower, Exh. B
at 39.) The Expert Panel also
discussed water level monitoring it obtained for SSFL’s ponds and opined, as
follows:
[T]hese modeling analyses and
field measurements confirm that stormwater infiltration in the ponds is very
low at SSFL. Furthermore, the constituents in stormwater that occasionally
exceed the NPDES permit’s water quality standard-based limits and benchmarks
(e.g., iron, manganese, lead, and dioxins) are predominately in particulate
form, which minimizes their downward migration as they are filtered and sorbed
by sediments and decomposing organic materials in the ponds, and soils in the
underlying vadose zone. Additionally, no analytes were detected above CA
Primary drinking water MCLs in the untreated influent samples collected from
Silvernale and R-1 ponds in 2022/23.
(Bower Decl., Exh. B at 39-40.)
A representative of DTSC, the
lead agency for groundwater cleanup at SSFL, testified that the ponds will be
included as part of the DTSC-supervised Sitewide cleanup, which is still in the
planning stages. (Corbett Decl., Exh. J
at 36:9-12; 37:6-12.) The Regional Board
staff testified that “staff do not recommend a renewed Groundwater Infiltration
Study at this time,” based on the Expert Panel’s work and DTSC’s ongoing action
at the ponds. (Id., Exh. I at
241:2-3.) The Staff explained, “an
investigation of groundwater contamination is ongoing and disturbing sediments
will interfere with DTSC’s investigation and could exacerbate conditions
further.” (Id. at 240:24-241:2; see also Exh. K, No. 22.)
Based upon the foregoing,
Petitioner has established: (1) Studies of the ponds have already been
completed; (2) The study of the Silvernale pond showed “essentially zero”
infiltration; (3) The study of the R-1 pond showed “very small” amounts of
infiltration, equivalent to “clay soils;” (4) The contaminants of concern at the
ponds are “particulates” that do not migrate downward through soil to
groundwater; and (5) The staff of the Regional Board testified that
additional studies of the ponds are not necessary and could interfere with
ongoing remediation efforts. Therefore,
Petitioner demonstrates that a stay of these studies until after the
trial—which should occur this year—would not compromise the public interest. Respondent does not demonstrate any potential
harm to the public in delaying these studies.
Based upon
the foregoing, the court finds that delaying the studies of the Silvernale and
R-1 Ponds until after the trial would not be against the public interest. Therefore, the court grants the motion as it
relates to Condition Two.
D. Condition Three – DENIED
Condition Three imposes new
monitoring requirements for constituents designated “Chemicals of Potential
Concern” in the DTSC’s “Standardized Risk Assessment Methodology” (“SRAM”) for
the SSFL Site. (Bower Decl. Exh. A at §
4.1 and E-7.) Specifically, Condition Three
states in part: “In addition, the Discharger shall conduct influent monitoring
for PFAS and the additional remaining constituents of potential concern (COPCs)
as identified DTSC for all media in Attachment 1 of Appendix D of the 2014
Standardized Risk Assessment (SRAM), with updates as identified in Table 12-1
of Appendix F of the 2022 SRAM.”
Petitioner contends that a stay
of Condition Three “is not against the public interest, because compelling
evidence shows that these constituents, if they occur in stormwater at all,
would be at very low levels.” (Mot. 11.) As described by Petitioner’s declarant,
Project Manager Michael Bower, the SRAM “presents a methodology for future
human health and ecological risk assessments for SSFL … [and] contains a list
of chemicals that have been detected at some time, in some amount, at SSFL over
the course of its long history of environmental investigations.” (Bower Decl. ¶ 11.) Condition Three applies to constituents of
potential concern (“CPOCs”) identified by DTSC.
(Bower Decl. Exh. A at E-7.) Data
from the monitoring required by Condition Three “may be used to inform
potential environmental investigation and cleanup at SSFL.” (Id. ¶ 11.)
Petitioner does not cite
opinions asserting that the CPOCs at issue do not present a potential health
risk to the public if found in stormwater at SSFL, or that monitoring for CPOCs
required by Condition Three would not provide useful information to Regional
Board. Petitioner also does not assert
that the available monitoring tools are unreliable. While Petitioner asserts that Condition Three
applies to “naturally occurring metals, including titanium and lithium, that
are ubiquitous in SSFL soil but have been detected below the natural background
levels for unimpacted soils at SSFL in over 99% of samples,” Petitioner’s
declarant does not fully explain the cited sampling evidence, dispute the
presence of CPOCs in media at the Site, or provide an expert opinion that
testing of stormwater for the CPOCs would be harmful to the public. (Mot. 11, citing Bower Decl. ¶¶ 11-12, Exh.
E-F.) Respondent also submits evidence,
which Petitioner does not rebut, that “because monitoring requirements for
these chemical constituents have not been imposed in prior permits for the SSFL
site, the Regional Board is currently unaware whether COPCs are present in
stormwater discharges, and, if so, at what concentrations.” (Newman Decl. ¶ 25.) Given that Condition Three applies to CPOCs
that have been found on the Site and Petitioner does not show any public harm
from the stormwater monitoring for the CPOCs, Petitioner does not satisfy its
burden of proving that a stay of Condition Three would be appropriate.
Petitioner also contends that it
is unable to analyze 12 of the constituents “because there is no approved
method for analyzing them in stormwater, and because Boeing has been unable to
find a lab, in a nationwide search, to analyze these constituents in
stormwater.” (Mot. 11, citing Miller
Decl. ¶¶ 6-7.) The WDRs provide a
process by which Petitioner can request Regional Board approval of an
alternative testing method. (Bower Decl.
Exh. A at E-2 (Nos. 1.4, 1.5), E-5 (No 1.18).)
Petitioner has not completed this
process. (See Newman Decl. ¶ 28; Reply
Corbett Decl. Exh. Q.) Petitioner also
does not cite any evidence that it, or the public, would suffer harm if this
process of identifying alternative testing methods continued during the
pendency of this writ action. Finally,
Petitioner does not provide any data or expert opinion concerning the potential
health risks of the 12 CPOCs at issue.
(See Miller Decl. ¶¶ 6-7.)
Based upon
the foregoing, the court finds that Petitioner has not satisfied its burden of
demonstrating that a stay would be consistent with the public interest. Therefore, the court denies the motion as it
relates to Condition Three.
E. Condition Four – DENIED
Condition Four sets new effluent
limits at Discharge Points 001 and 002. (Bower
Decl., Exh. A § 4.1 and F-27-F-29.) In the Fact Sheet for the WDR, Regional Board
provided a rationale for the effluent limits at Discharge Points 001 and 002. (Bower Decl., Exh. A at F-26-F-29.) Regional Board explained that a “reasonable
potential analysis (RPA) to determine impacts from the discharge was conducted
using data from the second quarter of 2015 to the first quarter of 2023.” (Id., Exh. A at F-26.) Regional Board further explained the addition
of effluent limits at Discharge Points 001 and 002, in part, as follows:
This Order converts the
benchmarks at Discharge Point 001 and 002 into enforceable effluent
limitations. The State Water Board WQ Order 2006-0012 held that “Outfalls 001
and 011 and Outfalls 002 and 018 are duplicative because Outfalls 011 and 018
flow directly to Outfalls 001 and 002, respectively, without any change in
flows or discharge in the interim and with only open space between them.”
(emphasis added). However, with the implementation of the stormwater treatment
systems at Outfalls 011 and 018 beginning in 2010 as well as the initiation of
remediation activities, the Los Angeles Water Board has determined that the
discharges can no longer be considered unchanged from the interior outfalls
(Outfalls 011 and 018) to the perimeter outfalls (Outfalls 001 and 002),
respectively.
(Id., Exh. A at F-26-F-27.)
Petitioner contends that
“staying the challenged effluent limits will not deprive the Regional Board or
public of any information about stormwater at SSFL, because Boeing is
monitoring for these constituents regardless.”
(Mot. 11.) Relatedly, Petitioner
contends that “[s]eparate from the effluent limits, the WDR includes general
prohibitions on discharges of various wastes and materials,” which could be
enforced by Regional Board during a stay.
(Mot. 12.) Finally, Petitioner
argues that the only impact of a stay would be to “eliminate the potential
threat to Boeing of mandatory minimum statutory penalties.” (Mot. 11.)
These arguments are not persuasive.
The new “effluent limits” impose obligations on Petitioner in addition
to monitoring. While Petitioner may
continue to monitor if Condition Four is stayed, it would not be required to
comply with the effluent limits that Regional Board deemed necessary. The purpose of the mandatory minimum
statutory penalties is to ensure compliance with the regulations.
Petitioner argues, in effect,
that the Regional Board imposed “duplicative effluent limits” at paired
outfalls 001 and 011 and paired outfalls 002 and 018. As support, Petitioner cites the State
Board’s order from 2006, which “ordered the LA Regional Board not to set limits
at all four of the paired outfalls,” and the Internal Waste Stream Rule
promulgated in 40 CFR section 122.45(h).
(Mot. 12-13, citing Corbett Decl. Exh. L.)[4] In weighing the public interests for and
against a stay, the court considers that the Regional Board explained in
detail, in the WDR’s fact sheet, how the discharges from the interior outfalls
(011 and 018) “are distinct in character and timing” than the perimeter
outfalls (001 and 002). (Bower Decl.,
Exh. A at F-26-F-27.) Further, in the
Regional Board proceedings for the current WDR, the EPA representative
testified that EPA “support[ed] the inclusion of effluent limits at the
Outfalls 01 and 02, and those requirements are consistent with Federal
Regulations.” (Newman Decl., Exh. H at 283:9-15.) The EPA representative opined that “the Fact
Sheet … appropriately explains how conditions have changed over the ears,
including the stormwater treatment is different at each Outfall.” (Ibid.) Petitioner does not show, with discussion of
Regional Board’s rationale for the effluent limits or other evidence, that the
new limits on Discharge Points 001 and 002 are unnecessary. Nor does Petitioner demonstrate that
complying with Condition Four will pose an undue burden.
Based upon
the foregoing, Petitioner has not satisfied its burden of demonstrating that a
stay is consistent with the public interest.
Therefore, the court denies the motion as it relates to Condition Four.
F. Condition Five – DENIED
Condition Five
sets new effluent limits for aluminum. (Bower Decl. Exh. A § 4.1 and F-29; see
also Corbett Decl. Exh. K at No. 3, p. 9.)
Petitioner contends that a stay of Condition Five is not against the
public interest for the same reasons as Condition Four, “namely, Boeing will
continue to monitor aluminum in stormwater, and the LA Regional Board will
retain enforcement authority to protect human health and the environment.” (Mot. 13:16-19.) The court again disagrees with Petitioner’s
analysis.
Petitioner contends that
“[s]etting an effluent limit for aluminum exceeds the LA Regional Board’s
jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act, because it may only regulate
‘significant materials’ that remain from former industrial activities, 40
C.F.R. § 122.26(a)(1)(ii) and (b)(14), which would not include” aluminum. (Mot. 13.)
As noted, the court is not required to consider Petitioner’s likelihood
of success on the merits for a motion for stay pursuant to section
1094.5(g). (See Canyon Crest
Conservancy, supra, 46 Cal. App. 5th at 406-07.) Regardless, 40 CFR section 122.26 applies to
“[s]torm water discharge associated with industrial activity,” which is defined
as “the discharge from any conveyance that is used for collecting and conveying
storm water and that is directly related to manufacturing, processing, or raw
materials storage areas at an industrial plant.” (40 CFR § 122.26(b)(14).) Respondent cites record evidence that
aluminum has some industrial applications related to the former industrial
activities at the Site. “For example,
aluminum is a component in solid rocket propellants as well as building
material for space shuttles and equipment.”
(Newman Decl. Exh. G at 8-9 [response to comments]; see also Newman
Decl. ¶¶ 31-32.)
Finally, Petitioner contends
that a stay is not against the public interest because aluminum is a “naturally
occurring metal”; the Expert Panel concluded that aluminum exceedances in
stormwater at the Site “are likely from natural background soils”; and Regional
Board has not previously set effluent limits for aluminum at the Site. (Mot. 13-14, citing Bower Decl. Exh. B at
App. C at 33-35; Id. Exh. C at 41; and Bower Decl. ¶ 7.) As noted, there is evidence that aluminum has
some industrial applications related to the former industrial activities at the
Site. (Newman Decl. ¶¶ 31-32 and Exh. G
at 8-9.) The Expert Panel’s report also
indicates that aluminum was detected above the 1 mg/L effluent limit at Outfall
008 in 2022/2023. (Bower Decl. Exh. B at
App. C at 33.) Newman also declares that
“data collected during the prior permit term shows that aluminum exceeded the
applicable water quality objective of 1 mg/l at all outfalls.” (Newman Decl. ¶ 31.) These circumstances show that a stay would be
against the public interest. Petitioner
has not demonstrated that complying with Condition Five will pose an undue
burden.
Based upon the foregoing,
Petitioner has not satisfied its burden of demonstrating that a stay is
consistent with the public interest.
Therefore, the court denies the motion as it relates to Condition Five.
G. Additional Arguments
Petitioner argues that a stay
“is needed in this case to preserve this Court’s ability to meaningfully review
the Contested Conditions.” (Mot.
14-15.) Petitioner argues that “[w]ithout
a stay, this case will provide a blueprint to permitting agencies in California
for how to evade judicial review by setting short deadlines for permit
compliance before there is an opportunity for review.” (Mot. 2.)
In discussing the “timeline” of this case, Petitioner ignores the
lengthy public comment process that started in December 2021 and continued
through October 2023, when Regional Board adopted the WDRs. (See Newman Decl. ¶¶ 3-10.) That lengthy public process undercuts
Petitioner’s implication that Regional Board is seeking to evade review of the
permit conditions.
Further, the Legislature has
provided permittees with two avenues to seek interim relief if the permit’s
conditions apply during the pendency of review. The permittee may seek a stay
from State Board (Water Code § 13321) or from the superior court (Code Civ.
Proc. § 1094.5 (g).) Here, Petitioner sought a stay from the State Board, a
stay from this court on an ex parte basis in December 2023, and a stay
from this court based on this noticed motion.
Petitioner has received ample “process” and opportunity to prove that
permit conditions should be stayed pending final review by this court. Staying the conditions is not necessary to
preserve judicial review.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Based upon
the foregoing, the court orders as follows:
1. The court grants Petitioner’s motion to
stay Condition Two, which requires groundwater infiltration studies at the
Silvernale and R-1 Ponds, pending trial in this matter.
2. The court denies Petitioner’s motion in
all other respects.
3. Petitioner shall provide notice and
file proof of service with the court.
[1] Petitioner
also relies, in part, on expert evidence that may not be part of the
administrative record. (See Long Decl.
Exh. 1.)
[2] Specifically, the condition states, in relevant part:
“Monitoring for PCBs as aroclors and PCBs as congeners are required…. PCBs as
congeners shall be individually quantified (or quantified as mixtures of
isomers of a single congener in coelutions as appropriate) using U.S. EPA
proposed method 1668c or using a high-resolution EPA-approved method. U.S. EPA
recommends that until the proposed Method 1668c for PCBs is incorporated into
40 CFR § 136, Dischargers should use for discharge monitoring reports/State
monitoring reports … U.S. EPA proposed method 1668c for monitoring data,
reported as 44 congener results, that will be used for informational purposes
to help assess concentrations in the receiving water.” (Bower Decl. Exh. A at E.14.)
[3] In reply, Petitioner suggests that the EPA
representative lacked authority to speak for the EPA on this issue. (Reply 9.)
Petitioner does not cite evidence that supports its position.
[4] Section 122.45(h), titled
“Internal waste streams”, provides in pertinent part as follows: “(1) When permit effluent
limitations or standards imposed at the point of discharge are impractical or
infeasible, effluent limitations or standards for discharges of pollutants may
be imposed on internal waste streams before mixing with other waste streams or
cooling water streams…. (2) Limits on internal
waste streams will be imposed only when the fact sheet under § 124.56 sets forth the exceptional circumstances
which make such limitations necessary, such as when the final discharge point
is inaccessible … , the wastes at the point of discharge are so diluted as to
make monitoring impracticable, or the interferences among pollutants at the
point of discharge would make detection or analysis impracticable.”