Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case: 23STCV05336, Date: 2024-01-11 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV05336    Hearing Date: January 11, 2024    Dept: 39

Ternesha Peoples, et al. v. Villa Nueva RHCP, LP, et al.

Case No. 23STCV05336

Demurrer and Motion to Strike

Case Management Conference

            Plaintiffs filed this habitability case against Defendants, asserting causes of action for breach of contract, breach of the implied warranty of habitability, nuisance, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and violation of Civil Code section 1942.4.  Now, Defendants demur to the complaint and move to strike the prayer for attorneys’ fees and punitive damages.

            A.        Demurrer

            The Court sustains the demurrer to the first cause of action (breach of contact).  Plaintiffs have not attached a copy of the lease.  Nor do Plaintiffs sufficiently allege the term(s) that was allegedly breached.  Plaintiffs allege only that the lease requires “habitable, safe and clean-living quarters.”  (First Amended Complaint, ¶ 39.)  This summary does not include sufficient detail to confirm that there is, in fact, an express lease provision requiring habitability (as opposed to the implied warranty of habitability, which is inherent in every such lease).  Therefore, the demurer to the first cause of action is sustained with leave to amend.

            The Court overrules the demurrer to the remaining causes of action.  Plaintiffs allege  sufficient facts to assert the second and third causes of action.  (See First Amended Complaint, ¶ 40.)  Plaintiffs allege sufficient facts to establish a claim for the fourth cause of action, intentional infliction of emotional distress.   Plaintiffs allege that Defendants failed to address the issues, despite having notice, in reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress.  (See First Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 41-47, 75-77.)  Similarly, Plaintiffs allege sufficient facts to assert the fifth cause of action, negligence.  (See First Amended Complaint, ¶ 40.)  Finally, Plaintiffs allege sufficient facts to assert a cause of action under Civil Code section 1942.4, which prohibits rent demands for buildings that the government has declared to be substandard.  Plaintiffs allege such a declaration in this case.  (See First Amended Complaint, ¶ 92.)  

            Defendants argues that the first amended complaint is unclear because Plaintiffs do not allege their claims individually.  This is not necessary in the absence of evidence of misjoinder.  Defendants are free to file a motion to bifurcate the cases if this truly is an issue.  The Court has considered Defendants’ remaining arguments and finds none to be persuasive. 

            B.        Motion to Strike Prayer for Punitive Damages

            The Court grants Defendants’ motion to strike the prayer for punitive damages.  To state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a plaintiff must allege the elements set forth in the punitive damages statute, Civil Code section 3294.  (Coll. Hosp., Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721.)  Per Civil Code section 3294, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud or malice.  (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).)  “Malice is defined in the statute as conduct intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.”  (Coll. Hosp., Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725.)  “The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages.  Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim.”  (Grieves v. Superior Ct. (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166, internal citations and footnotes omitted.) 

“[T]he imposition of punitive damages upon a corporation is based upon its own fault.  It is not imposed vicariously by virtue of the fault of others.”  (City Products Corp. v. Globe Indemnity Co. (1979) 88 Cal. App. 3d 31, 36.)  “Corporations are legal entities which do not have minds capable of recklessness, wickedness, or intent to injure or deceive.  An award of punitive damages against a corporation therefore must rest on the malice of the corporation’s employees.  But the law does not impute every employee’s malice to the corporation.  Instead, the punitive damages statute requires proof of malice among corporate leaders:  the officers, directors, or managing agents.”  (Cruz v. Home Base (2000) 83 Cal. App. 4th 160, 167, internal quotations and citation omitted.)  Plaintiffs do not satisfy this standard, as they do not identify the managing agent responsible for the issues in this case.  Therefore, the motion to strike is granted with leave to amend.

C.        Motion to Strike Prayer for Attorneys’ Fees

Defendants move to strike the prayer for attorneys’ fees based upon the contract.  As discussed, Plaintiffs do not sufficiently allege the breach of a contract.  Nor do Plaintiffs allege sufficient facts to demonstrate that an attorneys’ fees provision in the lease would permit attorneys’ fees absent a breach of contract case.  Therefore, the motion to strike is granted with leave to amend.

D.        Conclusion and Order

Based upon the foregoing, the Court orders as follows:

1.         The demurrer is sustained with respect to the first cause of action with leave to amend.

2.         The demurrer is overruled in all other respects.

3.         The motion to strike is granted with leave to amend.

4.         Plaintiffs shall file a second amended complaint within thirty (30) days.

5.         The Court held the case management conference because all parties have appeared, and no party objected to the Court doing so.  The Court set the following dates:

Final Status Conference:        July 3, 2025, at 9:00 a.m.

Trial:                                       July 15, 2025, at 9:30 a.m.

The parties shall comply with all pretrial procedures for Department #39.  Jury fees shall be posted within thirty (30) days or the parties shall waive jury.

            6.         Defendants’ counsel shall provide notice and file proof of such with the Court.