Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case: 23STCV09361, Date: 2023-11-14 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV09361 Hearing Date: March 4, 2024 Dept: 39
Deni
Hoffman v. Patricia Lynn Reyes
Case
No. 23STCV09361
Motion
for Summary Judgment
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff
Deni Hoffman (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against the executors of the
Estate of Melvin M. Hoffman (“Hoffman”) and as successor trustees to his trust
(collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiff
is Hoffman’s ex-wife, and Defendants are Melvin Hoffman’s children. Plaintiff alleges as follows:
Plaintiff
and Hoffman were divorced on December 30, 2011, following a ten-year
marriage. (Complaint, ¶ 5.) Afterwards, Plaintiff continued to live with
Hoffman until late 2013. (Ibid.) After Plaintiff vacated Hoffman’s residence,
he continued to ask her to move back into his house and to care for him. (Ibid.)
Between 2014 and Hoffman’s death, Plaintiff provided personal care,
specifically, she checked his vital signs, ordered his medications, made his
appointments, and took him to the doctor/hospital when necessary. (Id., ¶ 6.)
In October 2015, Hoffman was diagnosed with cancer, and Plaintiff
accompanied him to the hospital and stayed with him for days at a time. (Id., ¶¶ 7-8.) Plaintiff also accompanied him to his
chemotherapy appointments and took care of him.
(Id., ¶¶ 13-19.) In 2017, on
several occasions, Hoffman promised Plaintiff that she would receive his house
and four vacant lots when he died. (Id.,
¶¶ 10-11.) Hoffman also showed her at
least one deed that was signed but not notarized. (Id., ¶ 20.)
However, Hoffman did not deliver the deed or change his will/trust to
leave Plaintiff the properties at issue.
(Id., ¶ 23.)
Defendants
now move for summary judgment, which Plaintiff opposes. The motion is granted.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Defendants
initiated a probate case—Case Number 20SPTB02367—after Hoffman passed. (Complaint, ¶ 25.) There also was a case relating to Hoffman’s
trust, which Plaintiff initiated: Deni Hoffman v. Patricia Lynn Reyes, et al.,
Case Number 20STPB04342. (Id., ¶ 26; see
also Request for Judicial Notice, Exh. #1.)
On January 29, 2021, Plaintiff filed and severed timely Creditor’s Claims
for $955,200 in both cases. (Complaint,
¶¶ 25, 26.) Defendants rejected the
claims. (Id., ¶ 27.) Plaintiff then filed this case on April 26,
2023. Defendants filed a motion for
summary judgment on June 27, 2023. In
the reply brief, Defendants argued that this action is barred under the
principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel by the probate
proceedings. Because this argument was
raised in the reply brief, the Court continued the hearing and ordered supplemental
briefings. (See Court’s Minute Order,
dated November 14, 2023.)
EVIDENTIARY ISSUES
Defendants
request judicial notice of certain pleadings from the probate cases. The Court grants the request for judicial
notice under Evidence Code section 452(d) to the extent those exhibits are
referenced in this order.
LEGAL STANDARD
“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears the
burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that
he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law[.] There is a triable issue of
material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of
fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in
accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” (Aguilar v.
Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) “[T]he party
moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a
prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact;
if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing
party is then subjected to a burden of production of his
own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of
material fact.” (Ibid.)
DISCUSSION
This action is barred by
the principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel because the dispositive
issues were previously litigated in the probate court. Plaintiff alleges that Hoffman promised on
multiple occasions to leave her “the Burbank residence and four vacant lots
after his death” and “[i]n reliance on that promise, she continued to go out of
her way to care for [Hoffman] until his death . . . .” (Complaint, ¶¶ 11, 12, 22.) The probate court resolved that issue against
Plaintiff in granting summary judgment.
(See Request for Judicial Notice, Exh. 11.)
Now, Plaintiff seeks to
convert her claim for the properties into one for unpaid wages. There are several problems with this
claim. As an initial matter, Plaintiff
is not entitled to minimum wage and overtime because the provisions of the
Labor Code “shall not apply to personal attendants.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11150, subd.
(1)(B).) For purposes of the Labor Code,
a personal attendant is “any person employed by a private householder . . . to
supervise, feed, or dress a child or person who by reason of advanced age,
physical disability, or mental deficiency needs supervision.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11150, subd.
(2)(J).) This was Plaintiff’s alleged
work for Hoffman.
Nor is it clear that
Plaintiff’s claim for unpaid wages is timely.
Plaintiff filed a “Verified Complaint on Rejected Creditor’s Claim for
Earned but Unpaid Wages.” In fact,
Plaintiff did not file a creditor’s claim before the probate court for unpaid
wages; she only sought a transfer of properties (which the probate court
rejected). (See Request for Judicial
Notice, Exhs. 2-4.) To the extent this
is a new claim, it appears to be untimely.
Plaintiff alleges that she was not paid for her services between October
2015 and February 2020. (See Complaint,
¶ 25.) Even assuming there was an oral
employment agreement, the statute of limitations is two years. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 339.) This action was filed on April 26, 2023. Even if Plaintiff had raised this claim
before the probate court, the complaint still would be untimely. Probate Code section 9353 requires a lawsuit
to be filed within 90 days of notice of the rejection of a claim. (See Prob. Code, § 9353.)
Regardless, Plaintiff’s claim
for unpaid wages is untenable. There was
no employment relationship between Plaintiff and Hoffman, so Plaintiff must
proceed under a promissory estoppel theory.
The elements are as follows: (1) There was a promise that was clear and
unambiguous in its terms; (2) The plaintiff relied on the promise; (3) The
plaintiff’s reliance was reasonable and foreseeable; and (4) The plaintiff was
injured by her reliance. (See Jones v.
Wachovia Bank (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 935, 945.)
In this case, there was no promise to pay Plaintiff an hourly wage. Nor was there reliance on any promise by
Hoffman. The probate court has already
resolved this issue. (See Request for
Judicial Notice, Exh. #11, p. 9.) There
is collateral estoppel with respect to this issue. At heart, this is nothing more than an
attempt to relitigate issues that have already been resolved by the probate
court.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Based upon the
foregoing, the Court orders as follows:
1. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment
is granted.
2. Defendant’s counsel may lodge a
proposed judgment if necessary.
3. Defendant’s counsel shall provide
notice and file proof of such with the Court.