Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case: 23STCV09411, Date: 2024-01-31 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV09411    Hearing Date: January 31, 2024    Dept: 39

Dusty Bowman v. Rob Bowman

Case No. 23STCV09411

Demurrer

            Plaintiff Dusty Bowman (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against her former spouse, Rob Bowman (“Defendant”), asserting causes of action for quiet title, breach of contract, and declaratory relief.  Plaintiff alleges as follows:

            On October 15, 2010, the parties obtained a judgment of legal separation in Case Number BD507258, which required Defendant to pay Plaintiff child support in the amount of $4,058 per month.  (First Amended Complaint, ¶ 10.)  The parties subsequently purchased a condominium with Plaintiff holding a one percent interest and Defendant holding a 99% interest.  (Id., ¶ 12.)  In or about September 2016, the parties agreed to modify Defendant’s child support payments.  (Id., ¶ 13.)  Defendant agreed to a monetary increase and to execute a deed transferring to Plaintiff an additional 43% interest in the property.  (Id., ¶ 13.)  In addition, Defendant agreed to convey to Plaintiff an additional 7% interest per year until Plaintiff attained a 100% interest in the property.  (Ibid.)  “This agreement precluded Plaintiff from seeking a court-ordered modification of child support at any, lest she would automatically lose all interest she had accumulated in the Real Property at that time, and would thereafter be entitled to only the amount of child support the court deemed appropriate.”  (Ibid.)  The agreement was memorialized in writing as a “Stipulated Order re Additional Child Support.”  (Ibid.)  Neither party signed the stipulation, but both parties conducted themselves as through they had done so.  (Ibid.)  On March 16, 2017, Defendant executed a grant deed conveying a 51% undivided interest in the property to Plaintiff.  (Id., ¶ 17.)  Now, Plaintiff alleges that she is entitled to a 93% undivided interest in the property, and that she is entitled to a 100% undivided interest this year, per the agreement.  (Id., ¶¶ 17-20.)

Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff asserts causes of action for quiet title, breach of contract, and declaratory relief.  Defendant demurs to the causes of action.  “It is black letter law that a demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint.”  (Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.)  In ruling on a demurrer, the court must “liberally construe[]” the allegations of the complaint.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 452.)  “This rule of liberal construction means that the reviewing court draws inferences favorable to the plaintiff, not the defendant.”  (Perez v. Golden Empire Transit Dist. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1238.)

As an initial matter, the Court does not appear to have jurisdiction over this dispute.  At heart, Plaintiff seeks to enforce an agreement to modify Defendant’s child support payments.  Had the “Stipulated Order re Additional Child Support” memorializing the agreement been signed and filed, this dispute would fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the family court.  The mere fact that the stipulation was not filed does not change the nature of the dispute.  “Almost all events in family law litigation can be reframed as civil law actions if a litigant wants to be creative with various causes of action.  It is therefore incumbent on courts to examine the substance of claims, not just their nominal headings.”  (Neal v. Superior Court (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 22, 25.)  Such disputes ordinarily must be resolved in family court.  (See Askew v. Askew (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 942, 961.)  According to Plaintiff, the agreement only prohibited her from seeking a court-ordered modification of child support.  The agreement does not prohibit her from seeking to enforce the agreement in family court (and any such provision probably would be unconscionable).  The Court provides notice that the parties should be prepared to address this issue if Plaintiff files a second amended complaint.

But the Court need not resolve that issue at this stage.  Instead, the Court sustains the demurrer because the parties’ agreement violates the statute of frauds.  The statute of frauds requires contracts “not to be performed within one year” and contracts for an interest in real property, to be in writing and signed by the party against whom the contract is to be enforced.  (Civ. Code, § 1624(a)(1) & (3).)  Plaintiff argues that Defendant is equitably estopped from relying on the statute of frauds because she changed her position in reliance of the parties’ oral agreement to her detriment and would suffer unconscionable injury if the Court does not enforce the agreement.  (See Monarco v. Lo Greco (1950) 35 Cal.2d 621, 623.)  Plaintiff does not allege facts in the first amended complaint to support this argument, e.g., Plaintiff elected not to pursue a court-ordered modification of child support based upon the parties’ agreement; Plaintiff would have been entitled to a court-ordered modification of child support based upon Defendant’s income and/or other changed circumstances; Plaintiff suffered an unconscionable injury because she did not receive sufficient child support to which she was entitled; etc.  The Court is required to grant leave to amend because it appears likely that Plaintiff could allege sufficient facts to demonstrate that Defendant is estopped from relying on the statute of frauds. 

            Defendant makes a series of additional arguments, none of which is persuasive.  Defendant argues that the sham pleading doctrine bars Plaintiff’s claims because the complaint alleges an “oral agreement” and the first amended complaint alleges “an agreement, partially oral and partially written.”  These allegations do not necessarily conflict because the original complaint does not allege that there was “only” or “exclusively” an oral agreement.  Defendant also argues that the statute of limitations bars Plaintiff’s claim because the statute began to run when Defendant failed to make the required transfer on January 1, 2018.  Defendant is incorrect.  A statute of limitations runs each time Defendant breached the obligation in the contract.  (See Armstrong Petroleum Corp. v. Tri-Valley Oil & Gas Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1375, 1388-1389.)  At best, this may constitute a limitation on damages, which the Court will address in ruling on motions in limine. 

The Court sustains the demurrer to the third cause of action without leave to amend.  A declaratory relief action is inappropriate when a plaintiff has an adequate remedy on other causes of action at trial.  (See Hood v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 319, 324; California Ins. Guarantee Assn. v. Superior Court (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1617, 1624.) 

            The declaratory relief statute should not be used for the purpose of anticipating and determining an issue which can be determined in the main action.  The object of the statute is to afford a new form of relief where needed and not to furnish a litigant with a second cause of action for the determination of identical issues.

(General of America Ins. Co. v. Lilly (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 465, 470.)  In this case, the declaratory relief claim is duplicative of the indemnity claims.  The Court has discretion to decline to issue a declaratory judgment under these circumstances.  (See AICCO, Inc. v. Insurance Company of North America (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 579, 590.)  A cause of action for declaratory relief is not intended as a means for the trial court to “overrule” the jury’s decisions on the related causes of action.    

            Based upon the foregoing, the Court orders as follows:

            1.         The Court sustains the demurrer to the first and second causes of action with leave to amend. 

            2.         The Court sustains the demurrer to the third cause of action without leave to amend.

            3.         The Court orders the parties to meet-and-confer whether they wish to dismiss this case without prejudice and resolve their dispute in family court.  This meet-and-confer shall occur via telephone within five (5) days.

            4.         Plaintiff’s counsel shall file a request for dismissal without prejudice or a second amended complaint on or before February 20, 2024. 

            5.         The Court shall hold an additional case management conference on March 29, 2024, at 8:30 a.m.  If Plaintiff files a second amended complaint, Defendant may notice any demurrer for hearing on that date/time. 

            6.         If Plaintiff’s counsel elects to file a second amended complaint, the Court shall notice its own motion for judgment on the pleadings under the authority of Code of Civil Procedure section 438(b)(2) & (c)(3)(A).  The motion would be based on the apparent lack of jurisdiction over this dispute for the reasons discussed in this order.  The motion for judgment on the pleadings would be heard on the same date/time as the case management conference: March 29, 2024, at 8:30 a.m.  Any opposition and reply to the opposition would be due based upon statutory deadlines.

            7.         The Court’s clerk shall provide notice.