Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case: 23STCV10120, Date: 2023-12-06 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV10120    Hearing Date: December 6, 2023    Dept: 39

Elaine Johnson v. Mercury Insurance Company, et al.

Case No. 23STCV10120

Demurrer and Motion to Strike

 

            Plaintiff Elaine Johnson (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against the California Automobile Insurance Company (“Defendant”) asserting causes of action for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and declaratory relief.  Plaintiff also asserts prayers for punitive damages and attorneys’ fees.  Now, Defendant demurs to the declaratory relief claim and moves to strike the prayers for punitive damages and attorneys’ fees. 

 

            A.        Claim for Declaratory Relief

 

            The Court sustains the demurrer to the declaratory relief claim.  The Court agrees with Defendant: A declaratory relief action is inappropriate when a plaintiff has an adequate remedy on other causes of action at trial.  (See Hood v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 319, 324; California Ins. Guarantee Assn. v. Superior Court (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1617, 1624.) 

 

            The declaratory relief statute should not be used for the purpose of anticipating and determining an issue which can be determined in the main action.  The object of the statute is to afford a new form of relief where needed and not to furnish a litigant with a second cause of action for the determination of identical issues.

 

(General of America Ins. Co. v. Lilly (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 465, 470.)  The Court has discretion to decline to issue a declaratory judgment under these circumstances.  (See AICCO, Inc. v. Insurance Company of North America (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 579, 590.) 

 

Plaintiff’s counsel attempts to circumvent this case law by arguing: “[W]hile Plaintiff’s Breach of Contract and Bad Faith causes of action seek to redress past wrongs on the part of the insurers, the cause of action for declaratory relief relates to the future obligations of the parties to the insurance policies.”  (Plaintiff’s Opposition, p. 2:16-18.)  That is, quite simply, not true.  The First Amended Complaint alleges that this dispute relates to “[a]n actual controversy and dispute,” not a future dispute.  (See First Amended Complaint, ¶ 52.)  The First Amended Complaint then states: “Johnson contents that she has incurred a loss of $1,973,520.78 and that her repair plan will be permitted” and “Insurer on the other hand has failed to provide a complete cost of repair or adequately investigate the proposed repair plan by Johnson” and “Insurer has paid $862,330.38 based on a preliminary and complete investigation of the water damage.”  (First Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 53-54.)  The First Amended Complaint then asks for a declaration concerning this dispute.  (First Amended Complaint, ¶ 55.)  The First Amended Complaint does not reference any future obligation amongst the parties requiring an interpretation of the contract.  Therefore, the demurrer is sustained without leave to amend.

 

B.        Prayer for Punitive Damages

 

Defendant’s counsel also moves to strike the prayer for punitive damages.  To state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a plaintiff must allege the elements set forth in the punitive damages statute, Civil Code section 3294.  (Coll. Hosp., Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721.)  Per Civil Code section 3294, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud or malice.  (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).)  “Malice is defined in the statute as conduct intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.”  (Coll. Hosp., Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725.)  “The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages.  Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim.”  (Grieves v. Superior Ct. (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166, internal citations and footnotes omitted.) 

 

“[T]he imposition of punitive damages upon a corporation is based upon its own fault.  It is not imposed vicariously by virtue of the fault of others.”  (City Products Corp. v. Globe Indemnity Co. (1979) 88 Cal. App. 3d 31, 36.)  “Corporations are legal entities which do not have minds capable of recklessness, wickedness, or intent to injure or deceive.  An award of punitive damages against a corporation therefore must rest on the malice of the corporation’s employees.  But the law does not impute every employee’s malice to the corporation.  Instead, the punitive damages statute requires proof of malice among corporate leaders:  the officers, directors, or managing agents.”  (Cruz v. Home Base (2000) 83 Cal. App. 4th 160, 167, internal quotations and citation omitted.) 

 

The First Amended Complaint contains only conclusory allegations: “Insurer intended to and did vex, damage, annoy, and injure Plaintiff.  Said conduct was intentional, willful, and with conscious disregard of Plaintiff’s rights, and was malicious, oppressive and/or fraudulent under California Civil Code section 3294, thereby entitling Plaintiff to punitive and exemplary damages against” Defendant. (First Amended Complaint, ¶ 48.)  Plaintiff does not allege specific facts to support these conclusions.  Regardless, the larger problem is that Plaintiff does not allege specific facts demonstrating that an officer, director, or managing agent acted with oppression, fraud, or malice.  Plaintiff’s counsel does not articulate any facts suggesting that an amendment would resolve this issue.  Therefore, the Court grants the motion to strike without leave to amend.  This order is without prejudice to Plaintiff’s counsel seeking leave to amend if he develops sufficient facts during discovery.

 

C.        Prayer for Attorneys’ Fees

 

Finally, Plaintiff’s counsel seeks attorneys’ fees.  Plaintiff alleges no basis for attorney’s fees in the complaint.  Nor does Plaintiff’s counsel’s opposition articulate a contractual or statutory basis for seeking attorney’s fees.  Therefore, the motion to strike the prayer for attorney’s fees is granted without leave to amend.

 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

 

            Based upon the foregoing, the Court orders as follows:

 

            1.         The Court sustains Defendant’s demurrer to the third cause of action without leave to amend.

 

            2.         The Court grants Defendant’s motion to strike the prayers for punitive damages and attorney’s fees without leave to amend.

 

            3.         Defendant shall file an answer within thirty (30) days.

 

            4.         Plaintiff’s counsel has not served Mercury Insurance Company, in violation of California Rules of Court, rule 3.110(b).  Therefore, the Court issues an Order to Show Cause why monetary sanctions in the amount of $500 or less should not be imposed against Plaintiff and/or Plaintiff’s counsel, Stephen M. Sanders, Esq. and/or Jeff G. Coyner, Esq., per the authority of California Rules of Court, rule 3.110(f) and Code of Civil Procedure section 583.150.  The OSC hearing shall be held on February 20, 2024, at 8:30 a.m. at the following location:

 

Stanley Mosk Courthouse

111 North Hill Street

Department #39 (Goorvitch, J.)

Los Angeles, California 90012

 

The parties may appear remotely or in-person.  Plaintiff’s counsel may file a written response and/or may address the issues at the hearing.  The Court orders Plaintiff’s counsel to serve or dismiss Mercury Insurance Company forthwith.

 

            5.         Defendant’s counsel shall provide notice and file proof of such with the Court.