Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case: 23STCV10370, Date: 2023-11-13 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV10370    Hearing Date: March 13, 2024    Dept: 39

Scott Guerrero v. Loyola Marymount University

Case No. 23STCV10370

Motion to Strike

            Plaintiff Scott Guerrero (“Plaintiff”) filed this employment discrimination case against Defendant Loyola Marymount University (“Defendant”).  The Court previously granted Plaintiff’s motion to strike the prayer for punitive damages and related allegations.  Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint, and Defendant again moves to strike the prayer for punitive damages and related allegations. 

            As an initial matter, Plaintiff argues that the motion is untimely under Code of Civil Procedure section 436(b).  The motion was two days late.  By addressing the motion on the merits, however, Plaintiff has waived the right to challenge the timeliness of the motion.  (See In re Marriage of Falcone (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 826.)  Nor does Plaintiff establish any prejudice.  Therefore, the Court shall reach the merits of the motion.    

In ruling on a motion to strike punitive damages, “judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth.”  (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.)  The motion is granted in part and denied in part.    

To state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a plaintiff must allege the elements set forth in the punitive damages statute, Civil Code section 3294.  (Coll. Hosp., Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721.)  Per Civil Code section 3294, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud or malice.  (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).)  “Malice is defined in the statute as conduct intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.”  (Coll. Hosp., Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725.)  “The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages.  Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim.”  (Grieves v. Superior Ct. (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166, internal citations and footnotes omitted.)

“[T]he imposition of punitive damages upon a corporation is based upon its own fault.  It is not imposed vicariously by virtue of the fault of others.”  (City Products Corp. v. Globe Indemnity Co. (1979) 88 Cal. App. 3d 31, 36.)  “Corporations are legal entities which do not have minds capable of recklessness, wickedness, or intent to injure or deceive.  An award of punitive damages against a corporation therefore must rest on the malice of the corporation’s employees.  But the law does not impute every employee’s malice to the corporation.  Instead, the punitive damages statute requires proof of malice among corporate leaders: the officers, directors, or managing agents.”  (Cruz v. Home Base (2000) 83 Cal. App. 4th 160, 167, internal quotations and citation omitted.) 

            Plaintiff alleges that Craig Pintens, LMU’s Athletic Director, terminated him based upon his age, and that Pintens engaged in a pattern and practice of replacing older staff members with younger ones.  Plaintiff argues that “the violation of fundamental civil rights is inherently malicious conduct” that would support a claim for punitive damages.  Plaintiff is incorrect.  A plaintiff must allege more than violations of the Fair Employment and Housing Act and other claims in order to support a prayer for punitive damages.  (See Scott v. Phoenix Schools, Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 702, 715-716.)  Plaintiff also alleges that Pintens terminated him because he wanted “to go in a different direction.” 

            At the prior hearing, Plaintiff’s counsel cited Cloud v. Casey (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 895, in support of his claim for punitive damages.  In that case, the Court held that the employer may be liable for punitive damages “because it denied the plaintiff a promotion based on gender, then attempted to hide the illegal reason for denying the promotion with a false explanation . . . .”  (See Scott, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 717, discussing Cloud, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th 895.)  In Cloud, the false explanation related to an objective criterion for the position: “[T]he jury also heard evidence that the operational experience criterion was developed after [a man] was selected for the position.  From this the jury could conclude that operational experience was not a real requirement for the position, but a pretext utilized by the corporations to explain away its gender-based decision.”  (Cloud, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 912.)  In this first amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges more than a termination based upon wanting “to go in a different direction.”  Plaintiff alleges that Defendant falsely justified the termination based upon “statistical evidence” suggesting “that the team was underperforming.”  (First Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 40, 51.)  This is sufficient for pleading purposes.    

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

            Based upon the foregoing, the Court orders as follows:

            1.         Defendant’s motion to strike the prayer of punitive damages is denied.

            2.         Defendant shall file an answer within thirty (30) days.

            3.         Defendant shall provide notice and file proof of such with the Court.