Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case: 23STCV13890, Date: 2023-11-08 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV13890 Hearing Date: November 8, 2023 Dept: 39
J.W.
v. Los Angeles Unified School District
Case
No. 23STCV13890
Demurrer
and Motion to Strike
Plaintiff
J.W. asserts negligence causes of action against the Los Angeles Unified School
District (the “LAUSD”) based upon having allegedly been sexually abused by an
LAUSD employee in 1981, when he was approximately thirteen (13) years old. Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to
Assembly Bill 218, which made California Government Code section 905(m)
retroactive to include conduct in years prior to 2009. Now, the LAUSD demurs to the first and third
causes of action (which are the claims against the LAUSD), arguing that AB 218 violates
the California Constitution’s prohibitions against the gift of public
funds.
Prior
to the passage of AB 218, Government Code section 905 exempted claims of
childhood sexual abuse occurring on or after January 1, 2009, from the claims
presentation requirements. (See Rubenstein
v. Doe No. 1 (2017) 3 Cal.5th 903, 914.)
Thus, when the Legislature enacted AB 2018, it retroactively eliminated the
claims presentation requirement for the additional claims. (See Gov. Code, § 905, subd. (p).) In doing so, the Legislature removed a substantive
element of a claim for childhood sexual abuse against a governmental entity
based on past misconduct by its employees.
(See Shirk v. Vista Unified School Dist. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 201,
209.)
Accordingly,
the LAUSD argues that AB 218 is unconstitutional because retroactively removing
a substantive element—in this case, the claims presentation requirement—imposes
liability claim previously existed. The
LAUSD argues that doing so constitutes a gift.
(See Heron v. Riley (1930) 209 Cal. 507, 517; see also Chapman
v. State (1894) 104 Cal. 690, 693.)
The mere fact that there has been an appropriation of funds does not
mean there has been a gift. “It is
generally held that in determining whether an appropriation of public funds is
to be considered a gift, the primary question is whether the funds are to be
used for a public or private purpose; the benefit to the state from an
expenditure for a public purpose is in the nature of consideration and the funds
expended are therefore not a gift even though private persons are benefited
therefrom. The determination of what
constitutes a public purpose is primarily a matter for the Legislature to
determine, and its discretion will not be disturbed by the courts so long as
that determination has a reasonable basis.”
(County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 730, 745–746,
internal quotations and citations omitted.)
As
the Court in K.M. v. Grossmont Union High School Dist. (2022) 84
Cal.App.5th 717 recognized, the public purpose in reviving claims of childhood
sexual abuse is to reduce barriers for victims to assert claims. (K.M. v. Grossmont Union High School Dist.
(2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 717, 738.) The
Court cannot say that the Legislature lacked a reasonable basis in determining
that this is a valid public purpose.
Further, “[a]s a general rule statutes should be construed, if
reasonably possible, to avoid finding they are unconstitutional.” (Martin v. Santa Clara Unified School Dist.
(2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 241, 254.)
Accordingly, the Court overrules the demurrer.
Defendants move
to strike the treble damages allegations.
Such damages are not recoverable against a school district. (See Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v.
Superior Court (2023) 14 Cal.5th 758, 790.)
Plaintiff does not oppose the motion to strike. Accordingly, the motion to strike is granted.
Based upon the
foregoing, the Court orders as follows:
1. The LAUSD’s demurrer is overruled.
2. The LAUSD’s motion to strike is granted
without leave to amend.
3. The LAUSD shall file an answer within
thirty (30) days.
4. The parties stipulated to proceed with
the case management conference before the LAUSD files its answer.
5. The parties waived notice in open
court.