Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case: 23STCV23148, Date: 2024-01-23 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV23148    Hearing Date: January 23, 2024    Dept: 39

Isidro Bonilla, et al. v. Jose L. Torres

Case No. 23STCV23148

Demurrer and Motion to Strike

Case Management Conference

            Plaintiff Isidro Bonilla (“Plaintiff”), an assignee of Elsie Pineda and Fortunato Sens Arriaga, filed this action against Jose L. Torres (“Defendant”) for equitable indemnity, implied indemnity, and declaratory relief.  Plaintiff alleges as follows:

Arriaga was in the business of providing tour buses for various clubs and functions, and Pineda was an unpaid volunteer for the Montecito Heights Seniors Club (the “Seniors Club”).  In October 2017, the Seniors Club scheduled a trip to Las Vegas, which required two buses.  The Seniors Club contracted with Arriage to provide the buses, but he did not have any buses available for the trip, so he subcontracted with Defendant.  Defendant had only one bus available, so he subcontracted the other bus to a company called CHR Tours, which was owned by Maria Lourdes Huizar and Carlos Rivas.  Plaintiff was a passenger on the bus driven by Rivas, and he was injured when disembarking the bus due to use of an unsafe step.

Defendant demurs to the complaint.  “It is black letter law that a demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint.”  (Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.)  In ruling on a demurrer, the court must “liberally construe[]” the allegations of the complaint.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 452.)  “This rule of liberal construction means that the reviewing court draws inferences favorable to the plaintiff, not the defendant.”  (Perez v. Golden Empire Transit Dist. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1238.)

Defendant requests that the Court take judicial notice of pleadings in Isidro Bonilla v. Red Star Charter, Inc., Case Number 18STCV08868.  The Court takes judicial notice of the existence and legal effect of the pleadings, but not the truth of their factual contents, per Evidence Code section 452(d). 

Defendant argues that “Plaintiff’s newly fabricated allegations that attempt to implicate Mr. Torres are 100 percent false.”  Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s pleadings in his prior case constitute “judicial admissions.”  In his prior case, Plaintiff alleged as follows: “Plaintiff arranged for the tour through Defendant Pineda who in turn contracted with Defendants Red Star Charter, Inc. and Arriaga dba Red Star Charter and Tours.  Red Star Charter, Inc. and Arriaga in turn contracted with CHR/Huizar/Rivas to provide the bus and driver.”  (Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. #1, p. 3.)  Defendant was added to the underlying case by way of Doe and Roe amendments.  (See Defendant’s Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Support of Demurrer, p. 2:8-10.)  Then, Elsie Pineda dismissed Defendant from the cross-complaint on July 30, 2020.  (See Request for Judicial Notice, Exh. #2.)  Plaintiff dismissed Defendant from the complaint on August 21, 2020.  (See Request for Judicial Notice, Exh. #3.)  Now, Plaintiff alleges that Pineda subcontracted with Arriaga, who subcontracted with Defendant, who subcontracted with CHR/Huizar/Rivas.  (Complaint, ¶¶ 7-14.)  Accordingly, Defendant demurs on this basis.

There are two problems with Defendant’s argument.  First, admissions—i.e., Plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint in Case Number 18STCV08868—are binding as judicial admissions only in the case in which they were made.  (Minish v. Hanuman Fellowship (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 437, 456.)  A pleading from a prior case may only be offered in a different case as an evidentiary admission.  (See Magnolia Square Homeowners Assn. v. Safeco Ins. Co. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1049, 1061.)  The Court cannot rely on an evidentiary admission in sustaining a demurrer because there may be factual disputes: “[I]t is always competent for the party against whom the pleading is offered to show that the statements were inadvertently made or were not authorized by him or made under mistake of fact.”  (Ibid.)  There is good reason for this law.  A complaint is a pleading prepared by the attorney before discovery, which often clarifies the issues, and parties get dismissed for countless reasons.  The Court is baffled that Defendant’s counsel did not cite this case law in his motion or address the issue—raised by Plaintiff’s opposition—in his reply brief.       

Second, the instant case is a different case.  The underlying case was Plaintiff’s direct claims.  In the instant case, Plaintiff is prosecuting Pineda and Arriaga’s claims against Defendant, and he provides a copy of the assignment.  The Court notes that Pineda dismissed her cross-claims against Defendant with prejudice.  (See Request for Judicial Notice, Exh. #3.)  Defendant may have an argument that Plaintiff’s claims on Pineda’s behalf should be dismissed under the doctrine of retraxit.  However, Defendant does not raise the issue in the motion, and that would not affect the claims prosecuted on behalf of Arriaga anyway. 

Defendant also argues that the claims are time-barred.  Plaintiff’s claims for indemnity did not accrue until Plaintiff obtained a judgment against Pineda and Arriaga.  (Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co. v. Reiswig (1999) 21 Cal.4th 208, 213.)  Plaintiff attaches the judgment against both assignees, which is dated February 13, 2023.  This action was filed within the statute of limitations.  The Court has considered Defendant’s remaining arguments and finds none to be persuasive.  Therefore, the Court overrules the demurrer to the first and second causes of action.

The Court sustains the demurrer to the third cause of action, declaratory judgment.  A declaratory relief action is inappropriate when a plaintiff has an adequate remedy on other causes of action at trial.  (See Hood v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 319, 324; California Ins. Guarantee Assn. v. Superior Court (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1617, 1624.) 

            The declaratory relief statute should not be used for the purpose of anticipating and determining an issue which can be determined in the main action.  The object of the statute is to afford a new form of relief where needed and not to furnish a litigant with a second cause of action for the determination of identical issues.

(General of America Ins. Co. v. Lilly (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 465, 470.)  In this case, the declaratory relief claim is duplicative of the indemnity claims.  The Court has discretion to decline to issue a declaratory judgment under these circumstances.  (See AICCO, Inc. v. Insurance Company of North America (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 579, 590.) 

            The Court denies the motion to strike.  Defendant seeks to strike individual factual allegations because they conflict with the allegations in Case Number 18STCV08868.  The Court has already addressed that issue. 

            Based upon the foregoing, the Court rules as follows:

            1.         The Court overrules the demurrer to the first and second causes of action.

            2.         The Court sustains the demurrer to the third cause of action without leave to amend.

            3.         The Court denies the motion to strike.

            4.         The Court sets the following dates for trial:

                        Final Status Conference:        July 3, 2025, at 9:00 a.m.

                        Trial:                                       July 15, 2025, at 9:30 a.m.

The parties shall file joint trial documents on or before June 26, 2025.  The parties shall disclose all witnesses they intend to call in their respective cases-in-chief, and identify and produce all exhibits they intend to introduce in their respective cases-in-chief, on or before June 26, 2025.

            5.         The parties shall post jury fees on or before January 31, 2025.  Otherwise, the parties shall waive jury.

            6.         The parties shall comply with all courtroom procedures for Department #39. 

7.         Defendant’s counsel shall provide notice and file proof of such with the Court.