Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case: 23STCV275840, Date: 2024-03-12 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV275840    Hearing Date: March 12, 2024    Dept: 39

Jane LA Doe, et al. v. Los Angeles Unified School District

Case No. 23STCV275840

Demurrer and Case Management Conference

BACKGROUND

            Plaintiffs Jane LA Dow and Jane MA Doe (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed this action against the Los Angeles Unified School District (the “LAUSD”) and their former teacher, Corey Hogan (“Hogan”) based upon having allegedly been sexually abused by Hogan between 2002 and 2006.  Plaintiffs assert the following causes of action:

            1.         Negligence against all defendants

            2.         Negligent Supervision against all defendants

            3.         Negligent Hiring/Retention against the LAUSD

            4.         Negligent Failure to Warn, Train, or Educate against the LAUSD

            5.         Sexual Harassment against all defendants

            6.         Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (“IIED”) against the LAUSD

            7.         Breach of Fiduciary Duty against all defendants

            8.         Gender Violence against Hogan

            9.         Sexual Battery against Hogan

            10.       Sexual Assault against Hogan

The LAUSD now demurs to first, second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of action.  Plaintiff opposes the demurrer.  The Court sustains the demurrer to the fourth cause of action without leave to amend.  The demurrer is otherwise overruled. 

LEGAL STANDARD

“It is black letter law that a demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint.”  (Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.)  In ruling on a demurrer, the court must “liberally construe[]” the allegations of the complaint.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 452.)  “This rule of liberal construction means that the reviewing court draws inferences favorable to the plaintiff, not the defendant.”  (Perez v. Golden Empire Transit Dist. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1238.)

DISCUSSION

            Plaintiffs filed this action pursuant to Assembly Bill 218, which made California Government Code section 905(m) retroactive to include conduct in years prior to 2009.  Now, the LAUSD demurs to the first and third causes of action (which are the claims against the LAUSD), arguing that AB 218 violates the California Constitution’s prohibition against the gift of public funds.   

            Prior to the passage of AB 218, Government Code section 905 exempted claims of childhood sexual abuse occurring on or after January 1, 2009, from the claims presentation requirements.  (See Rubenstein v. Doe No. 1 (2017) 3 Cal.5th 903, 914.)  Thus, when the Legislature enacted AB 218, it retroactively eliminated the claims presentation requirement for the new claims of sexual abuse before 2009.  (See Gov. Code, § 905, subd. (p).)  The claims presentation requirement is a substantive element of a claim for childhood sexual abuse against a governmental entity based on past misconduct by its employees.  (See Shirk v. Vista Unified School Dist. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 201, 209.)  Therefore, the LAUSD argues that AB 218 retroactively stripped its statutory governmental immunity and resurrected “dead” claims, which is an unconstitutional “gift” of public funds. 

               The Court overrules the demurrer.  “It is generally held that in determining whether an appropriation of public funds is to be considered a gift, the primary question is whether the funds are to be used for a public or private purpose; the benefit to the state from an expenditure for a public purpose is in the nature of consideration and the funds expended are therefore not a gift even though private persons are benefited therefrom.  The determination of what constitutes a public purpose is primarily a matter for the Legislature to determine, and its discretion will not be disturbed by the courts so long as that determination has a reasonable basis.”  (County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 730, 745–746, internal quotations and citations omitted.)  Further, “[a]s a general rule statutes should be construed, if reasonably possible, to avoid finding they are unconstitutional.”  (Martin v. Santa Clara Unified School Dist. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 241, 254.)  The purpose of AB 218 was to reduce procedural barriers for victims to assert childhood sexual abuse claims.  (See K.M. v. Grossmont Union High School Dist. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 717, 738.)  The Legislature also sought to “help prevent future assaults by raising the costs for this abuse.”  (See X.M. v. Superior Court (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 1014, 1027, citing the legislative history of AB 2018.)  The Legislature determined that these are valid public purposes, and the Court cannot say the Legislature lacked a reasonable basis to do so.  Therefore, the demurrer is overruled on this ground.

            The LAUSD argues that the fourth cause of action is invalid.  This cause of action is encompassed by the second and third causes of action.  (See C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 875.)  Therefore, the Court sustains the demurrer to the fourth cause of action without leave to amend.

The LAUSD argues that there are insufficient facts to support the fifth cause of action.  A school district is not liable for a teacher’s sexual harassment of students unless “unless an official of the school district who at a minimum has authority to institute corrective measures on the district's behalf has actual notice of, and is deliberately indifferent to, the [teacher’s] misconduct.”  (Roe v. Hesperia Unified School District (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 13, 33, internal quotations and citaitons omitted.)  Plaintiffs allege that Defendant “acted with deliberate indifference towards responding to . . . and preventing further abuse.”  (Complaint, ¶ 115.)  For pleading purposes, Plaintiffs’ allegations suffice, and the demurrer to the fifth cause of action is overruled. 

            Finally, in the notice of motion, the LAUSD argued that there are insufficient facts to support the sixth cause of action.  However, this argument is not raised in the memorandum of points and authorities.  It appears that the LAUSD could be liable based upon IIED committed by Hogan, per Government Code sections 815.2 and 820.  Therefore, the demurrer to the sixth cause of action is overruled. 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

            Based upon the foregoing, the Court orders as follows:

            1.         The Court sustains the demurrer to the fourth cause of action without leave to amend.

            2.         The Court overrules the demurrer to all other causes of action.

            3.         The LAUSD shall file an answer within thirty (30) days.

            4.         The Court sets the following dates:

                        Final Status Conference:        October 3, 2025, at 9:00 a.m.

                        Trial:                                       October 14, 2025, at 9:30 a.m.

The parties shall comply with all pretrial procedures for Department #39.  The parties shall file joint trial documents on or before September 25, 2025.  The parties shall identify all witnesses they intend to call in their respective cases-in-chief, and identify and produce all exhibits they intend to introduce in their respective cases-in-chief, on or before September 25, 2025.

            5.         Jury fees shall be posted within ten (10) days or the parties shall waive jury.

            6.         Defendant’s counsel shall provide notice and file proof of such with the Court.