Judge Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case Number: 24STCP00112, Date: 2024-11-06 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case: 24STCP00112, Date: 2024-11-06 Tentative Ruling

Petitioner California Pacific Homes, Inc. (“Petitioner”) filed a verified petition and complaint against the County of Los Angeles (the “County”) and the Board of Supervisors (the “Board”) (collectively, “Respondent”). Petitioner submitted an application to the County to construct 15 new single-family residences on 18 lots within the Santa Monica Mountains Coastal Zone. The project would encroach into the protected zones of 119 oaks and nine other native trees. Petitioner’s project required 12 variances falling within six categories: (1) Construction of an onsite wastewater treatment system (“OWTS”) less than 50 feet from a protected tree and less than 150 feet from a riparian canopy of streambed; (2) Construction of guest houses within a protected zone; (3) Construction of guest houses that would share the OWTS with primary residences; (4) Construction of structures with less than the required buffer from parkland; (5) Construction of structures that occupy more than 50 percent of the linear frontage of a parcel fronting a scenic route; and (6) Construction of driveways or access roads greater than 300 feet in length. Petitioner’s representatives met with the County’s planning staff on 11 occasions between 2019 and 2021. Eventually, the County requested that Petitioner change the proposed project as follows: (1) Remove the guest houses planned for each single-family residence; (2) Reduce the size and/or change the location of several residences; (3) Relocate several of the onsite wastewater treatment systems; and (4) Build fewer than 15 residences and merge certain lots. Petitioner refused to do so.

The case proceeded before a hearing officer, who denied the project because: (1) Petitioner did not satisfy the required burden of proof for the variances; (2) Several proposed residences did not comply with design requirements; and (3) The project conflicted with the goals and policies of preserving habitats and scenic resources and was not compatible with rural surroundings. Petitioner appealed this decision to the Regional Planning Commission and then the Board, which upheld the hearing officer’s decision. Now, Petitioner asserts four causes of action: (1) Writ of mandate for violation of the Housing Accountability Act, Government Code section 65589.5; (2) Writ of mandate for violation of Code of Civil Procedure sections 1094.5 and/or 1085; (3) Inverse condemnation; and (4) Declaratory judgment. The court denies the petition for writs of mandate because the Board made sufficient findings, supported by substantial evidence, that Petitioner did not comply with the requirements. The court declines to issue a declaratory judgment and transfers the inverse condemnation claim to Department One for reassignment to an independent calendar court.

The Project site is located on Piuma Road in Monte Nido, an unincorporated community in the Santa Monica Mountains. (AR 5145, 8224, 8921-27.) In January 1983, the County approved Tentative Tract Map 38931 (“TTM 38931”) creating 22 residential lots on the Project site. (AR 8238-8256.) The California Coastal Commission (the “Coastal Commission”) issued Coastal Development Permit 5-83-4 in July 1983, ratifying the County approval of TTM 38931 and allowing grading. (AR 8224-8237.) The Coastal Commission later approved a coastal development permit for construction of a single-family residence on one of the lots of TTM 38931 on November 13, 2008. (AR 5402-5434.) The remaining lots on the Project sites have been graded but are not developed. (See AR 8921-27, 5315.)

Vintage Pacific at Monte Nido LLC acquired the Project site in or about 2011. (See AR 2-6, 464.) Petitioner states that it is “an authorized representative for CDB Investments, L.P., which is the managing member of Vintage Pacific at Monte Nido LLC, owner of the Property.” (Petition for Writ of Mandate (“Pet.”) ¶ 4.)

On or around August 26, 2014, the County adopted the Santa Monica Mountains Local Coastal Program (the “LCP”) through the amendment of the Santa Monica Mountains Local Implementation Program (the “LIP”) and the Santa Monica Mountains Land Use Plan (the “LUP”). (AR 5450-5456, 8335-8494, 8495-8887.) The LCP was established to implement the Coastal Act within the Santa Monica Mountains Coastal Zone, pursuant to California Public Resources Code section 30500. (AR 5450-5456.) Pursuant to Los Angeles County Ordinance section 22.44.620, “[p]rotection of Significant Environmental Resource Areas (SERAs) (H1 and H2 Habitats) and public access shall take priority over other LIP development standards.” (AR 8496 [County of Los Angeles County Ordinance [“LACC”], 22.44.620].)

On or about April 3, 2019, Petitioner submitted an application to the County Department of Regional Planning (“Regional Planning”) for 15 coastal development permits (“CDPs”) to construct 15 new single-family residences on the Project site. (AR 5314, 5317.)[1] The lots that Petitioner seeks to develop are numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 13, 14, 15/16, and 17 through 21. (AR 5314.) The Project proposed encroachments into the protected zones of 119 oaks and nine other native trees. (AR 5314.)

Petitioner requested 12 variances for the following: (1) construction of an onsite wastewater treatment system (“OWTS”) less than 50 feet from an oak or other protected native tree or less than 150 feet from a riparian canopy or streambed; (2) construction of habitable accessory structures (guest houses) within the H1 Habitat Buffer or H1 Habitat Quiet Zone; (3) construction of habitable accessory structures (guest houses) that share an OWTS

with the primary residence; (4) construction of new structures with less than the required 100-foot buffers from parkland; (5) construction of new structures that occupy more than 50 percent of the linear frontage of a parcel fronting a scenic route (Piuma Road); and (6) construction of driveways or access roads greater than 300 feet in length. (AR 5314-5315.)

The total Project site is 18.2 acres. Each lot contains a graded pad of approximately 12,000 square feet. One single-family residence, attached garage, and OWTS is proposed for each lot, except for one single-family residence, attached garage, and OWTS that would span Lots 15 and 16. Four of the lots (Lots 1, 2, 4, and 18) would also contain detached habitable

accessory structures (guest houses). The average residential square footage for each residence is 5,386 square feet. (AR 5315.)

The County’s Regional Planning Staff (the “Staff”) met with Petitioner approximately 11 times from 2019 to 2021 to discuss the Project. During these meetings, the Staff requested that Petitioner redesign the Project to eliminate most variances and inconsistencies with the LIP standards. (AR 5317.)

In August 2021, the County Environmental Review Board (“ERB”) reviewed the Project and did not make a motion regarding consistency with the LCP. Instead, the ERB indicated that it “would like the project to come back presented as a complete project, better defined, and with efforts to be consistent with LIP.” (Ibid.; see also AR 2013-2018 [ERB minutes].)

On April 14, 2022, Amy Bodek, Director of Regional Planning, sent a letter to Petitioner requesting several specific changes to the Project and providing notice that failure to incorporate changes would result in a denial of the Project. (AR 8131-8143.) These changes included the following: (1) removing the guest houses, (2) reducing the size and/or changing the location of several residences, (3) relocating several of the OWTS, and (4) proposing fewer residences by merging lots. (Ibid.; see also AR 5317.)

In a letter dated May 13, 2022, Petitioner’s attorney stated that Petitioner declined to incorporate the changes requested by Regional Planning. (AR 8144-8148, 5317.) As relevant to this writ petition, Petitioner’s attorney also stated the following:

[T]he Project came to a screeching halt when Staff released its report for the August 16, 2021, ERB hearing. The Staff Report revealed Staff’s position that no viable project could be constructed due to unavoidable fuel modification impacts to H1 habitat. (Biological Resources Description and Recommendations, Oaks at Monte Nido, 2019-00686-(3) (Aug. 16, 2021).) ….

After the ERB hearing, [Petitioner] requested an urgent meeting with Staff and the

representatives of the LACFD Fuel Modification Unit to attempt to confirm the change in

the collective understanding of the fuel modification zones for the Project. That meeting

occurred on October 25, 2021, and included Staff and certain members of the LACFD

Fuel Modification Unit. The meeting further revealed to [Petitioner] that neither Staff nor LACFD intended to honor what [Petitioner] had considered to be a settled interpretation of Zones B and C that avoids fuel modification thinning impacts in H1 Habitat.

…. In subsequent meetings with [Petitioner], after being pressed, Staff definitively confirmed to [Petitioner] that avoidance of H1 was not possible, and that, therefore nothing could be constructed on any of [Petitioner’s] approved and graded lots.

After Petitioner refused to make the recommended changes, the Staff scheduled the Project for a hearing before a hearing officer. After a hearing held on October 4, 2022, November 1, 2022, and February 7, 2023, the hearing officer denied the Project application with findings. (AR 5317, 3191-3356.)

On February 13, 2023, Petitioner appealed the hearing officer’s decision to the Regional Planning Commission (the “Commission”). (AR 5317, 5310-5311, 5572.) On April 26, 2023, after a public hearing, the Commission denied Petitioner’s appeal and Petitioner’s application for a CDP for each of the 15 single-family residences in the Project. The Commission issued detailed findings in support of its decision. (AR 5142-5309, 5572, 5317.)

On April 28, 2023, Petitioner appealed the Commission’s decision to the Board. (AR 5318; see also AR 5310-5313 [Petitioner’s appeal] and AR 5328-5343 [Petitioner’s counsel letter to Board].) The Board held a public hearing on the appeal on September 19, 2023. (AR 5318, 5546-5547.) After hearing from Regional Planning staff, Petitioner, and members of the public, the Board unanimously voted to deny the appeal. (AR 7947-7971 [transcript].) Because the County Counsel did not prepare new findings for the Board within the time permitted by County ordinance, the decision and findings of the Commission were affirmed by operation of law. (See Opening Brief (“OB”) 6:23-26 and Pet. ¶ 38; LACC § 22.44.1040.E.5, 6; and AR 8204-8205, 8586-85887.)

The petition includes two causes of action for writ of administrative mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. The first cause of action seeks to enforce the Housing Accountability Act (the “HAA”). (See Pet. ¶¶ 39-47.) The HAA requires that, “[a]ny action brought to enforce the provisions of this section shall be brought pursuant to Section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure. . . .” (Gov. Code § 65589.5(m)(1).) Under the HAA, the court’s task “is therefore to determine whether the [County] ‘proceeded in the manner required by law,’ with a decision supported by the findings, and findings supported by the evidence; if not, the [County] abused its discretion.” (Cal. Renters Legal Advocacy and Education Fund v. City of San Mateo (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 820, 837.) The County “bear[s] the burden of proof that its decision has conformed to all of the conditions specified in Section 65589.5.” (Gov. Code § 65589.6.)

The second cause of action contends that the Board’s decision to deny the Project under the LCP and the County’s zoning laws was an abuse of discretion. (Pet. ¶¶ 49-50.) “Where, as here, a land use decision is challenged by administrative mandamus, courts are to apply the substantial evidence standard of review.” (Toigo v. Town of Ross (1998) 70 Cal.App.4th 309, 317.) Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion (California Youth Authority v. State Personnel Board (2002) 104 Cal. App. 4th 575, 584-85), or evidence of ponderable legal significance which is reasonable in nature, credible and of solid value. (Mohilef v. Janovici (1996) 51 Cal. App. 4th 267, 305 n. 28.) Under this standard of review, “[c]ourts may reverse an [administrative] decision only if, based on the evidence …, a reasonable person could not reach the conclusion reached by the agency.” (Sierra Club v. California Coastal Com. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 602, 610.) Petitioner bears the burden of proof on the second cause of action and must demonstrate, by citation to the administrative record, that the evidence does not support the administrative findings. (Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28, 32; Shenouda v. Veterinary Medical Bd. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 500, 513; Toigo, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at 317.)

Petitioner contends that the Board failed to make the findings required by section 65589.5(j) of the HAA in order to disapprove of the Project. (OB 13-15.) Respondent makes two arguments. First, Respondent argues that the HAA does not apply to single-family residential units. Second, Respondent argues that “the County has met the obligations under the HAA by determining that the Project is not consistent with the City’s objective general plan, zoning and subdivision standards, or that the Project will have a specific adverse impact to public health and safety that cannot be mitigated.” (Oppo. 21-22.)[2]

Assuming the HAA applies to the Project, Respondent complied with its requirements. Petitioner contends that the County failed to comply with section 65589.5(j)(1)(A) and (B) of the HAA.[3] The statute states in relevant part as follows:

(j)(1) When a proposed housing development project complies with applicable, objective general plan, zoning, and subdivision standards and criteria, including design review standards, in effect at the time that the application was deemed complete, but the local agency proposes to disapprove the project or to impose a condition that the project be developed at a lower density, the local agency shall base its decision regarding the proposed housing development project upon written findings supported by a preponderance of the evidence on the record that both of the following conditions exist:

(A) The housing development project would have a specific, adverse impact upon the public health or safety unless the project is disapproved or approved upon the condition that the project be developed at a lower density….

(B) There is no feasible method to satisfactorily mitigate or avoid the adverse impact identified pursuant to paragraph (1) ….

(emphasis added.) The HAA defines “objective” as “involving no personal or subjective judgment by a public official and being uniformly verifiable by reference to an external and uniform benchmark or criterion available and knowable by both the development applicant or proponent and the public official.” (Gov. Code § 65589.5(h)(9).)

[I]nstead of asking, as is common in administrative mandamus actions, whether the City’s findings are supported by substantial evidence, we inquire whether there is substantial evidence that would allow a reasonable person to conclude that the housing development project complies with pertinent standards. As the public entity that disapproved the project, the City bears the burden of proof that its decision conformed to the HAA.

(California Renters Legal Advocacy and Education Fund v. City of San Mateo (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 820, 837 [hereafter, “CARLA”], internal quotations and citations omitted.) Here, the Board found that certain residences in the Project did not comply with objective design standards of the LIP, including: (1) maximum building site area of 10,000 square feet (County Code Section 22.44.1910 I); (2) maximum structural height of 18 feet in a Scenic Resource Area (County Code Section 22.44.1250); and (3) maximum height of six feet for retaining walls within a Scenic Resource Area (County Code 22.44.1240). (See AR 5316, 5142-5309.)[4] These design standards are objective because they involve “no personal or subjective judgment by a public official” and are “uniformly verifiable by reference to an external and uniform benchmark or criterion available and knowable by both the development applicant or proponent and the

public official.” (Gov. Code § 65589.5(h)(9).) For certain of the proposed residences, the Board also found as follows:

· “[T]he Project design is not compatible with surrounding environmental resources, as it would result in development of H1 Habitat”

· “[T]he development is not the minimum necessary development for the site, as required within an H1 Quiet Zone or H1 Habitat Buffer by the LIP”

· “[T]he LIP specifically prohibits OWTS seepage pits or leach fields to be placed within 50 feet of the canopy of an oak tree or within 150 feet of a riparian canopy or streambed.”

(See e.g. AR 5161-5163, 5172-5174, 5286-5287.) These development standards from the LCP also appear to be objective. The parties have not cited, and the court has not found, substantial that would allow a reasonable person to conclude that the housing development project complies with the pertinent, objective standards. (Gov. Code § 65589.5(f)(4).) Accordingly, because the Project did not satisfy applicable, objective zoning and design standards from the LIP and LCP, Respondents were not required to make the additional findings of section 65589.5(j)(1) to deny the Project. (See CARLA, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at 838.)

In reply, Petitioner argues that the “variances [requested] in this case are a normalized, codified channel for relief under the LCP” and that the County has discretion to approve or conditionally approve the variances requested by Petitioner. (Reply 8-9.) As Petitioner implicitly acknowledges, variances are not “objective general plan, zoning, and subdivision standards and criteria” subject to subdivision (j)(1). Petitioner seems to contend that the availability of a discretionary exception to an objective zoning standard renders the standard non-objective under the HAA. Petitioner cites no authority for this position, which conflicts with the plain language and purpose of the HAA. If a project does not comply with an applicable, objective standard, section 65589.5(j)(1) does not impose additional duties on the County with respect to its discretionary decision to grant or deny a variance.

Based on the foregoing, Respondent has proven compliance the HAA. Because Respondent complied with the HAA, the court does not reach Petitioner’s contention that the County acted in bad faith within the meaning of the HAA. (OB 15.) The first cause of action is denied.

Petitioner’s second cause of action alleges that the Board’s decision to deny the Project constituted an abuse of discretion. (See Pet. ¶¶ 49-50.) For this cause of action, Petitioner “must identify (with citations to the record) the factual findings made by the board that he or she is challenging and demonstrate (with citations to the record) why those factual findings were [not supported by] the evidence.” (Shenouda v. Veterinary Medical Bd. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 500, 513.) When the petitioner challenges “the sufficiency of the evidence, all material evidence on the point must be set forth and not merely [its] own evidence.” (Toigo v. Town of Ross (1998) 70 Cal.App.4th 309, 317.) “Failure to do so amounts to waiver of the alleged error and we may presume that the record contains evidence to sustain every finding of fact.” (Ibid.; accord Desmond v. County of Contra Costa (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 330, 335-336 [“it is presumed that the findings and actions of the administrative agency were supported by substantial evidence”].)

Here, the Commission made detailed findings explaining why Petitioner did not satisfy the requirements of the LCP and County zoning laws for each of the 15 single-family residences for which Petitioner applied for CDPs and other land use entitlements. (AR 5142-5309.) As Petitioner acknowledges, the Board adopted the Commission’s findings and decision by operation of law. (See OB 6:23-26 and Pet. ¶ 38; LACC § 22.44.1040.E.5, 6.)

In its writ briefing, Petitioner does not identify the administrative findings that it challenges or to explain why those findings are not supported by substantial evidence in the record. Nor has Petitioner identified all material evidence that supports the Board’s findings, as required for a petition of this nature. Rather than discuss the Commission and the Board’s detailed decisions and findings with respect to each of the 15 CDPs and proposed residences, Petitioner’s writ briefing focuses on certain issues (including, whether denial of the Project was a takings) that were not decided by the Commission or the Board. (See OB 7-13.) Accordingly, Petitioner has not met its initial burden to show a prejudicial abuse of discretion in the administrative findings and decision. (See CCP § 1094.5(b); Shenouda, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at 513; Toigo, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at 317.)

Nor could Petitioner successfully do so. Because Petitioner is challenging a denial, it has a high burden:

Because [the court is] reviewing a denial of a requested land use permit, it is not necessary to determine that each finding by the Board was supported by substantial evidence. As long as the Board made a finding that any one of the necessary elements enumerated in the ordinances was lacking, and this finding was itself supported by substantial evidence, the Board’s denial of appellant’s application must be upheld.

(Desmond, supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at 336-337, emphasis in original.) Staff reports, staff opinions, and statements made by area residents that are based on relevant personal observations or that involve nontechnical issues may constitute substantial evidence sufficient to support a finding. (See e.g. Young v. City of Coronado (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 408, 428; Bowman v. City of Berkeley (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 572, 583.)

Here, the Board made findings, supported by substantial evidence, that the necessary elements for approval of the Project were lacking, including the following:

The Board found that many of the proposed residences do not comply with the design standards of the Santa Monica Mountains Local Implementation Program (“LIP”), including: (1) maximum building site area of 10,000 square feet (County Code Section 22.44.1910 I); (2) maximum structural height of 18 feet in a Scenic Resource Area (County Code Section 22.44.1250); (3) maximum height of six feet for retaining walls within a Scenic Resource Area (County Code 22.44.1240); and (4) development within 100 feet of riparian vegetation is only allowed when it is the minimum amount of development necessary to provide a reasonable economic use of the property and there is no feasible alternative (County Code Section 22.44.1340 A.1). (See AR 5316, 5142-5309.) Specifically, lots 1, 4, 6, 7, 13, 14, 15/16, and 17-21 do not conform with one or more of the foregoing design standards. (AR 5316.)

These findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record, including Project design plans, staff reports, and testimony by Regional Planning staff. (See e.g. AR 3497-4831 [staff report, which includes design plans], 5314-5316 [summary staff report], 7948-7950 [testimony of Bodek].) Petitioner has not addressed these findings or the supporting evidence. Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown a prejudicial abuse of discretion.

The Board found that the Project conflicts with goals and policies of the LCP, including sensitive habitat preservation, preservation of scenic resources, and compatibility with rural surroundings. (AR 5316, 5142-5309.) As examples, for certain of the proposed residences, the Board found that:

· “[T]he Project design is not compatible with surrounding environmental resources, as it would result in development of H1 Habitat”

· “[T]he development is not the minimum necessary development for the site, as required within an H1 Quiet Zone or H1 Habitat Buffer by the LIP”

· “[T]he LIP specifically prohibits OWTS seepage pits or leach fields to be placed within 50 feet of the canopy of an oak tree or within 150 feet of a riparian canopy or streambed.”

(See e.g. AR 5161-5163, 5172-5174, 5286-5287.) These findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record, including Project design plans, staff reports, testimony by Regional Planning staff, and written comments and oral testimony of members of the community. (See e.g. AR 3497-4831, 5314-5316, 7947-7971.) Petitioner has not addressed these findings or the supporting evidence. Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown a prejudicial abuse of discretion.

The Board also found that Petitioner did not meet the burden of proof for the variances requested because: (1) Petitioner did not demonstrate that there were unique circumstances or special characteristics of the lots that required variances to preserve substantial property rights; and (2) Petitioner did not demonstrate that it was infeasible to redesign the Project to eliminate many, if not all, of the variances. (AR 5316, 5142-5309.) As examples, the Board found: “It has not been demonstrated that OWTS seepage pits cannot be placed in a location more than 50 feet from the dripline of an oak tree.” (AR 5174.) For certain residences, the Board also found:

The Commission finds that the LIP specifically prohibits habitable accessory structures within H1 Habitat Buffers and H1 Quiet Zones, as development within these zones is only allowed when it is required to provide the landowner a minimum reasonable economic use of the property (County Code Sections 22.44.1370 D.10 and 22.44.1890 D and E). Habitable accessory structures are also required to have an OWTS separate from the primary residence (County Code Section 22.44.1370 D.8). The Department of Public Health’s Environmental Health Division, which is responsible for the review of OWTS, has not approved any arrangements for the sharing of an OWTS by both structures. It has also not been demonstrated that the placement of two separate OWTS on the Project Site is infeasible, nor would it be necessary to allow reasonable economic use of the property. As stated above, because a single-family residence alone would provide a reasonable economic use, it cannot be demonstrated that a variance is necessary to preserve a substantial property right (see “Variance Findings” below)….

The proposed habitable accessory structure is not necessary to allow for a reasonable economic use of the property. The design of the residence could be modified to reduce the building site area. It has also not been demonstrated that this structure cannot be proposed in a location outside of the H1 Quiet Zone or designed to utilize a separate OWTS.

(AR 5152-5153.) The Board’s variance findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record, including Project design plans, staff reports, and testimony by Regional Planning staff. (See e.g. (See e.g. AR 3497-4831, 5314-5316, 7947-7971.) Petitioner has not addressed these findings or the supporting evidence. Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown a prejudicial abuse of discretion.

In the fourth cause of action, Petitioner seeks declaratory relief. (Pet. ¶¶ 60-63.) This court declines to issue a declaratory judgment because Petitioner has an adequate remedies by virtue of the other causes of action. “The object of the statute is to afford a new form of relief where needed and not to furnish a litigant with a second cause of action for the determination of identical issues.” (General of America Ins. Co. v. Lilly (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 465, 470.) A declaratory relief action is inappropriate when a plaintiff has an adequate remedy on other causes of action at trial. (See Hood v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 319, 324; California Ins. Guarantee Assn. v. Superior Court (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1617, 1624.)

Petitioner’s third cause of action—for inverse condemnation—alleges that “[b]y improperly denying the Project, Respondents have refused to allow any economically viable or beneficial use of the Property,” which constitutes a regulatory taking. (See Pet. ¶¶ 54-55.) In its

opening brief, Petitioner argues that the LCP forecloses development of any habitable structures on the lots, depriving Petitioner of all economically beneficial use of its land. Petitioner argues:

[T]here is no point on any of the CPH Lots far enough from H1 Habitat boundaries to allow avoidance of fuel modification thinning in H1 Habitat or buffer. Not even a structure as small as a broom closet could have been installed on any of the CPH Lots without fuel modification zones emanating into H1 Habitat areas.

(OB: 10-11.) Petitioner argues that the County has transformed its private property into public property without compensation, citing Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1031 (1992). In the alternative, Petitioner argues that land use restrictions, as those in this case, may constitute a taking even if they do not deprive Petitioner of all economically beneficial or productive uses, citing Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).

Per Local Rules 2.8(d) and 2.9, Department 82 handles only writs of mandate and other “special proceedings,” which do not include inverse condemnation claims. Such claims involve discovery, pretrial litigation, and trials with witnesses and exhibits, all of which are handled in the independent calendar courts. At the trial setting conference, the court only set trial on the petition for writ of mandate. (See Court’s Minute Order, dated May 17, 2024.) Having decided those claims, the court now transfers the case to Department One for reassignment to an independent calendar court for the only remaining cause of action: The inverse condemnation claim.

1. The court denies the first and second causes of action, which seek a writ of administrative mandate.

2. The court declines to issue a declaratory judgment on the fourth cause of action.

3. The court transfers the case to Department One for reassignment to an independent calendar court for the only remaining cause of action: The third cause of action, which asserts an inverse condemnation claim.

[1] A previous development application was denied after a project opponent successfully appealed the County’s issuance of a mitigated negative declaration under the California Environmental Quality Act. (Opening Brief 3:2-9; AR 8313-8325.) The Board’s decision on that administrative appeal is not at issue in this writ petition.

[2] Respondents confusingly cite subdivision (d) of section 65589.5, but the reference to “objective general plan, zoning and subdivision standards” suggests that Respondents meant to cite subdivision (j). Also, subdivision (d) only applies to a housing development project “for very low, low-, or moderate-income households” or to an “emergency shelter,” neither of which pertains to the Project.

[3] Petitioners do not argue that Respondents failed to comply with section 65589.5(j)(2).

[4] Since the HAA applies to the entire 15-residence development and since Petitioner applied to build the entire Project, it stands to reason that the findings of non-compliance with objective LIP standards for some of the residences are sufficient to disapprove the Project under the HAA. However, Counsel should address that issue at the hearing, as neither party has briefed it.