Judge Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case Number: 24STCP00509, Date: 2025-05-15 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case: 24STCP00509, Date: 2025-05-15 Tentative Ruling

Petitioner Tony Lewis (“Petitioner”) filed this petition for writ of administrative mandate challenging a decision of Respondent City of Los Angeles (“Respondent” or the “City”), through the Los Angeles Housing Department (the “LAHD”). Petitioner owns a two-story office building, located at 5287 Sunset Boulevard in Hollywood, California (the “Property”). Petitioner was using the property for residential purposes in violation of law. In 2018, the City declared the Property to be substandard and uninhabitable and ordered Petitioner to discontinue its use for residential purposes. Petitioner did not comply with that order. Then, in 2023, there was a fire at the property, and the City again declared the Property to be unsafe for occupancy. However, the City ordered Petitioner to pay eight tenants relocation benefits in the amount of $12,050 each. Petitioner challenges that order. The court denies this petition on the merits.

The Property, which is owned by Petitioner, consists of a two-story office building. (AR 799-801; see AR 570-571 [photos].) On June 8, 2018, the Los Angeles Department of Building and Safety (“LADBS”) issued Petitioner a “Substandard Order and Notice of Fee” (the “2018 Order”) because Petitioner was using the Property illegally for residential purposes. (AR 1-2, 807.) The 2018 Order declared the Property to be substandard and uninhabitable due to dangerous life-threatening conditions including illegal occupancy, unpermitted conversion of studio/offices into sleeping rooms with communal kitchens and bathrooms, and unpermitted construction, electrical, and plumbing work. (AR 1-2, 5, 803.) Petitioner was ordered to discontinue using the Property for residential purposes and to secure all required permits and begin the necessary work to eliminate the code violations. (AR 1-2.) Petitioner did not comply with the 2018 Order and continued to allow the Property to be used for residential occupancy. (AR 803.)

On March 19, 2023, a fire broke out at the Property. (AR 5.) LADBS again declared the Property as unsafe for occupancy. (AR 5, 571.) A temporary shelter was established to assist individuals who were affected by the fire. (AR 571.)

On April 27, 2023, LAHD ordered Petitioner to vacate the Property and pay relocation benefits to certain tenants (“2023 Order”). (AR 5-8.) The 2023 Order identified five tenants that LAHD had determined to be eligible for relocation benefits under the City’s Tenant Relocation Assistance Program (“TRAP”). (AR 6.) Subsequently, LAHD identified three additional tenants eligible for relocation benefits and issued an updated order to pay relocation benefits to Petitioner. (AR 639-642, 804.) In total, LAHD determined that the following tenants are each entitled to relocation benefit payments of $12,050: Chisala Chanda, Cameron Musa Thornton, Tre Antonio Bitten, Nathan James Santiago-Lazzar, Riley Christopher Cooper, Alasia B. Ford, Eion Spellman, and Boluwatifa Sonola (collectively, the “Tenants”). (AR 808.)

On May 11, 2023, Petitioner appealed the 2023 Order directing him to pay relocation benefits to occupants of the Property displaced by the Fire. Petitioner’s appeal identified the following grounds for challenging the 2023 Order: “the reservations ended for the list of guests, one of the claimants is a suspect in the fire that took place on 3/19/2023, and the city caused the property to be unsafe.” (AR 9.) An administrative hearing was held before a hearing officer (the “Hearing Officer”) on June 21, 2023. (AR 799.) On or about July 20, 2023, the Hearing Officer issued a written decision denying Petitioner’s appeal. (AR 785-810.) Petitioner appealed the Hearing Officer’s decision to the Rent Adjustment Commission (“RAC”) Board, which denied the appeal on November 17, 2023. (AR 1670.) This petition for writ of mandate followed.

Respondent requests that the court take judicial notice of two exhibits: (1) Section 163.000-163.07 (TRIP Ordinance), and (2) Section 151.02 (Rent Stabilization Ordinance. Petitioner does not object. The court grants the request under Evidence Code section 452(c).

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5(b), the pertinent issues are whether the respondent has proceeded without jurisdiction, whether there was a fair trial, and whether there was a prejudicial abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion is established if the agency has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5(b).)

“In an administrative writ proceeding that, like this one, does not involve a fundamental vested right, the trial court reviews the agency’s factual findings for substantial evidence and its legal conclusions de novo.” (Reznitskiy v. County of Marin (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 1016, 1023; accord E.W.A.P., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 310, 325 [administrative decisions “reducing profits are considered impacts on economic interests, rather than on fundamental vested rights”]; JKH Enterprises, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1046, 1062 [“the continued operation of a business in a manner that violates the applicable regulatory scheme governing all employers is not a fundamental vested right”].)

Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion (California Youth Authority v. State Personnel Board (2002) 104 Cal. App. 4th 575, 584-85), or evidence of ponderable legal significance which is reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value. (Mohilef v. Janovici (1996) 51 Cal. App. 4th 267, 305 n. 28.) “Courts may reverse an [administrative] decision only if, based on the evidence . . . , a reasonable person could not reach the conclusion reached by the agency.” (Sierra Club v. California Coastal Com. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 602, 610.) Under the substantial evidence standard:

[The court] do[es] not weigh the evidence, consider the credibility of witnesses, or resolve conflicts in the evidence or in the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from it. The administrative agency’s findings come before [the court] with a strong presumption as to their correctness and regularity. [The court] do[es] not substitute [its] judgment if the agency’s decision is one which could have been made by reasonable people.

(Doe v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1073, internal citations omitted; accord Valenzuela v. State Personnel Board (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1184-85.)

The court exercises its own independent judgment on questions of law arising in mandate proceedings. (See Christensen v. Lightbourne (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1239, 1251.) The interpretation of statute or regulation is a question of law. (See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Quackenbush (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 65, 77.)

Petitioners bear the burden of proof and persuasion under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. (See, e.g., Steele v. Los Angeles County Civil Service Commission (1958) 166 Cal.App.2d 129, 137; Elizabeth D. v. Zolin (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 347, 354.) A reviewing court “will not act as counsel for either party to an appeal and will not assume the task of initiating and prosecuting a search of the record for any purpose of discovering errors not pointed out in the briefs.” (Fox v. Erickson (1950) 99 Cal.App.2d 740, 742.) When an appellant challenges “the sufficiency of the evidence, all material evidence on the point must be set forth and not merely [their] own evidence.” (Toigo v. Town of Ross (1998) 70 Cal.App.4th 309, 317; accord Shenouda v. Veterinary Medical Bd. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 500, 513.) “Unless this is done the error is deemed to be waived.” (Roy v. Superior Court (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1347.)

A. There is Substantial Evidence the Tenants are Eligible for Relocation Benefits

There is substantial evidence to support Respondent’s decision that the Tenants are entitled to relocation benefits.[1] The Hearing Officer found that the LAHD properly determined that Petitioner is required to pay relocation benefits to the Tenants pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 17975 and Los Angeles Municipal Code (“LAMC”) sections 163.02 and 163.03 of the City’s Tenant Relocation Assistance Program (“TRAP”). (AR 5-6, 803-810.) LAMC section 163.02.A, which is modeled after Health and Safety Code section 17975, provides in relevant part as follows:

Any tenant who is displaced or subject to displacement from a residential rental unit as result of an order to vacate or any order requiring the vacation of the residential unit by the Enforcement Agency due to a violation so extensive and of such a nature that the immediate health and safety of the residents is endangered, shall be entitled to relocation benefits payable by the landlord in the amounts prescribed in Section 163.05. The Enforcement Agency shall determine the eligibility of tenants for benefits paid pursuant to this article.

(RJN Exh. 1, emphasis added.)[2] LAMC section 163.03.A states, in pertinent part, that “[u]nless the Enforcement Agency determines that the tenants are not eligible for relocation benefits pursuant to the provisions of Section 163.02 above, the Enforcement Agency shall issue an order requiring the landlord to pay relocation benefits in the amounts specified in Section 163.05.” (Ibid.)

Here, the Hearing Officer found that the Tenants are entitled to relocation benefits because “the evidence clearly shows that the building had been declared unsafe and uninhabitable by LADBS in 2018.” (AR 805.) The Hearing Officer explained that although “the fire in March 2023 resulted in the occupants being vacated . . . , the building had already been determined to be unsafe or hazardous due to its illegal use as a residential building.” (Ibid.)

There is substantial evidence to support these findings. The 2018 Order declared the Property to be substandard and uninhabitable due to dangerous life-threatening conditions including illegal occupancy, unpermitted conversion of studio/offices into sleeping rooms with communal kitchens and bathrooms, and unpermitted construction, electrical, and plumbing work. (AR 1-2, 5, 803.) Petitioner was ordered to discontinue use of the Property for residential purposes and to secure all required permits and begin the necessary work to eliminate the code violations. (AR 1-2.) Petitioner did not comply with the 2018 Order. Rather, he allowed the Property to be used for residential occupancy without performing the necessary work to make the Property habitable and permitted for residential use. (AR 803.) After the Fire occurred in 2023, Petitioner was ordered to vacate the Property due to “Substandard unsafe conditions [that] create uninhabitable conditions.” (AR 5.) The 2018 Order and the 2023 Order are “Orders to Vacate,” within the meaning of LAMC section 163.02, because they required the occupants to vacate the building “due to a violation so extensive and of such a nature that the immediate health and safety of the residents is endangered.” Although the 2018 Order did not use the word “vacate,” it ordered Petitioner to discontinue use of the Property for residential purposes, which has the same effect as an order to vacate for residential tenants. The 2018 Order remained in effect through the time of the Fire in 2023. Further, the Tenants were expressly required to vacate the Property pursuant to the 2023 Order. Thus, the Hearing Officer reasonably concluded that the Tenants are entitled to relocation benefits under LAMC sections 163.02.A and 163.03.A.

Petitioner first contends that the Hearing Officer erred by finding that LAMC section 163.02.C did not apply. (Opening Brief (“OB”) 4-5.) Section 163.02.C provides:

A landlord shall not be liable for relocation benefits if the Enforcement Agency determines that the unit or structure became unsafe or hazardous as the result of a fire, flood, earthquake, or other event beyond the control of the landlord and the landlord did not cause or contribute to the condition.

(RJN Exh. 1.) The 2023 Order was not based solely on the Fire. Rather, the 2023 Order stated the following:

1. On June 8, 2018, the Los Angeles Department of Building and Safety (LADBS) issued a Substandard Order and Notice of Fee (Order) to the owner of the site address listed above – 5283-5287 W Sunset Blvd., Los Angeles, CA 90027 (Property).

2. The Property was declared Substandard by LADBS due to dangerous life threatening conditions such as illegal occupancy and unapproved construction, electrical, and plumbing work making the Property uninhabitable in violation of various provisions of the Los Angeles Municipal Code (LAMC)….

3. On March 19, 2023 a fire engulfed the Property. LADBS declared the Property unsafe making it uninhabitable.

4. On March 20, 2023 and thereafter, the Los Angeles Housing Department (LAHD) conducted a site visit and observed that the Property was maintained with sleeping rooms with communal kitchen and bathrooms and individuals were residing at the Property in violation of LADBS Order.

5. The Substandard unsafe conditions create uninhabitable conditions/critical habitability problems for the tenants/occupants.

(AR 5.) Thus, LADBS determined that the Property was unsafe for residential use two times: first in 2018 and then in 2023. Although the Fire may have triggered the 2023 investigation, the 2023 Order shows that the order to vacate was also issued based on violations of the LAMC that had existed since 2018.[3] The Fire simply confirmed that the violations were “so extensive and of such a nature that the immediate health and safety of the tenants is endangered.” (See AR 6, ¶¶ 1-13.) Therefore, the Hearing Officer correctly concluded that section 163.02.C did not apply. In light of this conclusion, the court does not reach Respondent’s argument that “LAHD’s evidence demonstrated that illegal occupancy contributed to the Fire.” (Oppo. 7:11-12.)

Referencing LAMC section 163.02.C, Petitioner states that he “did submit evidence of arson by the one of tenants occupying the Property, Cam Thornton, who was illegally occupying the Property without permission and made threats to ‘burn the Property down’.” (OB 4, citing AR 648, 691.) Since the Hearing Officer correctly found that section 163.02.C does not apply, Petitioner’s argument that he is not liable for any relocation payments under that section as a result of Cam Thornton’s alleged conduct is misplaced. Instead, Petitioner may contend that Cam Thornton, individually, is not entitled to benefits pursuant to section 163.02.B, which states that “[n]o relocation benefits pursuant to this article shall be payable to any tenant who has caused or substantially contributed to the condition giving rise to the order to vacate.” (RJN Exh. 1, emphasis added.) Petitioner’s cited evidence (AR 648 and 691) consists entirely of his own allegations against Thornton. A reasonable person could find that this evidence is insufficient to prove that Thorton caused the fire or otherwise contributed to any conditions giving rise to the order to vacate. Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the Hearing Officer’s finding that Petitioner “did not provide any documentation or other evidence verifying his claim” that Thornton was not entitled to relocation benefits. (AR 806.)

Finally, Petitioner contends that the units at the Property are not “residential rental units” within the meaning of Health and Safety Code section 17975 and LAMC section 163.02.A. (OB 6.)[4] TRAP does not define the term, “residential rental unit,” in its own definitions section. Instead, it states that “Words and phrases not defined here shall be construed as defined in Sections 12.03, 57.202, 91.201 et seq., 91.8902, 151.02 and 161.201.” (LAMC § 163.01 [emphasis added]; RJN Exh. 1.) LAMC section 151.02, of the City’s Rent Stabilization Ordinance (“RSO”), provides a broad definition of “rental unit” that includes “all dwelling units … rented or offered for rent for living or dwelling purposes.” (RJN Exh. 2.) As the Hearing Officer noted, LAMC section 151.02 also broadly defines “tenant” as “[a] tenant, subtenant, lessee, sublessee or any other person entitled to use or occupancy of a rental unit.” (AR 805; RJN Exh. 2 [emphasis added].)

Further, as Respondent argues, TRAP is enforceable against Petitioner even though “rental agreements regarding units lacking a certificate of occupancy are unlawful.” (Carter v. Cohen (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1038, 1048-49; see Oppo. 9:10-12.) LAHD “submitted extensive documentation … verifying that [the Tenants] had resided at the property for at least thirty consecutive days prior to the fire.” (AR 805.) Petitioner has not discussed that evidence or cited any contrary evidence, as required to establish a prejudicial abuse of discretion in the findings. (See Toigo v. Town of Ross (1998) 70 Cal.App.4th 309, 317.) Simply, Petitioner cannot use the units for residential purposes and then turn around and argue that because he did so unlawfully, they are not “residential rental units” for purposes of relocation assistance. Accordingly, the court concludes that substantial evidence supports the Hearing Officer’s finding that units at the Property are “residential rental units” within the meaning of section 163.02.A.[5]

The court has considered Petitioner’s remaining arguments and finds that none has merit. Based on the foregoing, substantial evidence supports all the administrative findings. Petitioner has not shown a prejudicial abuse of discretion in the decision. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5(b).)

[1] Respondent argues that this petition is untimely. The court need not resolve that issue.

[2] LAMC section 163.01 similarly defines “Order to Vacate” as “[a]ny order or notice to vacate issued by an Enforcement Agency or by a court of law, requiring the vacation of a residential unit as a result of a violation so extensive and of such a nature that the immediate health and safety of the residents is endangered.” (Ibid.)

[3] Whether the LADBS adequately enforced the 2018 Order is not relevant to the Tenants’ eligibility for relocation benefits. Petitioner advances no argument to the contrary.

[4] Effective January 1, 2025, section 17975(b) defines “residential rental unit” to include “a unit rented by a tenant for human habitation, regardless of the zoning designation or approved uses of the building, that is located in a building or portion thereof that is deemed or found to be a substandard building.” (See 2024 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 487 (S.B. 1465) (WEST).) Since that provision was enacted after the administrative decision was issued, it does not apply. (See Oppo. 9:13-22.)

[5] As Respondent argues, Petitioner’s reliance on Samaniego v. County of Contra Costa, 2023 WL 4269779 (N.D. Cal. June 29, 2023) is misplaced because that decision is inapposite. (Oppo. 8:19-25.) Regardless, federal district court decisions are not binding on this court.