Judge Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case Number: 24STCP00557, Date: 2024-06-05 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case: 24STCP00557, Date: 2024-06-05 Tentative Ruling

[Tentative] Order Sustaining Demurrers to First Amended Petition for Writ of Mandate and Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief

The Citizens for Chiquita Canyon Closure (“Petitioner”) filed the instant petition in 2024 for a writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief seeking to void a conditional use permit in 2017, which approved the ongoing operations and expansion of the Chiquita Canyon Landfill, and to stop the landfill’s continued operations. This is not the first such petition. In 2017, after the Board of Supervisors approved the permit, three other citizens groups filed a petition for a writ of mandate, arguing that the County failed to comply with the California Environmental Quality Act, Public Resources Code, sections 21000, et seq. (“CEQA”) when it issued the conditional use permit. The court (Beckloff, J.) denied the petition, and the District Court of Appeal affirmed that decision.

In the instant petition, Petitioner seeks a writ of mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 or, in the alternative, section 1085. Petitioner argues: “Defendants have failed to proceed in the manner required by law in reviewing, processing, and approving Landfill permits, including failing to enforce the Conditional Use Permit. Rather, defendants’ practice and pattern in the manner in which they approve applications systematically violates CEQA.” (First Amended Petition for Writ of Mandate (“FAP”) ¶ 112.) Petitioner identifies specific provisions of the conditional use permit at issue. Petitioner also asserts a cause of action under Government Code section 11135, arguing that “[T]he County’s approval of permits for the Landfill’s continued operations results in disproportionately high and adverse effects on the majority minority low-income population.” (FAP ¶ 128.)

Now, the County and the real parties in interest (the “Real Parties”) demur to the petition. The court finds that any challenge to the issuance of the conditional use permit in 2017 is untimely. The court finds that Petitioner’s challenge to the manner in which the County enforces the permit falls outside the scope of Code of Civil Procedure section 1085. While the court understands and sympathizes with Petitioner’s complaints, the court only has authority to require the County to exercise a ministerial duty, which is a duty that must be performed in a “prescribed manner” and without discretion. Because Petitioner challenges the manner in which the County exercises its discretion in enforcement matters, Petitioner’s remedy lies with the County or the Legislature, not the court. Therefore, the court has no choice but to sustain the demurrers.

Petitioner is a “grass-roots, nonprofit corporation based in Val Verde, California.” (FAP ¶ 5.) The Real Parties “own, operate, manage and control the Chiquita Canyon Landfill [hereafter ‘Landfill’], located at 29201 Henry Mayo Drive, Castaic, California 91384.” (Id. ¶ 9.) The Landfill is a Class III non-hazardous municipal solid waste (“MSW”) facility, which first began accepting waste in or about 1972. (Id., Exh. 11 at 3.)

In 2004, the Chiquita Canyon LLC (“Chiquita”) filed applications for a conditional use permit to continue to operate the Landfill and to expand its operations. (Id. ¶ 36.) The County prepared an environmental impact report (“EIR”) pursuant to the California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”), which concluded that “environmental impacts [from] the Project will be reduced to less than significant levels, except for impacts to air quality, greenhouse gas emissions, and climate change.” (Id. ¶ 42.) Community groups and members of the community objected to the application and raised concerns about the environmental impacts of the project. (Id. ¶¶ 44-46, 99-100.)

On July 25, 2017, the Board of Supervisors approved Conditional Use Permit No. 2004-00042-(5) (the “conditional use permit”) authorizing continued operation and expansion of the Landfill. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 47.) The conditional use permit contains numerous conditions of approval. Petitioner alleges that the Real Parties in Interest have violated these conditions. (Id. ¶¶ 65-91.) Petitioner alleges that the County has not taken sufficient action to enforce the conditions in the conditional use permit, resulting in the harm alleged in the first amended petition. (See id. ¶¶ 65-91.)

After the Board of Supervisors approved the conditional use permit in 2017, three groups—Val Verde Civic Association, Citizens for Chiquita Canyon Landfill Compliance, and Santa Clarita Organization for Planning the Environment—filed a petition challenging the issuance of the permit. (Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”), Exh. 1.)[1] Specifically, Petitioners challenged the adequacy of the CEQA analysis and seeking to have a court set aside the approval of the permit. (Ibid.) The trial court (Beckloff, J.) denied the writ. (RJN, Exh. 2.) The District Court of Appeal for the Second District, Division Two, affirmed that decision. (RJN, Exh. 3.) Petitioner was not a party to the prior action.

On February 22, 2024, Petitioner filed its original petition for writ of mandate, and on March 4, 2024, Petitioner filed the operative first amended petition. The first cause of action alleges violations of CEQA and seeks a writ of mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 or, in the alternative, section 1085. The second cause of action alleges violations of Government Code section 11135, which prohibits discrimination in “any program or activity that is conducted, operated, or administered by the state or by any state agency, is funded directly by the state, or receives any financial assistance from the state.” (Gov. Code § 11135, subd. (a).) In its prayer for relief, Petitioner seeks a writ of mandate directing the County to void the conditional use permit, withdraw any and all approvals of the Landfill’s continued operations, and stopping all dumping and other operations at the Landfill. In other words, Petitioner seeks to close the Landfill. Petitioner also appears to seek an order requiring the County to enforce certain conditions in the conditional use permit.

A demurrer tests the sufficiency of a pleading, and the grounds for a demurrer must appear on the face of the pleading or from judicially noticeable matters. (Code Civil Proc. § 430.30, subd. (a); Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) “We assume the truth of the allegations in the complaint, but do not assume the truth of contentions, deductions, or conclusions of law.” (California Logistics, Inc. v. State (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 242, 247.) “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters.” (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) The allegations in the petition must be liberally construed in favor of Petitioner on demurrer. (See Mobil Oil Corp. v Exxon Corp. (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 942, 947.) “A demurrer must dispose of an entire cause of action to be sustained.” (Poizner v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119.)

Any petition for writ of mandate challenging the issuance of the conditional use permit—which occurred in 2017—is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Petitioner’s first cause of action could be interpreted as raising such a challenge because it is predicated upon Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, and some of the allegations in the first amended petition reference the approval of landfill permits. (See, e.g., FAP ¶ 112.) Any such claim would be untimely under CEQA based upon either the 30-day or the 180-day statute of limitations. (See Pub. Res. Code § 21167(a) and (c).) Petitioner develops no argument to the contrary. Therefore, the court sustains the demurrer to the first cause of action, to the extent it is predicated upon Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5.

Petitioner’s second cause of action is predicated upon the issuance of the conditional use permit in 2017. Specifically, Petitioner alleges that “the County’s approval of permits for the Landfill’s continued operations results in disproportionately high and adverse effects on the majority of the minority low-income population.” (FAP ¶ 128.) However, the first amended petition identifies only the conditional use permit. Because this claim seeks to enforce a liability created by statute, Petitioner was required to file this claim within three years of issuance of the conditional use permit, per Code of Civil Procedure section 338(a). Therefore, the court sustains the demurrer to the second cause of action on this basis.

Contrary to the moving parties’ argument, the instant petition is not necessarily barred under the principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Res judicata, or claim preclusion, “prevents relitigation of the same cause of action in a second suit between the same parties or parties in privity with them.” (DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813, 824.) “The doctrine of collateral estoppel provides that a party to an action, or one in privity with a party, is barred from subsequently relitigating issues actually litigated and finally decided in a prior proceeding…. The issue sought to be precluded from relitigation must be identical to that decided in a former proceeding.” (Lincoln Place Tenants Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 425, 447, fn. 17.) Petitioner was not a party to the prior case, and the moving parties cannot demonstrate at this stage whether Petitioner was in privity with any of those petitioners. (See LaCour v. Marshalls of California, LLC (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 1172, 1196 [“[D]ue process … requires that the nonparty ‘should reasonably have expected to be bound’ by the prior adjudication… In short, we must be able to say both that another party acted as the nonparty’s virtual representative in the first action and that the circumstances put the nonparty on notice he may be bound by the result there.”].) Further, the moving parties do not demonstrate that Petitioner’s causes of action are identical to those decided in the prior action. To the contrary, the first amended petition alleges that the County has failed to enforce the conditions of the conditional use permit, suggesting that the issues are different. Therefore, the court cannot resolve issues of res judicata and collateral estoppel on demurrer.

At heart, this petition for writ of mandate arises under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 because Petitioner challenges the County’s interpretation and enforcement of the conditional use permit. There are two essential requirements to the issuance of an ordinary writ of mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085: (1) a clear, present, and ministerial duty on the part of the respondent, and (2) a clear, present, and beneficial right on the part of the petitioner to the performance of that duty. (California Ass’n for Health Services at Home v. Department of Health Services (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 696, 704.) “An action in ordinary mandamus is proper where … the claim is that an agency has failed to act as required by law.” (Id. at 705.)

“Generally, mandamus is available to compel a public agency’s performance or to correct an agency’s abuse of discretion when the action being compelled or corrected is ministerial.” (AIDS Healthcare Foundation v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Public Health (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 693, 700.) “To compel the [respondent] to take some action the [petitioner] must plead and prove the [respondent] has failed to act, and its failure to act is arbitrary, beyond the bounds of reason, or in derogation of the applicable legal standards.” (Id. at 704.) “A ministerial act is an act that a public officer is required to perform in a prescribed manner in obedience to the mandate of legal authority and without regard to his own judgment or opinion concerning such act’s propriety or impropriety, when a given state of facts exists.” (Kavanaugh v. West Sonoma County Union High School Dist. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 911, 916.)[2]

In the instant case, none of the conditional use permit provisions contain ministerial duties; each is discretionary. Petitioner appears to challenge the following conditions: 12, 15, 20, 63, 64, 65, and 77. The court will examine each one separately.

This condition requires that the property “shall be developed, maintained, and operated in full compliance with the conditions of [the permit], and any law, statute, ordinary, or other regulation applicable to any development or activity on the subject property.” (FAP, Exh. 1.) This provision is derivative of other permit provisions and laws.

This condition does include some mandatory duties. For example, the condition requires that “[i]nspections shall be made to ensure compliance with the conditions of this grant, as well as to ensure that any development undertaken on the subject property is in accordance with eh approved site plan on file.” (Ibid.) Although this provision contains a ministerial duty, the first amended petition does not allege that the County failed to conduct necessary inspections.

Petitioner’s theory is that this condition requires that “[t]he permittee shall also comply with the conditions and requirements of all permits or approvals issued by other government agencies or departments . . . .” (Ibid.) Petitioner relies on a violation report, dated August 18, 2023, stating that the Real Parties have “received 44 Notices of Violation (NOV) between May 17, 2023 and August 16, 2023 for violating Southern California Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) Rule 402 and California Health & Safety Code Section 41700 in relation to nuisance odors that are emanating from the Landfill.” (Id., Exh. 2.) Condition 12 does not require any ministerial action on the party of the County in response to such complaints.

This condition provides that the County “shall have the authority to order the immediate cessation of Landfill operations or other activities at the Facility if the Board, Department of Regional Planning, or DPH determines that such cessation is necessary for the health, safety, and/or welfare of the County’s residents or the environment.” (Id., Exh. 1.) This provision is entirely discretionary and contains no ministerial duty.

Notwithstanding the plain language of this condition, Petitioner argues that this provision contains a ministerial duty because it “requires a CEQA analysis.” (Oppo. at 5:22-23.) Petitioner contends, in effect, that the County’s discretionary enforcement decisions are “projects” within the meaning of CEQA, and such “projects” require environmental review. (Id. at 11-12, citing Pub. Res. Code §§ 21068 and 21080.) The court disagrees with this analysis. In fact, CEQA applies to “discretionary projects proposed to be carried out or approved by public agencies, including, … the issuance of conditional use permits ….” (Pub. Res. Code § 21080(a).) A “project” is defined under CEQA as an “activity which may cause either a direct physical change in the environment, or a reasonably foreseeable indirect physical change in the environment....” (Pub. Resources Code § 21065; see also CEQA Guidelines § 15378.) An “activity” includes “[a]n activity directly undertaken by any public agency.” (§ 21065(a).)

Petitioner cites no authority in support of the proposition that a regulatory agency’s discretionary decision not to enforce a permit condition, or to enforce the condition in a particular manner, is a “project” subject to CEQA. Further, CEQA categorically exempts from environmental review “[a]ctions by regulatory agencies to enforce or revoke a lease, permit, license, certificate, or other entitlement for use issued, adopted, or prescribed by the regulatory agency or enforcement of a law, general rule, standard, or objective, administered or adopted by the regulatory agency.” (14 Cal. Code of Regs. § 15321(a); see also Pub. Res. Code § 21174.) The first amended petition does not address this categorical exemption or allege any facts suggesting that it does not apply to County’s ongoing enforcement decisions.

In its opposition brief, Petitioner argues that the County had an obligation to conduct a supplemental environmental study:

CEQA does contemplate environmental impacts substantially changing during the life of a project and provides for a lead agency to conduct subsequent environmental impact reports where substantial changes are proposed in the project, substantial changes occur with respect to the circumstances under which the project is undertaken, or [there is] new information of substantial importance, which was not known and could not have been known at the time [of] the previous environmental impact report. California Code of Regulations, title 14, section 15162 (CEQA Guidelines section 151262).

(Oppo. at 9:28-10:6.) In other words, Petitioner now argues that there is some change at the Landfill that necessitates a new environmental impact report under CEQA. This legal theory is not pleaded in the first amended petition. “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not … extrinsic matters.” (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) Nor does this argument make sense in the context of Petitioner’s allegations that the County violated CEQA by not utilizing its enforcement discretion in the manner requested by Petitioner. As discussed, actions by regulatory agencies to enforce a permit are exempt from CEQA.

This condition states that “the Regional Planning Commission . . . or a Hearing Officer “may, after conducting a public hearing in accordance with Section 22.56.1780, et seq. of the County Code, revoke or modify this grant, if the Commission or Hearing Officer finds that these conditions have been violated, or that this grant has been exercised so as to be detrimental to the public's health or safety, or so as to be a nuisance.” (FAP, Exh. 1.) Again, this provision vests Respondent with discretionary, not ministerial, authority over enforcement actions.

Enforcement decisions are generally not reviewable. “[A]n agency’s decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision generally committed to an agency’s absolute discretion. . . . This recognition of the existence of discretion is attributable in no small part to the general unsuitability for judicial review of agency decisions to refuse enforcement.” (Heckler v. Chaney (1985) 470 U.S. 821, 831.) This principle applies in both civil and criminal matters in which an agency or public officer has enforcement discretion. (See People v. Karriker (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 763, 786; accord People v. Cimarusti (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 314, 322-323; Riggs v. City of Oxnard (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 526, 530; Dix v. Sup.Ct. (1991) 53 Cal.3d 442, 451; Gananian v. Wagstaffe (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1545-1546; Schwartz v. Poizner (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 592, 597–598.)

Petitioner does not allege sufficient facts to circumvent this authority. In certain limited circumstances, mandamus may be utilized to correct abuses of discretion.

In determining whether a public agency has abused its discretion, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency, and if reasonable minds may disagree as to the wisdom of the agency’s action, its determination must be upheld. A court must ask whether the public agency’s action was arbitrary, capricious, or entirely lacking in evidentiary support, or whether the agency failed to follow the procedure and give the notices the law requires.

(County of Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 643, 654.) In this case, however, Petitioner does not argue, or cite any authority, that the County’s discretionary enforcement decisions may be reviewed for abuse of discretion. Moreover, even if limited judicial review was available, Petitioner does not plead sufficient facts to support a theory that County’s enforcement decisions have been arbitrary, capricious, or entirely lacking in evidentiary support. To the contrary. Although Petitioner alleges that County has “failed to enforce” the conditions of the conditional use permit, the first amended petition includes detailed allegations showing that the County and other agencies have in fact taken enforcement action. (See FAP ¶¶ 72-91, Exh. 12 [October 17, 2023, letter of County Department of Public Health ordering remedial measures].)

The gravamen of Petitioner’s complaint is that there are “alternatives for Los Angeles County’s trash.” (FAP, ¶ 92.) Specifically, Petitioner alleges:

trash. . . . Trash could be diverted to the regions of other landfills which still have capacity. . . . Trash could be sent by rail to the Mesquite Regional Landfill. . . .

The County admits that there are better ways to manage waste than what the County is currently doing.

(FAP, ¶¶ 92-98.) These allegations demonstrate that Petitioner is challenging the County’s exercise of its discretion, which is not suitable for relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085.

These conditions require the permittee to undertake certain actions. None of these conditions impose any ministerial duty upon the County. Rather, enforcement of these conditions falls within the scope of the County’s discretionary authority.

Based upon the foregoing, Petitioner does not allege any violation of a ministerial duty. To the contrary, Petitioner’s first cause of action is predicated exclusively on challenges to the County’s exercise of discretion, arguing that the County should have pursued “alternatives for Los Angeles County’s trash.” This falls outside the scope of the court’s authority under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085. Therefore, the court sustains the demurrer to the first cause of action.

Finally, to the extent Petitioner predicates its second claim on how the County utilizes its discretionary authority to enforce the conditional use permit, Petitioner does not allege sufficient facts. Government Code section 11135 provides, in relevant part:

No person in the State of California shall, on the basis of sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, ethnic group identification, age, mental disability, physical disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, or sexual orientation, be unlawfully denied full and equal access to the benefits of, or be unlawfully subjected to discrimination under, any program or activity that is conducted, operated, or administered by the state or by any state agency, is funded directly by the state, or receives any financial assistance from the state.

(Gov. Code § 11135, subd. (a), emphasis added.) Petitioner does not allege that the County’s conditional use permit or enforcement of its conditions is a “program or activity that is . . . funded directly by the state, or receives any financial assistance from the state.” Therefore, the demurrer is sustained to the second cause of action.

Essentially, Petitioner alleges that the County has not sufficiently enforced the conditions in the conditional use permit and seeks remedial action. While the court has authority to enforce ministerial duties—which are those performed in a “prescribed manner” and without discretion—the court does not have authority to require the County to undertake discretionary enforcement actions under these circumstances. Petitioner attempts to circumvent this issue by arguing that the County must comply with CEQA in enforcing the conditional use permit, but that argument is contrary to the plain language of the regulations. The court understands and sympathies with Petitioner’s complaints about the Chiquita Canyon Landfill but does not have authority under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 to remedy the issue. Rather, Petitioner must raise these issues with the County (which decides whether to issue landfill permits and how to enforce their conditions) or the Legislature (to the extent Petitioner seeks a change in the law). Based upon the foregoing, the court orders as follows:

2. The court denies leave to amend to the extent the first and second causes of action are predicated upon the issuance of the conditional use permit in 2017, because those claims are untimely.

3. The court denies leave to amend with respect to the first cause of action, to the extent it is predicated on Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, because Petitioner articulates no facts suggesting the County has violated any ministerial duty under the conditional use permit.

3. The court denies leave to amend with respect to the second cause of action, to the extent it is predicated upon how the County exercises its discretion to enforce the conditional use permit, because Petitioner does not represent that it can amend the petition to allege that this exercise is a “program or activity that is . . . funded directly by the state, or receives any financial assistance from the state.”

4. Respondent shall prepare and lodge a proposed judgment for the court’s signature.

5. Respondent’s counsel shall provide notice and file proof of service with the court.

[1] The court grants the request for judicial notice, per Evidence Code section 452(d).

[2] A petition for writ of mandate under section 1085 based upon the County’s alleged failure to address the current conditions at the landfill would not be untimely.